G.R. Nos. 139341-45. July 25, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO FERNANDEZ, APPELLANT.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the prosecution’s evidence, consisting mainly of the
complainant’s
testimony, fails the test of moral certainty demanded by the law and the
rules,
the accused must be acquitted. It then becomes this Court’s duty to
uphold the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent regardless
of the
weakness of the defense.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 30,
1998 Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo,
La Union (Branch 32) in Criminal Case Nos. A-3177, A-3274, A-3275,
A-3276 and
A-3277, finding Ernesto Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five
(5)
counts of rape and sentencing him to death for each count. The decretal
portion
of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING consideration[s], the
accused
Ernesto Fernandez a.k.a. “Tang-ked” is hereby found GUILTY of the five
(5)
criminal cases for Rape for which he is charged and he is hereby
sentenced in
all the five (5) cases to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to pay
the
complainant Yolanda Fernandez damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in
each case
or P250,000.00 and to pay the cost of the proceedings.”[2]
The Information for Criminal Case No. A-3177[3] dated November 29,
1996, reads as
follows:[4]
“That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1995, in the
Municipality of Sto.
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the father and
person-in-charge of the custody and care of the offended party, with
lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual
intercourse with the offended party Yolanda Fernandez, a minor then
fourteen
(14) years old, to her damage and prejudice.”[5]
The four (4) other Informations (Criminal Case Nos.
A-3274,[6]
A-3275,[7]
A-3276[8] and
A-3277,[9] all
dated January 17, 1997) indicted
appellant for the same crime against the same victim on four different
dates,
October 3, 4 and 15 — all in 1995 — and “in or about the month of
April 1996.”
Appellant was arraigned twice, first on July 29, 1997[10] for Criminal Case No.
A-3177; and the
second on September 17, 1997[11] for
Criminal Case Nos. A-3274 to A-3277. In both instances, appellant, with
the
assistance of his counsel de parte,[12]
pleaded not guilty.[13] After pretrial
and trial in due course, the lower court rendered its assailed
Decision.
The
Facts
Version of the
Prosecution
In its Brief,[14] the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the facts in the following
manner:
“Private complainant Yolanda Fernandez is the illegitimate
daughter of
appellant Ernesto Fernandez and Percilita Garcia. Percilita Garcia, on
the other
hand, is appellant’s step-daughter, being the daughter of his common-law
wife
Espirita Costales with her first husband, who was then living with
appellant in
Namonitan, Sto. Tomas, La Union, when she was raped and impregnated by
appellant. On October 10, 1982, Percilita Garcia, who was then 18 years
old,
gave birth out of wedlock to appellant’s child, complainant Yolanda
Fernandez,
in appellant’s house in Namonitan, Sto. Tomas, La Union. After giving
birth to
Yolanda, Percilita went to live in her brother Ernesto Garcia’s house,
also in
Namonitan, until she went to Manila in 1984 and stayed there for good,
leaving
Yolanda to the care and custody of appellant and her mother
Esperita.“Since birth, Yolanda lived with her father, appellant Ernesto
Fernandez, and
her grandmother Espirita Costales, appellant’s common-law wife, in
appellant’s
house in Namonitan, Sto. Tomas, La Union. She went to school at Cupang
Elementary School in Namonitan, which was a walking distance from their
house.
She was in Grade V when she was serially raped by [her] father,
appellant
Ernesto Fernandez, inside their house starting October 2, 1995, which
forced her
to quit schooling. At the time, Yolanda was twelve (12) going [on]
thirteen (13)
years old, and was living in the house of appellant together with
appellant, her
grandmother Espirita Costales and her 5-year old sister Catherine
Fernan[d]ez
who is also appellant and Percilita’s daughter. Previous to these rape
incidents, appellant had started abusing Yolanda as early as when she
was five
(5) years old by touching her breasts and other parts of the body.
“THE FIRST RAPE (Criminal Case No.
A-3177)
“On October 2, 1995 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening,
Yolanda was sitting
in the sala of their house when appellant came near her. Just the two
[of] them
were in the house at the time, because her grandmother and Catherine
were out
selling fish. Appellant pulled her by the arm to her room which was
located
south of the sala of the house. As he pulled her towards her room, he
warned her
not to tell anyone. When they got inside the room, appellant undressed
her, by
removing first her T-shirt, then her short pants, then her panty and
bra. She
tried to fight back, boxed his back, and tried to run away but appellant
caught
her and laid her down on her bed. After laying her down on the bed, he
kissed
her cheeks, her lips and on her breasts; touched her body and her
private parts
with his hand; then he held his penis, opened her legs wide and inserted
his
penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions for a while. She felt
pain in
her anybody [sic] because he would kill her, and then he left. She then
put her
clothes on.
“THE SECOND RAPE (Criminal Case No.
A-3274)
“On October 3, 1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning,
while Yolanda was
alone at the kitchen of their house washing the dishes, appellant
arrived and
pulled her inside his own room. There, he removed her dress (bestida),
her bra
and her panty, and laid her to his bed. She tried to run away but he
caught her.
He then laid her down on his bed and thereupon, inserted his penis and
had
sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain inside her vagina. While
doing the
act, appellant kissed her breasts, cheeks and lips. After the
intercourse,
appellant warned her that he would kill her should she report what
happened,
then he left.
“THE THIRD RAPE (Criminal Case No.
A-3275)
“On October 4, 1995, at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning,
Yolanda was
sweeping in the house when appellant kissed her all over her body and
then
pulled her to her room. Only she and the appellant were in the house at
the
time. Once inside her room, appellant removed first her skirt, then her
blouse
and then her bra and panty. When she was totally naked, he [lay] her
down on the
bed. Despite her resistance by pushing him away, appellant again
succeeded in
inserting his penis inside her vagina. He also kissed her. She felt pain
in her
vagina and in her breasts as he did the pumping motion. After the
intercourse,
appellant warned her, that he would kill her; then, he
left.
“THE FOURTH RAPE (Criminal Case No.
A-3276)
“On October 15, 1995, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning,
Yolanda was
sitting alone in the kitchen of their house, as her grandmother and
sister
Catherine had already left to sell fish, when appellant approached and
pulled
her towards her room. She tried to resist but he was very strong in
pulling her.
Once they got inside her room, appellant embraced her, kissed her cheeks
and
mashed her breasts. Then he undressed her and laid her on the bed. He
again
warned her not to reveal it to anybody, or he would kill her. Then he
placed
himself on top of her, inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a
pumping
motion. She felt pain in her vagina. It took appellant a few minutes to
stay on
top of her. After consummating the sexual act, appellant left. Yolanda
remained
inside their house.
“THE FIFTH RAPE (Criminal Case No.
A-3277)
“After October 15, 1995, Yolanda was raped again and again, the
dates and the
number of times she could no longer remember nor recall. Even after she
was
already pregnant with appellant’s child, appellant still kept on raping
her. On
July 3, 1996, she gave birth in their house to appellant’s child, a baby
girl
whom they named Marimar Fernandez.”[15]
(Citations omitted)
Version of the
Defense
On the other hand, appellant’s version of the facts is as
follows:[16]
“The defense presented the oral testimonies of Winifreda Butay
and Ernesto
Fernandez.“The first witness, Winifreda Butay, is a Chief of Police of
Burgos, La
Union. Before she became Chief of Police of Burgos, La Union, she was
assigned
at the Women’s Desk of San Fernando, La Union. On July 1997, she
accompanied an
insane victim of a vehicular accident to the DSWD Substitute Home Care
for Women
in Urayong, Bauang, La Union. While she was there, Yolanda Fernandez
approached
her and introduced herself that she was from San Fernando, La Union. She
asked
Yolanda why she was there and the latter informed her that she was taken
by the
DSWD and NBI because she filed a rape case against her father. When she
asked
why she filed a rape case Yolanda answered that it was her mother who
instructed
her to reveal that it was her father who raped her. She asked why, and
Yolanda
said that her parents were quarreling. She further inquired as to who
raped
Yolanda. The latter answered that it was her boyfriend, Jonathan Camiro.
She
said that when Yolanda was confiding to her, two (2) personnel of the
DSWD were
listening to their conversation. The said personnel were Remelie
Guillermo and
Edwina Masi. While she was talking with Yolanda, the two (2) approached
them and
said that Yolanda gave them the same story. She again asked Yolanda who
raped
her and why she filed a case against her own father. She gave the same
answer
that her mother taught her what to say and that it was her boyfriend whoimpregnated her. During that time, the two (2) DSWD personnel were still
listening. She told the DSWD about the case and she was informed that
the DSWD
already sen[t] a written communication to the NBI, but the NBI, however,
didn’t
respond. She said that she received a letter from the mother of Yolanda
prohibiting her from talking to or visiting Yolanda.“The last witness, Ernesto Fernandez, is the accused[.] He
admitted that he
is the father of the alleged victim but said that Catherine is not [his]daughter because Percy gave birth in Manila. He denied vehemently the
rape
charges filed against him but admitted that he tied Yolanda to a mango
tree to
force her to admit as to who impregnated her. However, he denied kicking
her
abdomen to abort the baby. The uncle of Yolanda talked to her and the
latter
admitted to her uncle that it was Jonathan Camiro who got her pregnant.
Upon
knowing this, he asked a Barangay councilman to talk to the father of
Jonathan,
but the latter denied that he impregnated Yolanda. During the dates of
the
alleged rapes, he was working at San Fernando, Pampanga. On June 26,
1996, the
DSWD personnel and the assigned NBI Agent went to their house to get
Yolanda,
whom he voluntarily allowed to go with them. He didn’t know where they
brought
Yolanda. He only came to know that a complaint was filed against him
when he
received a subpoena requiring him to file a counter-affidavit which he
identified in open court.”[17] (Citations
omitted)
Ruling of the Trial
Court
The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of complainant,
noting that “she
narrated the circumstances before, during and after the alleged rape in a
positive and straightforward manner.”[18]
On her part, no ill motive for accusing her own father of the crime of
rape was
found by the trial court.[19]
Having accepted complainant’s testimony, the RTC ruled that
appellant had
indeed succeeded in having carnal knowledge of his daughter who, at the
time of
the rape, was under eighteen years of age. It sentenced him to death,
one each
for the five (5) counts of rape he had been charged with.
Hence, this automatic review.[20]
Issues
In his Brief, appellant faults the RTC with this lone
assignment of
error:
“The lower court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty
upon
accused-appellant despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
real age
of the victim.”[21]
The Court’s
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious; the prosecution’s evidence does not
pass the test
of moral certainty. Hence, appellant must be acquitted.
Main
Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution
Evidence
Appellant did not raise the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence as an
issue. This Court, however, looked into it motu proprio, consistent with
the
principle that an appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for
review.[22]
Any review of a rape case begins with the settled reality that
accusing a
person of this crime can be done with facility.[23] Thus, the testimony of the
complainant
must always be scrutinized with great caution.[24] It may not be easy for her to prove
the
commission of rape; yet, it is even more difficult for the accused,
though
innocent, to disprove his guilt.[25] This
principle must be viewed in relation to that which holds that the
evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw
strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[26]
To be sure, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side
with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical
and
inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of
the accused with moral certainty.[27]
Upon the prosecution’s failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the
constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the
thought
that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life[28] or, worse — as in
this case — put him
to death.
Complainant’s Dubious
Testimony
The court a quo describes the testimony of
the victim as “positive,
straightforward, explicit and spontaneous”;[29] hence, sufficient to convict
appellant of
rape. This Court believes otherwise.
We are not unmindful of the general rule that the findings of
the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great
respect and
even finality on appeal.[30] However,
this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to
determine
whether material facts or circumstances have been overlooked or
misinterpreted
by the trial court.[31] In the past, we
have not hesitated to reverse judgments of conviction, where there were
strong
indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charge was
false.[32]
After a judicious examination of complainant’s testimony, which
is the main
evidence for the allegation of rape, we cannot subscribe to the RTC’s
assessment
of it as straightforward and unwavering. Quite the contrary, we believe
that no
conviction can arise from it on the following grounds.
- Unreliability
Complainant testified that the first incident of rape happened
on October 2,
1995, at 6:00 p.m.[33]But on
cross-examination, she testified that on the afternoon of that day, she
went out
to fetch her Inang.[34] It would
have been a simple matter to reconcile these two events, if complainant
simply
clarified that one happened after the other. Surprisingly, during her
direct
examination, she did not even remember that she had gone out to pick up
her
Inang that afternoon.What baffles this Court is the fact that complainant was sure
of the time of
the alleged rape; she was likewise sure of the time her
Inang
arrived.[35] But
the girl could not
remember what time she had gone out to fetch her grandmother.
Complainant could
have easily estimated the time she had done so, if indeed the events
transpired
as she recounted them, because one event logically followed the
other.The same recall selectiveness is repeated in her testimony as
to the alleged
second and third incidents of rape. On direct examination, she claimed
that on
October 3, 1995, she was raped for the second time at 7:00 a.m.[36]
But on cross-examination, she said that she had just left her
Inang at
that same time in the place where the latter was to get a ride.[37] As to the third
incident of rape
allegedly committed on October 4, 1995, complainant testified that she
was raped
at 6:00 a.m.[38]
Again, on
cross-examination, she declared that at that very same time, she and her
sister
Catherine had brought their Inang to the place
where the old lady would
get a ride.[39]As before, following the narration of events given by
complainant, one can
logically infer that after the rape, she accompanied her grandmother up
to the
place where the latter would get a ride; or the other way around —
after
fetching her Inang, she returned home and was
raped. However,
complainant could make no such connection between the two events. The
only way
to reconcile these events is to suppose that they happened in
succession, but
her failure to recall a closely connected sequence of events immediatelypreceding or succeeding the supposed rape[40] casts doubt on the veracity of her
statements and erodes her credibility.[41]The pattern that emerged was that when defense counsel made no
reference to
the supposed rape incident, she became unsure whether her testimony
during
direct examination on the alleged rape coincided with the times of the
activities she mentioned at the latter portion of the
cross-examination.These discrepancies were material. Yet, they were not explained
in the direct
or redirect examinations even when the trial was continued on succeeding
dates.
Neither were they discussed in the Decision of the trial
court. - Inconsistency
A careful analysis of the testimony of complainant will reveal
that she kept
on giving statements that were inconsistent or contradictory.First, she testified that she stopped
schooling in October 1995,
because her stomach was already bulging due to her pregnancy.[42]She categorically
declared that she became
pregnant because appellant had raped her.[43] But later, still on direct examination,
she averred that she was raped for the first time on October 2, 1995.
She
testified:“Q When for the first time did this Ernesto Fernandez [rape]
you?
A
October 2, sir.Q What year?
A In 1995, sir.”[44]x x x x x x x x x
“Q But you claimed that he only raped you for the first time on
October 2,
1995?
A Yes, sir.”[45]It bewilders this Court how she could have stopped schooling in
October 1995
due to her pregnancy, which allegedly resulted from the first instance
of rape
committed by appellant, also in October of that same year. She said, in
fact,
that her stomach was already “bulging”[46] at this time. If such were the case, then
not only did her pregnancy occur simultaneously with the first rape but,
more
incredibly, her pregnancy preceded the
rape.Second, in her testimony she alleged that
at the time of the second
rape, she was on her way to school.[47]
This allegation contradicted her earlier statements, during both the
direct and
the redirect examinations,[48] that she
had already stopped schooling on October 2, 1995.Third, when asked by the public prosecutor
what she did after that
rape, she said that “she left their house to go to her Uncle
Boyet.”[49] But
when asked the same question by the
trial court, again she responded, “I went to school.”[50]Fourth, she also said in her testimony
that on October 4, 1995, she
was with her sister Catherine when they brought their grandmother to the
place
where the woman would get her ride. Almost in the same breath, though,
complainant said that she and her sister went home. Later, the former
clarified
that on that date, she went home while her sister Catherine accompanied
their
grandmother in selling fish.[51] - Inadequacy
Showing lack of substance in her testimony, complainant could
not even relate
details of the final rape allegedly committed sometime in April 1996.
Besides
giving no details, she gave the impression that the occurrence itself
was
doubtful. When questioned by the trial court, she testified
thus:“COURT QUESTION:
Q. How about in the year 1996, do you remember if you were
raped by him?
A
No more.”[52] - Complainant’s Perfunctory Manner of Testifying
Although it is settled that the accused may be convicted of
rape simply on
the basis of the complainant’s testimony,[53] this principle holds true only if such
testimony meets the test of credibility.[54] This requires that the testimony be
straightforward, clear, positive and convincing.
What particularly caught the Court’s attention was the manner
in which
complainant gave her testimony. We note that all the major circumstances
before,
during and immediately after the alleged rape were indirectly provided
by the
prosecutor through his questions. In fact, when one sifts through the
testimony
of complainant, it becomes evident that she simply affirmed, denied or
supplied
the missing facts in response to the questions propounded by him. Such
testimony
cannot be considered positive or categorical.
Although the trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude
to the
questioning of a child witness,[55] we
must not lose track of the basic tenet that the truth must be
ascertained.
When one scrutinizes the testimony of complainant, one will
easily notice
that her manner of testifying seems to be so mechanical that, in the
alleged
four instances of rape, both her actuation and that of appellant were
almost
always identical. To the Court, her narration seemed to come from
memorization
by rote, rather than genuine recollection, and thus sounded perfunctory
or
routinary. Moreover, when asked questions on events contemporaneous or
immediately before or after the alleged rape, she seemed to falter in
giving
immediate, positive and categorical responses.
Owing to the character of the crime of rape, the testimony of
the victim is
the focal point around which the charges naturally revolve. Therefore,
the
degree of reliability, consistency and adequacy of her testimony on
material
points — as well as the very manner in which she gives such testimony
— can
either sustain or negate conviction.[56]
Tainted Testimony
of
Complainant’s Mother
It is clear that conviction may arise from any categorical and
consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of
the
eyewitness testifying on the matter. In a litany of cases, this Court
has ruled
that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the
victim
to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the
latter in the
commission of the crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive
exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.[57]Further, this Court has reiterated time
and time again that it is most unlikely for a young girl like
complainant, or
even her family, to impute the crime of rape to no less than a relative
and to
face social humiliation, if not to vindicate her honor.[58]
However settled these principles, they do not apply to the case
at bar. We
note from Defense Witness Winifreda Butay’s testimony that complainant
admitted
to having been instructed by her mother to testify to having been raped
by the
father. We also had the occasion to examine the testimony of
complainant’s
mother, who openly testified how she herself had allegedly been raped by
appellant.[59]
Without passing judgment
on that incident, we note the animosity she felt towards him. The
mother’s ill
motive clearly supported Butay’s testimony that complainant had accused
her
father of raping her after being coached by her own mother to do so.
This point
will be discussed shortly.
Unrebutted Testimony
of
Credible Defense
Witness
Most damaging to the cause of the prosecution was the testimony
referred to
above — that of Defense Witness Winifreda Butay, a police officer
assigned to
the Women’s Desk of Burgos, La Union. In July 1997, she accompanied
complainant
to the DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development) Substitute
Home Care
for Women in Urayong, Bauang, La Union. Having had the opportunity to
interview
complainant, Butay testified as follows:
“Q And what happened with this Yolanda Fernandez when she saw
you?
A When
this victim saw me, I ask her from where she is and she told me that
[she is]
from Sto. Tomas, La Union.Q What happened next?
A I asked her name and she
uttered Yolanda
Fernandez.Q After she told you her name, what happened next?
A I
inquired from
her.Q What did you inquire from her?
A I inquired from
her, what happened to
her.Q And what was the answer of Yolanda Fernandez?
A She
was taken by the
DSWD and NBI for them to [take] care of her or custody of her and she
told me
also that she filed a case [of rape] against her father, Ernesto
Fernandez.Q And when she told you tha[t], what happened or what did you
do?
A I
asked her, why she filed a case against her father and she told me that
her
mother taught her that she will tell that her father was the one who
raped
her.Q And did you ask her why did her mother [teach] her to file a
case against
her father?PROS. CATBAGAN:
Objection, your honor, that is only a
hearsay.COURT:
Objection over[r]uled, that is a
conversation.What was the answer?
A She told me that her mother and
father are
quar[r]eling.Q Could you quote the exact Ilocano dialect before this Court
[what] she told
you?
A Yes sir.Q What was it?
A I ask[ed] her ‘Apay nga indarum mo ni
tatang mo ti rape’
(Why did you charge your father with rape) and she answered ‘Isumet
ngamin ti
inbaga ni Nanang ko’, nga idarum ko ni tatang ko ti rape’, and after
that I
ask[ed] her did your father rape you and she said no and then I asked
her again
who is then the person who raped you, she answered ‘didiay nobyok’ (my
boyfriend).Q Did you [ask] her the name of her suitor?
A Yes
sir.Q And what was the answer that was revealed?
A My
boyfriend Jonathan
Camiro.Q And what else did she [reveal] to you regarding Jonathan
Camiro?
A I
asked he[r], is it not true that he was the one who raped you.Q And what was the answer of Yolanda Fernandez?
A He
was the one.”[60]
x x x x x x x x x
“Q And what did she say to them
A And what she said to
them she also told
me.Q And what is that?
A She said: (‘Isu met ti imbaga ni
Nanangco’) That is
what my mother said.Q What [was] Yolanda Fernandez referring to?
A Yolanda
Fernandez told me
‘that it was not my father who impregnated me’ she said.Q Did you ask Yolanda Fernandez who impregnated her?
A
Yes, your honor,
and said: ‘my boyfriend Jonathan Camiro.’Q Where [were] these two DSWD [personnel] when Yolanda
Fernandez told you
that?
A They were in front of me, your honor.Q How far Madam witness?
A This far, sir. (Witness is
pointing to one-half
meter).Q Did you ask Yolanda Fernandez if she was actually raped by
[her]
father?
A Yes, and she told me again: ’Saan nga ni tatangco ti
nangsicog
caniac.’ (It was not my father who made me pregnant).Q Did you ever ask her why she filed the case against her
father?
A Yes,
your honor.Q And what was the answer?
A I asked her: ‘why then
did you file a case
against your father or why is it [that it is] your father whom you
charged?’
(Apay ngarud nga ni tatangmo ti indarum mo?).Q And what was the answer?
A Yes, because that is what
my mother told me
(Wen ta isu met ngarud ti imbaga ni nanangco cania).Q Did you ask her why her mother want[s] her to charge Ernesto
Fernandez?
A Yes, sir.Q And what was the answer?
A She told me in Ilocano
again. (Wen ta
agap-apada). Yes because they are quarreling.”[60]
We find no logical reason for Witness Butay to testify falsely.
The public
prosecutor tried to discredit her by implying that there was a friendly
relationship between her and appellant. However, no concrete proof
showing that
her testimony was biased was ever presented.
Granting for the sake of argument that there was a friendly
relationship
between Butay and appellant, it did not impair or in any way affect the
weight
of her testimony. We have often held that the relationship of a witness
with the
accused does not automatically affect the veracity of the former’s
testimony.[62]
Friendship alone, even if
true, is not reason enough to discredit and label Butay’s testimony as
biased
and unworthy of credence.
Epilogue
Given
the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that complainant has not
been a victim of rape, or that appellant’s defense of alibi and denial
can be
given full faith and credence. We only stress that her testimony was
unable to
pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands and the
rules
require to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of overcoming appellant’s
presumption of innocence.[63]
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof
beyond reasonable
doubt — moral certainty that the accused is guilty.[64] The defense may be
weak, but the
prosecution is even weaker.[65] As a
result of this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other
issues
raised.
The Court has aptly said: “It is better to liberate a guilty
man than to
unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the
required
quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court’s support of ardent
crusaders
waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the People’s
evidence fails
to prove indubitably the accused’s authorship of the crime of which they
stand
accused, it is the Court’s duty — and the accused’s right — to
proclaim their
innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.”[66]
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of
Agoo, La Union in Criminal Case Nos. A-3177, A-3274, A-3275, A-3276 and
A-3277
is SET ASIDE.
Consequently, Ernesto Fernandez is
ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately
RELEASED from custody,
unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ORDERED to implement
this Decision forthwith and to
INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide,
Jr., C.J., on
leave.
Bellosillo, J., no part. Did not
take part in deliberations.
[1] Penned by
Executive Judge Leo M.
Rapatalo; rollo, pp. 29-79; records, pp. 158-208.
[2] RTC
Decision, p. 51; rollo, p. 79;
records, p. 208.
[3]
Rollo., pp. 15-16; records, folder
5, pp. 2-3.
[4]
Signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan, with the approval of Provincial
Prosecutor
Francisco M. Tejano.
[5]
Information dated November 29,
1996; rollo, p. 15; records, folder 5, p. 2.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 7-8; records, folder 1,
pp. 1-2.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 9-10; folder 2, pp.
1-2.
[8] Id.,
pp. 11-12; folder 3, pp.
1-2.
[9] Id.,
pp. 13-14; folder 4, pp.
1-2.
[10]
Order dated July 29, 1997;
records, p. 24.
[11]
Order dated September 17, 1997;
ibid, p. 46.
[12]
Atty. Placido Garcia Jr.
[13]
Supra, notes 10 and 11.
[14]
Appellee’s Brief was signed by
Solicitor General Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant
Solicitor General
Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo and Solicitor Luis F. Simon.
[15]
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-9; rollo,
pp. 174-180.
[16]
Appellant’s Brief was signed by
Attys. Bartolome P. Reus and Ma. Vanessa B. Donato-Balmaceda of the
Public
Attorney’s Office.
[17]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 5-7; rollo,
p. 102-104.
[18] RTC
Decision, p. 31; rollo, p.
59; records, p. 188.
[19]
Ibid.
[20] This
case was deemed submitted
for resolution on September 21, 2001, upon receipt by this Court of
appellant’s
Reply Brief. Earlier, appellant’s Brief was received by the Court on
February
27, 2001, while appellee’s Brief was received on June 20,
2001.
[21]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; rollo,
p. 98. Original in upper case.
[22]
People v. Arves, 343
SCRA 123, October 13, 2000; People v. Balacano, 336
SCRA 615, July 31,
2000; People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA 40, July 5,
2000; People v.
Buluran, 325 SCRA 476, February 15, 2000; People v.
Castillo, 325
SCRA 613, February 15, 2000.
[23]
People v. Galvez, GR
Nos. 136867-68, September 25, 2001; People v.
Navarette, GR Nos.
136840-42, September 13, 2001; People v. Babera,
332 SCRA 257, May 30,
2000; People v. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81, July 23, 1999;
People v.
Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228, April 21, 1999.
[24]
People v. Flores, GR No.
141782, December 14, 2001; People v. Manayan, GR
Nos. 142741-43,
October 25, 2001; People v. Morales, GR No. 134292,
August 16,
2001.
[25]
People v. Manayan, supra;
People v. Galvez, supra; People v. Queigan, GR Nos.
133586-603, February
19, 2001.
[26]
Ibid.
[27] §2,
Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court.
[28] People v. Aballe, GR No.
133997, May 17, 2001.
[29] RTC
Decision, p. 31; rollo, p.
59; records, p. 188.
[30] People v. Plana, GR No.
128285, November 27, 2001; People v. Villanos, 337
SCRA 78, August 1,
2000; People v. De Guzman, 333 SCRA 269, June 8,
2000; People v.
Palma, 308 SCRA 466, June 17, 1999.
[31]
People v. De la Cruz, GR
No. 137967, April 19, 2001; People v. Domogoy, 305
SCRA 75, March 22,
1999.
[32]
Ibid.; People v. Medel,
286 SCRA 567, February 26, 1998.
[33] TSN,
September 17, 1997, pp.
6-7.
[34] TSN,
October 15, 1997, p. 3.
[35] TSN,
September 17, 1997, p.
14.
[36]
Ibid., p. 15.
[37] TSN,
October 15, 1997, p. 4.
[38] TSN,
September 17, 1997, p.
20.
[39] TSN,
October 15, 1997, pp.
4-5.
[40]
People v. Bautista, GR
No. 123557, February 4, 2002.
[41]
Ibid.
[42] TSN,
September 17, 1997, p.
5.
[43]
Ibid.
[44] Id.,
p. 6.
[45] Id.,
p. 14.
[46] Id.,
p. 5.
[47] TSN,
September 17, 1997, p.
19.
[48] TSN,
October 15, 1997, p. 7.
[49] TSN,
September 17, 1997, p.
19.
[50]
Ibid.
[51] TSN,
October 15, 1997, p. 5.
[52] TSN,
October 2, 1997, p. 6.
[53]
People v. Taño, 331 SCRA
449, May 5, 2000; People v. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697,
February 25, 1999;
People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, November 6, 1997;
People v. Abad,
268 SCRA 246, February 13, 1997; People v. Rosare,
264 SCRA 398,
November 19, 1996.
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
People v. Daganio, GR
No. 137385, January 23, 2002.
[56] People v. Pajarillo, GR
Nos. 143755-58, February 20, 2002.
[57]
People v. Sansaet, GR
No. 139330, February 6, 2002; People v. Quezada, GR
Nos. 135557-58,
January 30, 2002; People v. Lanita, GR No. 134101,
September 5, 2001;
People v. Alay-ay, GR Nos. 137199-230, August 23,
2001; People v.
Banela, 301 SCRA 84, January 18, 1999.
[58]
People v. Libo-on, GR
No. 136737, May 23, 2001; People v. Villadares, GR
No. 137649, March 8,
2001; People v. Namayan, 246 SCRA 646, July 18,
1995.
[59] TSN,
August 5, 1997 pp. 5-7.
[60] TSN,
November 13, 1997, pp.
5-7.
[61] TSN,
November 20, 1997, pp.
4-6.
[62]
People v. Morial, GR No.
129295, August 15, 2001; Roca v. CA, GR No. 114917,
January 29, 2001;
People v. Oposculo Jr, 345 SCRA 167, November 20,
2000.
[63]
People v. Pajarillo, supra.
[64]
People v. Bautista, supra.
[65]
Ibid.; Chua v. People,
GR No. 128095, January 19, 2001; Rueda v. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 129064,
November 29, 2000; People v. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287,
April 6, 1990.
[66]
People v. Geron, 281
SCRA 39, October 17, 1997, per Romero, J.