G.R. No. 232329. April 28, 2021
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZZZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
HERNANDO, J.:
Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07658 which affirmed the
June 18, 2015 Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64 of
Labo, Camarines Norte convicting accused-appellant ZZZ of two (2) counts
of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1636-37.
ZZZ was
charged with two (2) counts of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. 7610[3] (RA 7610) in two
Informations which read:
CRIM. CASE No. 08-1636
That
sometime in the afternoon of May 3, 2008 in Brgy. xxxxxxxxx, Labo, Camarines Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and motivated by bestial lust and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of his 12-year old granddaughter
AAA,[4] without
her consent, which acts debase, degrade her intrinsic worth as a child
and is prejudicial to her growth and development, to her damage.CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
CRIM. CASE No.
08-1637That sometime in the early part of
2008 in Brgy. xxxxxxxxx, Labo, Camarines Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and motivated by bestial lust and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his 12-year old
granddaughter AAA, without her consent, which acts debase, degrade her
intrinsic worth as a child and is prejudicial to her growth and
development, to her damage.CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The cases against ZZZ were initially
archived by the trial court since the warrant for his arrest was
returned unserved.[7] He was eventually arraigned on December 6, 2011
and pleaded not guilty to both charges.[8]
During trial, AAA testified
that on two separate occasions in 2008, her grandfather, ZZZ, forcibly
took her out of their house, brought her to a secluded place and raped
her.[9]
AAA recounted that sometime in January to April
2008, ZZZ forcibly brought her to a big copra kiln where, after
undressing them both, he mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. To prevent her from screaming, accused-appellant covered her
mouth with his hand and inserted his penis into her vagina. After he
removed his penis from her vagina, AAA’s vagina was swollen with the
presence of blood and a white sticky substance. ZZZ gave AAA P50.00 and
instructed her not to tell her father about the incident.[10]
AAA further testified that in the afternoon of May 3, 2008, ZZZ fetched
her from their house and dragged her towards the river. While crossing
the river midway, AAA saw her siblings. However, ZZZ immediately covered
her mouth to prevent her from shouting and calling their attention. As
soon as they reached the side of the river, ZZZ undressed them both,
mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. After he was done,
accused-appellant once again told the victim not to report the incident
to her father. This time, he threatened AAA with death should she inform
her father. He also gave AAA P20.00.[11]
Since she could no longer
bear the pain in her swollen vagina, AAA told her father of what ZZZ had
done to her. AAA and her father then went to the barangay to file a
complaint.[12] AAA
was also examined by Dr. Virginia Barasona who testified at the trial
that her medical findings were consistent with AAA’s claim of rape and
that she had issued a medical certificate thereon.[13]
ZZZ was the
sole witness for the defense. He claimed that he could not have raped
his granddaughter, AAA, since he was already sixty-seven (67) years old
in 2008 and his penis was no longer capable of erection due to a cyst
near his inner thigh which caused chronic pain in his legs.[14]
Accused-appellant further testified that on May 3, 2008 he was at his
house which is located some distance away from AAA’s family home.[15]
On June 18, 2015, the trial court rendered its Judgment convicting ZZZ
of the charges of rape, thus:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing, and having
found accused ZZZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
two (2) counts of RAPE in relation to RA 7610, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Said accused is ordered to pay victim, AAA,
for each count the following:
- Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
- Php50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.SO
ORDERED.[16]
On
appeal, ZZZ maintained his innocence and decried the trial court’s
finding of guilt despite the prosecution’s failure to establish with
particularity the date of commission of the rape and the inconsistent
testimony of AAA.[17] He argued that the trial court erred in not
considering his defense of denial.[18] In the alternative, assuming without admitting
that he is guilty of raping his granddaughter, the penalty imposed
should be that provided in Section S(b), Article III of RA 7610.[19]
The appellate court sustained ZZZ’s conviction for two counts of rape:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
Judgment dated 18 June 2015 of Branch 64, Regional Trial Court of Labo,
Camarines, Norte in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1636 and 08-1637 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant [ZZZ] is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is accordingly sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole for each count. Appellant is ordered to pay the
private offended party as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, also
in each count. He is further ordered to pay interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.SO
ORDERED.[20]
Hence,
this appeal[21] by
ZZZ raising the same assignment of errors contained in his Appellant’s
Brief before the appellate court.[22]
Our
Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
After a careful review of the evidence and testimony
proffered by the prosecution, we rule that the trial court and the
appellate court were correct in their assessment of the testimonies of
AAA and ZZZ. The accused-appellant failed to show that the lower courts
overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome of
the case or misunderstood a circumstance of consequence in their
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, we will not
disturb the trial court’s findings of fact as affirmed by the appellate
court.
Accused-appellant insists that the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the date of the commission
of the rape. In particular, accused-appellant points to the Information
in Criminal Case No. 08-1637 which specified the date of the rape
charged as “sometime in the early part of 2008”. Accused-appellant
counters that this “irregular designation” violates Section 11,[23] Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court.
This contention does not persuade. As
correctly ruled by the appellate court, the date of commission of the
crime is not an essential element thereof. In fact, the specific Rule
cited by accused-appellant states that “it is not necessary to state in
the Information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense.” The date of commission is not even an element of the
crime of rape which elements are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a
woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under
[18] years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.[24]
We fully agree with the appellate court’s ruling that –
[A]n Information is valid as long
as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or
omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a
crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. In a prosecution
for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time
of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore,
it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate
precision.Further, it cannot be considered that
appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. As cited in
People v. Ibañez, the Supreme Court previously upheld
complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely
alleged that a rape has been committed “sometime in the month of April
1993,” for a rape which was committed in 1993; “on or about May 1998,”
for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; and
“sometime in the month of September 1998” for a rape committed on an
evening in September 1998. Here, the allegation in the Information that
appellant committed rape “sometime in the early part of 2008” was
sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of rape
committed against his granddaughter.It bears
emphasis that objections as to the form of the complaint or information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If appellant found the
Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either
for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact
date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the
ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. As appellant
failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to
any formal defect in the Information.[25]
Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony are
understandable considering that she was still only a minor, 16 years
old, at the time she testified before the trial court. In
People v. Lagbo[26] we explained that:
x x x Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim
narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape. Such
inconsistencies on minor details are in fact badges of truth, candidness
and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed. These discrepancies as to
minor matters, irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot, thus,
be considered a ground for acquittal.[27]
The
testimony of AAA is consistent on material points. Slightly conflicting
statements will not undermine her credibility or the veracity of her
testimony. They in fact tend to buttress rather than impair their
credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[28] The defense was not
able to elicit significant contradictions in the testimony of the victim
to render such as a fabrication prodded by her father who
accused-appellant points to as the perpetrator of the rape of AAA. Even
under rigid cross-examination, AAA remained consistent in her testimony
that accused-appellant, her grandfather, raped her in two separate
instances: one, where she was forcibly brought to the copra kiln, and
two, by the river where she had just previously seen her siblings but
was unable to cry out to them for help.
Carnal
knowledge had also been proven in two instances. It is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight
and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed.[29] The testimony of AAA sufficiently describes her
harrowing experience in the hands of ZZZ. It bears emphasis that
accused-appellant resorted to force, threat and intimidation to
consummate his lust. We have consistently ruled that rape is committed
when intimidation is used on the victim, which includes moral
intimidation or coercion.[30]
We find to be unacceptable
accused-appellant’s contention that he could not have sexually abused
AAA since he could no longer have an erection due to his old age, 67
years old at the time of the rape, and considering the cyst near his
inner thigh. Suffice it to state that neither of the lower courts gave
credence to accused-appellant’s unsubstantiated claim. Accused-appellant
did not present documentary evidence such as a medical certificate
attesting to the physical impossibility of his having an erection and
incapacity of raping AAA.
In the same vein, his
defense of denial fails to persuade Us. Denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves
no weight in law, as in this case.[31] Ultimately, accused-appellant’s conviction was
not primarily based on the weakness of his defense of denial and his
attempt to shift the accusation to AAA’s father as the alleged actual
perpetrator of the rape. Rather, accused-appellant was found guilty on
the basis of AAA’s consistent and steadfast testimony, even under rigid
cross-examination, pointing to him as the one who despoiled her honor.
ZZZ next insists that he should be penalized under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7160 and for the mitigating circumstance of
old age to be applied in his favor.
We disagree.
Notably, the trial court found accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of “Rape in relation to
RA 7610”. The appellate court affirmed this ruling of the trial court.
At this point, it must be pointed out there is a
need to fix the error in the nomenclature of ZZZ’s crime. As corrected,
accused-appellant should be held criminally liable for two (2) counts of
Rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1(a) penalized under Article 266-B
(1) of the RPC.[32] The correlation to RA 7610 is deleted.
People v. Tulagan[33] explains the ratio
for this, viz.:
Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph !(a) of the RPC are
mistakenly alleged in the same Information- e.g., carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse was due to “force or intimidation” with the added
phrase of “due to coercion or influence,” one of the elements of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully designate the
crime in the Information as violation of “Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a)
in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,” although this may be a
ground for quashal of the Information under Section 3(f) of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court – and proven during the trial in a case where the
victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual
intercourse, the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal
legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the
policies of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a
special law specifically enacted to provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development, We
hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the same law if
the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b) thereof would
be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12
years of age or below 18.Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law,
but also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence,
its short title “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.” R.A. No.
8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A. No. 7610, and provides
a “stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,” as
it imposes a more severe penalty of reclusion
perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC x x x [34] (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing,
accused-appellant’s conviction for two (2) counts of Rape under Article
266, Paragraph 1(a) of the RPC is in order.
Moreover, the crime of Qualified Rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the RPC is penalized under Article 266-B (1), which provides that the
death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under 18 years of age
and the offender, among others, is the ascendant or a relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Applying RA
9346,[35] the
appellate court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and without eligibility for parole. When
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty are present
but the death penalty could not be imposed because of RA 9346, the
qualification “without eligibility for parole” shall be used to qualify
reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the
accused should have been sentenced to death had it not been for RA No.
9346.[36]
The Court recently settled in People v.
Ejercito[37] (Ejercito) that RA
8353[38] amending
the RPC should now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual
intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
We declared that while RA 7610 has been considered as a special law that
covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the reach of
our rape laws. We thus clarified that these existing rape laws should
not only pertain to the old Article 335 of the RPC but also to the
provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610
which, applying the characterization in Quimvel v.
People[39] of a child “exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other abuse,” covers the rape of a minor.
Ejercito[40] instructs, thus:
It bears to emphasize that not
only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape from being a crime
against chastity to a crime against persons, it also provided for more
particularized instances of rape and conjunctively, a new set of
penalties therefor. Under RA 8353, Rape is considered committed not only
through the traditional means of having carnal knowledge of a woman (or
penile penetration) but also through certain lascivious acts now
classified as rape by sexual assault:Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
intimidation;
otherwise unconscious;
or grave abuse of authority; and
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)Moreover, RA 8353 provides for new penalties for Rape that may
be qualified under the following circumstances:Article 266-B. Penalty. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua
to death.When the rape is attempted and a homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.The death penalty shall
also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:1)
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or
military authorities or any law enforcement or penal institution;3) When the rape is committed in full view of the
spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third
civil degree of consanguinity;4) When the victim
is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and
is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of
the commission of the crime;5) When the victim is a
child below seven (7) years old;6) When the
offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency
Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other
sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted
to the victim;7) When committed by any member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military units thereof or
the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal
institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to
facilitate the commission of the crime;8) When by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;9) When the
offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and10) When the offender
knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.x x x x
Significant to
this case, the above-highlighted provisions of RA 8353 already accounted
for the circumstance of minority under certain peculiar instances. The
consequence therefore is a clear overlap with minority as an element of
the crime of sexual intercourse against a minor under Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610. However, as it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not only the
more recent statutory enactment but more importantly, the more
comprehensive law on rape; therefore, the Court herein clarifies that in
cases where a minor is raped through sexual intercourse, the provisions
of RA 8353 amending the RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA
7610 although the latter also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse
against a minor.[41]
Finally, the damages awarded by the trial court and increased by the
appellate court to P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages pursuant to People v.
Gambao,[42] as well as the impostion of interest, are
correct and consistent with the ruling in People v.
Jugueta.[43]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The September 9, 2016 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07658 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ZZZ is held
GUILTY of two (2) counts of Rape under Article 266-A,
Paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
He is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The correlation to Republic Act
No. 7610 is DELETED. He is ORDERED
to pay the victim AAA the following amounts: (i) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (ii) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (iii) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All amounts due shall earn legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision
until full payment.
SO
ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson),
Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ.,
concur.
*
Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to
Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-15 dated September 5, 2017
Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting
on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using
Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances issued on September 5, 2017.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Renato
C. Francisco and concurred in by Associate Justices Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser.
[2] CA
rollo, p. 55-61; penned by Acting Presiding Judge
Roberto A. Escaro.
[3] Special Protection of children Against Child
Abuse. Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
[4] “The identity of the
victim or any information which could establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members,
shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing
for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation,
and for Other Purposes, Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence
against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004.”
(People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669
(2011).
[5] Records (Crim. Case No. 08-1636), p.
1.
[6] Records (Crim. Case No. 08-1637), p.
1.
[7] CA rollo, p. 55.
[8] Id.
at 56.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 56-57.
[11]
Id.
[12] Id. at 57.
[13] Id. at
57-58.
[14] Id. at 58.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
at 61.
[17] Id. at 36-38.
[18] Id. at
44-45.
[19] Id. at 45-51.
[20]
Rollo, p. 17.
[21] CA
rollo, pp. 115-116.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 35-36; see Manifestation of the
accused-appellant adopting his Appellant’s Brief as his Supplemental
Brief to the Supreme Court.
[23] Section 11. Date of
commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.
[24] People v.
Colentava, 753 Phil. 361 (2015).
[25]
Rollo, p. 9.
[26] 780 Phil. 834
(2016).
[27] Id. at 844.
[28] Id.
[29]
People v. Eulalio, G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019
citing People v. Salaver, G.R. No. 223681, August 20,
2018.
[30] People v. Gacusan, 809 Phil.
773 (2017) citing People v. Servano, 454 Phil. 256
(2003).
[31] People v. Molejon, G.R. No.
208091, April 23, 2018.
[32] People v.
Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
[33]
Id.
[34] Id.
[35] AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
[36] People v. Molejon, supra
note 31.
[37] G.R. No. 229861, July 2, 2018.
[38] The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
[39] 808 Phil. 889 (2017).
[40]
Supra.
[41] Id.
[42] 718 Phil. 507 (2013).
[43] 783
Phil. 806 (2016).