ARNOLD J. DIAZ THRU HIS REPRESENTATIVE, RAFAEL J. DIAZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SOLEDAD NAMBAYAN AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING UNDER THEM, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
CRUZ, R.A., J.:
THE CASE
This is an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated January 20, 2012[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16 in Civil
Case N-7914, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“ xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Arnold J. Diaz, ordering the
defendant Soledad Nambayan and all persons claiming rights under her to (sic):1. To vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. To pay jointly and severally, the amount of Three Thousand
Pesos (P3,000.00) per month to plaintiff for the use and occupation of
the property from the time of the filing of the instant complaint until
the subject premises is actually vacated; and3. To pay jointly and severally, the amount of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees and One Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P1,500.00) per court appearance, with costs.SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx “
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 6, 2008, Arnold J. Diaz thru his representative
Rafael J. Diaz, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against Soledad Nambayan, as defendant, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No.
N-7914.[2]
On April 10, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend complaint and for admission of the Amended Complaint.[3] The allegations of the Amended Complaint[4] are quoted hereunder, viz:
” xxx xxx xx
2. That the plaintiff is true, lawful, registered and absolute
owner in fee simple of that parcel of land containing an area of TWO
HUNDRED (200) SQ. METERS as described and embraced in TCT No. T-22979 of
the Register of Deeds of Cavite City;3. That the plaintiff has declared the said property under Tax
Declaration No. 99-00204 of the City Assessor’s Office of Cavite xxx and
he has been (sic) likewise been paying continuously without fail the
real property tax on the said property and latest of which the payment
made for the year 2008 under Real Property Tax Official Receipt No.
9105633 dated December 26, 2007, xxx4. That sometime in the month of December 2005, the plaintiff
thru his representative Rafael J. Diaz, discovered, through information
from the Barangay officials of Brgy. 10-B and other persons from said
barangay that the defendants occupied the registered properties of the
plaintiff without any permission whatsoever from the owners of said
parcel of land, making them illegal occupants, interlopers, and
squatters of said parcel of land now owned by the plaintiff;5. That defendant and/or their predecessors in interest never
bothered and deliberately refused to check the land, either by
clarifying or verifying with the City Register of Deeds, the City
Assessor of Cavite or by a private land surveyor or a licensed Geodetic
Engineer if the land they possessed and occupying is a registered and
titled land or not;6. That after a relocation survey of the property latest of
which was conducted by Geodetic Engineer Rommel T. Bautista, on November
8, 2007, it was definitely verified and established that the defendant
and her family have possessed, occupied, trespassed the property of the
plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest and put up or erected a
residential building on the portion of the aforesaid property without
the consent of the plaintiff or his predecessors who is the registered
owner of the property, and that the defendant have physically
dispossessed the plaintiff and its previous owners illegally, alleging
and pretending and falsely claiming that the land is of public domain.
xxx xxx7. That the plaintiff failing to secure the voluntary removal of
the structures thereon erected by the defendant, to vacate and
surrender voluntarily the premises, brought cases for ejectment against
the defendant before the Lupon of Barangay 10B and for failure to reach
settlement the Lupon of Barangay 10B issued a Certificate to File Action
in court xxx xxx8. That in view of the obstinate refusal of the defendant to
vacate the premises, formal written demand dated Feburary 24, 2006 was
sent ot the defendant herein thru registered mail on February 28, 2006
and the written demand was duly received by the defendant xxx9. That inspite also of the written demand for her to vacate the
premises and remover her residential structures and surrender
possession of the said portion of land the defendant still obstinately
refuse to vacate the said premises and to dismantle the structures
thereon erected up to the present;10. That in view of the lack of verbal or written lease
agreement or verbal or written consent to occupy the said parcels of
land from the present owners and his predecessors in interest, it is
therefore evident that she occupied and built her house on the said
parcel of land illegally;11. That at present, the defendant has been illegally occupying
said parcel of land for MORE THAN ONE YEAR to be counted from December
2005 or the date when the plaintiff discovered the illegal occupation up
to March 3, 2008 or the time of the filing of this complaint. xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx “
By Order dated April 15, 2008,[5] the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.
In her Answer,[6]
defendant denied taking possession of any portion of the subject land.
She argued that she had lawful possession of the subject land since 1984
by virtue of an Agreement dated August 22, 2984 executed in her favor
by A. Sison & Sons, Inc., the former owner of the subject land.
In a Decision dated January 20, 2012,[7]
the RTC found that there was no valid transfer of the subject land from
A. Sison & Sons, Inc. to defendant. It also held that the
plaintiff, as the registered owner, has the right to enjoy and dispose
the subject property without other limitations than those established by
law, hence, it decreed that:
“ xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of Plainitff Arnold J. Diaz, ordering the
defendant Soledad Nambayan and all persons claiming rights under her to (sic):1. To vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. To pay jointly and severally, the amount of Three Thousand
Pesos (P3,000.00) per month to plaintiff for the use and occupation of
the property from the time of the filing of the instant complaint until
the subject premises is actually vacated; and3. To pay jointly and severally, the amount of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees and One Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P1,500.00) per court appearance, with costs.SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx “
Aggrieved, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal[8] which the RTC gave due course in its Order dated February 29, 2012.[9]
THE ASSIGNED ERRORS
Defendant, as appellant, raises the following arguments, that:
I. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE AND
PALPABLE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE HAS THE ABSOLUTE
RIGHT TO TAKE AND ENJOY FULL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY;1. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE AND
PALPABLE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE INDEFEASIBILITY OF A
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE APPLIES TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OBTAINED BY
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
Defendant-appellant, in her brief,[10] asserts that the only issue in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana is possession de facto
and not title. Since she immediately took lawful possession of the
subject land since August 22, 1984 and introduced improvements thereon,
she is entitled to remain thereon.
She adds that the rule on
indefeasibility of title is inapplicable because plaintiff-appellee
knows that she and her family have been occupying the subject property.
The latter cannot therefore be considered an innocent purchaser in good
faith.
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee maintains that he
has legal title and ownership over the subject land. And, as the
registered owner, he has a right to recover possession of the same from
the defendant-appellant who is unlawfully occupying the property.
He also claims that the arguments raised by defendant-appellant are
collateral attacks to the certificate of title which is prohibited under
Section 48, P. D. No. 1529. A certificate of title is not subject to
collateral attack and any issue as to the validity thereof can only be
raised in an action instituted for that purpose and not in an accion publiciana.
OUR RULING
Accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,
is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.[11] Otherwise stated,
if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one
of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[12] The issue involved is not possession de facto but possession de jure.[13]
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right
to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession.[14]
The complaint recites that plaintiff-appellee is the registered owner
of the land containing an area of two hundred square meters (200 sq. m.)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22979 (TCT No. T-22979) of
the Registry of Deeds of Cavite City. Sometime December 2005,
plaintiff-appellee discovered that defendant-appellant was occupying the
subject land and intorduced improvements thereon without his consent.
Thus, a Letter dated February 24, 2006 was sent demanding the latter to
vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. When
the demand went unheeded, plaintiff-appellee instituted a complaint for
recovery of possession on March 6, 2008. In her defense,
defendant-appellant also claim ownership over the subject land since she
had lawful possession thereof since 1984 by virtue of an agreement
dated August 22, 1984 executed in her favor by A. Sison & Sons,
Inc., the former owner of the subject land. The fundamental issue for
resolution in this case is who has better right to possess the subject
property. But before We can settle the same, the matter of ownership
must be first passed upon.
In civil cases, the law requires that
the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proving it.[15]
The party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.[16]
We find that the evidence preponderates in favor of
plaintiff-appellee. As established by the records, plaintiff-appellee
purchased the subject land from A. Sison & Sons, Inc. as evidenced
by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2005.[17] A Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22979 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite City[18]
was likewise presented showing that Arnold J. Diaz is the registered
owner thereof. He also adduced a copy of Tax Declaration No. 99-00204[19] in his name and an Official Receipt evidencing payment of real property tax[20] covering the subject land.
Jurisprudence teaches that a torrens title is evidence of indefeasible
title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title
appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is
entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including
possession.[21] Guided by the
foregoing principle, plaintiff-appellee, being the registered owner of
the property in question, therefore has the right to enjoy it[22]
including the right to exclude others from its enjoyment through proper
action against its possessor or holder in order to recover it.[23]
The TCT No. T-22979 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite issued in
plaintiff-appellee’s name vested in him the right of possession as a
necessary consequence of the right of ownership.
On the other
hand, defendant-appellant’s allegations are negated by the evidence on
record. We examined the unnotarized agreement dated August 22, 1984[24]
executed in favor of Nonilo Nambayan, the late husband of
defendant-appellant, and it provides for the following terms and
conditions: (a) that Nonilon Nambayan offered to buy Lot No. 2, Block 3
of the Cavite Sea Breeze Subdivision, located at Cavite City containing
an area of 200 sq.m. for an amount of P400.00 per sq.m. or a total of
P80,000.00, Philippine Currency; (b) that the downpayment in the amount
of P10,000.00 shall be paid together with the offer; (3) but the balance
of the purchase price payable in monthly installments including
interests were left blank.
A contract of sale is a contract by
which one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.[25]
Although the law does not expressly state that the parties must also
meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed,
otherwise there is no sale.[26]
Here, it appears that the parties to the agreement have yet to agree on
how and when the installments were to be paid. For Us, the absence of a
definite manner of payment of the purchase price of the subject land in
the agreement indicates that it is not a contract of sale.
In fact, Defendant-Appellant Soledad Nambayan, on cross-examination,[27]
admitted that the agreement entered into between A. Sison & Sons,
Inc. and Nonilon Nambayan is an offer to buy and not a contract of sale,
viz:
“ xxx xxx xxx
Also, she recounted that a deed of sale was not executed in her
favor because she was not able to pay the amount P80,000.00, Philippine
Currency to the seller. Her testimony[28] went as follows:
It is a basic rule that judicial admissions, verbal or written,
made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case, are conclusive on them. No evidence
is needed to prove the same and it cannot be contradicted unless it is
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.[29] The
records do not show any attempt on the part of defendant-appellant to
contradict her judicial admissions, either on the ground of palpable
mistake or by denying that she ever made the admission. These admissions
are therefore binding and conclusive on defendant-appellant and no
amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.
Besides, had the seller intended to transfer title, s/he could
have easily executed the document of sale in its required form
simultaneously with her/his acceptance of the partial payment, but s/he
did not. The absence of any formal deed of conveyance is a strong
indication that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of
ownership.[30] Plainly, as
against plaintiff-appellee’s Torrens title, defendant-appellant’s
purported agreement cannot confer better right to possess.
Even a perusal of the tax declarations[31]
issued in the name of Nonilon Nambayan, Jr., do not in any way
establish ownership over the subject land as they merely pertain to the
buildings and machinery. As preponderance of evidence tilt in favor of
plaintiff-appellee, there can be no other conclusion that
plaintiff-appellee, being the registered owner of the subject property,
should be placed in possession thereof.
We also find that
defendant-appellant’s second assigned error is an indirect and
collateral attack on plaintiff-appellee’s title which is not proper in
an accion publiciana.
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[32]
a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. A
collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different
relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made
against the judgment granting the title.[33] To reiterate, the objective in an accion publiciana
is simply to recover possession, not ownership. Hence, any issue
assailing the validity of the certificate of title registered in the
name of plaintiff-appellee can only be threshed out in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
The case of Vda. De Aguilar vs. Spouses Alfaro[34]
is instructive. There, it was held any issue on the validity of title
can only be raised in action expressly instituted for that purpose and
not in an accion publiciana, thus:
“ xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, respondents’ attack on the validity of petitioner’s
title by claiming that their mother became the true owner of the
southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354
constitutes as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack
incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in
an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.
This cannot be allowed. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a certificate
of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
— A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to
obtain a different relief and as an incident to the present action, an
attack is made against the judgment granting the title. 30 This manner
of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment
granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul,
set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
judgment had been disposed of. 31 Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan, therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana.
In his defense, defendant-appellant alleged among others that
plaintiff-appellee’s Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 was issued
under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we
rejected defendant-appellant’s defense on the ground that the issue on
the validity of said title can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals we arrived at the same conclusion and elaborated as follows:In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that
the issues of fraud and ownership raised in their so-called compulsory
counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which
they may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the
transfer certificate of title of private respondents. That theory will
not prosper.While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for
a relief different from those in the basic complaint in the case, it
does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate
and independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action
is subject to explicit conditions, as above set forth, particularly in
its required relation to the subject matter of opposing party’s claim.
Failing in that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an
altogether different and original action.It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify
the title of private respondents to the property in question, which
thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled
that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the
validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can
only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of
the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.
That should be threshed out in a proper action. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx “
All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, viz:
“ xxx xxx xxx
As the registered owner of the property under consideration,
plaintiff has the right to enjoy and dispose what is owned by him
without other limitations than those established by law. As owner, he
also has the right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order to recover it. He also possesses the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Articles 428-429, Civil Code).
Thus, as registered owner of the subject property, plaintiff has a
right to recover possession of the same from defendants who are
unlawfully occupying the property.Plaintiff’s claim that defendants have been illegally occupying
his property finds support in the findings of Geodetic Engineer Rommel
T. Baustista whose Verification Plan of Lot 2, Blk 3, (LRC) Pcs-8580 as
prepared for Arnold J. Diaz (Exhibit “E”) corresponding to TCT
No. T-22979 revealed that defendants have erected their
structures/houses within the boundary of plaintiff’s property.It is fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein (Velasquez, Jr., vs. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 309).
Where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under the
Torrens System, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be
given weight, and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to
the contrary, he (sic) holder thereof should considered as the owner of
the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in
an appropriate ordinary action (Go Kim Huy vs. Go Kim Huy, 365 SCRA 490).In the instant case, defendants, in support of their contention
that they own the land in question, presented a purported Contract to
Sell dated August 22, 1984 (Exhibit “1”) allegedly executed in
their favor by the land’s previous owner, A. Sison & Sons, Inc.
According to defendant Soledad Nambayan, a certain Danny Sison, whose
signature allegedly appears in the said document, sold the subject
property to her and her late husband by virtue of the said contract to
sell.To the mind of the Court, there was no valid transfer of
ownership of the subject property to the defendants as the latter were
not able to pay the full purchase price.
xxx xxx xxx
Herein, defendant Soledad Nambayan, on cross-examination by
Atty. Encarnacion and clarificatory questioning by the Court, admitted
that she was not able to pay the entire purchase price of Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00). It was her testimony that she only paid the
amount of Eight Thousand pesos (Php8,000.00) as downpayment, and an
un-receipted amount of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Danny Sison (TSN, March 28, 2011, pp. 12-13; 20-21).
Thus, the non-payment by the defendants of the full purchase price of
the subject property rendered the contract to sell ineffective and
without force and effect.Moreover, the tax declarations presented by the defendants (Exhibits “6”, “7” and “8”) pertains (sic)
only to the ownership of the buildings and machinery situated over the
subject property and not to that of the land, while the other documents
they have presented such as Certificate of Occupancy (Exhibit “2”),
Mayor’s Permit (Exhibit “3”), and Certificate of Residency (Exhibit “4”)
does not in anyway evidence their ownership of the land under
consideration and cannot prevail over TCT No. T-22979 registered in the
name of the plaintiff.A title once registered under the Torrens System cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it
be defeated by prescription. (Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 47).
It cannot thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged
or diminished, except in a direcrt proceeding permitted by law. (Seville vs. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112).
xxx xxx xxx “
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision dated January 20, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16 in Civil Case N-7914 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Abdulwahid (Chairperson) and Barza, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Honorable Judge Manuel A. Mayo; Records, pp. 150-166.
[2] Complaint, Ibid., pp. 1-6.
[3] Id., pp. 17-18.
[4] Amended Complaint; Id., pp. 19-24.
[5] Id., p. 33.
[6] Id., pp. 36-40.
[7] Supra, Note 1.
[8] Id., pp. 167-168.
[9] Id., p. 170.
[10] Defendant-Appellant’s Brief; Rollo, pp. 25-35.
[11] Aguilar vs.
Spouses Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010. Citing Bejar v. Caluag,
G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Barredo v.
Santiago, 102 Phil. 127, 130 (1957). Sps. Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529,
533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291 (1906);
Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908). Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R.
No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179; Lopez v. David, Jr.,
G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
[12] Spouses Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, et.al, G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006.
[13] De Leon, Hector
S., and De Leon, Hector M. Jr., Comments and Cases on Property, 3rd Ed.
(1998), p. 91. citing Caballero vs. Abellan, 15 Phil. 345 (1910); Reyes
vs. Sta. Maria,.91 SCRA 164 (1979); see De Leon vs. Court of Appeals,
245 SCRA 166 (1995).
[14] Tolentino vs.
Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 2012. citing Urieta Vda. De
Aquilar vs. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 143.
[15] Calibre
Traders, Inc., et.al. vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161431,
October 13, 2010. Citing Spouses Hutchison v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 261
(2005).
[16] Jison vs Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998. citing See 7 Vicente J.
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Evidence (Part
II, Rules 131-134), at 2-4, 542-543 [1973]
[17] Marked as Exhibit “H”, Records, pp.117-118.
[18] Marked as exhibit “B”, Ibid., p. 106.
[19] Marked as Exhibit “C”, id., p. 107.
[20] Marked as Exhibit “D”, id., p. 108.
[21] Tolentino, et.
al., vs. Laurel, et.al., G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 2012. Citing Caña
v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573,
February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238. Vda de. Aguilar vs. Spouses
Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010. citing See Baloloy v. Hular, 481
Phil. 398, 410 (2004). Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582, 594
(1997).
[22] Article 428 of the Civil Code.
[23] Article 429 of the Civil Code.
[24] Records, p. 139.
[25] Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
[26] San Miguel Properties Phil., Inc. vs. Huang, G.R.No. 137290, July 31, 2000.
[27] TSN dated March 28, 2011, pp. 12-13.
[28] TSN dated March 28, 2011. pp. 20-21.
[29] Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
[30] Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119255, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 54.
[31] Records, pp. 144-146
[32] Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
“ xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.
xxx xxx xxx “
[33] Madrid vs.
Spouses Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, August, 2009. citing Teoville Homeowners
Association, Inc. vs. Ferreira, G.R. No. 140086, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA
459, 474.
[34] G.R. No.
164402, July 5, 2010. citing Magay v. Estiandan 161 Phil. 586, 587
(1976). Co v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 108, 116 (1991).