LEONARDO GALEON, PETITIONER, VS. MARCIAL GALEON, ZOSIMA GALEON-CANDA, MATEO GALEON, AND COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH II, LUCENA CITY, RESPONDENTS.

Galeon versus Galeon

The Case

This is a petition for review by certiorari brought by Leonardo Galeon against his half-siblings, the legitimate children of the late Demetrio Galeon, together with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch Two, sitting in Lucena City. Leonardo sued for the partition of the estate of Demetrio Galeon, claiming to be the deceased's acknowledged illegitimate son. The trial court dismissed his amended complaint on the ground that he had no legal personality to sue, because his pleading contained no allegation or proof that his filiation had been duly established. The case matters because it fixes the pleading standard for a spurious child who sues for a share in the estate of a deceased putative father: what must the complaint allege, and what is deemed admitted when the defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Procedural History

Leonardo Galeon filed a complaint for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch Two, in Lucena City, and amended it in August 1963. The private respondents moved to dismiss on three grounds: that the petitioner had no legal capacity or personality to sue, that the amended complaint stated no cause of action, and that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. In an order dated February 2, 1966, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no legal personality to sue, because nowhere in his pleading was there an allegation or proof that his filiation had been duly established as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code. Leonardo then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review by certiorari, seeking reversal of that order.

Facts

Demetrio Galeon was married to Felisa Venal, and the private respondents are their only legitimate children. Leonardo Galeon alleges that he is the illegitimate, adulterous son of Demetrio, and that Demetrio during his lifetime acknowledged and recognized him as such an illegitimate child. Demetrio died intestate in September 1958, survived by his three legitimate children, his wife Felisa, and Leonardo.

Demetrio owned shares in six parcels of land, which passed upon his death to his heirs in intestacy. Felisa died intestate in March 1962, and her share in her husband's estate passed to her legitimate children as her only compulsory heirs. After their mother's death, the private respondents took possession of all the lands left by Demetrio, kept the fruits for themselves, and excluded Leonardo.

No partition has ever been made, and Leonardo has no assurance that the private respondents will agree to an extrajudicial partition. He therefore prayed that the court order partition of the estate, that the private respondents render an accounting of the produce, and that he be granted other just and equitable relief.

Issues

• Whether or not the amended complaint states a cause of action for partition, accepting the truth of its allegations, when it alleges that the plaintiff is the illegitimate son of the deceased who during his lifetime acknowledged and recognized him as such.
• Whether or not the allegation of acknowledgment and recognition is sufficient, though it does not state the manner or form in which the recognition was made.

Applicable Provisions

Article 278 of the New Civil Code, which the Court discusses as the provision governing the forms of voluntary recognition, provides:

Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.

The Court notes that the complaint does not state which of these modes was used, yet holds that this omission does not make the pleading dismissible.

Articles 287, 887 and 895 of the New Civil Code are cited as the source of the spurious child's right to inherit, and the Court reasons that acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of that right.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint does state a cause of action. The dismissal was in effect a dismissal for insufficiency of the averments to show a cause of action. On such a motion, the question is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact, not their truth, for the motion hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged. The test is whether, accepting the veracity of the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer. The trial court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations and find them false before a hearing on the merits; if it doubts their veracity, it must deny the motion and require an answer.

Applying that test, the Court held that the allegation substantially complies with the requirement laid down in Paulino versus Paulino, where it was held that acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of the right to inherit, and that without an allegation of acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition, which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The case at bar, the Court stressed, is not an action to compel recognition. It is an action by one who alleges as a matter of fact that he is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child, for the partition of the estate. Whether he was actually acknowledged is a question of fact for the trial. Since that acknowledgment was hypothetically admitted by the motion to dismiss, the dismissal was premature, deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to prove acknowledgment, and amounted to a denial of his day in court.

On the second issue, the Court conceded that the allegation is vague, since it does not state the manner or form of the voluntary recognition. But a complaint cannot be dismissed for being vague, ambiguous, or indefinite; the remedy of the defendant is to ask for more particulars or to compel disclosure through the methods of discovery. The real test of a good pleading is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial.

Doctrine

First, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the truth of the allegations is hypothetically admitted, and the court asks only whether those allegations, if true, would support a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer.

Second, a spurious child suing for a share in the estate of a deceased putative father must allege that the father acknowledged and recognized him as such, because acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of the right to inherit under Articles 287, 887 and 895 of the New Civil Code. If no acknowledgment is alleged, the action is one to compel recognition, which cannot be brought after the putative father's death.

Third, an allegation that the deceased during his lifetime acknowledged and recognized the plaintiff as his illegitimate child is sufficient against a motion to dismiss. The specific mode of recognition under Article 278 is a matter of evidence and particulars, not a ground for dismissal, and the defendant's remedy against vagueness is a motion for more particulars or discovery.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the order dismissing the complaint was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.

Remember This

Memorize this line: acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of the right to inherit, but a bare allegation of acknowledgment in the lifetime of the putative father suffices to survive a motion to dismiss, because the motion hypothetically admits it. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an action to compel recognition, which cannot be brought after the putative father's death, and an action for partition by one who pleads acknowledgment, and to test the rule that vagueness is cured by a motion for more particulars, not by dismissal.