G.R. No. L-42679. May 25, 1979

GRACIANO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, SPOUSES MARIANO ILAGAN AND MARIA FLORES AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF TARLAC PROVINCE, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 25, 1979 FIRST DIVISION DE CASTRO, J.:
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DE CASTRO, J.:


Filed as a petition for review by certiorari, the instant
petition was treated as a special civil action by Resolution of this Court
dated April 26, 1976 (p.
78, Rollo).

In his petition, petitioner complains against the dismissal by
the respondent Court of Appeals of his appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 4569,
entitled “Graciano Santos vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al”, for the annulment of foreclosure proceedings and
all incidents thereof, including the deed of absolute sale, and the Transfer
Certificate of Title (No. 85462) in the name of the defendant Maria Flores, one
of the respondents herein.   The decision
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, among
others, dismissed the complaint of petitioner who, thereupon, interposed an
appeal therefrom, after his motion for new trial was
denied.

The ground of the dismissal of the appeal by the respondent Court
of Appeals, as was also the ground of the “Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal” filed by the defendant Philippine National Bank in Civil Case No.
4569 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac is, as
the Resolution of the Court dated November 29, 1974 (pp. 17-19, Rollo, Annex “D”, Petition) states:

“It is thus evident that the record on appeal suffers from jurisdictional
defects.  There is no way from which to
determine when the period for appeal should commence and when it expired.  As held by the Supreme Court, where nothing
is stated in the record on appeal regarding the date when the appellant
received the notice or copy of the appealed order or judgment, such omission is
fatal to the appeal (Government vs. Antonio, 15 SCRA
119; Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA
73; Anota vs. Bermudo, Jr.,
25 SCRA 43). 
Such date is important in the determination of whether or not the record
on appeal was filed on time (DBP vs. Santos, L-26387,
September 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 113).”

The ruling relied upon by the respondent court has already been
modified by later cases, among which are Krueger vs. CA, L-41063, January 20,
1976, 69 SCRA 50; Villanueva vs. CA, L-29719,
November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216; Pan American World
Airways, Inc. vs. Espiritu, January 20, 1976, 69 SCRA 36.  From the
uniform doctrine enunciated in these later cases, to the effect that the
failure to show on the fact of the Record on Appeal the date when the
petitioner received the decision of the trial court, and such other data to
show that the appeal was duly perfected, is not a fatal defect, the trial
court’s approval of the Record on Appeal having served to cure whatever defects
or omissions there are.  (See also Garcia
vs. CA, et al., L-35234, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 149;
Garcia vs. CA, L-34620, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 609;
Del Rosario vs. Cunanan, L-37903, March 30, 1977, 76 SCRA 136; Libongco vs. CA,
L-39439, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 333, Pajarillo vs. CA, L-38344, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 151; Gregorio vs. CA, L-39393, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 608; Cabalza vs. CA,
L-37996, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 593; Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes vs. CA,
L-39277, October 24, 1976, 73 SCRA 593; Morales vs.
CA, L-37229, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 304; Republic
vs. CA, L-40495-96, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322).

An examination of the Record on Appeal (Annex “A” to
Petition, p. 32, Rollo) shows that, upon motion of
the petitioner for the approval of the Record on Appeal, which was alleged
therein as “having been filed within the reglementary
period”, the trial court approved the Record on Appeal (p. 114, R.A.).  With this
fact clearly appearing on the Record on Appeal, the defect upon which the
respondent court predicated its dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was deemed
cured and, therefore, cannot serve to give legal justification to its act of
dismissing the appeal.

Private respondents, however, question the propriety of treating
the petition not as a review by certiorari, but as a special civil action.  They point to the fact that as an appeal by
certiorari, the petition was filed out of time under the provision of Section
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“A party may appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court
of Appeals by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari within 15
days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration
filed in due time and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the
corresponding fee.  The petition shall
not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals.”

In the face of the patent error of respondent court in dismissing
the appeal of the petitioner on a ground no longer valid in the light of the
liberalized doctrines laid down in more recent cases than those relied upon by
the respondent court, it would be a manifest injustice were the action taken by
said court to deprive, in an illegal way, petitioner’s right to appeal, left
uncorrected.  When compelling reasons
exist, as in this case, to depart from a strict procedural prescription in
order to attain substantial justice, such lapse of procedure would take on the
character of a mere technicality which can not be allowed to be a hindrance to
dispensing real and substantial justice (Gregorio vs. CA, L-43511, July 28,
1976, 72 SCRA 120; Obut vs.
CA, et al., L-40535, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 546;
Villanueva vs. CA, L-29719, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA
216; Rodriguez, et al. vs. CA, et al, L-37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262; Berkenkotter vs. CA,
L-36629, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).  In thus treating the instant petition as a
special civil action, the dictates of equity and justice have been what this
Court has harkened to, in obedience to the injunction of applying the rules of
procedure with liberality with a view to attaining substantial justice (Araneta vs. Doronilla, L-34882,
August 24, 1976, L-35643, August 24, 1976, 72 SCRA
413.  Canturna vs. CA, et al. L-40934, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 563; Pan American World Airways
Inc. vs. Espiritu, L-35401,
January 20, 1976, 69 SCRA 36).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution appealed from should be as it is
hereby reversed.  The appeal of
petitioner is ordered reinstated, for proper further action or
proceedings.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernandez, J., took no part.