REDENTOR ALBANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PATROCINIO C. GAPUSAN OF DUMALNEG, ILOCOS NORTE, RESPONDENT.

Albano versus Gapusan

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court against Municipal Judge Patrocinio C. Gapusan of Dumalneg and Adams, Ilocos Norte. The complainant, Redentor Albano, charged the respondent with two things: first, incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for the personal separation of a husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership; and second, misconduct for allegedly influencing a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in deciding two criminal cases. The case matters because it fixes the standard of conduct for notaries public with respect to the institutions of marriage and the family, and because it draws a careful line between a lawyer's liability as a notary and his immunity as a judge.

Procedural History

The case began as an original administrative complaint, verified and dated August 18, 1975, filed by Redentor Albano directly with the Supreme Court. There was no trial court and no Court of Appeals below; the Supreme Court took cognizance of the charges in the first instance. The respondent filed his answer, admitting some matters and denying the charge of influence. The Court, through Justice Aquino, resolved the two charges in a single decision, censuring the respondent as a member of the bar on the first charge and dismissing the second charge.

Facts

In 1941, five years before his appointment to the bench, Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar, Ilocos Norte, and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. The document stipulated that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, the other should refrain from filing an action. Gapusan denied drafting the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed it, that the wife had begotten children with her paramour, and that the agreement provided they would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled violent incidents between the spouses.

On the second charge, Albano alleged that Gapusan took advantage of his intimacy with Judge Zacarias A. Crispin of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Albano implied that because of that intimacy, Judge Crispin acquitted the accused of frustrated murder in one criminal case and convicted Albano of double frustrated murder with triple attempted murder in another. Albano said that Freddie Gapusan, an accused in the first case and a complaining witness in the case against Albano, is a relative of the respondent, and that after the acquittal the relatives of the accused were saying their relationship to Judge Gapusan proved worthwhile and useful.

Gapusan admitted he is close to Judge Crispin because they were both members of the Municipal Judges League, which Judge Crispin once headed, and because Judge Crispin had been an Executive Judge with supervision over municipal judges. He described the association as purely official. He admitted Freddie Gapusan is a distant relative, but denied influencing Judge Crispin in either criminal case.

Issues

• Whether or not respondent Gapusan should be disciplined as a member of the bar and as a notary public for having notarized a document providing for the personal separation of spouses and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
• Whether or not respondent Gapusan should be disciplined as a municipal judge for the same act of notarization.
• Whether or not respondent Gapusan should be held liable for alleged misconduct in influencing Judge Crispin in the two criminal cases.

Applicable Provisions

Article 221 of the Civil Code provides:

The following shall be void: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

This provision is the core of the case: it renders void the very covenants the respondent notarized.

Article 52 of the Civil Code provides:

Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution.

This provision grounds the Court's holding that the separation agreement undermines marriage.

Article 216 of the Civil Code provides:

The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

This provision grounds the protection the Court extends to the family against extrajudicial dissolution.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the covenants in the separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs, and that they undermine the institutions of marriage and the family. The Court quoted the Civil Code and declared that to preserve these institutions, the law considers as void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife and every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. It stressed that a notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, and it noted that notaries had been severely censured for notarizing documents which subvert these institutions. Accordingly, the respondent, as a member of the bar, was censured.

On the second issue, the Court held that the notarization did not warrant disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge, especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments.

On the third issue, the Court held that the imputation of influence was anchored on mere suspicion. It reasoned that if Albano had evidence that Judge Crispin committed an irregularity, he should have complained against Judge Crispin's actuations and not vented his ire on Gapusan alone. The Court warned that when an officer or court allows itself to enter upon the sea of suspicion, it permits itself to enter upon a sea which has no shore. It added that a person has freedom to choose his friends, that it is not a crime nor unethical per se for a municipal judge to fraternize with a Judge of the Court of First Instance, and that whether such fraternization produced an unjust verdict cannot be shown by mere inference or conjecture but must be substantiated by solid evidence. The second charge was dismissed for being speculative and unfair to Judge Crispin.

Doctrine

A contract for personal separation between husband and wife, and every extrajudicial agreement during the marriage for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, are void under Article 221 of the Civil Code, because marriage is an inviolable social institution and the family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. A notary public who facilitates the disintegration of a marriage and the family by notarizing such void agreements is subject to censure as a member of the bar. The same act of notarization, however, does not warrant disciplinary action against him as a judge, especially where his appointment was screened by the Commission on Appointments. Finally, a charge of improper influence based on mere suspicion, inference, or conjecture, without solid evidence, must be dismissed.

Disposition

The respondent was censured as a member of the bar for having notarized the void separation agreement, and the second charge of influencing Judge Crispin was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family, and any contract for personal separation or extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership is void. Examiners use this case in legal ethics and notarial practice, and in civil law on the inviolability of marriage and the family under Articles 52, 216, and 221 of the Civil Code.