ONESIMA D. BELEN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceedings? No. 9226, denying appellant’s petition therein as
hereafter discussed.

Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal
may be narrated as follows:

Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent
provisions of which read:

“9.o-En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom bradbs por mi,
seran beneficiarios o sea pasaran los legados a favor solamente de los
descendientes y ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.

10.o-Transcurridos diez o quince aiios despues de mi muerte todas mis
propiedades, muebles o immiebles, derechos y acciones, cuando asi convenga a los
legatarios y los precios sean ventajosos, pueden proceder a la venta de todos
dando preferencia a los legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil pesos
(fl,000) para los cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y
reservando una cantidad suficiente y bien calculada para sufragar los gastos
para otros diez anos para las mandas y misas. El resto se distribuira a las
siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes legitimos;

A Isabel M. de Santiago-cincuenta por ciento (50%)
Los hijos de Domingo
Legarda-treinta por ciento (30%)
Filomena Diaz-diez por ciento (10%)

Nestor M. Santiago-diez por ciento (10%).”

On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil, together
with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the
same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the administration
of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter
put under the administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
trustee for the benefit of the legatees.

Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children,
Milagros Belen de Olaguera, married, [with seven (7) legitimate children, and
Onesima D. Belen, single.

On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings
No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena
Diaz under the codicil should now be divided (equally) only between herself and
Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to
the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros
Belen de Olaguera. The court, in its order of May 23, 1958, denied, as we
initially pointed out, Onesima’s petition. More specifically, the court
said:

“After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on March
19, 1958, wherein it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the Philippine Islands
be directed to deliver to her ‘one-half of whatever share is due to the deceased
Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased testator
Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship in these proceedings,’ this Court
finds that said petition should be, as it is hereby, denied in view of the
resolution of September 28, 1959, in which resolution the following was
declared:

‘That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale
of the properties covered in paragraph 10 of the codicil aforementioned does not
and should not form part of her estate; it pertains to her legitimate
descendants; and

‘That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only
between her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also
among her other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not
only children but also grandchildren, etc., and in this connection, it is not
amiss to observe that one may be a descendant and yet not be an heir, and vice
versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a
descendant.”

From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that
(1) the Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of
September 16, 1955 bad been affirmed by our decision of February 28, 1958 in the
case of Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164 Feb. 28,
1958; and (2) that the term “sus descendientes legitimos” as used in
the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in degree to the
original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present case, they are her two daughters
(Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said
legatee.

As to her first point, the appellant is correct in her view that the trial
court’s interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz
has not been affirmed in our previous decision (G. R. No. L-10164). Perusal of
that judgment will show that this Court left the issue open at the time,
contenting itself with pointing out tjiat the then appellant Administrator of
the estate of Filomena Diaz was not the proper party to raise the particular
issue.

As to the actual meaning of the provision-

“El resto se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus
descendientes legitimos”,

it is undeniable that by this clause the testator ordained a simple
substitution (sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for
each legatee. This form of substitution is authorized by the first part of
Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):

“Two or more persons may be substituted for one; and one person for two or
more heirs.”

The issue is now squarely btefore us: do the words “sus descendientes
legitimos” refer conjointly to all living descendants (children and
grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or.do they refer to the descendants
nearest in degree?

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the
relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be
therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera,
to the exclusion of the latter’s sons and daughters, grandchildren of the
original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis,
appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing
ne varietur Article 751 of the Code of 1889):

“A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator’s relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in
degree.”

The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its
application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the
testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that
the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit
the relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes,-

“la razon y la logica hacen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este
favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a su intention el que gozasen
sus bienes aquellas personas mas ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vineulos de
la sangre y de la familia” (6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).

But the ratio legis (that among a testator’s relatives the closest
are dearest) obviously does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of
another person (the legatee) and not of the testator. There is no
logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to
the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided
substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would
prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he
envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred
beneficiary.

Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various
reasons against this. The most important one is that under this article, as
recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest
exclude all the farther relatives and the right of representation does not
operate. Castan, in his monograph “El derecho de representacion y mecanismos
juridicos afines en la sucesion testamentaria” (Reus, 1942), says on this
question (pp. 13, 14, 15):

“En el subgrupo iberico de Europa y America predomina, aunque haya
excepciones, como ya hemos visto, al criterio de que la representation, cuando
menos en principio, no tiene cabida en la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por
ejemplo, lo establece la doctrina cientffica en Portugal y en la Argentina y lo
ha sancionado la jurisprudencia en Cuba.

En igual sentido, en la doctrinji espanola es opinion general que el derecho
de representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar mas que en la
sucesion intestada, y en la testamentaria en la parte referente a las legitimas.
MUCius SCAevola juzga que la representacion, atraida por la herencia legitima,
es repelida por la testada, y apunta, como razon de ello, la de que ‘la primer a
descansa en la ley de la sangre, en el parentesco con su consiguiente atributo
de linea y grado, elementos propios c indispensables para la representaeion, en
tanto que la segunda se basa exclusivamente en la voluntad del testador,
elemento diverso, en el orden legal, al de la naturaleza o de la sangre’. Y el
maestro de diego, con orientacion analoga, piensa que ‘como el titulo de la
sucesion testada es de origen voluntario y caracter personalisimo, es evidente
que no hay terminos habiles para el derecho de representacion: los llamamientos
son individuales y la premoriencia del instituido, como su incapacidad,
aniquilan la institution’

In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shows that
the right of representation was deliberately suppressed. Says Castan
(op. cit., 24):

“En nuestra Patria opino gaecia goyena ‘que debia tener lugar el derecho de
representacion aun cuando el testador llame a los parientes mas cercanos”, pues
‘en lo que no se contraria abiertamente la voluntad del testador, debe
observarse el orden de la sucesion legitima, al que se presume que en todo lo
demas quiso atemperarse’. Por ello, el art. 562 Proyecto de 1851 quedo redactado
asi: “La disposition hecha simple y generalmente a favor de los parientes del
testador, se entiende hecha en favor de los mas proximos en grado; pero habra
lugar al derecho de representation con todos sus efectos, con arreglo al titulo
siguiente’.

Con poco acierto, a nuestro juicio, los autores del vigente Codigo han
suprhnido e?ta ultima salvedad del Proyecto del 51, y con ello han instaurado
una norma rigida, distanciada de lo que exige la equidad y de lo que suelen
establecer los Codigos extranjeros. Los com-mentaristas convienen en que la
supresion ha sido intencionada, y por consiguiente el proposito del legislador
es que en esta clase de llamamientos no se da el derecho de representaci6n. Dice
Manresa que el art. 751 ‘tiene por favorecidos con tal institucion, no a los
parientes de mejor derecho, sino a los mas proximos en grado y, por lo tanto,
los de primer grado excluiran a los de segundo y, asi sucesivamente, toda vez
que la proximidad del parentesco se aprecia en esta forma con arreglo al art.
915’. La misma interpretacion dan al articulo de referencia NAVARRO AMANDI,
MUCIUS SCAEVOLA, SANCHEZ ROMAN y VALVERDE.”

The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filomena Diaz the
“nearest relatives” rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her
children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could
hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame clause 10 of his
codicil (ante), speaks of “cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian”
and of “los hijos de Domingo Legarda,” as well as of “descendientes legitimos”
of the other legatees, to us indicating clearly that he understood well that
hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. Observe
that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor Santiago and
Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator, does not even use the description “sus
hijos 6 descendientes,” but only “descendientes”.

It is suggested that “descendientes legitimos” could mean the nearest
descendant but with right of representation in favor of the more distant
relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a series of
successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the
original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant
descendants should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate succession.
But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare that the testator had:

(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs
and co-legatees, as established for testamentary successions by Articles 1016
(old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to replace such accretion with
representation:

“Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a
testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:

(1) That two or more persons he called to the same inheritance, or to the
same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and

(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or renounce
the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.

* * * * * * *

Art. 1019. The heirs to whom th^ portion goes by the right of accretion take
it in the same proportion that they inherit.”

(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765
of the Code of 1889) providing that:

“Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit- in equal
parts”,

which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;

(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies
in the free part should be filled according to the rules of accretion, or
substitution (not representation); and in default of these two, ultimately
inherited by the testator’s own heirs intestate:

“Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not
take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has
been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall
receive it with the same charges and obligations.”

There is no doubt that, the testator’s intention being the cardinal rule of
succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered
inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any
other supporting circumstances, we deem it extremely conjectural to hold that by
the simple expression “6 a sus descendientes legitimos,” the testator Benigno
Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It was
incumbent upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the testator;
yet she has not done so.

It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the
courts are divided on the question whe&er a bequest to “relatives” or
“issue,” made in genera] terms, gives rise to a succession per capita
or per stirpes. In Wyeth, et al., vs. Crane, 174 N.E. 871, the
Supreme Court of Illinois said:

“The meaning of the word ‘descendants’, when used in a will or deed to
designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been
frequently considered and decided by the courts of England and the United
States. The established rule in England from an early date was that the word
‘descendants’ or the word ‘issue’, unexplained by anything in the context of the
instrument, means all persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest
degree, and includes persons so descended, even though their parents are living,
and that such descendants take per capita and not per stirpes.”

“The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether
in case of a gift or conveyance to ‘descendants’ or ‘issue’, children take
concurrently with their parents. The so-called’ English rule has been adhered to
in New York, New Jersey, and Tennessee. * * * On the other hand, the courts of
Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and South Carolina have held that, in case of
a gift or conveyance to descendants or issue, unexplained by anything in the
context of the instrument, children do not take concurrently with their
parents.”

We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the
proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a
class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per
capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to
Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and
grandchildren.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Gutierrez
David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.