G.R. No. 1440. November 14, 1905

The offense charged in this case is one for which the penalty which
may be imposed is not limited to six months imprisonment or a fine of
100 dollars or both, and the accused were tried convicted, and
sentenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction.

Counsel for the defendants assign as error the assumption of
jurisdiction by that court over the subject matter of the alleged
offense, because, as clearly appears from the record, if the offense
charged was committed at all it was committed in the municipality of
Pasay, in the Province of Rizal, beyond the territorial limits of the
city of Manila, although within “a zone surrounding the city on land
five miles in width.”

Act No. 140 defines the judicial districts of the Philippine Islands, and provides that “the city of Manila shall constitute a judicial district to be known as the judicial District of Manila,” and that “the Fifth Judicial District shall consist of the Provinces of Bulacan, Bataan, and Rizal,”
and it is admitted that unless the provisions of this act have been
amended the Court of First Instance of Manila was without jurisdiction
for the trial of the offense charged.

Counsel for the prosecution vigorously contends that this act has
been amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First
Instance of Manila to hear and determine this case by section 3 of Act
No. 183, wherein it is provided that—

“The jurisdiction of the city government for police
purposes shall extend to three miles from the shore into Manila Bay and
over a zone surrounding the city on land five miles in width.”

We are of opinion that this contention can not be successfully
maintained and that Act No.140 has not been amended so as to confer
upon the Court of First Instance of Manila original jurisdiction in
criminal cases over territory not included within the territorial
limits of the city.

The section relied upon by the prosecution does not in itself
contain a grant of power of any kind, nor does it confer jurisdiction
upon the city government, the Municipal Board, nor upon any other body
or person whatever. Its manifest purpose and effect is merely to define
the territorial limits wherein may be exercised a certain limited
jurisdiction for police purposes only, which is expressly conferred
upon the city government and its officers in later sections of the act.

The first section of the act creates the municipal corporation known
as the city of Manila; the second defines the territorial limits of its
general jurisdiction; the third defines the territorial limits of its
police jurisdiction; the fourth provides for the Municipal Board which
constitutes the city government; and we must look to the later sections
of the act to discover what powers are granted to the municipality thus
created and defined. There is no more reason for the attempt to
construe the third section as a general grant of power for police
purposes than there would be for an attempt to construe the second
section as a general grant of power for all municipal purposes whatever
they might be held to be.

This view was confirmed by an examination of the context and a
review of the various provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the rule
of statutory construction that—

“The presumption is that the lawmaker has a definite
purpose in every enactment, and has adapted and formulated the
subsidiary provisions in harmony with that purpose; that these are
needful to accomplish it; and that, if they have the intended effect,
they will, at least, conduce to effectuate it. * * * From this
assumption proceeds the general rule that the cardinal purpose or
intent of the whole act shall control and that all the parts be
interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious. They are to be brought into
harmony, if possible, and so construed that no clause, sentence, or
word shall be void, superfluous, or insignificant.” (Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, sec. 240.)

If this section itself were a grant to the city government of
jurisdiction for police purposes, it might well be contended that it
confers jurisdiction for the exercise of “police powers” in the usual
legal acceptation of that term; but that it was not the intention of
the legislator to grant such powers over the 5-mile zone surrounding
the city on land is evident from the provisions of subsection (cc) of
section-17, which expressly confers upon the city the right to extend
its ordinances over Manila Bay 3 miles beyond the city limits, but
fails to grant this power as to the land zone mentioned in section 3.
If “general police powers” over the territory described in section 3
had been granted by that section, there would not seem to be any need
for a grant of express authority to the city to extend its ordinances
to the bay, and the express grant of this authority in one case has the
effect of denying its existence in the other.

Again, if we construe the term “police purposes“as used in
section 3 to mean merely the exercise of a sort of police supervision
over the territory therein defined, we are not justified in treating
that section as in itself a grant of general authority for the exercise
of such supervision, for such a construction would result in a direct
conflict between this section and the provisions of sections 37 and 40,
which limit and prescribe the police jurisdiction of the city, and it
would at the same time render “superfluous and insignificant”
the provisions of those sections which contain an express grant of
certain limited authority for the exercise of such supervision.

But while we can not accept the conclusions of counsel for the
prosecution based on the hypothesis that this section is in itself a
general grant of jurisdiction for police purposes, we find that a
limited and carefully defined police jurisdiction over the territory
therein described is expressly conferred upon the city government and
various city officials by later provisions of the act Sections 37 and
40 authorize the city government, through its proper officers, to
exercise police supervision over this territory, to serve and execute
certain processes therein, to pursue and arrest criminals or persons
suspected of having committed offenses therein, and to bring such
persons before the municipal courts of the city, which are expressly
clothed with jurisdiction to hold preliminary investigations touching
graver offenses and exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of lesser
offenses alleged to have been committed therein.

But the grant of these limited powers to the city government and
certain city officials can not be held to operate so as to enlarge or
affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
except in so far as an appeal is expressly provided from final
judgments of lesser offenses tried in the municipal courts. The Courts
of First Instance of Manila are insular and not city courts, and their
judges and clerks are insular and not city officials. They are not
created or supported by the city nor in any wise dependent upon it and
are wholly separate and distinct from the municipal government, and no
more form a part thereof than does the Supreme Court itself, which
holds its sessions within the territorial limits of the municipality.

It has been contended, however, that for the proper exercise of such
police jurisdiction as has been conferred upon the city government over
the zone in question, it is necessary that the Courts of First Instance
of Manila should have jurisdiction over that zone for the trial of all
crimes and offenses alleged to have been committed therein, and
therefore that such jurisdiction is conferred by necessary implication
if not by express provision.

We do not think this proposition can be maintained, even though it
were admitted that the government of the city of Manila has
jurisdiction for police purposes in the widest possible signification
of the term; and much less is it true, if we limit that jurisdiction to
the powers expressly conferred in the act, for under the provisions of
Act No.140, the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other
provinces adjoining Manila have jurisdiction in such cases and are as
fully equipped and competent to try all offenders when properly brought
before them as are those of the city of Manila.

It is true that it might at times be convenient for the officers of
the city of Manila charged with the arrest and detention of offenders
in the zone in question, to bring such offenders for trial in the
Courts of First Instance of Manila, but it will not be seriously
maintained that for the mere convenience of the police officers of the
city, jurisdiction in criminal cases can be assumed by these courts
over territory wherein such jurisdiction is not expressly conferred.

Furthermore, express provision is made in section 40
of the very act wherein these powers are conferred for their convenient
and effective exercise. The municipal courts are given “exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases arising under the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands where the offense is committed within the police
jurisdiction of the city, and the maximum punishment is by imprisonment
for not more than six months or a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars, or both,” and “such courts may also conduct preliminary
examinations for any offense without regard to the limits of
punishment.”

It would be a strained construction indeed which would support an
implied grant of jurisdiction to the Courts of First Instance, based
upon considerations of convenience, which the legislator has foreseen,
and for which he has made ample provision.

Act No. 183 became a law on July 31, 1901, at a time when a state of
lawlessness naturally following on the heels of the insurrection was
still prevalent in Manila and the surrounding territory. To combat this
condition, well organized police courts and an expensive and highly
disciplined body of metropolitan police were brought into existence,
and the creation of a police jurisdiction for the city extending far
beyond its natural boundaries, may fairly be attributed to a desire to
extend their usefulness to the widest possible limit. Within this large
extent of territory the city government and its peace officers and
police were given all necessary authority looking to the pursuit and
capture of offenders against the law, and since it was necessary, not
only to arrest and detain such criminals, but to bring them to justice,
the jurisdiction of the municipal police courts was made coextensive
with the police jurisdiction of the city, by express provision of law.
This, it may be safely presumed, because better results might fairly be
expected from these courts than from the justice courts, whose learning
and loyalty had not yet been thoroughly tested.

These reasons for extending the jurisdiction of the municipal courts
beyond the limits of the city of Manila did not require the extension
of the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance beyond the
boundaries already fixed in Act No. 140, and no express provision to
that end was incorporated into the law, nor has our attention been
directed to any reason which renders such a provision necessary to
carry out the purpose and object of the act.

In this connection it is worthy of note that section 42 of the act
expressly prescribes that all appeals from judgments of the municipal
courts imposing fines or imprisonment shall lie to the Courts of First Instance of Manila,
whereas section 40 provides that after preliminary examinations in the
municipal courts the accused shall be released or committed and bound
over to secure his appearance before the proper court. If the
lawmaker had intended to confer upon the Courts of First Instance of
Manila original jurisdiction over the zone in question, we should
naturally expect to find the same provision for the disposition of
criminal cases after preliminary trial as upon appeal. The striking
variation in the wording of these closely allied provisions of the act
strongly confirms our opinion that the lawmaker had clearly in mind the
nature and character of the jurisdiction conferred upon the city
government and the provisions necessary for its convenient and
effective exercise, and that he expressly conferred upon the municipal
courts all the jurisdiction necessary to that end, and carefully
refrained from the unnecessary extension or modification of the
original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.

A number of authorities are cited in the brief of counsel for the
prosecution, but we think that these authorities merely go to show that
the legislator, had he deemed it proper or prudent so to do, might have
conferred jurisdiction over the zone in question upon the Courts of
First Instance of Manila. The question is not, however, whether the
legislator had authority to confer such jurisdiction, but whether he
did, in fact, confer it.

We are of opinion that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try
the alleged offense charged in the complaint in this case, and that
said complaint should therefore be dismissed with the costs in both
instances de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., disqualified.