G.R. No. L-9296. December 27, 1956

The respondent Narciso Guison fibed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action against the petitioners Gregorio de la Cruz et al. , praying that the latter be ordered to vacate the land” respectively occupied by them, as set forth in the complaint, and to pay monthly the sum of 20 centavos per square meter to respondent Guison for the use and occupation of said land from such time as the court may fix.  On March 1. 1955, a decision was rendered sentencing the petitioners to vacate the land in Question and each to pay monthly to respondent Guison the sum of 30 centavos per square meter from the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs.

Upon motion of respondent Guison, the court issued on April 5, 1955, an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The petitioners, who had in the meantime perfected their appeal from the decision of the Court of .First Instance of Rizal to the Court of Appeals, instituted in this Court the present petition for cartioraris to set aside the order of April 5, 1955, it being contended in the  main that action filed against the petitioners by respondent Guison in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was an ordinary civil action to recover possession of land, and not an action for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, for the reason that the petitioners have long been in actual possession before respondent Guison purchased the land in question from J.M, Tuason Co., Inc.; that there was no contract whatsoever between the petitioners and respondent Guison with respect to the land; that the justice of the peace or municipal court had exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer cases in accordance with section 1 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court and section 76 of the Judiciary Act of 1948; and that the issuance of the writ of execution should therefore be governed by  section 2   of  Rule 39  of  the  Rules  of  Court,   and not by section 8  of Rule  72.

Petitioners’ contentions  are  tanable. It  is  true  that  justice   of the  peace   courts  have  exclusive  original  juris­diction in all actions  of  forcible  entry  and detainer com­menced within  one   year after the   illegal entry   or detention, and after the  expiration of one  year,   the court  of first   instance has  original  jurisdiction  (Ledesma vs.  Vercon,   9 Phil. 618; Lucido  vs.  Vita,   25 Phil. 414;   Cortes vs.  Ramos,  46 Phil. 188).    As  the  petitioners appear to  have  held possession of the land  for more  than  one  year prior to  and even after  Its acquisition  by  respondent  Guison and;   as  stated in annex “An of the complaint  and proved during the  trial,   said petitioners  are mere   squatters  in  or adverse  possessors   of  their respective  lots,   the  action was  properly  instituted In the Court   of First  Instance   of Rizal. Said action was not,  however,   of  such  summary  nature  as the  be governed by Rule  72 of the Rules  of Court.     This rule   contemplates  and  is  applicable  only  to  forcible  entry  and detainer  suits  filed  in the justice  of  the  peace   or municipal court within  one  year after accrual  of the  cause   of  action.     With particular  reference to  the matter  of  execution ponding appeal,   sections 8 and  9 of Rule   72 speak  of  the   same  requirement  for  staying ‘execution.    It  is  to fee  recalled  that  section 9, regarding appeal to  the   Court   of Appeals  or the Supreme  Court was  not   in the old Code  because  of  a  law prohibiting appeals  from. judgments  of Courts   of First  Instance  In  cases   originating from  justice of the  peace   counts,   and was   inserted  in  the  Rules  of  Court after  the said law had  been declared void (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd Edition, Vol. II, p. 297); with the logical result that section 9 cannot apply to an action originally brought in the Court of First Instance. The failure of the petitioners to comply with said section 9 did not therefore give legal cause for the issuance of the order complained of.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted, the order of April 5, 1955 set aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued in this case made permanent. So ordered with costs againts respondent Guison.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, J.J. concur.