G.R. No. L-9421. June 29, 1957

The appellant  Daniel Jaynie seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of  Industrial Relations,  declaring  his motion for  bill  of  particulars as  improperly  taken and denying the same, and granting appellee Melchor Maniego’a authority to  dispossess the appellant of his landholding at Parang Manga, San Jose, Nueva  Ecija.

It appears that on February 27,  1954, appellee Melchor Maniego filed a complaint before the Nueva Ecija branch of the Court of Industrial Relations to eject the appellant from his  landholding.  At the hearing  set for March 9, 1954,  the appellant did  not  appear and was declared  in default.   Appellee Maniego was forthwith allowed by  the court  to  present his evidence.  On March 31, 1954,  the appellant moved for the lifting  of the order  of default which was  granted  in  an  order  dated April 30,  1954, requiring him to  file his answer to the complaint within five  days from notice.   Appellee Maniego,  on his  part, moved  for  the reconsideration of the  resolution lifting the order of default but the  court  denied said  motion on July 2, 1954.  Pursuant  to the  order of April 30,  1954 the hearing was  set for September  21, 1954.   On  June 23,  1954,  the  appellant filed a  motion for bill of particulars  and  on  September  17,  1954,  asked  for a  continuance  of the  hearing set for  September- 21,  1954.  On the latter  date, the  appellant did  not appear  for  trial. Appellee Maniego was  present.  On March 11,  1955, the court issued  an order  denying the  motion  for  bill of particulars copy of which was received  by the appellant on March 19, 1955.   Subsequently, or on March 29,  1955, the court rendered its decision awarding  relief to appellee Maniego—granting him authority to dispossess the appellant of his  landholding at Parang Manga, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

The  questions of law  raised by the  appellant are as follows:

(a) Was it legal for  the lower  court  to hear the case on September 21,  1954,  although on that date it had not yet resolved  appellant’s  motion for  bill of  particulars, and much. less  had answer  been filed;  hence the issues had not yet been joined?

(b) Was it legal for  the lower court to revoke its order of April 30,  1954, and revive both its  verbal order of default  and  the evidence taken pursuant to said order which had  already been set aside?

(c) Did  the lower  court act within the proper exercise of judicial discretion when it deprived  the  appellant in its order of March 11, 1955 of the right to file his  answer and the right to a hearing by considering the case submitted on the ex parte evidence aforementioned?

(d) Is the decision of March 29, 1955, based on the order of March 11, 1955, and aforementioned  ex parbe evidence  or appellee Maniego valid?

(e) Did  the lower  court act within the proper exercise of sound discretion when by  its  resolution  of  June 15, 1955, it denied to  reconsider its aforesaid decision?

The appellant  argues (a) that the case was not yet ready for hearing when the court  proceeded to hear the same ex parte on September 21, 1954, inasmuch as the appellant had not yet filed his answer, for which  he could not be blamed as his motion for bill of particulars legally stopped the running  of  the period of five  days to answer,  and said motion was not yet resolved;  (b)  that when the lower court issued its order of March 11, 1955, the only matter submitted  to it for consideration was that raised in the motion for bill of particulars; and the order of April 30, 1954 was  not brought before  it for resolution;  (c) that while  the  court  could perfectly deny appellant’s  motion for  bill  of particulars, it could not  deprive him of the right to file an  answer  within the five  days granted  by the order ,of April 30, 1954;  and if there was delay in the filing of said  answer, it was due  to the failure of the court to resolve the motion for bill  of  particulars;  (d) that the decision of March  29, 1955,  being based  on  incompetent  evidence  and  irregular proceedings   held  on September  21, 1954, is not  valid and legal.

The records reveal that inasmuch as the appellant did not  appear for trial on  March 9, 1954,  he was  declared in default while the appellee  was allowed to present his evidence; that on March  81,  1954, the appellant moved for the lifting of the order of default and that acting on said motion, the lower court  issued the  order dated April 30, 1954,  providing  that:

“In the interest  of justice  and in order  to give the respondent-tenant another chance to present his evidence, said respondent is hereby ordered to file his answer to the complaint within five days from  receipt  of this order.  After the  respondent  had filed  his answer, Atty. Marta Dallo,  Commissioner of this  Court  in Nueva Ecija, is directed to set again this  case for hearing and receive the evidence of  the respondent,  giving him the opportunity  to cross examine the  petitioner and his  witness.”

It  is noteworthy that  this order  did  not declare the proceedings during the hearing on March  9,  1954, void. It merely  ordered the appellant to file his answer and  to appear for hearing to present his  evidence  and  to cross examine appellee’s  witnesses.   An  order setting aside a judgment  by  default shall  not disturb  the proceedings already  taken,  except that  the defendant who  did not answer and appear for trial shall by opening said judgment be  given the right  to file his answer and  to  appear for trial  to present  his evidence as well as  to  cross  examine complainant’s witnesses.

“Merely opening  a judgment or setting aside a final judgment by default,  does not necessarily  vacate prior proceedings  in the case except such as are dependent upon  the judgment.”  (34 C. J. 386.) “Upon the entry of an  order opening a  judgment  by default, defendant should serve or file his plea or answer, in pursuance of leave  granted in the order, or on  being ruled so to  do, the case should be placed on the calendar or set for trial, and should there upon  be  proceeded with  as  if no  default  had  been  entered.” (supra, 431.)

The decision under consideration  (order, of  March  29,. 1955) based  its findings  of facts  on the evidence presented by appellee  Maniego at  the hearing held  on March 9, 1954.   This hearing  was never set aside by  the order of April 30, 1954,  lifting the  order of  default.  It was proper for  the lower court to  have utilized the evidence presented at such hearing as the basis for its order  under appeal.   When the appellant did not appear on September 21, 1954, which was fixed for the  only purpose of  receiving  his evidence and  giving him the  opportunity to cross  examine  appellee Maniego’s witnesses, there was no need  for said  appellee  to  reintroduce his  evidence.

We cannot understand why the appellant filed a motion for bill  of particulars when in his motion for lifting the order of default,  he had set forth clearly his defenses and set-offs.  For cause and effect, it is to  be  assumed that when  one is definite in  his defense, he is fully  aware of the exact  claims against  him. Moreover,  as  the  lower court  had pointed  out,  inasmuch as the particular  averments of appellee Maniego could be determined  from  the evidence already  submitted and shown in the records, and if the appellant was really interested in  the adjudication of his case, he could easily have examined said  records and there was no  need for any bill of  particulars.  By several motions for continuance, motion  for bill  of particulars,” and .subsequently blaming the  lower  court  for delayed  action on said  motions, the  appellant in  effect had tried  to  avert due administration  of justice.

Granting that  appellant’s motion for bill of particulars was not immediately  resolved, and that in the  meantime the five-day period within which  to answer was suspended, there was still time to file the required answer after the appellant  had received the order  denying his  motion  on March  9,  1955.  Within  five days  from the latter date, he had ample opportunity to do so.   But he did not.

Wherefore,  the decision  appealed from is affirmed.   So ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes,  A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J,  B.  L. and Felix, JJ., concur.