G.R. No. 20374. October 11, 1923

On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the
last will and testament of Dolores Coronel, the document Exhibit A, which
translated is as follows:

“In the name of God, Amen:

“I, Dolores Coronel, resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, Philippine Islands,
in the full exercise of my mental faculties, do hereby make my last will and
testament, and revoke all former wills by me executed.

“I direct and order that my body be buried in conformity with my social
standing.

“That having no forced heirs, I will all my properties, both movable and
immovable, to my nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to my niece Angela
Coronel, in consideration of the good services which he has rendered, and is
rendering to me with good will and disinterestedness and to my full
satisfaction.

“I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that
is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be able to
discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name and
appoint as substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, a native and resident
of the town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond.

“All my real and paraphernal property as well as my credits, for I declare
that I have no debts, are specified in an inventory.

“In testimony whereof and as I do not know how to write my name, I have
requested Vicente J. Francisco to write my name at the foot hereof and on the
left margin of each of its sheets before me and all the undersigned witnesses
this July 1, 1918.

	“VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
	“For the testatrix Dolores Coronel

“The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be
her last will and testament in our presence, and as the testatrix does not know
how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under
her express direction in our presence, at the foot, and on the left margin of
each and every sheet, hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed these
presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix at the foot hereof and
on the margin of each and everyone of the two sheets of which this document is
composed, which are numbered “one” and “two” on the upper part of the face
thereof.

	(Sgd.) “MAXIMO VERGARA
	SOTERO DUMAUAL
	MARCOS DE LOS SANTOS
	MARIANO L. CRISOSTOMO
	PABLO BARTOLOME
	MARCOS DE LA CRUZ
	DAMIAN CRISOSTOMO

“On the left margin of the two sheets of the will the following signatures
also appear:

“Mariano L. Crisostomo, Vicente J. Francisco for the testatrix Dolores
Coronel, M. Vergara, Pablo Bartolome, Sotero Dumaual, Damian Crisostomo,
Marcos de la Cruz, Marcos de los Santos.”

The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, husband of
Angela Coronel, who is a niece of the deceased Dolores Coronel.

The opponents are: Eriberto Coronel, Tito Coronel, Julian Gozum, Cirila
Santiago, widow of the deceased Macario Gozum, in her own behalf and that of her
three minor children, Hilarion Coronel, Geronimo Coronel, Maria Coronel and her
husband Eladio Gongco, Juana Bituin, widow of the deceased Hipolito Coronel, in
her own behalf and that of her three children, Generosa, Maria, and Jose, all
minors, Rosario Coronel, Agustin Coronel, Filomeno Coronel, Casimiro Coronel,
Alejo Coronel, Maria Coronel, Severina Coronel, Serapia Coronel, Maria Juana de
Ocampo, widow of the deceased Manuel Coronel, Dionisia Coronel, and her husband
Pantaleon Gunlao.

The probate of this will is impugned on the following grounds: (a)
That the proof does not show that the document Exhibit A above copied contains
the last will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the attestation clause is
not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.

These are the two principal questions which are debated in this case and
which we will now examine separately.

As to the first, which is the one raised in the first assignment of error,
the appellants argue: First, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores
Coronel should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the document Exhibit A,
her true will being that the same be distributed among her blood relatives; and
second, that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous
illegal influence.

Let us examine the first point.

The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the
testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely
exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to
one who is only a relative by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for
such exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained
very cordial relations with the aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the
management and direction of her lands. It appears, however, from the testimony
of Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript of the stenographic notes) that
Dolores Coronel revealed to him her suspicion against some of her nephews as
having been accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim.

As to whether or not Lorenzo Pecson rendered services to Dolores Coronel, the
opponents admit that he rendered them at least from the year 1914, although
there is proof showing that he rendered such services long before that time.

The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very
strongly knit and that the exclusion of relative from one’s estate is an
exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines
are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from
the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will
when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in
the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraph of article
763 in the following terms:

“Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property
or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire
it.”

Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the Code embodying it has
been in force in the Philippines for more than a quarter of a century, and for
this reason it is not tenable to say that the exercise of the liberty thereby
granted is necessarily exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants
of this country whose customs must have been taken into consideration by the
legislator in adopting this legal precept, are averse to such a liberty.

As to the preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor
a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appellee, although
contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services
which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the
year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the
administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of
her life. And that this was not a whim of the moment is shown by the fact that
six years before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was
named and appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the document Exhibit
B, which, translated, is as follows:

“1. That my present property was acquired by me by inheritance from my
parents, but a great part thereof was acquired by me by my own efforts and
exertions;

“2. That I have made no inventory of my properties, but they can be seen in
the title deeds in my possession and in the declarations of ownership;

“3. That I institute Lorenzo Pecson, married to Angela Coronel, and a known
resident of the town, my heir to succeed to all my properties;

“4. That I appoint my said heir, Lorenzo Pecson, as executor, and, in his
default, Victor Pecson, a resident of the same town;

“5. That as to my burial and other things connected with the eternal rest of
my soul, I leave them to the sound discretion of the aforesaid Lorenzo
Pecson;

“6. That as I cannot write I requested Martin Pangilinan, a native and
resident of this town, to write this will in accordance with my wishes and
precise instructions.

“In testimony whereof I had the said Martin Pangilinan write my name and
surname, and affixed my mark between my name and surname, and Don Francisco
Dumaual, Don Mariano Sunglao, Don Sotero Dumaual, Don Marcos de la Cruz and Don
Martin Pangilinan signed as witnesses, they having been present at the beginning
of, during, and after, the execution of this my last will.

(Sgd.) “DOLORES CORONEL

Witnesses:

       (Sgd.) “MARIANO SUNGLAO
                   MARCOS DE
LA CRUZ
                   FRANCISCO DUMAUAL
                   SOTERO
DUMAUAL
                   MARTIN PANGILINAN”

The appellants find in the testament Exhibit B something to support their
contention that the intention of Dolores Coronel was to institute the said
Pecson not as sole beneficiary, but simply as executor and distributor of all
her estate among her heirs, for while Lorenzo Pecson’s contention that he was
appointed sole beneficiary is based on tho fact that he enjoyed the confidence
of Dolores Coronel in 1918 and administered all her property, he did not
exclusively have this confidence and administration in the year 1912. Although
such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly with
others and never exclusively, this fact does not show that the will of the
testatrix was to appoint Pecson only as executor and distributor of her estate
among the heirs, nor does it prevent her, the testatrix, from instituting him in
1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for
determining whether or not such institution in favor of Pecson was the true will
of the testatrix.

We find, therefore, nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores
Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her
sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here
would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per
se.

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute
dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without
regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the
requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not
affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the
fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the
testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as
caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already been shown,
the unreasonableness or injustice of a will may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity.” (40 Cyc., 1079.)

The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this
case.

Passing to the second question, to wit, whether or not the true last will of
Dolores Coronel was expressed in the testament Exhibit A, we will begin with
expounding how the idea of making the aforesaid will here controverted was borne
and carried out.

About the year 1916 or 1917, Dolores Coronel showed the document Exhibit B to
Attorney Francisco who was then her legal adviser and who, considering that in
order to make the expression of her last will more legally valid, thought it
necessary that the testament be prepared in conformity with the laws in force at
the time of the death of the testatrix, and observing that the will Exhibit B
lacked the extrinsic formalities required by Act No. 2645 enacted after its
execution, advised Dolores Coronel that the will be remade. She followed the
advice, and Attorney Francisco, after receiving her instructions, drew the will
Exhibit A in accordance therewith, and brought it to the house of Dolores
Coronel for its execution.

Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores Coronel in her presence and that of
the witnesses and asked her whether the will was in accordance with her wishes.
Dolores Coronel answered that it was, and requested her attorney, Mr. Francisco,
to sign the will for her, which the attorney accordingly did in the presence of
the witnesses, who in turn signed it before the testatrix and in the presence of
each other.

Upon the filing of the motion for a rehearing on the first order allowing the
probate of the will, the opponents presented an affidavit of Pablo Bartolome to
the effect that, following instructions of Lorenzo Pecson, he had informed the
testatrix that the contents of the will were that she entrusted Pecson with the
distribution of all her property among the relatives of the said Dolores. But
during the new trial Pablo Bartolome, in spite of being present in the court
room on the day of the trial, was not introduced as a witness, without such an
omission having been satisfactorily accounted for.

While it is true that the petitioner was bound to present Pablo Bartolome,
being one of the witnesses who signed the will, at the second hearing when the
probate was controverted, yet we cannot consider this point against the appellee
for this was not raised in any of the assignments of error made by the
appellants. (Art. 20, Rules of the Supreme Court.)

On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the opponents to present Pablo
Bartolome to prove before the court the statement made by him in his affidavit,
since it was their duty to prove what they alleged, which was that Dolores
Coronel had not understood the true contents of the will Exhibit A. Having
suppressed, without explanation, the testimony of Pablo Bartolome, the
presumption is against the opponents and that is, that such a testimony would
have been adverse had it been produced at the hearing of the case before the
court. (Sec. 334, subsec. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The opponents call our attention to the fourth clause of the document which
says: “I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all
that is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be able
to discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name and
appoint as a substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, resident of the town
of Betis, without requiring him to give bond,” and contend that this clause is
repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her
estate, for if such was the intention of the testatrix, there would have been no
necessity of appointing an executor, nor any reason for designating a substitute
in case that the first one should not be able to discharge his duties, and they
perceived in this clause the idea which, according to them, was not expressed in
the document, and which was that Pecson was simply to be a mere executor
entrusted with the distribution of the estate among the relatives of the
testatrix, and that should he not be able to do so, this duty would devolve upon
his substitute.

But it is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute the estate, which in
testate succession, such as the instant case, has to be distributed with the
intervention of the court. An executor has, besides, other duties and general
and special powers intended for the preservation, defense, and liquidation of
the estate so long as the same has not reached, by order of the court, the hands
of those entitled thereto.

The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity of an executor does not
imply a negation of her desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It is
to be noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that her body be
given a burial in accordance with her social standing and she had a perfect
right to designate a person who should see to it that this order was complied
with. One of the functions of an executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained
in the will.

It is argued that the will of the testatrix was to will her estate to her
blood relatives, for such was the promise made to Maria Coronel, whom Rosario
Coronel tends to corroborate. We do not find such a promise to have been
sufficiently proven, and much less to have been seriously made and coupled with
a positive intention on the part of Dolores Coronel to fulfill the same. In the
absence of sufficient proof of fraud, or undue influence, we cannot take such a
promise into account, for even if such a promise was in fact made, Dolores
Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards and dispose of her estate as she
pleased. Wills themselves, which contain more than mere promises, are
essentially revocable.

It is said that the true will of Dolores Coronel not expressed in the will
can be inferred from the phrase used by Jose M. Reyes in his deposition when
speaking of the purpose for which Lorenzo Pecson was to receive the estate, to
wit:

“in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the
most appropriate manner.”

Weight is given to this phrase from the circumstance that its author was
requested by Attorney Francisco to explain the contents of Exhibit B and had
acted as interpreter between Dolores Coronel and Attorney Francisco at their
interviews previous to the preparation of Exhibit A, and had translated into the
Pampango dialect this last document, and, lastly, was present at the execution
of the will in question.

The disputed phrase “in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in
the most appropriate manner” was used by the witness Reyes while sick in a
hospital and testifying in the course of the taking of his deposition.

The appellants interpret the expression “dispose in the most appropriate
manner” as meaning to say “distribute it among the heirs.” Limiting ourselves to
its meaning, the expression is a broad one, for the disposition may be effected
in several and various ways, which may not necessarily be a “distribution among
the heirs,” and still be a “disposition in the most appropriate manner.” “To
dispose” is not the same as “to distribute.”

To judge correctly the import of this phrase, the circumstances under which
it was used must be taken into account in this particular instance. The witness
Reyes, the author of the phrase, was not expressing his own original ideas when
he used it, but was translating into Spanish what Dolores Coronel had told him.
According to the facts, the said witness is not a Spaniard, that is to say, the
Spanish language is not his native tongue, but, perhaps, the Pampango dialect.
It is an admitted fact based on reason and experience that when a person
translates from one language to another, it is easier for him to express with
precision and accuracy when the version is from a foreign language to a native
one than vice-versa. The witness Reyes translated from the Pampango dialect,
which must be more familiar to him, to the Spanish language which is not his own
tongue. And judging from the language used by him during his testimony in this
case, it cannot be said that this witness masters the Spanish language. Thus is
explained the fact that when asked to give the reason for the appointment of an
executor in the will, he should say at the morning session that “Dolores
Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson and in his default, Victor Pecson, to act
during her lifetime, but not after her death,” which was explained at the
afternoon session by saying “that Dolores Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo
Pecson executor of all her estate during his lifetime and that in his default,
either through death or incapacity, Mr. Victor Pecson was appointed
executor.” Taking into account all the circumstances of this witness, there
is ground to attribute his inaccuracy as to the discharge of the duties of an
executor, not to ignorance of the elementary rule of law on the matter, for the
practice of which he was qualified, but to a non-mastery of the Spanish
language. We find in this detail of translation made by the witness Reyes no
sufficient reason to believe that the will expressed by Dolores Coronel at the
said interview with Attorney Francisco was to appoint Lorenzo Pecson executor
and mere distributor of her estate among her heirs.

As to whether or not the burden of proof was on the petitioner to establish
that he was the sole legatee to the exclusion of the relatives of Dolores
Coronel, we understand that it was not his duty to show the reasons which the
testatrix may have had for excluding her relatives from her estate, giving
preference to him. His duty was to prove that the will was voluntary and
authentic and he, who alleges that the estate was willed to another, has the
burden of proving his allegation.

Attorney Francisco is charged with having employed improper means for making
Lorenzo Pecson appear in the will as sole beneficiary. However, after an
examination of all the proceedings had, we cannot find anything in the behavior
of this lawyer, relative to the preparation and execution of the will, that
would justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his personal and professional
conduct, nor that he should harbor any wrongful or fraudulent purpose.

We find nothing censurable in his conduct in advising Dolores Coronel to make
a new will other than the last one, Exhibit B (in the drawing of which he does
not appear to have intervened), so that the instrument might be executed with
all the new formalities required by the laws then in force; nor in the
preparation of the new will substantially in accordance with the old one; nor in
the selection of attesting witnesses who were persons other than the relatives
of Dolores Coronel. Knowing, as he did, that Dolores Coronel was excluding her
blood relatives from the inheritance, in spite of her having been asked by him
whether their exclusion was due to a mere inadvertence, there is a satisfactory
explanation, compatible with honorable conduct, why said attorney should
prescind from such relatives in the attesting of the will, to the end that no
obstacle be placed in the way to the probating thereof.

The fact that this attorney should presume that Dolores was to ask him to
sign the will for her and that he should prepare it containing this detail is
not in itself fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to presume, and it
appears that he asked her, through Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the
document in her stead.

No imputation can be made to this attorney of any interest in favoring
Lorenzo Pecson in the will, because the latter was already his client at the
execution of said will. Attorney Francisco denied this fact, which we cannot
consider proven after examining the evidence.

The conduct observed by this attorney after the death of Dolores Coronel in
connection with the attempted arrangement between Lorenzo Pecson and the
opponents, does not, in our opinion, constitute any data leading to the
conclusion that an heir different from the true one intended by the testatrix
should have been fraudulently made to appear instituted in the will Exhibit A.
His attitude towards the opponents, as can be gathered from the proceedings and
especially from his letter Exhibit D, does not show any perverse or fraudulent
intent, but rather a conciliatory purpose. It is said that such a step was well
calculated to prevent every possible opposition to the probate of the will. Even
admitting that one of his objects in entering into such negotiations was to
avoid every possible opposition to the probate of the will, such object is not
incompatible with good faith, nor does it necessarily justify the inference that
the heir instituted in the instrument was not the one whom the testatrix wanted
appointed.

The appellants find rather suspicious the interest shown by the said attorney
in trying to persuade Lorenzo Pecson to give them some share of the estate.
These negotiations were not carried out by the attorney out of his own
initiative, but at the instance of the same opponent, Agustin Coronel, made by
the latter in his own behalf and that of his coopponents.

As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record sufficient proof to
believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to
frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her
blood relatives. The opponents insinuate that Lorenzo Pecson employed Attorney
Francisco to carry out his reproachable designs, but such depraved
instrumentality was not proven, nor was it shown that said lawyer, or Lorenzo
Pecson, should have contrived or put into execution any condemnable plan, nor
that both should have conspired for illegal purposes at the time of the
preparation and execution of the will Exhibit A.

Although Norberto Paras testified having heard, when the will was being read
to Dolores Coronel, the provision whereby the estate was ordered distributed
among the heirs, the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that said
Norberto Paras was not present at such reading of the will. Appellants do not
insist on the probative force of the testimony of this witness, and do not
oppose its being stricken out.

The data furnished by the case do not show, to our mind, that Dolores Coronel
should have had the intention of giving her estate to her blood relatives
instead of to Lorenzo Pecson at the time of the execution of the will Exhibit A,
nor that fraud or whatever other illegal cause or undue influence should have
intervened in the execution of said testament. Neither fraud nor evil is
presumed and the record does not show either.

Turning to the second assignment of error, which is made to consist in the
will having been probated in spite of the fact that the attestation clause was
not in conformity with the provision of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, let us examine the tenor of such clause
which literally is as follows:

“The foregoing document was executed and declared by Dolores Coronel to be
her last will and testament in our presence, and as the testatrix does not know
how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under
her express direction in our presence at the foot and on the left margin of each
and every sheet hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed these presents
in the presence of others and of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the
margin of each and everyone of the two pages of which this document is composed.
These sheets are numbered correlatively with the words “one” and “two” on the
upper part of the face thereof.

(Sgd.) “Maximo Vergara, Sotero Dumaual, Marcos de los Santos, Mariano L.
Crisostomo, Pablo Bartolome, Marcos de la Cruz, Damian
Crisostomo.”

Appellants remark that it is not stated in this clause that the will was
signed by the witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which on this particular point provides the following:

“The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which
the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other.”

Stress is laid on the phrase used in the attestation clause above copied, to
wit:

“each of us signed in the presence of others.“

Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to the expression “of
others.” One, that insinuated by the appellants, namely, that it is
equivalent to “of other persons,” and the other, that contended by the
appellee, to wit, that the phrase should be held to mean “of the others,”
the article “the” having inadvertently been omitted.

Should the first interpretation prevail and “other persons” be taken
to mean persons different from the attesting witnesses, then one of the
solemnities required by law would be lacking. Should the second be adopted and
“of others” construed as meaning the other witnesses to the will, then
the law would have been complied with in this respect.

Including the concomitant words, the controverted phrase results thus:
“each of us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the
testatrix.“

If we should omit the words “of others and,” the expression would be
reduced to “each of us signed these presents in the presence of the
testatrix,” and the statement that the witnesses signed each in the presence
of the others would be lacking. But as a matter of fact, these words “of
others and” are present. Then, what for are they there? Is it to say that
the witnesses signed in the presence of other persons foreign to the execution
of the will, which is completely useless and to no purpose in the case, or was
it for some useful, rational, necessary object, such as that of making it appear
that the witnesses signed the will each in the presence of the others? The first
theory presupposes that the one who drew the will, who is Attorney Francisco,
was an unreasonable man, which is an inadmissible hypothesis, being repugnant to
the facts shown by the record. The second theory is the most obvious, logical
and reasonable under the circumstances. It is true that the expression proved to
be deficient. The deficiency may have been caused by the drawer of the will or
by the typist. If by the typist, then it must be presumed to have been merely
accidental. If by the drawer, it is explainable taking into account that Spanish
is not only not the native language of the Filipinos, who, in general, still
speak until nowadays their own dialects, but also that such a language is not
even the only official language since several years ago.

In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476), this court said:

“The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it
is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right
to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s last will, must
be disregarded.”

We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase “of
others” as meaning “of the other witnesses,” and that a grammatical
or clerical error was committed consisting in the omission of the article
“the.“

Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital importance
when the intention is manifest in the will.

“The court may correct clerical mistakes in writing, and disregard technical
rules of grammar as to the construction of the language of the will when itr
becomes necessary for it to do so in order to effectuate the testator’s manifest
intention as ascertained from the context of the will. But unless a different
construction is so required the ordinary rules of grammar should be adhered to
in construing the will.” (40 Cyc., 1404).

And we understand that in the present case the interpretation we adopt is
imperative, being the most adequate and reasonable.

The case of In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Goque (43 Phil., 405),
decided by this court and invoked by the appellants, refers, so far as pertinent
to the point herein at issue, to an attestation clause wherein the statement
that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other is totally
absent. In the case at bar, there is the expression “in the presence of
others” whose reasonable interpretation is, as we have said, “in the
presence of the other witnesses.” We do not find any parity between the
present case and that of Re estate of Geronima Uy Coque above cited.

Finally, we will take up the question submitted by the opponents as to the
alleged insufficiency of the evidence to show that the attesting witnesses
Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution of the will
in controversy. Although this point is raised in the first assignment of error
made by the appellants, and not in the second, it is discussed in this place,
because it refers to the very fact of attestation. However, we do not believe it
necessary to analyze in detail the evidence of both parties on this particular
point. The evidence leads us to the conclusion that the two witnesses
aforementioned were present at the execution and signing of the will. Such is
also the conclusion of the trial judge who, in this respect, states the
following, in his decision:

“As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and the witnesses signed
the document Exhibit A in accordance with the provisions of law on the matter,
that is, whether or not the testatrix signed the will, or caused it to be
signed, in the presence of the witnesses, and the latter in turn signed in her
presence and that of each other, the court, after observing the demeanor of the
witnesses for both parties, is of the opinion that those for the petitioner
spoke the truth. It is neither probable nor likely that a man versed in the
law, such as Attorney Francisco, who was present at the execution of the will in
question, and to whose conscientiousness in the matter of compliance with all
the extrinsic formalities of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was
due the fact that the testatrix had canceled her former will (Exhibit B) and had
a new one (Exhibit A) prepared and executed, should have consented the omission
of a formality compliance with which would have required little or no effort;
namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix and the attesting witnesses were
all present when their respective signatures were affixed to the will.” And the
record does not furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line of
reasoning and findings of the trial judge.

In conclusion we hold that the assignments of error made by the appellants
are not supported by the evidence of record.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor,
and Johns, JJ., concur.