G.R. No. 19850. March 24, 1923

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay, finding the appellant, Romualdo Mijares,
guilty of the offense of resistance and serious disobedience to an agent of
authority, under article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for two months and one day, arresto mayor, to pay a fine of
six hundred twenty-five pesetas, and to pay the costs.

It appears in evidence that on June 4, 1921, Avelino Crisol, a traffic
inspector of the Bureau of Public Works, under the supervision of the district
engineer of the Province of Albay, went to the municipality of Virac, on the
Island of Catanduanes, in the Province of Albay, with instructions there to
examine an apprentice, one Julian Nuñez, then in the service of Marta Solano,
with a view to ascertaining whether he was qualified to be licensed as
chauffeur. Upon presenting himself at the house of Marta Solano, Grisol was met,
when about half way up the steps, by the accused, Romualdo Mijares, to whom
Crisol made known his errand, at the same time producing and exhibiting to
Mijares a letter from the office of the district engineer instructing Crisol to
examine the apprentice mentioned. Upon this Mijares asked Crisol what was in the
letter, and the latter proceeded to make known its contents by reading it to the
accused. However, before Crisol had finished reading, or interpreting the
letter, Mijares struck him a blow in the face and in the breast, and as a result
Crisol rolled down the steps. As he arose to gather his scattered papers Mijares
again struck him repeatedly on the face and body, and Crisol was compelled to
flee, being pursued by the accused, who continued to deliver other blows upon
the body and back of Crisol until they got into the street, when Mijares
desisted.

The bruises inflicted upon Crisol in the course of this assault were
numerous, though not serious, and their effects were manifested in pain and
swelling which lasted for about four days, without requiring medical assistance
or discapacitating Crisol for the performance of his usual labors.

The explanation of the incident appears to be found in the fact that Mijares
supposed Crisol to be responsible for unfavorable reports to the district
engineer with respect to Mijares as chauffeur and manager for Marta Solano, and
he is reported to have made threats prior to this occasion against Crisol to one
Fidel Macuja, an employee of the Bureau of Public Works1, acting under Crisors
directions. The testimony of witnesses for the prosecution also shows that
immediately before the assault was made Mijares accused Crisol of being the
tale-bearer who was carrying reports to the engineer.

Upon the proof submitted to the trial judge, and now before us upon appeal,
we have no hesitancy in holding that titie accused is guilty of committing an
assault upon the person of Avelino Crisol substantially in the manner above
stated, and the offense was clearly lacking of any provocation whatever on the
part of the person assaulted. The trial judge therefore committed no error in
finding the accused guilty of an offense of some sort in inflicting physical
injuries upon said Crisol; but in respect to the real character of the offense
in question and the penalty merited by the accused, there is abundant room for
discussion and possible difference of opinion.

The trial judge, as we have seen, found the accused guilty of resistance and
serious disobedience to an agent of a person in authority, under article 252 of
the Penal Code. The Attorney-General, however, recommends’ that the accused be
sentenced for the offense of assault upon a public officer, under article 251 of
the Penal Code, in relation with the final paragraph of article 250.

In order to resolve the question thus presented it is necessary to determine
the character in which Avelino Crisol was acting at the time this assault was
committed; and upon this we are of the opinion that he was1 undeniably a public
officer (funcionario publico) within the meaning of article 251 of the
Penal Code. In this connection it will be noted that he had been formally
appointed by the district engineer of Albay to discharge the duties of inspector
in the Bureau of Public Works. The duties involved in the office of inspector
are not of a clerical or manual nature, and their proper performance involves
discretion in the exercise of the functions of Government, He was therefore a
public officer under the definition contained in section 2 of the Administrative
Code, and the same must hold good as regards the application of the penal
laws.

So much having been determined, it will be at once seen that article 251 of
the Penal Code is applicable; and it is unnecessary for us further to consider
whether the person assaulted might also be considered to have been an agent of
authority, since the provision in question imposes the same penalty for assault
on the public officer that it imposes for assault upon an agent of
authority.

In connection with article 251 of the Penal Code, we note the fact that the
text of said article is erroneously printed in the Spanish edition of the Penal
Code for the Philippine Islands commonly used by students and practitioners in
this country, that is to say, the small annotated edition published by Gongora,
in Madrid, 1896. The error consists of the omission of certain words, possibly a
full line, after the expression “para el objeto señalado” and the change of the
expression “hubieren” into “de haber.” The result of this mistake in the text is
to change the sense of the article materially, and the English translation in
common use is evidently based upon this garbled Spanish version. The true text
of said article, reproduced from an authentic edition, is as follows:

“ART. 251. The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph
of the preceding article shall be imposed upon those who shall have employed the
force or the intimidation mentioned in No. 1 of article 249 for the object
indicated in No. 1 of article 229 or who shall have placed hands upon persons
coming to the assistance of authority or upon its agents or upon public
officers.”

As the article stands in the incorrect version and in the English
translation, it would appear that the offense defined in article 251 is not
committed unless the assault is made upon the occasion of a public rising of a
rebellious or seditious nature. As the article stands in the official edition
the offense contemplated may be either of that nature or may consist of the
laying of violent hands upon persons coming to the assistance of authority, or
upon its agents, or upon public officers. It results that when violent hands are
laid upon a public officer, it is immaterial whether the offense was committed
upon the occasion of a public uprising or not.

What has been said furnishes an explanation of the decision in United States
vs. Capurro and Weems (7 Phil., 24), which must have been decided by this
court with the correct text of the article in question before it; and without
this explanation said decision would appear to be erroneous, since article 251
was there applied to the case of an assault upon a public officer which was
wholly unconnected with the purposes of rebellion or sedition.

His Honor, the trial judge, was of the opinion that Avelino Crisol could be
treated as an agent of authority and that the offense committed might be
qualified as resistance and serious disobedience, under article 252 of the Penal
Code, applying the criterion indicated in the case of United States vs.
Tabiana and Canillas (37 Phil., 515). In the present case, however, the offense
was one of positive aggression throughout, and it cannot be considered to have
been a case of mere resistance or disobedience to official authority. The
accused was not the person against whom the authority of Avelino Crisol was
directed, and his intervention upon the occasion stated, for the purpose of
assaulting and beating up the injured party, was an act dictated by his own
malice and exhibits none of the aspects of mere resistance and disobedience. For
this reason it is impossible to apply article 252 of the Penal Code to the
offense in question.

In the light of what has been said, it is evident that the judgment appealed
from must be modified; and the accused will be sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for three years, four months and eight days, prision correccional, to pay
a fine of two thousand six hundred twenty-six pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

---

MALCOLM, J., with whom concurs JOHNS,
J.:

We cannot find guilty an accused person, who thrust out of his home a traffic
inspector of the Bureau of Public Works and gave the latter a beating on account
of the inspector having entered the house without knocking and of having looked
upon the wife of the accused in an insulting manner as she was resting, and
cannot see this accused undergo imprisonment for more than three years on
account of having done what any man would have done under similar circumstances,
without registering our disapproval. There are a number of things which might be
said of the case, but for the sake of brevity, we confine ourselves to the most
important points.

The majority presumably accept in its entirety the evidence for the
prosecution because no mention is made of the evidence for the defense. We,
however, see nothing unreasonable in the statement of the witnesses for the
defense, and believe that these witnesses were telling the truth. On the
supposition, however, that the defendant has done everything which the court
attributes to him, yet there are other considerations which should be
emphasized.

The court seizes upon a revised version of article 251 of the Spanish Penal
Code to convict the defendant. In doing so, the court is straining the meaning
of the term “public officer” considerably when it makes it include a
capataz, temporarily designated as motor vehicle traffic inspector. In
this connection, it is to be noted that the Legislature has gone to the trouble
to enact a number of special laws relating to assaults, resistance,
disobedience, and contempt of officials in different branches of the Philippine
Government, but it has not done so for officers and employees of the Bureau of
Public Works.

It is further to be noted that article 251 refers back to the first paragraph
of article 249, which relates to public uprisings for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in the definition of the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, and to paragraph 1 of article 229, which defines the crime of
rebellion as committed by any person or persons who shall rise publicly and in
open hostility to the Government for any of the following purposes, as for
example, to dethrone the King, or to use and exercise the constitutional powers
of the Ministers of the Crown. A mere statement of the law conveys to any
discerning mind its own comment.

The penalty imposed by the trial judge was imprisonment for two months and
one day, and the payment of a fine. The penalty suggested by the
Attorney-General is fifteen days’ imprisonment. The penalty imposed by this
Court is three years, four months and eight days’ imprisonment and the payment
of a fine. With reference to this latter penalty, it is pertinent to say that
when the case was first considered in banc, because of a faulty
translation of article 251 of the Penal Code, it was decided that the facts
merely constituted a misdemeanor, meriting fifteen days’ imprisonment. As the
court now finds article 251 applicable, it means that fifteen days of the
penalty are imposed for the assault and the remaining three years, three months,
and some days for lese majeste.

The writer has stated so often his
opinion that all of the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code relating, as in
this case, to such subjects as rebellion and sedition, are no longer effective
on account of the change from a monarchial to a democratic form of government,
that it is useless to add anything thereto. At least, fifteen days’ imprisonment
would prove to be ample punishment for the accused.