THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODRIGO MENDOZA Y CARAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an automatic review of a death sentence imposed on
RODRIGO MENDOZA.

In an Amended Information filed on November 17, 1970 in the Criminal Circuit Court at Pasig, Rizal,
presided by then Judge Onofre A. Villaluz,
CESAR CAÑEGA Y NARIDO, RODRIGO MENDOZA Y CARAS and a JOHN DOE were accused of
the Crime of Robbery with Homicide said to have been
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 18th day of August, 1970, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and against the
will of the owner thereof, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlaw­fully and feloniously take, rob
and carry away from one Tito Narvasa, some suiting
materials valued at P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in
the said amount of P200.00; that in the course of or by reason of said robbery
the said accused pursuant to the said conspiracy, with evident premeditation
and treachery, and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with sharp pointed
instrument (ice-pick type) one Tito Narvasa thereby
causing directly his death. “

When Rodrigo Mendoza was arraigned on November 18, 1970, he pleaded NOT GUILTY.  However, during the continuation of the trial
on November 25, 1970, the
following took place:

“ATTY. GALVAN: [Counsel de oficio]

Your Honor please, after a lengthy conference with the accused in
connection with the of­fense charged against him, he is withdrawing now his
former plea of not guilty to the of­fense charge and to be substituted with a
plea of guilty.

COURT:

Apprise the
accused.

ATTY. AGUSTIN: [Deputy Clerk of Court] (to the accused)

Q    Do you confirm the
manifestation of your lawyer that you are withdrawing your former plea of not
guilty to that of guilty?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    Are you aware that by
withdrawing your plea of not guilty to that of guilty, you will be punished by
death, that there is no other penalty except death?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    And notwithstanding that
fact, you insist on pleading guilty?

A     Yes,
sir.

ATTY. AGUSTIN:

Guilty Your
Honor.

(At this juncture, the Court promulgated
its sentence to the accused).”

In this Court, the appellant’s counsel de oficio,
former Justice Francisco R. Capistrano assigned two errors against the trial
judge but only one of them is necessary for the disposition of the appeal and
it is the allegation that:

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION TO RE­MOVE ALL REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE AC­CUSED
ENTERED HIS PLEA OF ‘GUILTY’ IMPRO­VIDENTLY OR WITHOUT CLEAR AND PRECISE
UNDERSTANDING OF ITS MEANING AND EFFECT.”

Former Justice Felix Q. Antonio who was then Solicitor General
said in the People’s brief: “We are constrained to agree with appellant on
this score.” And elaborated as follows:

“From the decision of the trial court, it appears that on November 18, 1970, accused, duly
assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Ruben Lacre, pleaded not guilty of the crime charged.  On November
25, 1970, accused assisted this time by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Jose O. Galvan, withdrew his former plea of
‘not guilty’ and entered instead a plea of guilty.  The court then asked the accused if he was
confirming the manifestation of his counsel de oficio
that accused was withdrawing his former plea of ‘not guilty’ and entering a
plea of guilty (p. 6, rec.).  Accused was
then apprised that there can be no other penalty than death as a consequence of
his plea of guilty and asked if he was insisting on his change of plea.  He was not, however, apprised of the meaning
and nature of the aforequoted aggravating
circumstances (p. 6, rec.).

“It is the essense of the plea of
guilty in criminal trial that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily
and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a
clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint
or information (U. S.
vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305).  The record in this case, however, does not
disclose that the accused Rodrigo Mendoza y Caras had
a clear understanding of the technical terms ‘with evident premeditation’,
‘treachery’, and “with abuse of superior strength” alleged in the
information.

“It is of common knowledge that laymen do not know the true
meaning and nature of the aforequoted aggravating
circumstances for even members of the bar will differ in opinion, in a given
set of circums­tances, as to whether the aforequoted
aggravating circumstances are present or not in a given case.  So in all probability, herein accused might
have entered his plea of ‘guilty’ improvidently, or with­out a clear idea and
precise understanding of its meaning and effect, especially considering that ac­cused
was represented merely by counsel de oficio.

“As stated by this Honorable Court in case of People vs. Gungab (64 Phil., 779, 782-783).

‘. . . It is true that the aggravating circum­stances in question
are alleged in the information but, judging from the testimony of the accused,
the latter must not have understood the true ex­tent of his plea of guilty in
the sense that he ad­mitted not only having hacked his wife with a bolo but
also having done so with premeditation and treachery.  Taking into consideration the ignorance of
the accused, it is neither just nor reasonable to assume that he had understood
the allegation that ‘the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
premeditation were present in the commission of the crime’, inasmuch as
‘treachery’ and ‘pre­meditation’ are highly technical terms the juridical
meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but
even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers.  Under the cir­cumstances of the present case,
this court can­not, without being unjust, hold that the accused- appellant in
pleading guilty upon arraignment admitted not only having killed his wife but
also having done so with premeditation and treachery.’

Likewise, in People vs. Bulalake (106
Phil., 767, 770-771), this Honorable Court stated:

‘. . . while it appears that the accused, with the assistance of
his counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the
information, voluntarily and spontaneously, the records do not disclose that
its contents enumerating several aggravating circumstances, were read and
translated or clearly explained to him. 
Neither does it appear that he fully and completely understood the
precise nature of the charges preferred against him and the consequences of his
plea.  No inquiry whatsoever was made by
the trial judge in this respect notwithstanding the fact that the accused was
assisted only by an attorney de oficio whose
appointment by the court for this purpose might have been extended only on the
date of the arraignment. . . . ‘

And in U.S.
vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91, 92), this Honorable Court
likewise said:

‘We are inclined to think that while he un­doubtedly intended on
that occasion, as also when he entered his plea of guilty, to confess and ad­mit
that he took the lives of the persons mentioned in the information, he did not
intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating cir­cumstances
mentioned therein. . . . ‘

To the same effect is
People vs. Salacito, (L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29
SCRA. 61, 69) where Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
speaking for the Supreme Court, ruled:

‘Under the circumstances, we are inclined to agree with Atty. Bargas — whose earnestness and sense of responsibility as
counsel de oficio and as an officer of the Court
should be complimented and deserve emulation – that there is no reasonable
certainty that, in pleading guilty to the charge against him, the defendant did
not in­tend to admit merely that he had killed the offended party, overlooking
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged in the information or, at
least, without a fair notion of the implications thereof. ‘

So also in People vs. Epifanio
Flores, G.R. L-32692, pro­mulgated July 30, 1971 this Honorable Court after
pointing out that ‘the term ‘nocturnity‘ and
‘superior strength’ have each a legal significance not ordinarily
understandable to a common man unless explained to him’ admonished:

‘The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is entered
by the defendant, especially in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed,
is that the court should be sure that defendant fully understood the nature of
the charges pre­ferred against him and the character of the punishment provided
by law before it is imposed.  While there
is no law requiring it, yet where the penalty may be death, it is advisable for
the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the
degree of culpability of the defendant (People vs. Virgilio
Solacito, G. R. No. L-29209, August 25, 1969, Citing
U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil., 541; U. S. vs. Rota, 9
Phil., 426; U. S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil., 91).  The latest decision on this point is in the
case of People vs. Remegio Estebia,
G.R. No. L-26868, July 31, 1971, where this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Enrique Fernando, stated: ‘inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the
extreme penalty of death are subject to review by the Supreme Court as law and
justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic
review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade, it would seem
that the proper and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a plea of
guilty to capital offenses especially where he is an ignorant per­son with
little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial
judge but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether accused really and
truly understood and com­prehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.’

“In the light of the foregoing, it is believed that the accused’s plea of guilty was made improvidently.”

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by both the appellant and the appellee, this case is hereby remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings with the expectation that the new judge
thereof will be more punctilious in obeying the elementary safeguards which the
law has erected to protect the rights of persons who face deprivation of life,
liberty or property.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, Plana, and Escolin, JJ., concur.