CIRILA LEGASON, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review^[1] of
the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in WCC Case No. RO7-12447 dismissing the claim for compensation of the petitioner
which has been previously granted by the Acting Labor Referee.

On June 11, 1923,
petitioner was employed as a classroom teacher by the respondent Republic of
the Philippines
thru the Bureau of Public Schools (hereinafter referred to as respondent
Republic).  In the course of her
employment, she was found to be suffering from hypertension, hypertensive heart
disease and tuberculosis of the lungs with hymoptysis.  Due to her ailments, she was constrained to retire
from her position on August 31, 1966
under Republic Act 660 at the age of 63 after having rendered more than forty
(40) years of government service.

Sometime in September 1972, petitioner filed a formal notice of
injury and claim for compensation which was tentatively controverted
by the respondent Republic.  However,
during the hearing before the Acting Labor Referee, the respondent Republic
failed to present any evidence in controversion of
petitioner’s claim.

On December 2, 1974,
the Acting Labor Referee rendered his decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay, through
this Office, the following pecuniary obligations, to wit:

1.                
To claimant, in lump sum, the amount of SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS, as disability benefit;

2.                
The claimant shall be entitled to the benefits
provided for by Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended;

3.                
To Atty. Adriano Montes, the counsel who helped
litigate this claim, the amount of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS, as attorney’s
fees; and

4.                
To this Office, the amount of SIXTY ONE (P61.00)
PESOS, as administrative fee.”

Upon review of the records of the case,
the respondent Commission reversed the decision of the Acting Labor Referee and
dismissed the claim of petitioner.

In dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation, the respondent
Commission ruled that she was not disabled from labor prior to her retirement
because she was merely suffering from hypertension and that her retirement was
by reason of age and length of service. 
This conclusion of the respondent Commission finds no support in the
evidence on record.  The respondent
Commission failed to consider the testimony of petitioner and that of her
attending physician who submitted the Report of Sickness or Accident.^[2]
It is clearly indicated in the Report of the Local Claims Committee for
Compensation^[3]
composed of the School Physician, the District Supervisor and the School
Principal:

“1.  That the claimant started as a classroom
teacher on June 11, 1923
until August 31, 1966 when
she retired under Republic Act 660, serving the respondent for more than 40
years; she retired at the age of 63 with the last salary rate of P3,223.56.

 2.   That
the claimant began to feel the pain and suffered hypertension in 1954 and she
had to consult some physician with different hospital, like the Graham
Memorial Hospital;

 3.   That
in 1964, she was treated by Dra. Simeona Virtucio,
who prepared the physician’s report.

 4.   That
the findings of the physician pointed to the fact that the claimant has been
suffering from a hypertensive heart disease which was caused by her employment
as a teacher in view of the routinary activities,
such as taking direct supervision and control of the school children;

 5.   The
physician also revealed that the claimant’s work involved emotional tension on
account of her teaching activities which caused her to contract tubercular
lungs with hymoptysis;

 6.   That
her constant hiking from her place of residence to her station practically
exposed her to the bad elements of weather and dust, resulting in the
aggravation of her ailment and resulting to her present rheumatic condition,
and for which reason, he was advised to rest by her physician, hence her
retirement.”

This Report contrary to the conclusion of
the respondent Commission clearly shows that petitioner was physically
incapable of performing her usual work and disabled for the purpose.  Besides, her retirement from her position on
August 31, 1966 under Republic Act No. 660 at the age of 63 after having
rendered more than forty (40) years of government service would not have been
approved if she had not complied with conditions prescribed for optional
retirement, pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the Office of the
President which among others provides that “all applications for optional
retirement under Com. Act No. 180, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1616 and No. 4968
shall not be recommended for approval unless funds are available in the bureau
or office concerned for the payment of applicants retirement gratuity over and
above the fund requirements of its programmed projects and activities and
provided any of the following circumstances or conditions, is present:

1.  x
x x x
x.

2. The employee-applicant is below 65 years of age, is
physically incapacitated to render further efficient service”.

The fact that petitioner’s application
for optional retirement at the age of 63 was duly approved,
simply indicates that she has met the conditions or requirements for retirement
that she was below 65 years of age but she was physically incapacitated to
render further efficient service.

On the other hand, while the respondent Republic made a tentative
controversion of petitioner’s claim, nevertheless, it
failed to present any evidence to the contrary during the hearing conducted by
the Acting Referee.  Indeed, this amounts
to no controversion at all.  The rule is well settled that once the
illness has supervened during the time of employment, there exists a rebuttable presumption^[4]
that the same arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and
the burden to overthrow said presumption shifts to the employer and the
employee is relieved of the burden to show causation.^[5]
Moreover, the failure to controvert the claim is fatal to any defense that the
employer could interpose and that constructively, such failure is equivalent to
an admission that the claim is compensable.^[6]
Under the circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner had
contracted her ailments, namely, hypertension, hypertensive heart disease and
tuberculosis of the lungs in the course of her employment and that the same
were aggravated by the nature of her work as a classroom teacher which involved
emotional strain because she had to take direct control and supervision over
school children.  Likewise, petitioner
had been subjected to constant exposure to the elements for such a considerable
length of time as she had to walk from her residence to her official
station.  Her physical condition must
have deteriorated to such a state that she could no longer discharge the task
of a classroom teacher, forcing her to retire from the service.  Hence, peti­tioner is entitled to
compensation under Sections 2 and 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.^[7]

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FORE­GOING, the decision of
the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission is hereby reversed and set
aside and the former award made by the Acting Labor Referee in favor of
petitioners revived and reinstated.

SO ORDERED.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Treated as Special Civil Action as per Resolution of the Court dated June 23, 1976.

^[2]
Exhibit “B”.

^[3]
Exhibit “C”.

^[4] “SEC. 44.  Presumption.  – In any
proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it
shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary -?

1.      
That the claim comes within the provisions of
this Act;

2.      
That sufficient notice thereof was given;

3.      
That the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the
injury or death of himself or of another;

4.      
That the injury did not result solely from the
intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; and

5.      
That the contents of verified medical and
surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are
correct.  (As added by Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 772.)

^[5] Talip vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 71 SCRA
218.

^[6] Pros vs. WCC, L-43348, Sept. 29, 1976;
Camarillo vs. WCC, L-42831, Oct. 21, 1976;
both citing Apolega vs. Hizon,
25 SCRA 336; National Mirror Factory vs. Vda.
de Anure, 27 SCRA 719, Victorias
Milling Co. vs. WCC, 28 SCRA 285; Northwest Airlines vs. WCC, 28
SCRA 877; La Mallorca vs. .WCC & Zuñiga, 30 SCRA 613; A.D. Santos vs. Sapon, L-22220, April 29, 1966; Itemcop
vs. Florzo, L-21969, Aug. 31, 1966; Nadeco vs. Rongavilla,
L-21963, Aug. 30, 1967; Rio y Compania vs. WCC,
L-21467, Aug. 30, 1967; Pampanga Sugar Mills vs. Espeleta, L-24973, Jan. 30, 1968.

^[7] “SEC. 2.  Grounds
for compensation.– When an employee suffers personal injury from any
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts
tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either
aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer
shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter
specified.  x x x.”

“SEC. 14.  Total disability.  – In case the injury or sickness causes
temporary total disability for labor, the employer shall, during such
disability, pay to the in­jured employee a weekly compensation equivalent to
sixty per centum of his average weekly wage but no less than fourteen pesos per
week, except in the case provided for in the next following paragraph.  No compensation shall be allowed for the
first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the
benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends
beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such
incapacity.  Such weekly payments shall
in no case continue after the disability has ceased,
nor shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case six
thousand pesos.  But no award of
permanent disability shall take effect until after two weeks have elapsed from
the date of injury.

In the case of an employee whose
average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the weekly compensation
shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages, but if the disability
is permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case, in the
event that the total disability begins after a period of partial disability,
the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other disability
shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos.”