A.M. No. OCA-01-5. August 01, 2002

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NCR, REPRESENTED BY NELSON L. ACEBEDO, DIR. IV, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AFFAIRS, COMPLAINANT, VS. REYNALDO B. STA. ANA, HRMO I, LEAVE DIVISION, OCA, RESPON…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions August 1, 2002 EN BANC


PER CURIAM:


For resolution is the administrative complaint filed against
respondent Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana, Human Resource Management Officer I,
Leave Division, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court
for Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Documents relative to his
promotion as Human Resource Management Officer III.

Respondent gained employment in the Office of the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court in 1976. He started as a Laborer and was
later promoted to the position of Human Resource Management Officer I.
Sometime in 1996, respondent applied for promotion as Human Resource
Management Officer III. In support of his application for promotion to
the said position, he submitted the following documents:

(1) a Certificate of Eligibility purportedly issued by
the
Civil Service Commission certifying that respondent Sta. Ana passed the
Career Service Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a
rating of 83.8%;[1] and

(2) a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated August 5, 1996
stating,
under Item 18, that he passed the Career Service Professional
examination on February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%.[2]

Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer of the
Civil
Service Commission in the Supreme Court, it was found that respondent
Sta. Ana was not in the CSC-NCR Master List of those who passed the MOWE
Career Service Professional Examination given by the Civil Service
Commission on February 18, 1996 at Ramon Magsaysay High School.[3] Atty. Huerta
recommended the filing of a formal charge against respondent.

Thus, the Civil Service Commission Office for Legal Affairs
(CSC-OLA) issued a formal charge against respondent for Dishonesty and
Falsification of Public Document committed as follows:

That in support of promotional appointment to the position
of
Human Resource Management Officer III, you submitted a Certificate of
Eligibility certifying you to have passed the Career Service
Professional Examination on February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%.
Upon verification with this Office’s Registry of Eligibles, it was found
out that your name does not appear among those who have passed the said
examination. Such act is contrary to Civil Service Law and
rules.[4]

A copy of the formal charge was furnished respondent on
October 11,
1996 requiring him to file his Answer within five days from notice.
Respondent asked for an extension of time to file his Answer which was
granted by the CSC-OLA on December 11, 1996.[5]
However, respondent still did not submit his Answer within the extended
period. He also failed to attend the scheduled hearings despite notices
for him to appear.[6]

On February 19, 1998, an ex-parte hearing
was conducted by
the Hearing Officer of the CSC-OLA. A representative from the CSC Field
Office in the Supreme Court, Ms. Rose Perlas, testified to confirm the
documents submitted by respondent in support of his promotional
appointment, namely: (1) a Certificate of Eligibility indicating that
respondent passed the Career Service Professional Examination held at
Ramon Magsaysay High School on February 18, 1996;[7] (2) a Personal Data Sheet dated
August 5, 1996 stating that he passed said examination;[8]
and (3) an official Appointment dated July 9, 1996 issued by then Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa promoting respondent to the position of Human
Resource Management Officer III.[9]

In the same hearing, a certification issued by Ms. Bella A.
Mitra,
Officer-in-Charge, Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD),
CSC-NCR, was presented attesting that respondent’s name was not included
in the Registry of Eligibles in the Career Service Professional
Examination held on February 18, 1996.[10]
On the basis of this certification, it was deduced that respondent
submitted a spurious certificate of eligibility and made a false entry
in his Personal Data Sheet.

Hence, on June 22, 1998, the Hearing Officer of the CSC-OLA
recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service.[11] This was affirmed by
Atty. Nelson Acebedo, Director IV, CSC-OLA, on June 24, 1998.[12]

On August 12, 1998, respondent filed a Petition to transfer
jurisdiction of the case from the Civil Service Commission to the
Supreme Court and/or to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction[13] pursuant to CSC
Memorandum No. 53, Series of 1998, to wit:

Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power,
it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge’s and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The CSC-OLA thus referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on August 18, 1998.

On May 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator
directed
respondent to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for dishonesty and falsification of public
documents.[14]

In a letter to the Court Administrator dated May 21,
1999,[15]
respondent admitted the charge and asked that the penalty meted him be
reduced and that he be given another chance to serve the court in order
to correct his mistake.

On February 28, 2001, the Court resolved to docket the case
as a
regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the available records on file.[16]
On April 10, 2001, the CSC-OLA manifested no objection to docketing of
the case as a regular administrative matter and submitting the same for
resolution.[17]

In his Manifestation dated April 11, 2001,[18]
respondent reiterated that he admits the charge against him and pleaded
for forgiveness. Respondent asked that he be given another chance
considering that he has served the court for more than twenty (20) years
and has consistently received performance ratings of “Very
Satisfactory” and “Outstanding.” Pertinent portions of respondent’s
Manifestation[19]
reads:

1. That he admits with so much regret that he indeed
committed the act complained of;

2. That he humbly pleads for forgiveness before this
Honorable
Court and he be given another chance to prove his sincerity to correct
his misdeed and promises that this wrongdoing, although not done in the
performance of his duties, this will never happen in the future;

3. That he respectfully informs this Honorable Court that
he
served the Court for more than twenty (20) years to the best of his
ability. In fact, he was given a performance rating of “Very
Satisfactory” (VS) and “Outstanding,” an indication that he has been
faithfully performing his job well. (Please see attached supporting
papers);

4. That this is the first Administrative Case filed
against him; and

5. That he respectfully prays for compassionate justice
before
this Honorable Court in inflicting a harsh penalty considering the
future of his children and family depend on his role (sic) financial
support.

xxx[20]

On January 25, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator
affirmed
the findings of the CSC-OLA but recommended suspension for one (1) year
without pay. In reducing the penalty, the Court Administrator took into
account –

xxx the fact that respondent has already spent more than

twenty (20) years of his life in the service of this Court and this is
his first administrative complaint. It could be that he committed the
acts complained of out of his desire to be promoted for the benefit of
his family. Respondent’s admission and prayer for forgiveness is a good
sign that he is indeed remorseful for what he did. xxx

True, respondent deserves to be penalized but the same may
(sic)
tempered in the name of compassionate justice. Unlike the respondent in
A.M. No. 95-1-01-MTCC respondent Sta. Ana did not defraud and prejudice
the government by his acts. He neither assumed the position he desired
nor received the compensation and benefits pertaining thereto.

Moreover, it appears that Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana proved to be
an
asset of the Leave Division, OAS-OCA. His efficiency is shown by his
performance ratings xxx.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and
Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the State’s policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.[21] And no
other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the
judiciary.[22]

Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty.[23]
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always
be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint
the judiciary.[24]
The Court
condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[25]

Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to this standard
of conduct.

One of the supporting documents respondent appended to his
application for promotion to HRMO III was a certificate of eligibility
purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission certifying that he
passed the career service professional examination on February 18, 1996
with a rating of 83.8%. In his personal data sheet, respondent also
stated that he passed the said examination on the same date and with the
same rating. However, upon examination of the records of the
Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service
Commission, it was disclosed that petitioner’s name was not in the list
of those who passed the said examination held at Ramon Magsaysay High
School on February 18, 1996. This belied respondent’s statement in his
personal data sheet and led to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
submitted a false certificate of eligibility.

Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
the
crime of “use of falsified documents” are (1) that the offender knew
that document was falsified by another person; (2) that the false
document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art.
172; (3) that he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and
(4) that the use of the false document caused damage to another or at
least it was used with intent to cause such damage.

It cannot be gainsaid that respondent was well aware that the

certificate of eligibility he submitted was false because he knew for a
fact that he did not pass the career service examination. It is,
likewise, undeniable that his use of such false document in support of
his promotion to HRMO III prejudiced the other applicants who were
genuinely qualified for the position. Then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
had already issued his official appointment, even though he neither
assumed the position nor received the compensation and benefits
pertaining thereto.

Respondent’s act of indicating in his personal data sheet
that he
passed that career service professional examination when in fact he did
not, also makes him liable for falsification of a document by making an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts, as defined under Art. 171,
par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification by false narration
of facts, (1) the offender makes untruthful statements in a narration of
facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4)
it was made with a wrongful intent to injure a third person.[26]

Respondent stated in his personal data sheet that he passed
the
career service professional examination knowing fully well that it was
not true because he did not pass the said exam. Being an aspirant for
promotion to a higher position, he had a legal obligation to disclose
the truth because the personal data sheet is required in connection with
the promotion to a higher position.[27] In the case of Inting vs.
Tanodbayan
,[28]
the Court ruled that “the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet
being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in
connection with employment in the government, the making of an
untruthful statement therein was therefore intimately connected with
such employment xxx.” In Belosillo vs.
Rivera
,[29]
we said that since “truthful completion of Personal Data Sheet is a
requirement for employment in the Judiciary, the importance of answering
the same with candor need not be gainsaid.”

By making a false statement in his personal data sheet to
enhance
his qualification and increase his chances of being considered for
promotion, which in fact happened because he was issued an appointment
as HRMO III by then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, respondent prejudiced
the other qualified aspirants to the same position. It does not matter
that respondent did not actually assume the position and receive
salaries and benefits pertaining thereto. The law does not require that
actual injury to a third person be present. What is necessary is that
there be intent to injure. Moreover, in People vs. Po Giok To,[30]
it is held that when official documents are falsified, “the intent to
injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein proclaimed.”

The facts and evidence, coupled with respondent’s admission,
sufficiently established his culpability. Respondent’s use of a false
certificate of eligibility constitutes an act of dishonesty under civil
service rules and his act of making a false statement in his personal
data sheet renders him administratively liable for falsification. Under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty
(par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the
first offense.

On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose
such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these
offenses.[31]
There is no reason why respondent should be treated differently. The
Court takes note of the fact that initially, respondent did not
controvert this evidence against him. Neither did he admit the charge.
In fact, deliberately or otherwise, respondent did not participate in
the proceedings before the CSC. He did not file any answer and failed to
appear in the scheduled hearings despite due notice. When he was found
guilty of the charge by the CSC-OLA and was recommended for dismissal,
he filed a petition to transfer jurisdiction to the Office of the Court
Administrator and/or motion to dismiss the case. It was only when his
case was transferred to the OCA did he confess his guilt, more than
three years after he was first charged in the CSC.

While we recognize that respondent committed the acts
complained of
out of an extreme desire to be promoted for the benefit of his family,
the Court cannot turn a blind eye to what is clearly a transgression of
the law. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no
place in the judiciary.[32]
Because of his conduct, the Court seriously doubts respondent’s ability
to perform his duties with the integrity, uprightness and honesty
demanded of an employee in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynaldo
B. Sta. Ana is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation, and
with forfeiture of unused leaves, if any, and retirement benefits. This
decision shall take effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
and Corona, JJ.,
concur.


[1] Rollo, pp.
27-28.
[2] Id., at 29.

[3] Id., at 31.

[4] Id., at
23-24.
[5] Id., at 147.

[6] Id., at 13,
16, 18.
[7] supra, Note
2.
[8] supra, Note
1.
[9] Rollo, pp.
25-26.
[10] Id., at
130-132.
[11] Id., at
8-11.
[12] Id., at 7.

[13] Id., at
117-119.
[14] Id., at 36.

[15] Id., at 63.

[16] Id., at 72.

[17] Id., at
152-153.
[18] Id., at
104.
[19] Ibid.

[20] Id.., at
104.
[21] Alawi vs.
Alauya, 268 SCRA 628 (1997).
[22] Rabe vs.
Flores, 272 SCRA 415 (1997).
[23] Court
Administrator vs. Sevillo, 270 SCRA 190; Estreller vs. Manatad, Jr., 268
SCRA 608 (1997).
[24] Concerned
Citizens of Laoag City vs. Arzaga, 267 SCRA 176 (1997).
[25] OCA vs.
Cabe, 334 SCRA 348 (2000); Santiago vs. Jovellanos, 337 SCRA 21(2000).

[26] REVISED
PENAL CODE, Vol. II, Luis B. Reyes.
[27] Lumancas
vs. Intas, 347 SCRA 23 (2000).
[28] 97 SCRA 494
(1980).
[29] 341 SCRA 1
(2000).
[30] 96 Phil.
913.
[31] Lumiqued
vs. Exevea,
282 SCRA 125 (1997); Re: Financial Audit of RTC, General Santos City,
271 SCRA 302 (1997); Marasigan vs. Buena, 284 SCRA 1 (1997); Moner vs.
Ampatua, 295 SCRA 20 (1998); Regalado vs. Buena, 309 SCRA 265 (1999);
Eamiguel vs. Ho, 287 SCRA 79 (1998); Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court
Rogelio R. Joboco, RTC, Br. 16, Naval, Biliran, 294 SCRA 119 (1998);
Marbas-Vizcarra vs. Florendo, 310 SCRA 592 (1999); Amane vs.
Mendoza-Arce, 318 SCRA 465; Almario vs. Resus, 318 SCRA 742 (1999).

[32] Pizarro
vs. Villegas, 345 SCRA 519 (2000).