JANOS TAMAS HERCZOG, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. ROSA C. ROSACAY-HERCZOG, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE,
ROMILLA-LONTOK, J.:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, declaring that:
- the marriage of petitioner, Janos Tamas Herczog, and respondent, Rosa C. Rosacay-Herczog, on April 18, 1990 as null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended;
- the conjugal property relationship dissolved pursuant to the aforementioned compromise agreement;
- the family name Herczog be dropped from the respondent’s name and;
- that a copy of this Decision be furnished to the National Census and Statistics Office and the appropriate Register of Deeds in connection with the dissolution of the conjugal property relationship of the spouses.
SO ORDERED.”
On October 25, 1994, Janos Tamas Herczog, a Dutch National, then residing within the country as an employee of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Shell Compound, Tabangao, Batangas, filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with Rosa C. Rosacay-Herczog. The complaint alleged that Janos and Rosa were married on April 18, 1990 at the Hague-Holland. Janos is a divorcee. Rosa was single with two (2) illegitimate children, namely: Jane Tammy Rose Rosacay, then 2½ years of age and Joanna Rose, then one (1) month old. The complaint is anchored on Rosa’s alleged psychological incapacity.
On January 3, 1995, Janos through counsel, filed a motion for referral to the Public Prosecutor to determine the absence of collusion.
Under date of February 6, 1995, Rosa filed her Answer with a counter-petition for Legal Separation and Support pendente lite. In her answer, Rosa alleged having started to live-in with Janos in March, 1989, initially in an apartment in Batangas City where Janos visited on weekends and later in the quarters which Janos occupied in the Shell Compound in Tabangao.
In May, 1989, Janos was assigned in Paris, France where he brought Rosa and her children and where they stayed the whole year. They acquired a a house in Southern France. In Paris, Janos was irritable most of the time. He quickly lost his temper for no apparent reason. He was assigned in Holland in February, 1990. They got married in the Hague in April, 1990. They bought a house and lot in Holland.
In 1991, Janos was assigned in California, U.S.A. He also brought Rosa and the children with him. They acquired house furnishings in California.
Janos maltreated Rosa. He would slap or kick her, pull her hair, punch her in the stomach even without any reason when he was in a bad mood. Rosa always forgave him in an effort to make a success of their marriage. Janos wanted Rosa to follow his every wish. She was treated like a sex slave. Janos’ sharp and inconsiderate language caused the loss of Rosa’s self-esteem. Even the children were treated with a heavy hand. He beat Rosa black and blue on October 20, 1994. She had to have medical attention.
Janos had an affair with their maid. He also had an affair with a certain Arlene Elma Sta. Clara. The spouses acquired a house and lot in BF Homes, Parañaque where Janos forbade Rosa to go to. The BF Homes property is registered in Rosa’s name; yet, Janos orchestrated a mortgage with his mother. Janos falsely accuses Rosa of infidelity to cover up for his womanizing. The spouses have “a house and lot in Holland, a house and lot in BF Homes, Parañaque, house furnishings in Paris, France and California, U.S.A.; a Toyota Corolla; two (2) Isuzu jeepneys and furnishings and appliances in their house in Tabangao, Batangas City.”
Rosa prays for the dismissal of Janos’ complaint for annulment; a grant of legal separation with forfeiture of Janos’ share in the conjugal property; and for support pendente lite.
In answer to Rosa’s counter-petition for legal separation, Janos admitted being a good provider for Rosa’s children; denied that the properties enumerated by Rosa in her answer are conjugal; alleged having acquired a 50-hectare property in Samar, half of which was covered by CARP; alleged having been a good, tolerant and loving husband to Rosa; denied having maltreated her; alleged that all their fights had been initiated by Rosa whose temper he could not endure; that Rosa suffers from psychosis; that Rosa had an illicit relationship with Enrico Andal, their driver; that Rosa had always been hungry for sex; and Rosa had made numerous attempts against his life.
In opposition to Rosa’s application for support pendente lite, Janos stated that being the offending party and on account of infidelity, Rosa is not entitled to support, nor to any share in the conjugal partnership which she forfeits in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code.
Janos reiterates his prayer for annulment of his marriage with Rosa; dropping by Rosa of the family name Herczog; dismissal of the petition for legal separation and denial of support pendente lite.
Pre-trial was set on March 20, 1995.
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
- That petitioner and respondent were married on April 20, 1990 at the Hague, Holland;
- The parties have no children of their own and delimited the issues to be –
- Whether or not petitioner is entitled toannulment of his marriage with the respondent; and
- Whether or not respondent is entitled tolegal separation.
In the course of the trial, under date of April 26, 1995, the parties submitted two (2) motions to approve Compromise Agreement on (1) Support Pendente Lite and on Support of Rosa’s children; and (2) on Liquidation/Separation of Properties. The motion to approve agreement on support pendente lite was granted by the lower court. The agreement as to separation of property was held in abeyance pending trial.
The plaintiff presented Drs. Natividad Alcantara-Dayan and Normando Napeñas; Janos Herczog, Arlene Elma Sta. Clara and Rolando Mendel.
Janos Herczog substantiated the allegations in his complaint. Arlene Elma Sta. Clara denied any alleged illicit relationship with Janos. Mendel testified on the mental incapacity and infidelity of Rosa.
Rosa denied psychological incapacity. She established her grounds for legal separation. Psychologist Rose Marie Yengko was presented to establish Rosa’s psychological profile.
After trial the Solicitor General was ordered to submit the proper certification as required. The case was submitted for decision without said certification.
The trial court rendered a decision which annulled the marriage. The compromise agreement relative to separation of property was approved.
The Solicitor General appealed on the following assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER-APPELLEE JANOS TAMAS HERCZOG AND RESPONDENT-APPELLEE ROSA ROSACAY-HERCZOG, AS NULL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO PRESENT PROOF THAT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS INCURABLE OR GRAVE AND THAT THE SAME WAS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE CELEBRATION.
The appeal is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[1]
As held in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Crasus L. Iyoy,[2]:
“The psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.”
A thorough scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that Rosa’s alleged psychological incapacity has not been declared to be incurable. There is no answer to the query as to whether her alleged psychological incapacity is permanent or curable. Everyone is left in a quandary as to Rosa’s actual mental state.
Besides, Dr. Dayan did not conduct an actual psychological examination of Rosa. In reaching the evaluation contained in her report, she relied heavily on the information she obtained from Janos and Dr. Napeñas.
As held in the case of Choa vs. Choa[3] such omission on the part of the psychologist to conduct actual examination of the party to whom psychological incapacity is attributed is methodologically flawed, consequently, any testimony of said psychologist could be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
While actual medical examination might not be a pre-requisite to establish the existence of psychological incapacity, the totality of evidence presented before this Court requires Us to necessarily look into a medical examination of Rosa to indubitably establish her psychological incapacity. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Choa vs. Choa:[4]
“We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity — more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.”
Actual psychological examination appears mandatory on account of Rosa’s denial of the imputations against her. There was even implied admission on the part of Dr. Normando Napenas that he needed further meetings or sessions with Rosa. The pertinent portion of his testimony is quoted, thus:[5]
“Q. What was the total diagnosis or impression that you have gathered during that whole session of the interview?
A. I could remember that when I was about to close our session, it was a long session, actually more than two hours, before I went to the conclusion, I had to introduce myself to her already. And I told her I am a physician actually and I wanted to help her. I told her that i have an office at the Golden Gate Hospital and I wanted to see her further because i wanted to help her. I cannot specify the term why I wanted to help her because I’m afraid the more she might become angry. I just told her I wanted to help her improve her relationship with her husband.
x x x
Q. After you ended up your interview with her, was there a follow up?
A. When we parted, actually she did not even accompany me outside, but before she went inside the room I told her I wanted to see her after one week, but I made it a point to remind Mr. Herczog to accompany Rosa to me but nothing materialized. Mr. Herczog was the one who called me a number of times.
Q. During the subsequent meeting with Mr. Herczog, what impressions did you gather from Mr. Herczog about this matter?
A. He said what was happening to their marriage. I told him even if I help him and I could not see his wife who seems to be the problem, I could not be of help to both of them. I remember I gave Mr. Herczog some medicine so that it could help him cope up with the problem.” (Emphasis and Underscoring Ours)
This Court finds the evaluation of Dr. Napeñas inadequate to arrive at the conclusion that Rosa is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Therefore, this Court is compelled to adhere to the rule that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage (Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partially granted. The decision of the lower court as to the declaration of nullity of marriage between Janos Tamas Herczog and Rosa Rosacay-Herczog and the the order requiring the family name Herczog be dropped from Rosa’s name are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dissolution of the conjugal property pursuant to a compromise agreement as approved by the lower court is AFFIRMED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the National Census and Statistics Office and the appropriate Register of Deeds in relation to the dissolved conjugal property relationship.
SO ORDERED.
Barrios, (Chairman) and Guariña, III, JJ., concur.
[1] Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20
[2] G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005. 470 SCRA 508
[3] 392 SCRA 641
[4] Ibid.
[5] TSN, August 10, 1995, pp. 11-12