G.R. No. L-10759. May 20, 1957

Petitioner-appellant was on  and before  January,  1953, a  watchman of the  Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division,  Bureau  of Public Works.  In  Administrative  Case  No.  E-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out  while under his care), the  Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him,  on the  basis of findings made by a  committee.  But  the  Civil Service  Board  of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence  in  not pumping the water  from the bilge, and  ordered  that he  be considered  resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.

Petitioner filed an action in the Court  of First Instance of  Manila to review the decision, but the said court dis missed the action  on a motion  to dismiss, on the ground that  petitioner had  not exhausted  all his administrative remedies before he instituted  the action.   The case Is now before us on  appeal against the  order  of dismissal.

The law which was applied  by the lower court is Section 2 of  Commonwealth  Act No.  598,  which provides:

“The Civil  Service Board of  Appeals shall  have  the power and authority  to  hear and decide all  administrative  cases brought before it on appeal,  and  its decisions in such  cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the Philippines.”

It  is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a  party  against whom  a decision has been  rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals  to  appeal to the President, and that the tendency of courts has been not to  subject the decision of the  President to judicial review. It  is  further  argued that if  decisions  of  the  Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of the  Civil Service  Board  of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse  may be had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final and  not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action  would be derogatory  to the high office  of  the  President.

The objection to a judicial  review of a Presidential act arises from  a failure to  recognize the  most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three  co-equal departments, the executive, the  legislative and  the judicial, each  supreme within  its own  assigned powers and  duties.  When a presidential act  is challenged before the courts of  justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the  courts.   The  legality  of his acts are under  judicial  review, not  because the  Executive is inferior to  the  courts, but  because  the law is above the Chief Executive  himself, and the courts  seek only  to  interpret,  apply  or implement it (the law).  A judicial review of the President’s decision on a case of  an employee decided  by  the Civil  Service Board of  Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of  the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review  of  all administrative  acts  of all administrative officers.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an administrative  remedy is provided by statute, as  in this case,  relief  must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.   (42  Am. Jur. 580-581.)  The  doctrine is  a device based  on  considerations of  comity and  convenience.   If  a  remedy  is still  available within  the  administrative  machinery,  this should be  resorted to before resort can  be  made to the courts,  not only to  give  the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. (Ibid.)

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598  above-quoted is a clear expression of the policy or principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.   If the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made  to  him before recourse can be had to the courts.  We have  applied this same rule in De la Paz vs. Alcaraz, et al.,  99 Phil., 130,  52 Off. Gaz.,  3037, Miguel,  et  al. vs. Reyes, et al., 93 Phil., 542, and especially in Ang Tuan Kai & Co. vs. The Import  Control  Commission,  91  Phil.,  143, and  we are loathe to deviate from the rule we have consistently followed,  especially in view  of  the express provision of the law (section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 598).

The  judgment  appealed from  is  affirmed,  with  costs against appellant.

Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor,   Reyes,  A.,  Bautista Angela, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,  Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.