PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. DIANA KYLA DELA CRUZ Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DE GUIA-SALVADOR, R., J.:
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 199, (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-0711, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused DIANA KYLA DELA CRUZ,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Other Acts of Abuse
(penalized under Sec. 10(a) RA No. 7610. This court hereby imposes an
Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as its minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as its
maximum period with the accessory penalty provided for by law. Accused
is further directed to indemnify the victim the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS as moral damages.The period under which accused has remained under detent[i]on
shall be credited to her in full provided that she agreed and complied
with the rules and regulation of the City jail.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the parties.
SO ORDERED.”
The Indictment
On 04 August 2008, an Information was filed by the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City charging accused-appellant Diana Kyla Dela
Cruz (appellant) with violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610 (RA 7610),
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, for physically assaulting the 15-year-old AAA[1], as follows:
“That on or about [the] 28th day of May 2008, in the
City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [appellant], did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit an act of abuse against [AAA], a fifteen (15)
year old minor, by then and there grabbing her hair and kicking her leg;
which acts debase[d], degrade[d] and demean[ed] the intrinsic worth of
the minor as a human being, and the same is prejudicial to the
minor-complainant’s mental and psychlogical development.”[2]
When arraigned on 04 November 2008,[3] appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses private
complainant AAA, her parents (Norma and Lauro), and Mayona Malibong (Mayona), AAA’s neighbor and an eyewitness to the incident.
For the defense, appellant and Dr. Blesilda Asuncion testified.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution’s version of
the physical confrontation between AAA and appellant as follows:
“In 2007, [AAA] was a 15-year-old high school student. The
prosecution showed that during that year, the [appellant] began showing
animosity to [AAA] after her live-in partner tried to court [AAA] for a
week. The [appellant] would send unpleasant messages to [AAA] and
spread sexual rumors about her.On 28 May 2008, the [appellant](who was with a companion named
Cherry Joy Santos) confronted [AAA] inside a store and angrily asked her
why she called the [appellant] ‘malandi‘ (slutty) and ‘pokpok‘ (prostitute)….[AAA] remained silent and turned away from the [appellant] after
the alleged confrontation. The [appellant] suddenly pulled [AAA’s]
hair and kicked her legs while shouting ‘malandi’ and ‘pokpok’. AAA
allegedly sustained a lump on her head and felt pain in her legs, but
did not undergo medical examination.
x x x x x x x x x”[4]
Version of the Defense
Appellant admitted the confrontation between her and AAA in
the afternoon of 28 May 2008 inside a neighborhood store, but claimed
that it was AAA who attacked her first.
Appellant related that
she was the live-in partner of Geralvin Mateo with whom she had two
children. Sometime in 2006, appellant learned of AAA’s romantic relation
with Geralvin Mateo, and decided to part ways with him. When Mateo
decided to reconcile with appellant, AAA started spreading rumors that
appellant was slutty (malandi) and a prostitute (pokpok). On 28 May 2008, appellant chanced upon AAA and calmly asked her why she was spreading such rumors. AAA angrily replied: “Why?” Is it not true?”
When appellant turned her back to leave, AAA suddenly grabbed
her arm and pulled her hair. Appellant could not fight back as AAA’s
cousin and father joined the fray. As a result, appellant sustained
bruises and scratches on her arms and neck.
Dra. Blesida Asuncion issued a Medical Certification (Exhibit “1”)[5] noting the following injuries of appellant that she treated on the date of the incident:
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x”
The RTC’s Ruling
In the Decision dated 08 February 2013, the RTC found that appellant’s act of badmouthing AAA with words such as “pokpok” and “malandi”,
as well as simultaneously hurting her, falls squarely under the
definition of child abuse under Section 10(a) of RA 7610. It accorded
great weight and consideration to AAA’s testimony for being consistent
and without any taint of uncertainty as to the circumstances surrounding
the incident, for manifesting no doubt as to the identity of appellant
as the assailant, and for having been corroborated by an eyewitness.
Further, it noted the ill-motive on the part of appellant to badmouth
and physically assault AAA, ostensibly provoked by the alleged romantic
liaison between the latter and appellant’s live-in partner. In rejecting
appellant’s version that AAA started the fight between them, it held
that while there was a medical certificate showing that appellant had
sustained injuries, there was no proof who had caused them. It also
stressed that while appellant had filed a complaint for physical
injuries, she admitted that the complaint was not against AAA but
against the latter’s father and cousin.
The Issue
Aggrieved, appellant filed the present appeal, urging the reversal of her conviction on the ground that:
“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT]
OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE
HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”[6]
Appellant argues that the inconsistencies and improbabilities in
the evidence for the prosecution warrant the reversal of the judgment of
conviction. First, private complainant AAA testified that only the
appellant physically assaulted her, while prosecution witness Mayona
testified that not just the appellant, but also her companion, Cherry
Joy, assaulted AAA.[7]
Second, on clarificatory questions of the trial court, AAA belied her
own testimony and that of Mayona that she did not fight back when
appellant attacked her.[8]
Third, the failure of AAA to submit herself to medical examination is a
positive indication that she was neither assaulted by appellant nor
sustained injuries therefrom.[9]
The Solicitor General counters that the alleged
inconsistencies will not alter the verdict of conviction, and stresses
that Mayona corroborated AAA’s account that appellant physically
assaulted her.[10] Further, it
argues that AAA’s failure to consult a doctor regarding her injuries
hardly indicated that AAA did not suffer an injury from the attack of
appellant. It also pointed out that “physical harm” is not an element of the crime of child abuse punished under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610.[11]
The basic issue is whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal partly impressed with merit.
Evidently, the resolution of this appeal hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies. The rule is settled that the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of their probative weight, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate court high
respect, if not conclusive effect, precisely because of the unique
advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range
the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they testify.[12]
Unless the trial court has overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted
cogent facts of substance which if considered might affect the result of
the case,[13] appellate courts are not inclined to disturb the factual determinations of the trial court.
Our judicious review of the records yielded no cogent reason
that would warrant a departure from this settled principle. The trial
court correctly gave credence to the account of AAA whose testimony is
consistent and without any taint of uncertainty as to the circumstances
surrounding the incident.[14]
AAA testified with clear details on how appellant unleashed her pent-up
anger on the former when they met by chance at a neighborhood store on
28 May 2008, thus:
and my mother enrolled in school. My mother instructed me to buy a load
for our phone. While I was talking to the person tending the store, she
called my name. She had a woman companion.
started to pull my hair. She kicked my legs. There were many people
around at that time. I was able to grab her and then, the money was even
torn.
For her part, appellant denied having physically abused
AAA, insisting that it was the latter who attacked her first, and as a
result thereof, she sustained bruises and scratches on her arms and
neck. Appellant’s bare denial, however, cannot prevail over AAA’s
direct, positive and categorical assertion. Mere denial of involvement
in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. Unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
appellant’s denial cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the
credible and straightforward testimony of the victim, like AAA, who
testified on affirmative matters.[16]
Further, We find appellant’s failure to file a complaint against AAA
runs counter to the normal human conduct and behavior of one who feels
truly aggrieved by the act complained of. As correctly noted by the
trial court, appellant admitted having filed a complaint for physical
injuries against the father and cousin of AAA, but not against the
latter despite her claim that it was AAA who attacked her first.
The law under which appellant was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a) of RA 7160, which provides:
“Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxx xxx xxx”
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
“Section 3. Definition of terms. –
x x x x
(b) “Child Abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.xxx xxx xxx”
Although We affirm the factual findings of the RTC to the effect
that appellant grabbed the hair of AAA and kicked her leg, We disagree
with its ruling that such acts of appellant constituted child abuse
within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. As borne by the
evidence on record, appellant was angry at AAA because of the latter’s
alleged past romantic liaison with appellant’s live-in partner, Geralvin
Mateo.[17] Hence, when they
met by chance at a neighborhood store, appellant, in anger and at the
spur of the moment, grabbed and pulled the hair, and kicked the leg of
AAA. However, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that such acts of appellant had been intended to debase, degrade
and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA as a human being, or
that appellant had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass the child.
In the case of Bongalon vs. People,[18]
the Supreme Court explained that not all acts of physical assault on a
minor constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA
7610. It is only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse; otherwise, it is punished under
the Revised Penal Code. In the said case, the Supreme
Court acquitted the accused of the crime of violation of Section 10 (a)
RA No. 7610 since the records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused’s laying of hands on the minors had been intended to
debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of the child as a human being,
or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass the child. The
High Court found that the laying of hands was done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, which was indicative of the accused being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own
minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of the minor
victims. It stressed that with the loss of his self-control, the accused
lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse.
In any event, aware of the need to establish the psychological impact of appellant’s physical attack on AAA, the RTC directed[19]
a social worker to conduct a case study on AAA and to submit a report.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, Social Welfare Officer II Ma. Edna
Picato made no assessment in the Social Case Study Report[20]
as to whether AAA felt debased by the 28 May 2008 incident, but merely
recommended that an in-depth Psycho-Social analysis of the subject minor
be made by the personnel of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).[21] Not to
mention, AAA’s mother admitted during cross-examination that she is in
possesion of the said DSWD report, but the prosecution never offered the
same in evidence. We view such omission in the context of the
disputable presumption that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”[22]
All said, guided by the ruling in Bongalon vs. People,[23]
We rule that appellant cannot be held criminally liable for child abuse
under Section 10(a) of RA 7610 for failure of the prosecution to
establish with moral certainty that appellant’s act of grabbing the hair
and kicking the leg of the minor AAA was specifically aimed to debase
the latter’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, or to
humiliate or embarrass her.
Despite its failure to prove the charge of child abuse under
Section 10(a) of RA 7610 as stated earlier on, the prosecution was able
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had pulled the hair
and kicked the leg of AAA, which constitutes the crime of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC), to wit:
“Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period;2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance;3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine
not exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed
without causing any injury.
There being no proof of the required medical attendance or the
period of AAA’s incapacity for labor as a result of the injuries
inflicted by the appellant, the latter may only be held criminally
liable for slight physical injuries[24] under Article 266 (2) of the RPC, the penalty for which is arresto menor,
which ranges from one (1) day to thirty (30) days of imprisonment, or a
fine not exceeding twenty (Php20) pesos and censure. With the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable as the penalty prescribed
does not exceed one year and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the appellant shall suffer a straight penalty
of 10 days of arresto menor.
As to appellant’s civil laibility, moral damages compensate
for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the
victim and his family as a proximate result of the wrongful act of the
accused and requires no proof of pecuniary loss.[25]
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. For
less serious and slight physical injuries, jurisprudence[26]
fixes the award of moral damages at Php5,000.00. Having been found
guilty of slight physical injuries, appellant is therefore liable to pay
AAA such amount in moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the appealed 08 February 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 199, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered finding appellant Diana Kyla Dela Cruz GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries under
Article 266(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, she is sentenced
to suffer the straight penalty of ten (10) days of arresto menor, and ordered to PAY private complainant AAA moral damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Garcia and Bueser, JJ., concur.
[1] Republic Act No. 7610
(An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And For Other Purposes);
Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women And Their
Children, Providing For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, And For Other Purposes); and Section 40 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC (Rule On Violence Against Women And Their Children) mandate
that in cases involving violence against women and their children, the
identity of the victim or any information which could establish or
compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or
household members, shall be withheld.
[2] Records, p. 01.
[3] Id., p. 86.
[4] Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[5] Records, p. 261.
[6] Rollo, p. 25.
[7] Id., pp. 30-31.
[8] Id., pp. 31-32.
[9] Id., p. 33.
[10] Id., p. 63.
[11] Id., p. 64.
[12] People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, 5 December 2012, cited in People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, 13 January 2013.
[13] People v. Escleto,
G.R. No. 183706, 25 April 2012; People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, 26
January 2013; Nombrefia vs. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30, 2007,
citing People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA
260, 265-266.
[14] Page 06 of the assailed Decision.
[15] TSN, 25 November 2008, pp. 11-15.
[16] People vs. An, G.R. No. 169870, 04 August 2009
[17] See Exhibit “A,” Records, p. 161.
[18] G.R. No. 169533, 20 March 2013.
[19] Records, p. 92.
[20] Records, p. 117.
[21] Id., p. 118.
[22] Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
[23] supra
[24] People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398.
[25] See Caprio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004, citing Art. 2217, Civil Code, Fule v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 349 [1998], and Zulueta v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 151 Phil. 1 (1973).
[26] People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, 7 September, 2011, 657 SCRA 270, cited in Bongalon v. People, supra.