G.R. No. 20794. October 30, 1923

On July 7, 1899, Apolonio Ramos, a resident of the municipality of Mabalacat,
in the Province of Pampanga, died intestate, leaving an estate of considerable
value, consisting of both real and personal property. Apolonio Ramos had been
twice married, and was survived by his second wife, Rufina de los Angeles, and
two sets of children. His children of the first marriage were two in number,
Florencio and Marta; while those of the second marriage were Rafaela, Dionisio,
and Agustin, and as the court below found, still another, named Gregorio Ramos,
the plaintiff in this case, whose parentage is in dispute.

Upon the death of Apolonio Ramos his property passed into the possession and
management of his widow, Rufina de los Angeles. On June 14, 1911, Rafaela,
Dionisio, and Agustin bought out the interest of Florencio Ramos and Marta Ramos
in the property of their father; and soon thereafter the widow, Rufina de los
Angeles, and her three children (Rafaela, Dionisio, and Agustin) proceeded to
partition among themselves the property derived from Apolonio Ramos. The
document by which this partition was effected is dated January 13, 1912, and was
duly acknowledged by the four parties thereto before a notary public. On
February 16, 1912, this deed of partition was given judicial approval by an
order entered by Judge Julio Llorente of the Court of First Instance for the
Province of Pampanga, in the proceedings relating to the intestacy of Apolonio
Ramos, deceased.

In the deed of partition the fact is recited that Rafaela, Dionisio, and
Agustin had purchased the shares of Florencio Ramos and Marta Ramos in the
estate of their father for the sum of P12,000, and it is also there stated that
Apolonio Ramos left no other heirs for the property pertaining to the conjugal
partnership between himself and Rufina de los Angeles than the three children,
Rafaela, Dionisio, and Agustin. The document then proceeds to assign to each of
the four partitioners mentioned in the deed such parts and portions of the
property to be divided as had been agreed upon, consisting chiefly of real
property. In the deed no reference whatever is made to the present plaintiff,
Gregorio Ramos.

After this division had been effected, the three children entered upon the
land assigned to them, and Rufina de los Angeles continued to hold in her own
exclusive right the portions assigned to her.

On March 15, 1921, Rufina de los Angeles died; and on August 12, 1922, the
present plaintiff, Gregorio Ramos, filed his original complaint in this action
against Dionisio Ramos, Agustin Ramos, and Rafaela Ramos (with her husband,
Januario Siopongco). In this complaint Gregorio Ramos alleges that he is a
legitimate son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los Angeles and that as such he
inherited an undivided one-fourth interest in the property held and owned by
Rufina de los Angeles at the time of her death. He therefore asks that two large
tracts of land described in the complaint be partitioned among the four children
of Rufina de los Angeles, including himself. The property of which partition was
thus sought consists of the same land that had been assigned to Rufina de los
Angeles in the deed of partition of January, 1912, between her and her three
children, parties to that deed.

In his supplemental complaint, dated September 22, 1922, the plaintiff
asserted a similar right of coownership with respect to an additional tract of
land, consisting of 191 hectares that had been assigned in the same deed of
partition to Rafaela Ramos and Agustin Ramos.

In their answer, dated September 2, 1922, the defendants, after a formal
denial of the allegations of the complaint in general, state that, though
Gregorio Ramos had been brought up in the family as if he were their brother,
nevertheless he is not such in fact; and it is alleged that he is really a
natural child of Marta Ramos, half-sister of the defendants and daughter of
Apolonio Ramos by his first marriage. For this reason alone, so their answer
asserts, Gregorio Ramos was not mentioned in the partition deed of 1912.

At the hearing of the cause an agreed statement of facts was submitted,
covering practically all material points relative to the origin and duration of
possession of the real property of which partition is sought, thus leaving only
one disputed question of fact to be tried, namely, whether Gregorio Ramos is the
son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los Angeles or the natural son of Marta
Ramos. In support of the plaintiff’s claim that he is the son of Apolonio Ramos
and Rufina de los Angeles a certified copy of an entry in the baptismal book
kept by the parish priest of Mabalacat was introduced in evidence, showing that
the child, Gregorio Ramos, legitimate son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los
Angeles, was baptized on December 30, 1895, at the age of seven days. In
addition to this various witnesses were presented in behalf of the plaintiff
whose testimony tended to show that Rufina de los Angeles was pregnant with
child in the year 1895 and that as a result of this pregnancy she gave birth to
Gregorio Ramos on December 23, 1895, at the family home in the municipality of
Mabalacat. Among the witnesses so introduced was one Genoveva de Leon, who said
that she acted as midwife at the birth. Another was Gregoria Angeles, a niece of
Rufina de los Angeles, who testified that she was present in the home of Rufina
de los Angeles upon the occasion of her confinement on December 23, 1895, and
that Gregorio Ramos was the child then born. Other testimony tending to
corroborate the foregoing statements was given by other witnesses; and it cannot
be denied that the testimony thus introduced makes out a strong case in favor of
the legitimate filiation of the present plaintiff as son and heir of Apolonio
Ramos and Rufina de los Angeles.

On the part of the defendants the principal witness testifying before the
court was Rafaela Ramos, herself a defendant in the case. She was 46 years of
age at the time of the trial in the court below and therefore about 20 years old
at the time Gregorio Ramos was born. Rafaela says that Gregorio is the son of
her half-sister Marta, and that she (Rafaela) was present in the house when
Gregorio was born. In explanation of the fact that Gregorio was baptized as the
son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los Angeles, the witness says that this was
done in order to prevent publicity from being given to the family disgrace. She
further states that the woman who acted as midwife on the occasion of Gregorio’s
birth was not Genoveva de Leon, as claimed by the latter, but one Tomasa
Carlos.

The defendant Agustin Ramos also testified for the defendants and stated that
Gregorio was the son of Marta and not of Apolonio Ramos. But this witness was
only 8 or 9 years of age when Gregorio was born and therefore could not be
expected to have any personal knowledge of the incidents connected with the
birth.

It is an admitted fact that Gregorio Ramos was brought up with the other
children of Apolonio Ramos as if he were one of the second set, and he appears
to have had the same advantages in respect to maintenance and education as the
other children. He called Rufina de los Angeles mother; and, so far as appears,
the three defendants treated him in every respect as a brother, with the
noteworthy exception that when the property of Apolonio Ramos was divided in
1912 Gregorio was not counted in. But the circumstance that Gregorio Ramos was
treated as a brother of the defendants in his bringing up is not of much weight
upon the controverted question whether he was the son of Apolonio Ramos and
Rufina de los Angeles or the natural child of Marta; for if the explanation
given by the defendants be true, he would have received the same treatment under
the one supposition as under the other.

It appears that there were present in court a number of other witnesses who
might possibly have been utilized to advantage by the defendants, but these
witnesses were reduced to mere ciphers by the course which was taken by the
attorney then representing the defendants. The incident is one which we think
should be clearly explained, as it involves a point of trial practice of
considerable importance.

In numerous cases that have come before us we have noticed a disposition on
the part of attorneys to agree upon what certain persons would testify to if
introduced and sworn as a witness in court. This practice has been disapproved
by this court in several criminal cases, but so far as we are aware the
authority of an attorney to make such an agreement in a civil case has never
been questioned. Indeed there are certain situations in which the practice is to
be commended as desirable, if not indeed necessary, as where a witness is absent
and cannot be produced in court. But the use of this device to abridge the labor
of attorneys and of the court is not to be commended in a case where the
witnesses are available for examination in court. The inevitable result of
making such an agreement is to emasculate the testimony, since it deprives the
court of the benefit of the reflections upon the intelligence and veracity of
the witnesses which can only arise in the process of examination and
cross-examination in court. No case has come before us in which this practice
has been indulged in with such questionable effect as in this case.

To be more specific, the following witnesses for the defendants were present
in court at the trial of this cause and ready if they had been called upon to
testify in the case, namely, (1) Tomasa Carlos, of the age of 80 years, claiming
to be the midwife who attended upon the young mother Marta when the child
Gregorio Ramos was born; (2) Rafaela Aquino, of the age of 46 years, who was
employed in the home of Apolonio Ramos at the time Gregorio was born and served
as his nurse; (3) Agustina Castro, of the age of 60 years, a niece of Apolonio
Ramos by marriage, and frequent visitor at his home at the time Gregorio Ramos
was born; (4) Bernabe Salunga, of the age of 56 years, a servant in the house of
Apolonio Ramos at the time Gregorio Ramos was born; (5) Marcelo Tiglao, of the
age of 53 years, and one of the principal residents of the municipality; and
finally (6) Emilio Gonzales, whose personal conditions and relations are not
stated.

All these witnesses, it is agreed, were prepared to testify that Gregorio
Ramos is the son of Marta Ramos and not the son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de
los Angeles; but instead of examining them and turning them over to his
adversary for cross-examination, Mr. Pineda, the attorney for the defendants
below, caused these witnesses to defile successively before the court, and after
their personal conditions and relations had been noted in the record, the
attorney made a statement as to what each particular witness would testify in
case he were examined. This statement was at once met by an announcement from
the attorney for the plaintiff to the effect that it was admitted that if such
witness were to testify he would testify as stated. The course thus followed may
be illustrated by the following excerpt from the record relative to the witness
Bernabe Salunga, and the same process was substantially repeated in relation
with the other witnesses above mentioned:

“The defendant presents Bernabe Salunga as witness, who, after being duly
sworn, testified as follows:

“Direct examination by Mr. PINEDA:

“Q. Tell your name and other personal circumstances.—A. Bernabe Salunga, 56
years old, married, laborer, resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga.

“PINEDA. This witness is first cousin of the defendants, and has been living
as a servant with Mr. Apolonio Ramos in his lifetime, probably from the age of
twelve years and is still there as a servant up to the present time, and if he
be allowed to testify about the birth of Gregorio Ramos, he would testify that
he (Gregorio Ramos) is not a child of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los Angeles,
but of Marta Ramos, daughter of Apolonio Ramos in his first marriage.

“GUEVARA. We admit that if this witness is allowed to testify, he would
testify to what Mr. Pineda has stated.”

It is impossible for a court to breathe the breath of life into these
dummies. Of course where facts are not controverted, agreed statements of this
sort may be accepted as sufficient to serve as the basis of judgment; but where
witnesses testifying to the contrary, and who are credited by the court, are
actually examined as witnesses, little or no weight can be conceded to such
statements. From the hesitancy of an attorney to subject his witnesses to
examination it may be fairly assumed that their testimony would be weak or that
something might be brought out upon cross-examination which would be hurtful to
the client’s cause.

It results that we must sustain the trial judge in holding that the
plaintiff, Gregorio Ramos, is the son of Apolonio Ramos and Rufina de los
Angeles, as indicated in the certificate of baptism and testified to clearly by
the witnesses for the plaintiff. We are not unconscious of the fact that there
is one strong moral consideration in support of the contention of the
defendants, which is, that it is difficult to see how Rufina de los Angeles, if
really the mother of Gregorio Ramos, could have been brought to participate in a
partition of the property of Apolonio Ramos which left her youngest son out of
account; also it is not easy to believe that, if the defendants had considered
Gregorio Ramos to be their brother, they would have participated in a fraudulent
partition which deprived him of his share in the paternal estate. But this moral
reflection is not in our opinion of sufficient force to justify a court in
ignoring the certificate of birth and the other testimony tending to show
filiation as claimed.

From what has been said it necessarily follows that the plaintiff is entitled
to share equally with Dionisio, Agustin and Rafaela Ramos in the property of
which their mother, Rufina de los Angeles, was possessed at the time of her
death, and the trial judge committed no error in so declaring. In this
connection it must be borne in mind that the plaintiff seeks partition of the
land thus held by his mother, i. e., the lands described in the original
complaint, by right of his descent from her, and not as heir of his father. As
Rufina de los Angeles died only in 1921, no question of the prescription of the
plaintiff’s right can arise in favor of the defendants, his coheirs.

It is different with respect to the tract of land described in the
supplemental complaint, as to which plaintiff’s claim is planted on title by
descent from his father, Apolonio Ramos, who, as already stated, died in the
year 1899. After the father’s death this land remained in the possession of the
widow, Rufina de los Angeles, until partition was effected in January, 1912,
when the occupation of Rafaela Ramos and Agustin Ramos began. Since that time
these defendants have exercised all the rights of owners to the exclusion of all
other persons. The division thus accomplished, sanctioned by judicial approval,
became a new and distinctive source of title, and it supplies a sufficient basis
for the acquisition of title by adverse possession.

It is undoubtedly a general rule of jurisprudence, recognized in article 1965
of the Civil Code, that prescription under the civil law cannot ordinarily
become effective from mere possession by one coheir or coowner as against his
coheirs and coowners; and the same idea is fully recognized in the common law.
The reason for this is that the possession of one coheir or coowner ordinarily
inures to the benefit of his fellows. His possession is therefore not adverse.
But when the occupant ceases to hold in the character of coheir or coowner and
holds or claims by some other right or title, prescription becomes effective to
the same extent as in other cases (De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil., 23;
Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857). The occupation which was begun by
Rafaela and Agustin Ramos in 1912 continued adversely to all the world for more
than ten years prior to the initiation of the present action, and as a
consequence they have acquired a valid title by acquisitive adverse possession
under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not necessary that this
prescriptive title should be specially pleaded in the defendants’ answer.
(Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil.,
427.)

The plaintiff was a minor when the adverse possession of his brother and
sister with respect to this parcel of land had its commencement, and section 42
contains a saving in favor of a minor by virtue of which he is entitled to bring
his action within three years after disability is removed. By this statute the
minor is given the designated period after attaining majority within which to
bring suit, if the period of prescription has expired. But the plaintiff became
of age on December 23, 1916, and the action was not instituted until more than
three years thereafter, and not until the full ten years of adverse possession
had been completed. It results that the action cannot be maintained as to the
parcel of land described in the supplemental complaint. (Suarez vs.
Suarez, 43 Phil., 903.) The trial judge was therefore in error in declaring that
the plaintiff had any interest in this parcel.

From what has been said it follows that so much of the appealed decision as
declares the plaintiff to be coowner with the defendants of the land described
in the original complaint and orders a division thereof must be affirmed; but so
much of the same judgment as declares the plaintiff to be coowner of the land
described in the supplemental complaint must be reversed, and the defendants
will be absolved from said supplemental complaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns,
and Romualdez, JJ., concur.