LORENZO DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE FLORENDO AQUINO, AURORA, BELEN AND ERNESTO, ALL SURNAMED DE GUZMAN, DEFENDANTS.

Lorenzo de Guzman petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari
with injunction to set aside and review the action of respondent Judge Florendo Aquino of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch I, at Cabanatuan City, reviving special
proceedings No. 8896 of that Court, over petitioner’s objec­tions, denying his
motion for reconsideration and ordering petitioner to
submit his accounts as guardian.

For a proper understanding of the issues involved, it is
necessary to state that on 12 September 1941 petitioner de Guzman was appointed
judicial guardian of the persons and property of his three minor children,
Aurora, Belen and Ernesto, all surnamed de Guzman, upon the filing of a
P2,000.00 bond, which was duly complied with. 
In 1943, the guardian submitted partial accounts, which were
approved.  In 1947 he was authorized to
mortgage to the Philippine National Bank some lands of the minors to secure a
P2,000.00 loan without objection from the wards.  In September of 1947, the court authorized
the guardian anew to execute another mortgage, this time to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, to guarantee a loan for P5,000.00.

In February of 1955, the court issued an order in the following
terms (Annex “N”, petition):

“The interested parties not having taken any step in this case
during the last EIGHT (8) years, and considering that this guardianship
proceeding has been pending in this Court since September 1, 1941.

“WHEREFORE, let this case be considered closed and terminated
for lack of prosecution.

“SO ORDERED.”

On 26 July 1967, the children of petitioner, Aurora, Belen and
Ernesto, applied through counsel to have the aforequoted
1955 order reconsidered and set aside, claiming that they had not been given
notice thereof.  They prayed the court
that the guardian be ordered to deliver to them three
(3) parcels of riceland described in the guardian’s
inventory, and that the latter be made to account for the crops of the said
parcels.  This petition was at first
denied by Judge Serafin Cuevas of Branch 2, but
subsequently, upon timely application, the denial was reconsidered and the
petition granted on 9 October 1967 by respondent Judge Florendo
Aquino of the court’s Branch I (after Judge Cuevas
was transferred to Manila).  The
guardian’s opposition and motion to reconsider were overruled.

“O R D E R

This Court believes that in line with the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Junquera versus Vaño, et al., Vo. 72, page 293, Phil. Reports, the motion
for reconsideration filed by the movant is hereby
granted.  Let this case be reinstated and
once reinstated the guardian is hereby ordered to give proper accounting to the
Court which he should have done within one year after his appointment as such
guardian.  Or if any accounting was made
after his appointment as guardian that all accounts supposed to be rendered
with respect to the properties to the wards which were placed under his custody
be accordingly made and filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.”

Unable to secure a recall of the order of Judge Aquino, petitioner resorted to this Court.  He attacks the respondent’s order in the
following grounds:

“a) That respondent Judge Florendo Aquino has no
jurisdiction over the aforesaid terminated Guardianship Case, after the same
has been dismissed twelve (12) years ago;

“b) That if any obligation due against herein petitioner the
same has already been barred;

“c) That said Judge Cuevas who has still the power to resolve
the Motion for Reconsideration, dated August
5, 1967, once and for all;

“d) That the case of Junquera vs. Vaño, 72 Phil. 293 could not be applied in said case; and

“e) That there was no valid transfer of said case from Branch
II (Judge Cuevas’) to Branch I (respondent Judge).”

We find the petition to be without merit and that the objections
to the order requiring the guardian to render accounts are untenable.

The decisive fact is that the wards were not given notice of the
1955 order of closure of the proceedings issued by Judge Montesa.  Their sworn assertion to this effect (Annex
“O”, Petition) is nowhere denied, and is supported by the detail that
at the foot of said order there appears the following notation (Petition, Annex
“N”):

“COPY
FURNISHED:

Attorney Lorenzo de
Guzman

Mr. Estanislao Gotangco

3/7/55″

Estanislao Gotangco
was the party upon whose petition the guardian was appointed.  But he did not represent the wards, either as
curator ad litem or as counsel.  Notice to him, therefore, was not notice to
the wards.  Consequently, so far as the
wards are concerned, the order of closure never became final and executory; hence, the matter remained pending and the said
order could be still reconsidered and set aside by the court that issued it.

This case comes within the purview of the rule set by this Court in
Junquera vs. Vaño, 72 Phil.
293, 302, to the effect that the Court can not, motu
proprio, order the closure or termination of a
minor’s guardianship case, unless he should ask for it, nor without granting
him a hearing, or receiving evidence of some kind to determine if such a step
should be taken or not.

“Por otra parte, no puede concederse ni ordenarse
por el Juzgado, motu proprio, el cierre o terminacion de un expediente de tutela de un menor, sino cuando
lo pidiere el interesado, o
sin antes oirle, o recibir pruebas de alguna clase para determinar
si tal pso
debe darse o no; y no consta por cierto
en autos que el apelante o algun otro en su
lugar lo haya hecho, antes de consumarse las referidas ventas.  Solo se pidio y se ordeno el cierre del Expediente de Tutela del apalante, en las fechas ya
mencionadas. 
El articulo 575 de la Ley
No. 190 contiene sobre el
particular la siguiente disposicion:

“The marriage of a minor ward terminates the guardianship of
the person of such ward, but not of the estate; the guardian of an insane or
other person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon the
application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer
necessary.”

The doctrine of the Junquera case
accords with Section 3 of Rule 98 of the original Rules of Court in force when
Judge Montesa improvidently issued his order of
closure:

“SEC. 3.  Other termination of
guardianship.  – The marriage
of a minor ward terminates the guardianship of the person of the ward; and the
guardian of any person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon the
application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer necessary.”

That it was respondent Judge Aquino who
set aside the initial denial made by Judge Cuevas is not abuse of discretion
nor does it constitute excess of jurisdiction, since the denial did not become final
and executory; and moreover, Judge Cuevas had been
transferred elsewhere, without as­surance when he would return.  Public policy demanded that the case he had
acted on be not delayed indefinitely.

As to the claim that the action is already barred by
prescription, suffice it to say that since the proceedings were never really
closed, the statute of limitations could not apply.  Anyway, the guardianship was an express
trust, and no limitation could possibly run except from and after the
repudiation thereof was driven home to the wards, as cestuis
que trustent.  No repudiation is here proved, since no
adequate showing is made that the wards were ever notified by their father and
guardian that he considered himself liberated from the trust imposed upon him
by the Court.  The fact that the guardian
is the father of the wards all the more demands that the alleged repudia­tion
of his trust be clearly proved, since it is unconscionable and contrary to
morals that a parent should deprive his children of what lawfully belongs to
them.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writs of certiorari and
injunction applied for are denied, and the restraining order heretofore issued
is dissolved.  Costs
against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.