G.R. No. 20088. March 05, 1923

STATEMENT

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari by the municipal council of
Masantol, Pampanga, in which it is alleged that the Honorable G. B. Guevara is
the Judge of the Court of First Instance of that province; that pending in his
court there are different petitions for writs of mandamus against the petitioner
here, who is respondent there, all of which were consolidated, to which the
petitioner here filed a demurrer upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the defendant or of the subject-matter, and that the petition
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that on October
20, 1922, the demurrer was overruled; that the terms of office of the municipal
councilors as constituted on October 9, 1922, expired on October 16, 1922, at
which time a new council was inaugurated; that at all times the new council has
never convened as a municipal board of election canvassers, and that the new
board never took any part in the canvass of the last general election returns;
that feeling itself aggrieved at the decision of the lower court in overruling
its demurrer on October 25, 1922, the petitioner here applied to this court for
a writ of certiorari to review such proceedings, contending that the lower court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It is then alleged that November 27,
1922,^[1] this court denied the application
for the writ for the alleged reason that the question of the jurisdiction of the
lower court had not been presented to that court prior to the application for
the writ of certiorari in this court. That the petitioner has always contended
that the lower court was acting in excess of its jurisdiction, and that after
its writ was denied here it immediately applied to the lower court for the
reconsideration of its order overruling the demurrer, and specifically calling
the attention of the lower court to the fact that it was acting in excess of its
jurisdiction. The petition for reconsideration was then heard in the lower court
and overruled. It is then alleged that the Court of First Instance was acting in
excess of its jurisdiction, and will continue to do so unless restrained by this
court, and that your petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at
law.

In response to the order of this court, the respondents here appeared and
filed an answer in which they deny all of the material allegations of the
complaint, and, as a special defense, allege that the municipal council of
Masantol may be reconvened by the Court of First Instance for the purpose of
correcting its canvass, and that in the mandamus proceedings the question was
not that the board of canvassers should certify that the respondents be declared
elected, but that the board should proceed to the mathematical computation of
the returns, and that the election protest which was dismissed is not res
judicata as to the mandamus proceedings; that there is no identity of the
parties; that the election contest is brought against the candidates voted for
in their respective offices while in the mandamus proceedings the action is
against the board of canvassers; that the subject-matter is not identical; that
the object of the election protest was to contest the title of the respondents
to the respective offices, but that the purpose of the mandamus proceedings is
to procure an order from the court to compel the board of canvassers to correct
its canvass and to make it conform with the genuine returns; that the election
protests were dismissed on technical grounds; that the Court of First Instance
has jurisdiction to compel the board of canvassers to correct its error, because
it is not a discretionary but a ministerial duty; that the grounds alleged in
the pending petition are identical with those alleged in the former petition for
a writ of certiorari, No. 19803, which was dismissed by this Court, with costs,
on November 27, 1922, and that the present petition must be denied following the
doctrine of Lucido and Lucido vs. Vita (20 Phil., 449).

JONHS, J.:

All of these different proceedings had their inception in the recent election
for municipal council of Masantol. After the election was over the canvassing
board met, canvassed the returns and declared the result. Following this an
election contest was initiated, in which it was claimed that others than those
certified by the canvassing board were elected. That proceeding was finally
dismissed in this Court for the reason that the complaint and records were not
sufficient to sustain the contest within the terms and provisions of the
Election Law. After the time for the filing of an election contest had expired,
and acting through, different proceedings, the respondents here filed petitions
for writs of mandamus against the petitioner here as respondent there, praying
for an order of the Court requiring it to meet and make a recanvass of the votes
cast at the last election, and to make another and different certificate for the
ostensible purpose of correcting mathematical errors in the original canvass,
with a view of having declared elected the persons who had initiated the
election contest which was dismissed by this court for want of jurisdiction. In
the final analysis, the mandamus proceedings now pending in the lower court are
nothing more than an election contest in another and different form commenced
after the time for the filing of an election contest has expired. The lower
court in its opinion, among other things, says:

“The court cannot concur with the counsel for the respondent. For the very
reason that the Election Law fixes a period too short and peremptory for the
filing of petitions and protest against the result of an election, the
petitioners in these cases have not at present any other easy and speedy remedy,
except that of asking that the municipal council of Masantol be compelled to
correct its canvass in accordance with the result of the
election.”

The purpose and intent of the Legislature was to fix a certain and definite
time within which petitions and protests against the result of an election
should be filed, and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such
contests. The question as to whether the time is too short and peremptory is one
for the Legislature and not for the courts. The duty of the courts is to
construe legislative acts, as written, and avoid judicial legislation. Upon the
facts shown in the record, the lower court did not have jurisdiction to hear and
issue a writ of mandamus for the purposes alleged in the petition. Such
proceedings were nothing more than an election contest in another and different
form, and were not commenced within the statutory time.

To review such proceedings of the lower court, the petitioner here filed a
petition in this Court against the respondents, known as R.G. No. 19803, in
which all of the papers filed in the mandamus proceedings in the lower court
were attached to, and made a part of, the record, from which it appears that the
petitioner here as respondent there filed a demurrer to the petition for
mandamus in the lower court upon the following grounds: First, that the court
had no jurisdiction of the defendant or the subject-matter of the action;
second, that the said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the respondent. Attached to, and made a part of, the
demurrer was an argument in which it was vigorously contended that the lower
court was acting in excess of its jurisdiction, and that it did not have any
authority to issue a writ of mandamus. Founded upon that petition, a member of
this court granted a restraining order against his Honor Guillermo B. Guevara to
abstain and refrain from further proceedings in the mandamus petition until the
further order of this court. To that petition the respondents here filed a
demurrer upon the grounds, first, that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari in the mandamus proceedings filed in the lower court;
second, that the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action in that: (a) The lower court has never exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the proceedings of mandamus. (b) The lower
court has not exceeded its jurisdiction on the alleged ground of res
adjudicata.

November 28, 1922, this court made an order reciting that: “It appearing that
the petitioner has not presented in the court below the question of
jurisdiction, it is the order of the court that the complaint should be, and is
hereby, dismissed with costs against the petitioner;” and the restraining order
was dissolved.

A vigorous motion for reconsideration was then filed by the petitioner to
which a copy of the decision of the lower court of October 20, 1922, was
attached and made a part of the record, in which the trial court said:

“One single demurrer was filed in the above entitled three cases on the
ground that this court has no jurisdiction either over the respondent
corporation or over the subject-matter of the controversy, and that the facts
alleged in the petition do not constitute a cause of action.”

The lower court then proceeds to analyze the grounds specified arid overrules
the demurrer.

December 18, 1922, this court denied the petition for a rehearing without
specifying the reasons why. But as a matter of fact it was denied because the
petitioner had not exhausted all of his remedies in the lower court. The
petitioner then at once appeared in the lower court and again raised and
presented the question that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus in the pending proceeding, and that it was acting in excess of its
jurisdiction. This contention was again overruled by the lower court, and the
present case, R.G. No. 20088, now seeks to review the action of the lower
court, and prays for an order that all further proceedings in the lower court be
stayed until the final judgment is rendered in this court, “and that upon a
review of said record and proceedings this Honorable Court adjudge and decree
that said respondent is acting and attempting to act without and in excess of
his jurisdiction as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and that he
be permanently enjoined from proceeding further therein and your petitioner have
and recover its costs and disbursements herein expended and such other and
further relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and proper in the
premises.”

The record is conclusive upon the facts alleged that the lower court is
without jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus in the proceedings pending
before it. But the respondents now contend that on account of the action taken
by this court in case R.G. No. 19803 in dismissing the petition, the question
involved is now res judicata, and that this court is without jurisdiction
to issue the writ in case R. G. No. 20088. But as stated, in truth and in fact,
the petition was dismissed in case R.G. No. 19803, for the sole reason that it
was prematurely filed, and that the petitioner had not exhausted all of its
remedies in the lower court. The petitioner at once took appropriate proceedings
to exhaust all of its remedies in the lower court, and was again denied relief,
following which an application for the writ of certiorari in case R. G. No.
20088 was again filed in this court.

The question of the jurisdiction of the lower court in the proceeding pending
before us is now squarely presented, and upon the merits we hold that the
petitioner is entitled to the writ, as prayed for in its petition, and it is so
ordered, without costs to either party.

We might add that where the question of the want of jurisdiction is squarely
raised, argued and submitted in the lower court, and where it appears from the
record that the question was squarely met and decided by the lower court, there
is no valid reason which requires a motion for a reconsideration of that same
question to be raised, presented and overruled as a condition precedent to the
filing of an application for a writ of certiorari in this court. Such a rule is
not in conflict but is in harmony with the principles of law laid down in the
oft cited decision of this court in Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (25
Phil., 245) as found on page 272 of the opinion.

Araullo, C.J., Street,
Malcolm, Avanceña, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Municipal Council of Masantol
vs. Guevara et al., R. G. No. 19803, not reported.