PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILSON CELESTIAL, JR. Y VACNOT @ “;JAY-AR”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Celestial versus People

The Case

This is the case of Celestial versus People, an appeal by Wilson Celestial, Junior, also known as Jay-Ar, from a judgment of conviction for rape through sexual assault in relation to Republic Act Number 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The victim is an eight-year-old girl whom the Court calls AAA. The case matters because it settles a question every bar candidate must be able to answer: when an adult inserts his finger into the genitalia of a child below twelve years of age, which law supplies the penalty — the Revised Penal Code, which punishes rape by sexual assault with prision mayor, or Republic Act Number 7610, which imposes the stiffer reclusion temporal in its medium period? The Court answers that the child-protective statute applies, and it does so on the strength of a lone but credible testimony of a child.

Procedural History

An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, charging the appellant with rape in relation to Republic Act Number 7610. On February 19, 2008, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits followed, with the prosecution presenting five witnesses and the defense presenting only the appellant himself. On July 11, 2013, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault in relation to Republic Act Number 7610, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve years, ten months, and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to fifteen years, six months, and twenty days of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordering him to pay AAA thirty thousand pesos as civil indemnity, thirty thousand pesos as moral damages, and thirty thousand pesos as exemplary damages. From that judgment the appellant elevated the case directly to the Supreme Court by appeal, raising the lone assignment of error that the trial court gravely erred in finding his guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

On November 16, 2007, at around eleven o'clock in the morning, the eight-year-old AAA was alone at home. She had just taken a bath and went inside her room to get dressed, wrapped only in a towel. The appellant, then twenty-five years old and a long-time neighbor of her family, entered the house and followed her into the room. She asked him why he had entered without knocking, and he went out.

He came back, made her sit down, and inserted his right index finger into her vagina, causing her pain. She hit him and stood up. He laid her down again and repeatedly kissed her on the cheeks. As she was crying, he removed his shorts and underwear and again inserted his finger into her genitalia. She got up, hit him on the shoulders, and told him she would report the incident to her father. He then left at once.

When her older brother arrived, she told him what happened, and he went looking for the appellant. When her mother came home at about a quarter past eleven and saw her crying, AAA narrated the abuse. They reported the matter to the barangay authorities, and the appellant was apprehended the same day and positively identified by AAA at the barangay hall. He was turned over to the Women and Children Protection Desk of the Las Piñas Police Station. The medico-legal examination showed no laceration of the hymen, but the hymen was congested or swollen, the perihymenal region and posterior fourchette were abraded and congested, and the labia minora was likewise congested — findings suggestive of sexual abuse, consistent with the insertion of a blunt object such as a finger. The social case study reported that AAA trembled during her interview, was still in pain recalling the incident, and had become afraid to stay alone in the house.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault in relation to Republic Act Number 7610.
• Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, and the appellant's claim that he was unarmed and that she could have escaped, cast reasonable doubt on his culpability.
• Whether or not the penalty for the act should be that provided under the Revised Penal Code for rape through sexual assault, rather than the stiffer penalty under Republic Act Number 7610.

Applicable Provisions

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed — 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

This is the provision that defines the act committed, rape by sexual assault, committed by inserting an instrument or object into the genital orifice of another.

Section 5, Article III of Republic Act Number 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

This is the provision that supplies the stiffer penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period because the victim is a child below twelve years of age.

Section 2, paragraph h of the rules and regulations of Republic Act Number 7610 defines lascivious conduct as:

the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

This definition brings the insertion of a finger into the genitalia within the reach of the child-protective statute.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal is bereft of merit and that the prosecution sufficiently proved the appellant's guilt of rape through sexual assault. The trial court correctly gave full credence to AAA's testimony, finding her answers on direct and cross-examination candid and unwavering. The Court stressed the age-old rule that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court, which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. The medical findings and the social case study report were consistent with AAA's narration and her reaction to the abuse. The Court also held that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible and free from fatal and material inconsistencies, can be the basis for conviction, especially where there is no showing of a strong ulterior motive to testify falsely, because rape involves two persons only and is usually perpetrated in seclusion. It added that a young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to a medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial, cannot easily be dismissed as mere concoction.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the appellant's arguments. Not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone, for the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. In any event, AAA actually exerted efforts to resist by hitting the appellant and telling him she would report the incident. As to the alleged inconsistencies, the Court held that minor contradictions which do not relate to the gravamen of the offense charged are to be expected in view of differences in impressions, memory, vantage points, and other related factors, and may even bolster credibility by erasing any suspicion of rehearsal. Against the overwhelming evidence, the appellant offered only bare denial, which is inherently weak, self-serving, and easy to fabricate, and which cannot prevail over categorical and consistent positive identification absent any showing of ill motive.

On the third issue, the Court held that since AAA was only eight years old during the commission of the offense, the penalty should not be that provided under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, punishing rape through sexual assault with prision mayor. Rather, it should be the penalty provided by Republic Act Number 7610, which provides the stiffer penalty of imprisonment by reclusion temporal in its medium period. The Court explained that it was not the intention of the framers of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 to disallow the applicability of Republic Act Number 7610 to sexual abuses committed against children, and that despite the passage of that law, Republic Act Number 7610 remains good law and must be applied when the victims are children. To impose the lesser penalty would be unfair to the child victim.

Doctrine

First, rape may now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through sexual assault, the latter commonly called rape by sexual assault, committed by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Second, when the victim of sexual abuse is a child below twelve years of age, the stiffer penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act Number 7610 applies, notwithstanding that the act would otherwise be punished with the lesser penalty of prision mayor under the Revised Penal Code. The child-protective statute remains good law and must be applied when the victims are children.

Third, the lone testimony of a child victim, if credible and free from fatal and material inconsistencies, and absent any showing of ill motive, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape, because the crime is usually committed in seclusion and the victim's testimony is often the only evidence available.

Fourth, minor contradictions that do not relate to the gravamen of the offense do not destroy credibility, and bare denial is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over categorical and consistent positive identification.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault in relation to Republic Act Number 7610 and sustaining the penalty and the awards of damages.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is this: when the victim of sexual assault is a child below twelve years of age, Republic Act Number 7610 supplies the stiffer penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period, not the prision mayor of the Revised Penal Code. Examiners use this case to test the hierarchy of penalties between the Revised Penal Code and the child-protective statute, and to test the weight given to the lone, credible testimony of a child victim.