ANICIA V. MERCED, CANDELARIO V. MERCED, CONCEPCION V. MERCED, ATILANO V. MERCED, JR., AND JOSEFINA V. MERCED, PETITIONERS, VS. COLUMBINA VDA. DE MERCED, BRICCIO MERCED, JR., AND…

Appeal from a resolution of the Social Security Commis­sion –
hereinafter referred to as the Commission – dismissing the petition of Anicia,
Candelario, Concepcion, Atilano and Josefina, all surnamed, Merced, to be declared
the beneficiaries of their deceased brother Briccio V. Merced – here­inafter
referred to as Briccio – and, as such, entitled to the corresponding death
benefits under Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1954.

As an employee of the Community Export and Import Corpora­tion, in Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Briccio became, some­time in 1957, a member of the Social Security
System – herein­after referred to as the System.  As such, he had designated as his beneficiaries his
aforementioned brothers and sisters, the
petitioners herein.  Subsequently, or on
May 29, 1960, Briccio contracted marriage with Colombina Merced, who bore him a
child, Briccio, Jr., hereinafter referred to as Co­lombina and Junior, respectively,
Briccio died on February 22, 1961.

Soon later, or on April 5, 1961, petitioners filed with the
Commission their claim for the benefits accruing under Briccio’s Social security insurance.  However, on April 27, 1961, petitioners were
advised by the System that their de­signation as beneficiaries of Briccio was
null and void, pursuant to Resolution No. 1620, series of 1960, of the Commission, and that a claim for the
aforementioned bene­fits had been filed
by Colombina.  Still later, or in
September, 1961, petitioners were informed that the Adminis­trator of the
System had declared Colombina and Junior as the legal heirs of Briccio and
approved payment to them of said benefits, amounting to P3,388.34.  This prompted the petitioners to file with
the Commission their present peti­tion, which, after appropriate proceedings,
was, by resolu­tion dated July 20, 1962, dismissed.  The Commission, like­wise, affirmed the
action taken by the Administrator and or­dered that the corresponding death
benefits be paid to Colombina and Junior. 
Hence, this appeal by petitioners herein.

They maintain that the designation made in their favor, as
beneficiaries of Briccio, remained valid and effective, despite his subsequent
marriage and the birth of Junior, in view of his (Briccio’s) failure to change said designation, and that the
choice of beneficiaries expressly made by Bric­cio should be respected.

The validity and
force of the last part of petitioners’ theory is, however, impaired by the fact that said choice had been made
when Briccio was still single, and that, according­ly, his failure to change
the designation of his beneficiaries may have been, and was probably, due to an
oversight on his part, especially considering that he died less than a year
after his wedding.

At any rate, the benefits accruing under Republic Act No. 1161
could not have vested until the death of the decedent, on February 22,
1961, not only because, prior thereto, the rights of the designated
beneficiaries were purely incohate, but, also, because Section 30 of said Act –
which became Sec­tion 31 thereof, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, which
was in force when Briccio became a member of the System – expressly reserved to Congress the right to
amend, alter or re­peal any provision thereof, and explicitly declares that
“no person shall be
or shall be deemed to be vested with any pro­perty or other right by virtue of the enactment or operation
of this Act.”

In pursuance of said reserved power, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 2658 (approved on June 18, 1960), which was in force at the time of
Briccio‘s death, amending
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161 (as amended by
Republic Act No. 1792), pursuant to subdivision
(k) of which the beneficiaries shall be “those designated as such
by the covered employee from among the following:

“(1) The legitimate spouse, the legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction and the
legiti­mate descendants;

“(2) In default of such spouse and children, the legitimate
parents of the covered employee;

“(3) In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other
person designated by him.”

In other words, the right of choice of the insured is subject
to the foregoing limitations, pursuant to which bro­thers and sisters may not
be designated as beneficiaries
ex­cept in default, not only of surviving spouse and children, but, also
of “legitimate parents of
the covered employee.”

It is, accordingly,
clear that the Commission was fully justified in holding that the designation
in favor of the brothers and sisters of the decedent as his beneficiaries was
null and void and that Colombina and Junior are, under the law, the persons
entitled to the corresponding benefits.

WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirm­ed,
with costs against herein petitioners-appellants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.