LINKOD JUANE, RUPERTO SUÑGA AND FLORA ANTONIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL…

The present action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, challenging
the legality of the proceedings in the courts below has its roots in two ejectment suits.

On January 28, 1960,
Manotok Realty, Incorporated (Manotok)
sued petitioners Linkod Juane
and Ruperto Suñga for ejectment.  Manotok’s complaint avers a month-to-month lease,
non-payment of rentals and refusal to vacate.^[1]

A similar action was lodged by Manotok
against petitioner Flora Antonio.^[2]

After answers to the ejectment suits were filed but before hearing on the
merits, the Republic started court proceedings for the expropriation of Manotok’s land (including the portions herein involved) for
resale to tenants under Republic Act 1162.^[3] By that law,^[4] “ejectment
proceedings against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas
or lands herein authorized to be expropriated, shall be suspended for a period
of two years, upon motion of the defendant, if he pays his current rentals, and such suspension shall con­tinue upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings until the final determination of the latter”.^[5] Parenthetically, it may be stated that this
Court, in a decision promulgated on
July 31, 1964, has ruled that Manotok’s said land may not be expropriated under Republic
Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 2342.^[6]

Prior to our decision in
the expropriation case, i.e., on July 11, 1960, after hearing the question of
rents due and current, respondent city court judge Gregorio N. Garcia ordered
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings against
petitioners Linkod Juane
and Ruperto Suñga and
directed them to pay back and current rentals.

On July 23,
1960, a similar
order was rendered in the other ejectment case
against petitioner Flora Antonio.

Respondent judge Garcia
disallowed the appeals lodged by Linkod Juane and Ruperto Suñga against the order of July 11, 1960 and by Flora Antonio against that of July 23,
1960.

It was at this point that
petitioners joined hands and petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila
for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari with a prayer for prohibitory-mandatory injunction questioning
the disallowance of their appeals.^[7]

After hearing, Judge
Gustavo Victoriano issued the preliminary injunction
prayed for.  But, on March
17, 1961 Judge Victoriano
dismissed the petition because the July 11 and July 23 orders of respondent
city judge Garcia are interlocutory.  A
last move to reconsider the judgment of Judge Victoriano
was denied by respondent judge Gaudencio Cloribel in his order of January 22, 1962.

Meanwhile – and with the
injunction of the court of first instance out of the way – on December 12 and
18, 1961, respondent judge Garcia heard the two ejectment
cases on the merits separately,^[8]
upon notices of hearing dated November
27, 1961.  These notices were
sent to petitioners’ counsel at his address – Room 313 Cu Unjieng Building, Dasmariñas Street, Manila.  But said notices were returned to the court
by respondent sheriff because Room 313 was found vacant, closed and locked.  Defendants in said ejectment
suits (petitioners herein) did not appear on the respective dates of trial.

On the same dates, December 12 and 18, 1961, respondent judge
Garcia promulgated two separate judgments ordering petitioners to vacate their
respective premises and to pay rentals due.

Then, on March
21, 1962,
petitioners lodged with the court of first instance a second petition
for certiorari, mandamus and relief from judgment with preliminary injunction
contesting the jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.^[9]
But respondent judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in his order of April 16, 1962, refused to grant the preliminary
injunction prayed for.  Two motions far
reconsideration of this order failed of their purpose.

This paved the way for
the issuance of two demolition orders – both dated July 30, 1962 – by respondent city judge Garcia in
execution of the two judgments aforesaid.

Petitioners came to this
Court on September 3, 1962 on certiorari and mandamus with prohibitory-mandatory
injunction.^[10]  We
dismissed said petition.^[11] Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals for
the same purpose.  They there prayed, inter
alia, for a permanent injunc­tion, declaration
of nullity of the July 11 and 23, 1960 orders and the judgments of December 12
and 18, 1961 – all of respondent judge Garcia – and for a writ of pre­liminary
injunction to restrain execution of the judgments and the demolition
orders.  The Court of Appeals, on January
31, 1963, dismissed
the petition.  Ground:  The Court of Appeals had no appellate jurisdiction over the orders and decrees of city courts;
consequently, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition aforesaid.  Motions to reconsider and to amend their
petition by including the CFI judges (respondents herein) as re­spondents
therein were summarily rejected by the Court of Appeals.

We now come to the case
before us.  Petitioners seek to
annul:  (1) the city court orders of July
11 and 23, 1960, (2) the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case 44339 refusing certiorari to nullify the foregoing orders, (3) the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case 49929 denying petitioners’
petition for preliminary injunction to stave off demolition and its refusal to
hear and try the merits of the petition for certiorari
filed before it, and (4) the Court of Appeals’ resolution dismissing their
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

On April
22, 1963, we granted
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners.

This Court, on November 19, 1963, allowed Manotok
to intervene.

1.  As we assess the merits of the petition before us, we find
it convenient to first dispose of petitioners’ argument that it was wrong both
for the city court and the court of first instance to disallow appeal from the
orders of July 11 and 23, 1960.  Said
courts below ruled that these orders were interlocutory and therefore not appealable.  We
agree.

We first go to the nature
of these two orders.  Since the rate of
monthly rentals is disputed, it became necessary for the city court to
ascertain “the current rentals”, payment of which is required as a
condition precedent for the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings upon the pro­visions of Section 5, Republic Act 1162 as amended,
and our ruling in Samia vs. Reyes, L-14760, May
31, 1963.  The city court’s orders of
July 11 and 23, 1960 besides ordering suspension of the proceedings also fixed
the amount of rentals in arrears as well as the current rentals to
be paid by petitioners to Manotok, their lessor.

By no stretch of
the imagination may the disputed orders be placed in the category of final and appeal­able. 
Precisely, those orders were issued in the course of the proceedings for
the suspension of the ejectment suits.  Suspension itself connotes
the idea of work unfinished.  Unfinished
because the ejectment suits at that time had yet to
be decided on their merits.  The
questioned orders did not completely dispose of the controversy.  Further court action – a substantial one – must take place.  Said orders then are clearly inter­locutory.  No appeal lies therefrom.^[12]

More to this.  The ejectment
litigations were only finally decided by the city court in its judgments on the
merits of December 12 and 18, 1961.

The orders of July 11 and
23, 1960 being inter­locutory and therefore unappealable
rejection of the appeal both by the city court and the court of first instance was proper.

2.  Petitioners seek
annulment of the city court judgments of December 12 and 18, 1961.  They gripe
that their counsel did not receive notices of trial in the two ejectment cases.  We
do not go along with petitioners.

There is no question that the address of record of counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Ruperto Suñga,
is Room 313 Cu Unjieng Building, Dasmariñas Street, Manila.  Respondent sheriff tried to serve said
notices of trial at the address just mentioned. 
He found the room vacant, closed and locked.  So, the notices
were unserved. 
This is a situation brought about by the negligence of counsel.  He did not inform the court of his change of
address.  It is a duty incumbent upon him
to do so.^[13]

The time has come, we
believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar that it is their
inescapable duty to make of record their correct address in all cases in which
they are counsel for a suitor.  For,
instances there have been in the past when, because of failure to inform the
court of the change of address, litigations were delayed.  And this, not to speak of inconvenience
caused the other parties and the court. 
Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such
negligence on the part of their counsel. 
It is painful enough for a litigant to suffer a setback in a legal
battle.  It is doubly painful if defeat
is occasioned by his attorney’s failure to receive notice because the latter
has changed the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor.  It is only
when some such situation comes about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize
the grave responsibility that he has incurred both to his client and to the
cause of justice.  It is then that the
lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly declared that he
“will conduct” himself “as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion”.  Too late.  Experience
indeed is a good teacher.  To a
lawyer, though, it could prove very expensive.

3.  The considerations just
adverted to deter us from nullifying the judgments of the city court of
December 12 and 18, 1961 in the ejectment cases.  Clearly, there was no abuse of discretion on
the part of the city court.  Of no
importance is petitioners’ charge that respondent city judge had personal
knowledge of Suñga’s change of address.  It
has no basis in fact.  His petition for certiorari
in Civil Case 44339, CFI, Manila, does not reflect the new address, as Suñga claims. 
Anyway, notices of hearing are ordinarily taken care of by clerks, who
are naturally guided by addresses of record. 
To require the judge himself to look after the
simple ministerial function of sending notices is to add another burden to an
already heavily burdened position.

Opportunity to be heard was given.  Petitioners lost that opportunity because of
their lawyer’s negligence.  There was due
process.  The city court had jurisdiction
to decide the case.  Certiorari to annul said judgments filed with the Court of Appeals
on behalf of said petitioners will not prosper. 
Neither will a plea for the other extraordinary writs.

At any rate, certiorari or similar writs may not
issue from the Court of Appeals.  For,
the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction.  In Philippine Products Co. vs. The Court of Appeals,^[14] we ruled that by statute the Court of
Appeals may only issue a writ of certiorari
and similar writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.  That is to say, if the main case is appealable to the Court of Appeals, a special civil action
for certiorari on a matter incidental
thereto may be brought to said court. 
The main cases here are for ejectment.  The city court’s judgments in said cases are appealable to the Court of First Instance, not to the Court
of Appeals.  Petitioners’ belated attempt
– after dismissal of their case by the Court of Appeals – to include as party
re­spondents in the Court of Appeals the judges of the Court of First Instance
of Manila here involved does not change the picture.  It is enough to say once again that those
judges committed no abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, there is no infirmity in the Court of Appeals’ decision
dismissing petitioners’ petition therein.

The net result of all the
foregoing is that no error exists in any of the proceedings taken by respondents which would call for the exercise of this Court’s supervisory
powers.

Accordingly, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
herein is hereby dismissed; and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is dissolved.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro,
Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on leave.

^[1]
Civil Case 74769, Municipal Court of Manila, Branch I, entitled “Manotok Realty, Inc., Plaintiff, versus Linkod Juane and Ruperto Suñga, Defendants”.

^[2]
Civil Case 78529, Municipal Court of Manila, Branch I, entitled “Manotok Realty, Inc., Plaintiff, versus Flora
Antonio, Defendant”.

^[3]
Civil Case 43275, Court of First Instance of Manila.

^[4]
Section 5 of Republic Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 1599 enacted without
executive approval on June 17, 1956.

^[5]
See:  Prieto
vs. Enriquez, 106 Phil. 1103, 1109.

^[6]
Republic of the Philippines
vs. Manotok Realty, Inc., L-20204, July 31,
1964.

^[7]
Civil Case 44339, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, entitled “Linkod Juane, Ruperto
Suñga and Flora Antonio, Petitioners, versus Hon.
Gregorio N. Garcia, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila and Manotok Realty, Incorporated, Respondents.”

^[8]
On December 12, 1961 Manotok’s Case against Flora Antonio was heard.  The other case against Linkod
Juane and Ruperto Suñga was heard on December
18, 1961.

^[9]
Civil Case 49929, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, entitled “Linkod Juane, Ruperto
Suñga, and Flora Antonio, Petitioners, versus
Hon. Gregorio N. Garcia, as Presiding Judge of Branch I of the Municipal Court
of Manila, The Sheriff of the City of Manila,
and Manotok Realty, Incorporated, Respondents”.

^[10]
L-20214, entitled “Linkod Juane,
et al., versus Hon. Gregorio Garcia, etc., et al.”

^[11]
See:  Resolution of this Court in
L-20214, dated September 6, 1962.

^[12]
See:  Salazar vs. de Torres, 58 O.G. No. 9, pp. 1713, 1717,
where we held:  “Courts have defined
a final order or judgment which is appealable as one which either terminates the action
itself or operates to vest some right in such manner as to put it out of the power of the court making the order to place the parties in their
original condition”.  Citing Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, Lawyers’ Journal, Vol. XIV, p. 305.  See also:  Bairan vs.
Tan Siu Lay, 18 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 1235, 1239, where we ruled:  “It is settled that a court order is
final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, leaving thereafter no substantial
proceeding to be had in connection therewith
except its execution; and, contrary wise, that a given court order is merely of
an interlocutory character if it is provisional and leaves substantial
proceedings to be had in connection with its subject in the court by whom it
was issued”; and Allied Free Workers’ Union vs. Estipona, 3 Supreme Court Reports Anno.
780, 783, where we held:  “Consequently,
when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory”.

^[13]
See:  Enriquez vs. Bautista,
79 Phil. 220, 222, where we held: 
“It is noteworthy that the registered letter of the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Bataan containing a copy
of the order in question was sent to the very address given by petitioners’
attorney in the petition for intervention, and there is no showing that the clerk
of court was ever notified by him of any change
of address. The excuse that the attorney did not stay in one place
permanently, cannot be accepted, inasmuch as an attorney owes it to himself and
to his clients to invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving
promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address of
record”.  See also:  Martinez
vs. Martinez, 90 Phil. 697,
700.

^[14]
21 Supreme Court Reports Anno.
870, 874.