G.R. No. 241494. April 03, 2024
SEN. ANTONIO “SONNY” F. TRILLANES IV, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY O…
SINGH, J.:
presidential power weighed against the protections granted under the
Bill of Rights. In resolving this issue, the Court, as it is sworn to
do, anchors its ruling on the Constitution and the supremacy of the rule
of law.
The Court affirms the value of procedural rules in
enforcing and protecting the fundamental right to due process and the
equal protection of the laws. Indeed, the duty of governing a country
requires the exercise of great powers. In the government’s zeal to
perform its duty, there can be a risk to take certain laws and rules
lightly upon the belief that these are minor irregularities justified by
the importance of the task at hand. Nonetheless, no intention, no
matter how lofty, warrants a violation of fundamental freedoms and of
cornerstone public policies that help keep our system of justice alive.
In these consolidated cases, the Court upholds the Constitution and
reaffirms that no one, not even the President, is above the law.
The Facts
Former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes) is a former active member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the Philippine Navy, with the rank of Lieutenant Senior Grade.[1]
On July 27, 2003, Trillanes led a group of armed soldiers known as the
Magdalo Group and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City. This event has been since known as the Oakwood Mutiny. Because of
his acts, Trillanes, along with the other members of the Magdalo Group
involved in the Oakwood Mutiny, were charged with the crime of Coup d’etat under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The case was filed before Branch 148 (Branch 148), Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, titled People of the Philippines v. Antonio F. Trillanes, IV, et al. (the Coup d’etat Case).[2]
During the pendency of the Coup d’etat Case, Trillanes won a Senate seat in the 2007 elections.
On November 29, 2007, during a hearing in the Coup d’etat
Case before Branch 148, Trillanes and the other members of the Magdalo
Group walked out of the court and proceeded to take over the Manila
Peninsula Hotel. Trillanes and the Magdalo Group called for the ouster
of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This event is now known as
the Manila Peninsula Incident.[3]
Police authorities attempted to serve a warrant of arrest for direct
contempt issued by Branch 148, but Trillanes and his group refused to
receive it. Thus, the police were eventually forced to break into the
hotel to arrest Trillanes and his group.[4]
Because of the Manila Peninsula Incident, Trillanes, among others, was
subsequently charged with Rebellion in 2007. The case was filed before
Branch 150 (Branch 150), RTC Makati City, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-3126, titled People of the Philippines v. Sen. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, et al.[5] (the Rebellion Case).[6]
On November 24, 2010, former President Benigno S. Aquino, III (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 75, Series of 2010 (Proclamation No. 75).[7] Proclamation No. 75 granted amnesty to all active and former personnel of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
and their supporters, who have or may have committed crimes punishable
under the RPC, the Articles of War, or other laws, in connection with
the Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila Peninsula
Incident.[8]
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 75 provided:
SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. — Amnesty is hereby granted
to all active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their
supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila
Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor; Provided that amnesty shall
not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity and other
crimes committed for personal ends.
Proclamation No. 75 also stated that the concerned AFP and PNP personnel and their supporters may apply for amnesty with the “ad hoc committee Department of National Defense”[9] within a period of 90 days following the date of publication of Proclamation No. 75.[10] The ad hoc committee of the Department of National Defense (DND)
was tasked with receiving and processing applications – including
oppositions thereto, if any – for amnesty, pursuant to this Proclamation
and determining whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty pursuant
to this Proclamation. The DND’s final decision as to an amnesty
application is appealable to the Office of the President.[11]
Proclamation No. 75 further states:
SEC 4. Effects. –
(a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any
criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related
to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident
without prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability for injuries or
damages caused to private persons.(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect
the restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees
that may have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of
any executive, administrative or criminal action or proceedings against
the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including criminal
conviction or any form, if any.
In accordance with Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,[12]
the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines, on
December 13, 2010 and December 14, 2010, respectively, adopted
Concurrent Resolution No. 4[13] and concurred with Proclamation No. 75. Concurrent Resolution No. 4 included the following recommendation:
Resolved, further, That both Houses of Congress adopt the
following recommendation to the President of the Philippines for
inclusion in the implementing rules and regulations of the Amnesty
Proclamation:(a) No application for amnesty shall be given due course without
the applicant admitting his guilt or criminal culpability of any or all
of the subject incidents in writing expressed in the application;[14]
On December 15, 2010, DND Secretary Voltaire Gazmin (Sec. Gazmin) issued Department Order No. 320 (DO No. 320),[15] which created the DND Ad Hoc Amnesty Committee (the Committee).
DO No. 320 tasked the Committee to perform the following: (1) receive
and process applications for amnesty including oppositions thereto; (2)
determine whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty under
Proclamation No. 75; (3) adopt its rules and procedure for the effective
implementation of the amnesty program; and (4) submit its
recommendations to the DND Secretary for approval.[16]
In the meantime, Branch 148, through its Order,[17] dated December 16, 2010, suspended the promulgation of judgment in the Coup d’etat
Case in view of the issuance of Proclamation No. 75. This Order also
required Trillanes to submit a copy of his application form for amnesty
on or before January 22, 2010.[18]
On December 21, 2010, the Committee promulgated the Department of
National Defense Amnesty Committee Circular No. 1 entitled the Rules of Procedure of the DND Ad Hoc Amnesty Committee/or the Implementation of Presidential Proclamation No. 75 (Committee Rules of Procedure).[19]
The relevant portions of the Committee Rules of Procedure state:
SEC. 5. Application Forms—Applicants for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 75, shall fill up the official application form as
attached herein. Official application forms can be obtained through the Ad Hoc
Amnesty Committee thru its Secretariat in the address as provided below
and can be downloaded from the official DND website, specifically
www.dnd.gov.ph and the official AFP website, namely www.afp.mil.ph.Certified true copies of any civilian and/or military court
decisions and/or resolutions of pertinent cases involving the
applicant’s involvement/participation in any of the subject incidents
shall be attached to the application.SEC 6. Where to apply; Period of availment.—Sworn applications for the grant of amnesty shall be personally filed by the applicant with the DND Ad Hoc
Amnesty Committee thru its Secretariat, within a period of ninety (90)
days following the date of the publication of Proclamation No. 75 in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation as concurred in by a majority
vote of all members of Congress. Applications filed beyond the foregoing
period shall no longer be entertained by the Committee.….
SEC 8. Official Register of Applicants; Periodic Posting and Publication.—The
Committee shall maintain an official register of applicants for amnesty
within the period of availment as specified under Section 6 of these
Rules. The Committee shall ensure accessibility of the official register
to any interested party.The Committee shall periodically cause the posting of the
updated official register in the following location: AFP Commissioned
Officers Club Bulletin Board and the Department of National Defense
Bulletin Board (lobby), and shall cause the publication of said updated
official register at the aforementioned DND and AFP website. The
Committee shall cause the inclusion of the name of any application in
the updated official register within three (3) days from filing of the
subject application.SEC. 9. Opposition.—Within fifteen (15) days from the
posting of the name of an applicant in the locations mentioned in
Section 8 hereof of the publication of the applicant’s name in the DND
and AFP website, whichever comes later, any person may file a sworn
opposition to the application or amnesty.SEC. 10. Determination of qualifications of applicants under the Amnesty Program.—Upon
receipt of the sworn application of any applicant and any sworn
opposition thereto, the Committee shall immediately proceed to calendar
the same for deliberation or for clarificatory hearing, if deemed
necessary. The Committee shall forthwith act on the same with dispatch
as provided for in Section 3 of Proclamation No. 75.SEC. 11. Deliberations by the Committee; Admission of Participation and Guilt.—The
Committee may, in the presence of a quorum, conduct deliberations or
any other investigative proceedings to clarify or resolve issues. A
majority of all the members constitutes a quorum to conduct official
proceedings. All decisions of the Committee shall be approved by a
majority vote of all the members.No application shall be approved without an express admission
by the applicant of actual involvement/participation in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and/or the November 29, 2007 Peninsula
Manila Hotel Incident and that such involvement/ participation
constituted a violation of the 1987 Constitution, criminal laws and the
Articles of War, as indicated in the application form. No application
shall likewise be approved without a recantation of all previous
statements, if any, that are inconsistent with such express admission of
actual involvement/participation and guilt.….
SEC. 14. Secretariat—The Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, J1, AFP, shall provide and create a Secretariat to provide
administrative assistance to the Committee in receiving and processing
of applications for amnesty and any opposition thereto and the recording
of minutes, reception of evidence and other documents presented during
deliberations and hearings.SEC. 15. Submission to the Secretary of National Defense.—The
Committee shall submit its recommendations to the Secretary of National
Defense for approval within fifteen (15) days from receipt of all
documentary requirements and/or from termination of the proceedings as
the case may be.….
SEC. 17. Appeal.—The final decision or determination of
the Department of National Defense shall be appealable to the Office of
the President by any party to the application within 10 days from notice
of the decision. The decision, however, shall be immediately executory
even if appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the recommendation stated in Concurrent Resolution No.
4, the Committee Rules of Procedure included a requirement that an
applicant for amnesty must admit guilt for his or her participation or
involvement in the Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off,
and the Manila Peninsula Incident; and that such
involvement/participation constituted a violation of the 1987
Constitution, criminal law, and the Articles of War.
On January 21, 2011, the DND granted amnesty in favor of
Trillanes, pursuant to Proclamation No. 75. This is evidenced by a
Certificate of Amnesty[20] signed by Sec. Gazmin.[21]
On the strength of the amnesty granted to him, Trillanes filed a Motion to Dismiss (Motion to Dismiss in the Rebellion Case),[22] dated August 18, 2011, before Branch 150 in the Rebellion Case.[23]
In its Order (Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case),[24] dated September 7, 2011, Branch 150 dismissed the case against Trillanes.[25] The dispositive portion of the said Order states:
Accordingly, the above-captioned case, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 07-3126 for Rebellion, is ordered DISMISSED against the
accused-movants.As a consequence of its dismissal, the bail bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty are deemed cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Trillanes also filed a similar Motion to Dismiss (Motion to Dismiss in the Coup d’etat Case) before Branch 148.
In an Order (Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case),[27] dated September 21, 2011, Branch 148 dismissed the case against Trillanes. The dispositive portion of the Order provides:
WHEREFORE, this instant case against herein accused, namely SEN. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, GARY C. ALEJANO and JAMES A. LAYUG is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to the grant of amnesty to them in Proclamation No. 75 dated November 24, 2010 by President Benigno S. Aquino III.
SO ORDERED.[28] (Emphasis in the original)
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed no motion for reconsideration nor appeal from both Orders. Thus, these Orders became final and executory.
On August 31, 2018, President Rodrigo R. Duterte (President Duterte) issued Proclamation No. 572, Series of 2018, titled Revocation
of the Department of National Defense Ad Hoc Committee Resolution No.
2(#1) dated January 31, 2011 insofar as it granted Amnesty to Former
LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV (Proclamation No. 572).[29] Proclamation No. 572 declared the amnesty granted to Trillanes void ab initio “because he did not comply with the minimum requirements to qualify under the Amnesty Proclamation.”[30]
Proclamation No. 572 recognized that Proclamation No. 75 granted
amnesty to all active and former personnel of the APP and the PNP as
well as their supporters who may have committed crimes punishable under
the RPC, the Articles of War, and other laws in connection with, in
relation or incident to the Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off, and
the Manila Peninsula Incident. Further, Proclamation No. 572 provided:
WHEREAS, Sections 5, 6 and 11 of the DND Amnesty
Committee (DND-AC) Circular No. 1 dated December 21, 2010, “The Rules
and Procedures in the processing of Amnesty Applications pursuant to
Proclamation No. 75, series of 2010,” requires the applications to
personally fill up and file the Official Amnesty Application Form and
expressly admit their guilt for the crimes committed during the Oakwood
Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila Peninsula Incident. DND-AC
Circular No. 1 further requires the applicants to recant all previous
statements inconsistent with the requirement of admission of that guilt;….
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in the case People of the
Philippines vs. Vera, et al, declared that “a previous admission of
guilt is necessary in amnesty since the invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the
pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if provided, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation”;WHEREAS, at the time Proclamation No. 75, Series of 2010
was issued former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, was facing
trial for a non-bailable offense of coup d e’tat in Criminal Case No.
03-2784 pending with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 148;WHEREAS, at the time Proclamation No. 75, Series of 2010
was issued former LTSG Antonio Trillanes, IV, O-11797 PN, was also
facing trial before the Military Tribunal for Mutiny or Sedition,
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentlemen, and all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, and all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service
defined and penalized under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as Amended,
otherwise known as the Articles of War;WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, a
grantee under Proclamation No. 75, did not file an Official Amnesty
Application Form as per the Certification dated August 30, 2018 issued
by Lt. Col. Thea Joan N. Andrade, Chief Discipline, Law and Order
Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, J1
stating that “there is no available copy of his application for amnesty
in the records”;WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN,
never expressed his guilt for the crimes that were committed on occasion
of the Oakwood Mutiny and Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege, stating that
“they were not admitting guilt to the mutiny and coup d’etat charges
lodged against them both in the civil and military courts” and “I would
like to qualify that we did not admit to the charge of coup d’etat or
anything na i-finile sa amin kasi we believe na hindi iyon and nararapat na i-charge sa amin,”WHEREAS, despite former LTSG Trillanes IV’s failure to
apply for amnesty and refusal to admit his guilt, his name was
nonetheless included among those granted amnesty pursuant to DND Ad Hoc
Committee Resolution No. 2 approved by former Secretary of National
Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin;[31] (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing, Section 1 of Proclamation No. 572 stated:
SEC. 1. The grant of amnesty to former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV under Proclamation No. 75 is declared void ab initio because he did not comply with the minimum requirements to qualify under the Amnesty Proclamation.
Further, Section 2 of Proclamation No. 572 provided:
SEC. 2. Effects.
1. As a consequence, the Department of Justice and Court Martial
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are ordered to pursue all
criminal and administrative cases filed against former LTSG Antonio
Trillanes in relation to the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula
Incident.2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are ordered to employ all lawful means to apprehend
former LTSG Antonio Trillanes so that he can be recommitted to the
detention facility where he had been incarcerated for him to stand trial
for the crimes he is charged with.[32]
On September 4, 2018, Trillanes alleged that about 40 officers and
members of the PNP and/or the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG), as well as officers of the AFP, went to the Senate
Building in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, to arrest him pursuant to
Proclamation No. 572.[33]
Meanwhile, on the same date, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure Order and Alias Warrant of Arrest Against Accused Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case),[34] dated September 4, 2018, before Branch 148 in the Coup d’etat Case.
The DOJ also filed a similar motion, captioned a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and Warrant of Arrest (Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case),[35] dated September 6, 2018, before Branch 150 in the Rebellion Case.
While the foregoing motions were pending before Branch 148 and Branch 150, Trillanes filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction (Certiorari Petition),[36]
dated September 5, 2018, before the Court, assailing the validity of
Proclamation No. 572. Trillanes impleaded the following as respondents:
Salvador Medialdea in his official capacity as Executive Secretary of
the Executive Department, Delfin N. Lorenzana in his official capacity
as Secretary of the National Defense, Eduardo M. Año in his official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Menardo I. Guevarra in his official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Justice, Carlito G. Galvez, Jr. in his official
capacity as Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Oscar
Albayalde in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National
Police, and Roel B. Obusan in his official capacity as Chief of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (collectively, the respondents).[37] This was docketed as G.R. No. 241494.
The Certiorari Petition included a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order. The Court denied this prayer in the Resolution (Injunction Resolution),
dated September 11, 2018. The Court ruled that the preliminary issues
of whether Trillanes filed an application for amnesty and whether he
admitted his guilt for the crimes subject of the amnesty are factual in
nature.[38] Thus, the Court said:
Only a trial court, and in certain cases, the Court of Appeals,
are trier of facts. Hence, it is appropriate that the Makati RTCs should
be given leeway in exercising their concurrent jurisdiction to hear and
resolve the pleadings/motions filed by the parties as regards the
legality of Proclamation No. 572, Series of 2018.[39]
Further, the Court took judicial notice of President Duterte’s
pronouncement that Trillanes will not be apprehended, detained, or taken
into custody unless a warrant of arrest has been issued by the trial
court. Thus, the Court concluded that there is no extreme and urgent
necessity for the Court to issue any injunctive relief.[40]
During the pendency of this case, Branch 148 conducted an evidentiary hearing on the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case where both the prosecution and Trillanes presented their evidence.
In its Order (Branch 148 Assailed Order),[41] dated October 22, 2018, Branch 148 denied the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat
Case and concluded that Trillanes filed “his amnesty application in the
prescribed form in which he also admitted guilt for his participation
in the Oakwood Mutiny, among others, and in which he further recanted
all previous statements that he may have made contrary to said
admission.”[42]
Branch
148 also ruled on the question of whether Proclamation No. 572 was
invalid as the issue was directly raised in Trillanes’ pleadings before
the trial court. It ultimately found that Proclamation No. 572 was
valid, but that Trillanes was entitled to amnesty because he complied
with the requirements under Proclamation No. 75.
The dispositive portion of the Branch 148 Assailed Order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution’s Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure
Order and Alias Warrant of Arrest against accused Antonio F. Trillanes
IV is DENIED DUE COURSE.SO ORDERED.[43] (Emphasis in the original)
Trillanes and the prosecution both filed their motions for partial
reconsideration, which Branch 148 both denied in its Joint Order (Joint Order),[44] dated November 22, 2018.
The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Certiorari,[45]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Branch
148 Assailed Order and the Joint Order before the Court of Appeals (CA). This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 159217 (Coup d’etat Appeal).
The CA denied the People’s Petition for Certiorari in its Decision (CA Decision in the Coup d’etat Appeal),[46] dated May 31, 2021. In particular while the CA concluded that Proclamation No. 572 is valid,[47] it also ruled that Branch 148 correctly denied the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat
Case because the prosecution failed to prove that Trillanes did not
submit an amnesty application form and that he did not admit guilt.
Moreover, the CA agreed with Branch 148 that Trillanes satisfactorily
proved that he complied with the requirements under Proclamation No. 75.[48]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision in the Coup d’etat Appeal states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the Order dated October 22, 2018 and the Joint Order dated
November 22, 2018 issued by public respondent Honorable Presiding Judge
Andres Bartolome Soriano of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 148 in Crim. Case No. 03-2784 are hereby SUSTAINED.SO ORDERED.[49] (Emphasis in the original)
The People filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Set the Case for Oral Argument (Petition in the Coup d’etat Case),[50] dated June 15, 2021, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, before the Court, assailing the CA Decision in the Coup d’etat Appeal. This was docketed as G.R. No. 256660, titled People of the Philippines v. Antonio F. Trillanes IV.
Meanwhile, Branch 150 also acted on the Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion
Case. Notably, it conducted a summary hearing, and not a full-blown
evidentiary hearing, where it allowed the parties to submit affidavits
and other documentary evidence.[51]
In its Order (Assailed Order in the Rebellion Case),[52] dated November 25, 2018, Branch 150 granted the Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case.
While Branch 150, like Branch 148, concluded that Proclamation No. 572 did not violate Trillanes’ constitutional rights,[53]
its own appreciation of the case led it to rule that Trillanes did not
submit an amnesty application form and did not admit his guilt as
required under Proclamation No. 75.[54]
Branch 150 gave credence to the Certification, dated August 30, 2018, issued by Thea Joan Andrade (Andrade)
of the DND’s Law and Order Division, which stated that Trillanes was
granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 75 and that “[h]owever, there is
no copy of his application for amnesty in the records.”[55] According to Branch 150, this Certification confirmed the prosecution’s claim that Trillanes did not apply for amnesty.[56]
Given this, Branch 150 ruled that since Trillanes failed to establish
the existence of the application form for amnesty, it will not give
credence to other pieces of evidence he presented in an attempt to prove
his claim that he complied with the requirements for the grant of
amnesty under Proclamation No. 75.[57]
Consequently, Branch 150 declared that its previous Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case is void ab initio. Branch 150 explained:
With the revocation of the amnesty granted to Sen. Trillanes the
resulting consequence is that the Order issued on September 7, 2011
dismissing the case for rebellion becomes void ab initio.
Proclamation No. 572 series of 2018 was precisely issued to rectify the
erroneous grant of amnesty to accused Trillanes due to his failure to
comply with the basic minimum requirements of filing his application and
the admission stated in the said application of his guilt of the crimes
covered by the amnesty. Accused Trillanes failed to prove his
allegation of filing his application and which contained express
admission of his guilt. Records show that the court relied on the
certificate of amnesty attached to the motion to dismiss filed by Sen.
Trillanes which resulted to the issuance of the order of dismissal on
September 7, 2011. When the order of dismissal was granted on September
7, 2011, there was as yet no proclamation no. 572 series of 2018
revoking the amnesty granted to Sen. Trillanes pursuant to Proclamation
No. 75 series of 2010. A cursory examination of the omnibus motion filed
by the prosecution to issue warrant of arrest and hold departure order
against Sen. Trillanes reveals that it raised valid grounds that require
factual determination of the issues in order to arrive at a just
resolution, so that none of the parties would be deprived of due process
x x x.The order dated September 7, 2011 being a void order, it has no
legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, the order dated September 7, 2011 is non-existent
and therefore cannot attain finality and the doctrine of immutability of
judgment cannot apply. x x x x.x x x x
While as a rule, the order of dismissal issued by this court on
September 7, 2011 may be annulled through an independent action,
nevertheless in contemplation of law, it is non-existent and therefore,
it is not even necessary for the state to take any steps to vacate or
avoid a void judgment or order.[58]
The dispositive portion of the Branch 150 Assailed Order states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above disquisition, the prosecution’s
Omnibus Motion dated September 7, 2018 for issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and Hold Departure Order against Sen. Antonio F. Trillanes IV is
granted. Bail for temporary liberty of the accused is fixed at
Php200,000.00 per Order dated January 16, 2010.SO ORDERED.[59]
Branch 150 also denied Trillanes’ motion for reconsideration in its Order,[60] dated December 18, 2018.
Trillanes filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and/or Injunction,[61] dated March 7, 2019, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 159811 (the Rebellion Appeal).
The CA denied Trillanes’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in its
Resolution,[62] dated March 18, 2019.
In the Decision (CA Decision in the Rebellion Appeal),[63] dated March 1, 2021, the CA granted Trillanes’ Petition. Similar to the CA’s ruling in the Coup d’etat
Appeal, the CA ruled in this case that Proclamation No. 572 is valid
and did not violate Trillanes’ constitutional right to due process and
equal protection of the laws, and against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and double jeopardy.[64]
However, the CA disagreed with Branch 150’s ruling that it could
validly reopen the Rebellion Case upon the People’s Omnibus Motion.
The CA ruled that if the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case became
void because of the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty, the People’s
proper remedy to initiate the process of prosecuting Trillanes was not
to file a mere motion before Branch 150. The Dismissal Order in the
Rebellion Case should have been assailed through the appropriate
independent action under the Rules of Court or through a collateral
attack in another case where the issue of the voidness of the order is
raised as an issue. For the CA, parties cannot be allowed to reopen a
case that has long become final, executory, and immutable through a mere
motion filed before the same court that rendered the decision.[65]
Further, the CA stated that the issue of whether the Dismissal Order in
the Rebellion Case is void requires an “inquiry into the factual basis
of Proclamation No. 572, that is, the compliance or non-compliance of
the petitioner with the requirements of Proclamation No. 75.”[66]
The CA also added:
Although we have debunked the Omnibus Motion theory of attacking
the alleged void judgment or order, we emphasize that, whether or not
the Omnibus Motion be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course
of a regular trial, the petitioner must be given an ample opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that he may desire
to introduce because after all, his situation is not an ordinary one. He
has been granted amnesty about a decade earlier and by reason of which
the rebellion charge against him was dismissed in 2011, only to have the
rug pulled from under his feet because of a purported non-compliance
with the conditions of the amnesty that was processed so many years
earlier.….
To the Court, the denial of the petitioner’s request to be given
reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence and present testimonies of
his witnesses deprived him of procedural due process. Further, assuming
that the respondent trial court had the jurisdiction to nullify its own
Order of 07 September 2011 on the basis of the Omnibus Motion, a
proposition we have shown to be untenable, it committed grave abuse of
discretion when it tackled the Omnibus Motion cursorily, giving the
petitioner no opportunity to fully present his evidence.[67]
Having found that Branch 150 acted with grave abuse of discretion,
the CA granted Trillanes’ Petition. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision in the Rebellion Appeal provides:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders of 25 September and 18 December 2018, having been issued by the
respondent court that no longer had jurisdiction on a dismissed criminal
action and that acted with grave abuse of discretion, are SET ASIDE and VACATED.IT IS SO ORDERED.[68] (Emphasis in the original)
The People filed its Petition for Review with prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument (Petition in the Rebellion Case),[69] dated March 24, 2021, before the Court. This was docketed as G.R. No. 256078.
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 241494, 256660, and 256078.
The Consolidated Cases
G.R. No. 241494
In his Petition, Trillanes raises the following arguments:
First, President Duterte and the respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
Proclamation No. 572. According to Trillanes, the issuance of
Proclamation No. 572 contradicts the prevailing jurisprudence that an
amnesty granted to a person completely abolishes and extinguishes his
criminal liability. Thus, President Duterte and the respondents erred in
ordering the DOJ and the AFP to pursue all criminal and administrative
cases against him arising from his participation in the Oakwood Mutiny
and the Manila Peninsula Incident.[70]
Second, Proclamation No. 572 is unlawful because it directed the AFP
and the PNP to arrest Trillanes when, at the time it was issued, there
was no existing warrant, lawful cause, or pending case against him which
would justify such an arrest.[71] Thus, Proclamation No. 572 violates the Constitutional proscription against unreasonable warrantless arrests.[72]
Third, Proclamation No. 572 violated Trillanes’ constitutional right to
due process as it ordered his arrest without any trial or proceeding.[73]
Fourth, Proclamation No. 572 also violated Trillanes’ constitutional
right to the equal protection of the laws because it specifically
singled out and targeted him as the sole subject of the proclamation.[74]
Fifth, the unilateral withdrawal of the amnesty granted to Trillanes’
violates Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution, which established
that the power to grant amnesty is a shared power between the Executive
and the Legislature. As the grant of amnesty requires the concurrence of
both houses of Congress, Trillanes asserts that its revocation also
requires the same concurrence.[75]
Sixth, Proclamation No. 572, which ordered the revival of cases against
Trillanes which were already dismissed, violates his Constitutional
right against double jeopardy.[76]
Finally, Trillanes insists that the factual basis for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 572, i.e., that he did not submit his application form
for amnesty and admit his guilt, is false. He asserts that he submitted
the application form and admitted his guilt as established by numerous
pieces of evidence.[77]
In their Comment,[78] dated September 24, 2018, the respondents put forth the following arguments:
First, the Certiorari
Petition suffers from several fatal procedural defects which warrant
its dismissal. Specifically, it raises questions of fact that should
first be resolved by the trial court or the CA. Moreover, Trillanes
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed the Certiorari Petition directly before the Court.[79]
In addition, the Certiorari
Petition’s notarial certificate is defective because it does not
indicate the address of the notary public. Further, the respondents also
allege that Trillanes could not have appeared before the notary because
he was detained in the Senate Building and there is no record of the
notary entering the Senate Building on the date that the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was notarized. The respondents
also pointed out that the integrity of the notary was doubtful.[80]
Second, Proclamation No. 75 imposed a suspensive condition to the grant
of amnesty. The respondents insist that Trillanes clearly failed to
meet these suspensive conditions as he did not submit an application
form and did not admit his guilt. Thus, the amnesty granted to him is
void and Proclamation No. 572 properly revoked it.[81]
Third, the question of whether President Duterte validly issued
Proclamation No. 572 is a political question beyond the reach of the
Court’s judicial review.[82]
Fourth, the respondents argue that the Certiorari Petition is an offshoot of the Coup d’etat
Case and the Rebellion Case. The courts that heard these cases have yet
to reacquire jurisdiction over the person of Trillanes as he has not
been arrested and he has not voluntarily surrendered. Thus, as the
courts have not acquired jurisdiction over Trillanes, he cannot ask for
judicial relief.[83]
Fifth, Trillanes committed forum shopping when he filed the Certiorari Petition before the Court despite the pendency of the Omnibus Motions in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat cases. The respondents averred that the prayer in the Certiorari Petition and the relief prayed for in the two Omnibus Motions in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat cases all involve the validity of Proclamation No. 572.[84]
The respondents also assail the validity of Proclamation No. 75. They
argue that Proclamation No. 75 unduly delegated the power to grant
amnesty to the Committee. According to the respondents, this cannot be
done because the power of clemency is an exclusively executive function
which must he exercised by the President himself. It cannot be exercised
by any other person, agency, or committee.[85]
Moreover, the respondents defend the validity of Proclamation No. 572. They allege the following:
First, the respondents insist that Trillanes did not submit an
application form for amnesty and did not admit his guilt. The
respondents emphasize that the Certification issued by Andrade confirm
that a copy of the application form does not exist in the record. The
respondents also point to alleged public statements which Trillanes made
where he purportedly asserted that he did not commit any of the crimes
for which he was charged. Since Proclamation No. 572 correctly revoked
the amnesty granted to Trillanes, the criminal cases against him
subsist.[86]
Second,
the respondents refute Trillanes’ allegation that Proclamation No. 572
violated his constitutional rights. The respondents highlight that
Proclamation No. 572 categorically stated that the AFP and the PNP
should “employ lawful means to arrest” Trillanes. This meant that the
“law enforcement agencies were allowed to proceed with the arrest of
petitioner pursuant to a valid warrant that may be issued by the trial
courts.”[87]
Finally,
the respondents assert that President Duterte acted in line with his
constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed when
he issued Proclamation No. 572. In revoking the amnesty granted by the
Committee, President Duterte was simply exercising his power of control
to correct the error of an executive department. Moreover, the
respondents argue that the congressional concurrence is not required for
the revocation of an amnesty because the Constitution does not require
it.[88]
Trillanes filed a Reply,[89] dated November 6, 2018, where he refuted the respondents’ arguments.
G.R. No. 256078
In the Rebellion Petition, the People raise the following arguments:
First, the CA erred when it concluded that the Dismissal Order in the
Rebellion Case could not be set aside through a mere motion. The People
argues that the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case is a void order
because it suffered from an infirmity, i.e., that Trillanes did not
actually comply with the requirements for a grant of amnesty under
Proclamation No. 75. Since the Dismissal Order is a void judgment, it
did not become final, executory, and immutable and could thus be
assailed at any time, and even through a collateral attack.[90]
Second, Branch 150 acted pursuant to the inherent powers of the court
to amend and control its processes and orders to make them conform to
law and justice.[91]
Third, Branch 150 did not err when it conducted a summary hearing, and
not a full blown hearing, in order to resolve the Omnibus Motion in the
Rebellion Case. The People highlighted that in issuing a warrant of
arrest and a hold departure order, which are the reliefs prayed for in
the motion, there is no legal requirement that the court must conduct a
full evidentiary hearing. The manner of the conduct of the litigation is
within the trial court’s sound discretion. More importantly, the People
asserts that Branch 150 gave Trillanes ample opportunity to plead his
case.[92]
Finally, the
People refutes the CA’s conclusion that the correct remedy to revive the
case against Trillanes was not to file a motion before Branch 150, but
to file a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, or a special Civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.[93]
Trillanes, on the other hand, argues the following:
First, the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case is final, executory,
and immutable. Thus, this Order can no longer be amended, let alone
revoked. A party seeking to assail such a final, executory, and
immutable order should file a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court or a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. A party can also attack the validity of an order in another
action where it is invoked if the assailed order is void on its face.
Here, Trillanes alleges that the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case
is not void on its face. Thus, the CA correctly concluded that Branch
150 erroneously reopened the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case on
the People’s mere motion.[94]
Second, the inherent power of the courts to amend and control its
processes and orders to conform to law and justice cannot be invoked to
justify Branch 150’s ruling. Even assuming that the People is correct
that the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case is void, procedural rules
provide for the correct remedy to assail such an order. It cannot be
done by merely filing a motion in the same case years after the order
became final.[95]
Finally, Branch 150 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
deprived Trillanes the opportunity to present witnesses and secure
evidence. By insisting on a mere summary hearing, Branch 150 deprived
Trillanes of due process.[96]
G.R. No. 256660
The People, in the Petition in the Coup d’etat Case, argue:
First, the CA incorrectly concluded that there were no factual bases
for the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty. In this regard, the People
took the view that the CA should have applied the Best Evidence Rule
(now the Original Document Rule). The People assert that the Best
Evidence Rule applies in this case because the issue involves the
contents of the application form for amnesty and not just its existence.
In particular, one of the issues in the case was whether Trillanes
admitted guilt. This would have been ascertained if the trial court and
the CA were able to examine the contents of the application form. Thus,
it cannot be said that the contents of the missing application form was
not a controlling issue in the case.[97]
Given this, the People insists that Branch 148 and the CA should not
have allowed the admission of and should not have given credence to
secondary evidence to establish that Trillanes filed an application form
for amnesty and admitted his guilt.[98]
Second, even if Trillanes did file an amnesty application form, the
general admission of guilt in the said form did not suffice to meet the
constitutional requirement that an applicant for amnesty must admit
guilt for the specific crime charged.[99]
Third, the CA was wrong in its conclusion that the Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case is final and immutable. According to the People, this order is void and thus never became final.[100]
Fourth, the People avers that a court may modify a judgment even after
it has become executory, “whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.[101] Here, the issuance of Proclamation No. 572 compelled the DOJ to file the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case, otherwise the State would have been deprived of the right to prosecute Trillanes.[102]
Fifth, the CA should not have ruled that the grant of amnesty in favor
of Trillanes is a matter of judicial notice. The CA used this as basis
for its conclusion that Branch 148 correctly took judicial notice of the
grant of amnesty and dismissed the Coup d’etat charge against
Trillanes. For the People, judicial notice of an act requires that the
act is valid. Here, the grant of amnesty in favor of Trillanes is not a
valid act because he did not comply with the requirements for amnesty
under Proclamation No. 75.[103]
Finally, the People claim that the CA erroneously ruled that Trillanes
should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused in the Coup d’etat
Case in accordance with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 11(a).
The People insists that this rule applies to a co-accused who is
convicted in the trial court but did not file an appeal. It finds no
application in the case of Trillanes where the charge was dismissed and,
thus, was never convicted.[104]
On the other hand, Trillanes makes the following arguments:
First, the CA and Branch 148 correctly concluded that there is no
factual basis for the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty. The burden of
proof in the case lies with the People, which sought to revive a case
seven years after it became final, executory, and immutable. In the
hearing before Branch 148, the prosecution utterly failed to prove its
claim that Trillanes did not file an application form for amnesty and
that he did not admit guilt. In fact, not a single witness or piece of
evidence for the prosecution showed that he did not file an amnesty
application form and did not admit his guilt. On the contrary, the
evidence on record, including the prosecution’s evidence, establish that
he did, in fact, file an amnesty application form and admitted his
guilt for his participation in the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila
Peninsula Incident.[105]
In this regard, Trillanes argues that the factual findings of the trial
court; when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to great
weight. Moreover, he also asserts that Branch 148’s and the CA’s
conclusion that the Best Evidence Rule does not apply here is correct
because the contents of the amnesty application form is not the subject
of the inquiry. More importantly, the best evidence that Trillanes did
file an application for amnesty and admitted his guilt is the
Certificate of Amnesty.[106]
Second, given the prosecution’s failure to establish the
factual basis for the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty, the Dismissal
Order in the Coup d’etat Case remains valid and continues to be
final and immutable. Similarly, the amnesty granted to Trillanes is
valid and effective. Thus, the CA and Branch 148 did not err in
dismissing the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case.[107]
Third, the CA was correct in its view that the grant of
amnesty in favor of Trillanes is an official act of which the courts can
take judicial notice.[108]
Finally, Trillanes should benefit from the CA’s acquittal of his co-accused in the Coup d’etat
Case. This is consistent with Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which states that an appeal taken by one or more
several accused will not affect those that did not appeal except when
the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter. He emphasizes that the CA’s bases for acquitting his co-accused
is that two of the elements of the crime of Coup d’etat did not exist. These conclusions should benefit Trillanes.[109]
The Issues
The issues for the Court’s resolution in these consolidated cases are:
In G.R. No. 241494
unconstitutional because it delegated to the DND the President’s power
to grant amnesty; andIn G.R. No. 256660
ruled that Branch 148 did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case.In G.R. No. 256078
ruled that Branch 150 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case.The Ruling of the Court
G.R. No. 241494
The Court first resolves the procedural issues.
Procedural Issues
|
Trillanes did not commit forum shopping
|
The meaning of forum shopping is well established. In Top Rate Development Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Corporation,[110] the Court explained:
FORUM SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or
more suits indifferent courts, either simultaneously or successively, in
order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or
increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.[111]
Further, in City of Taguig v. City of Makati,[112] the Court ruled:
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining
whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts
and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.[113] (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
The test to ascertain if forum shopping exists is whether in two
or more cases, there is identity of parties, rights, causes of action,
and reliefs sought.[114] With respect specifically to litis pendentia,
it exists when the following elements concur: (a) identity of the
parties in the two actions; (b) substantial identity in the causes of
action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and (c) the identity
between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be
rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.[115]
Here, Trillanes impleaded the respondents, in their official
capacities, and sought to have Proclamation No. 572 declared invalid and
unconstitutional. On the other hand, the matters then pending in Branch
148 and Branch 150 pertained to the Omnibus Motions filed by the
People, through the DOJ, to issue warrants of arrest and HDOs against
Trillanes. In his comments on these motions, Trillanes asked for the
denial of the Omnibus Motions. He assailed the legal and factual bases
of the Omnibus Motions and prayed that the trial courts deny the
issuance of warrants of arrest and HDO i.e., that he has been granted
amnesty and that the dismissals of the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Cases have become final and immutable. He did not raise in his comments
the issue of the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 572. Trillanes
filed the Certiorari Petition for the specific purpose of having
Proclamation No. 572 declared unconstitutional and to bar Branch 150 and
Branch 148 from hearing and granting the Omnibus Motions.
Clearly, the issues raised and the reliefs sought in G.R. No. 241494 and the Rebellion and Coup d’etat Cases are dissimilar.
While it is true that the issue of the validity, which would include
the legality and constitutionality, of Proclamation No. 572 was
eventually litigated before Branch 148 and Branch 150 (and eventually,
in the appeals before the CA), this only arose because of the Court’s
Injunction Resolution where it directed that “it is appropriate that the
Makati RTCs should be given leeway in exercising their concurrent
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the pleadings/motions filed by the
parties as regards the legality of Proclamation No. 572, Series of
2018.”[116] With this
directive, the Court allowed the parties to fully litigate the issue as
to the validity of Proclamation No. 572 in the lower courts.
It cannot be said that Trillanes committed forum shopping by filing this Certiorari Petition
during the pendency of the Omnibus Motions in the trial courts
precisely because he did not deliberately raise the same issues in
multiple fora with the intent of obtaining a favorable ruling in, at
least, one of these fora at the risk of having several courts making
contradictory rulings.
Thus, the primary purpose of forum
shopping, which is to prevent the possibility of having various courts
render conflicting decisions on the same issue, is obviated by the
consolidation of G.R. No. 241494 and the appeals in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Cases. By allowing the lower courts to fully thresh out the issues and
then consolidating these cases with G.R. No. 241494, the Court is now
prepared to resolve the question as to the validity of Proclamation No.
572.
|
Trillanes did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
|
The Court clarified and reiterated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in GIOS-Samar, Inc. v. DOT.[117] In that case, the Court held:
This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the
proper venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the issuance of
extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the RTC
have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the
lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the petition.[118] (Citations omitted)
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not a mere policy, it is a
“constitutional imperative given (1) the structure of our judicial
system and (2) the requirements of due process.”[119]
There are, however, recognized specific and narrow exceptions to this
doctrine when a litigant may be allowed to resort directly to the Court
upon allegation of “serious and important reasons.” In The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC,[120] the Court enumerated these exceptions:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation
of their right to freedom of expression; [and](8) the petition includes questions that are “dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.”[121] (Citations omitted)
In GIOS-Samar, the Court added:
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the
foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator – the issues for
resolution of the Court are purely legal. Similarly, the Court in
Diocese decided to allow direct recourse in said case because, just like
Angara, what was involved was the resolution of a question of
law, namely, whether the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in
question violated the right to free speech of the Bacolod Bishop.We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or
more of the so-called ‘special and important reasons’ is “not the
decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit
invocation, at the first instance, of its original jurisdiction over the
issuance of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the parties in those ‘exceptions’ that enabled us to allow the direct action before us.”[122] (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
In G.R. No. 241494, the main issue presented for the Court’s
resolution is whether Proclamation No. 572 violates Trillanes’
constitutional right to due process, the equal protection of the laws,
and against double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, bill of
attainders, and warrantless arrests. The case also raises as an issue
whether a President may revoke the amnesty granted by his predecessor
and whether the declaration of the purported invalidity of a prior grant
of amnesty should fall within the authority of the President or within
the jurisdiction of courts. These are patently legal questions.
Moreover, the issues raised in the case are novel questions making this a
case of first impression. The task of ascertaining the metes and bounds
of presidential power and the judiciary’s jurisdiction over the
validity of presidential proclamations is a duty that the Court can best
perform.
While Trillanes also asserts that Proclamation No. 572
erroneously asserts that he did not comply with the requirements for the
grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 75, the Court need not resolve
this question to adjudicate the constitutional questions raised. Nor
does the Court need a presentation of evidence to adjudicate the main
dispute presented before it.[123]
More importantly, by allowing the lower courts to first resolve the factual questions in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat Cases, all the relevant issues which require resolution in this case are now ripe for adjudication.
|
Minor defects in the notarial
certificate of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping do not warrant the dismissal of the Petition |
The respondents assert that the Certiorari Petition should
be dismissed because of defects in the notarization of the Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping because (a) the notarial
certificate does not indicate the address of the notary public and (b)
Trillanes purportedly did not appear before the notary public.
The Court cannot sustain the respondents’ arguments.
As
to the issue of the absence of the address of the notary public in the
notarial certificate, the rule is settled that this is a minor flaw that
would not justify the dismissal of a petition. The requirement that the
notary public must indicate his office address in the notarial
certificate is imposed by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.[124]
While failure to comply with this requirement could expose a notary
public to administrative liability, it is not, however, fatal to a
petition.[125]
Further, as to the respondents’ allegation that Trillanes did not appear
before the notary public, the Court reiterates that there is a
“presumption that official duty has been regularly performed with
respect to the jurat.”[126] While this is a disputable presumption, only clear and convincing evidence can overcome it.[127]
Here, the respondents’ claims (that Trillanes could not have appeared
before the notary because he was in the Senate Building and that there
were allegedly no records showing that the notary public ever entered
the building) rely on mere suppositions and conjectures, which is far
from proof.
|
The validity of Proclamation No. 572 is not a political question
|
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ assertion that the
question of whether Proclamation No. 572 was validly issued is a
political question.
Whenever the argument is raised that an issue presented before
the Court is a political question, the determination of the validity of
such a claim must be tested by a proper appreciation of the interplay
between the political question doctrine and the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al.,[128]
the Court explained that a question is “political, and not judicial”
when it pertains to a “matter which is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity” or a matter that “has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of
the government, with discretionary power to act.”[129] Whenever a question is determined to be political, the Court is expected to “act with deference.”[130] The Court will not invalidate the act of another governmental entity where the ultimate issue is political in nature.
The 1987 Constitution, however, expanded the power of judicial
review and effectively limited the resort to the political question
doctrine. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution states:
SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may he established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision granted the judiciary the power to determine
whether or not another branch or instrumentality of the government acted
with grave abuse of discretion and, if so, to nullify such act.
Operationally, this means that while an act may fall within the
exclusive power of a branch or instrumentality of the government, the
courts are nonetheless empowered to determine if such a power was
exercised with grave abuse of discretion. In Marcos v. Manglapus,[131] the Court said:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry to areas which the
Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the
political departments to decide.[132]
Similarly, in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[133] the Court said:
The “allocation of constitutional boundaries” is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a
recent case, “(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.
It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases.”[134] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, while the Constitution did not completely erase the
political question doctrine, it nonetheless affirmed that the judiciary
has the power and the duty to determine the “proper allocation of
constitutional boundaries.” Simply stated, where the question
pertains to whether a branch or instrumentality of the government is
constitutionally empowered to perform an act and whether such acts were
done within the limits defined by the Constitution, courts have the
power to resolve the case. The political question doctrine cannot be invoked to deprive the courts of jurisdiction. In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[135] the Court categorically said:
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.[136] (Emphasis supplied)
The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution function as “constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.”[137] In Diocese of Bacolod,[138] the Court held:
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right.[139]….
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to
the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that
a political question brings.[140] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Trillanes raises questions pertaining to the limits
imposed on the power of the President to grant an amnesty and to revoke
it. The Court is asked to ascertain if Proclamation No. 572 violates the
Bill of Rights. Whether Proclamation No. 572 exceeded these
constitutional limits and whether it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion are the ultimate questions for the Court to resolve. These
are not political questions. These are clearly justiciable questions
within the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, the
validity of a presidential proclamation is precisely within the
jurisdiction of the Court, as provided in Article VIII, Section 5 (c) of
the Constitution, which states that the Court shall have the power to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
at the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments, and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of a proclamation is in question.
To be sure, this is
not the first time that the Court has taken cognizance of a case
relating to executive clemency and the grant of amnesty.
To illustrate, Llamas v. Orbos[141]
resolved the question of whether the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. In determining whether the question is
political in nature, the Court said:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in
which the President’s discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the
issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or
whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial
review. And such review does not constitute a modification or
correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute
interference with the functions of the President.….
Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the
Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise
by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to
constitutional limitations. We will merely check whether the particular
measure in question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, We
will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which actuated
the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial review.[142] (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Sadava,[143]
the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court which refused to
dismiss a criminal case based on its finding that the accused claiming
the benefits of a grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 76 did not
comply with the condition that all ammunitions must be surrendered and
that the crime for which he was being prosecuted was included in the
crimes subject of the amnesty. Similarly, in People v. Orobia,[144]
the Court ruled that the trial court correctly concluded that the
accused is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty granted under
Proclamation No. 76, as implemented through the DOJ Circular No. 27,
because the accused did not accomplish the certificate required under
paragraph 2 of Circular No. 27. The Court also held that the accused
failed to establish that he was a member of the Hukbalahap organization
or of any subversive society, as membership in such an organization was
one of the conditions for the grant of amnesty.[145]
Of particular relevance is the case of Macaga-an v. People,[146] involving Presidential Decree No. 1082 (PD 1082),
which granted amnesty to leaders, members, supporters, and sympathizers
of the Moro National Liberation Front and the Bangsa Moro Army and
other anti-government groups with similar motivations and aims, who
committed acts penalized by existing laws in furtherance of their
resistance to the duly constituted authorities. Here, the Court ruled
that the crimes committed by the accused, who claimed that they were
granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission created under PD 1082, were
not in furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted authorities.
The Court said:
The instant case therefore presents the issue of what effect, if
any, may be given to supposed acts of the former President which were
in conflict with or in violation of decrees issued by that same former
President. So viewed, this Court has no alternative save to declare
that the supposed acts of the former President done in 1985 in clear
conflict with the restrictions embodied in the very decrees promulgated
by that same former President, cannot be given any legal effect. It
may be supposed that the former President could have validly amended
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1082 and 1182 so as to wipe away the
restrictions and limitations in fact found in those decrees. But the
former President did not so amend his own decrees and he must be held to
the terms and conditions that he himself had promulgated in the
exercise of legislative power.It may be — we do not completely discount the possibility — that
the former President did in fact act in contravention of the decrees
here involved by granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that
by such acts, he may indeed have aroused expectations (however
unjustified under the terms of existing law) in the minds of the
petitioners. If such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of the
petitioner is not to this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to
the Executive Department of the government.[147] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the interpretation of a presidential issuance granting
amnesty and the question of whether an amnesty was validly granted are
justiciable questions.
More specifically, whether an amnesty
previously granted should be considered void because the grantee failed
to comply with the requirements under the proclamation granting amnesty
is a question susceptible of judicial determination. It involves
conflicting legal rights (a “contrariety of legal rights” as defined by
the Court in Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry[148] and Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum[149]) and the assertion of opposite legal claims that can be settled by the application of the relevant laws.
To be clear, in resolving the issues raised in G.R. No. 241494, the
Court cannot and will not delve into the wisdom animating the issuance
of Proclamation No. 572. Neither will the Court supplant the judgment of
the Executive. The Court’s task here is only to determine whether the
limits prescribed by the Constitution have been upheld.
Substantive Issues
The parties in this case raise substantive issues which, in essence,
pertain to two questions – whether Proclamation No. 75 is invalid
because former President Aquino unduly delegated his constitutional
power to grant amnesty to the DND and the Committee, and whether
Proclamation No. 57 is unconstitutional.
|
Proclamation No. 75 is valid; it did not unduly delegate the President’s power to grant amnesty to the DND and the Committee
|
The Court will first resolve the issue as to the validity of Proclamation No. 75.
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution vests the power to
grant amnesty to the President subject to concurrence of a majority of
all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Section
19 states as follows:
SEC. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provide
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
Former President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 75 in accordance
with his power to grant amnesty under Article VIII, Section 19, of the
Constitution. Proclamation No. 75 set out the precise parameters of this
grant. In particular, Proclamation No. 75, Section 1 provides:
SEC. 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all
active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their
supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila
Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor; Provided that amnesty shall
not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity and other
crimes committed for personal ends.
The People assail the validity of Proclamation No. 75 because it
purportedly unduly delegated the power to grant amnesty to the DND and
the Committee. The Court disagrees.
Proclamation No. 75, Section 2 states:
SEC. 2. Where to Apply. – The concerned AFP and PNP personnel and their supporters may apply for amnesty under this Proclamation with the ad hoc
committee Department of National Defense (DND) which is hereby tasked
with receiving and processing applications – including oppositions
thereto, if any – for amnesty pursuant to this proclamation and
determining whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty pursuant to
this proclamation. The final decisions or determination of the DND shall be appealable to the Office of the President by any party to the application. The decision, however, shall be immediately executory even if appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the Committee Rules of Procedure, which detail the procedure for the processing of amnesty applications, reads:
SEC. 2. Functions of the Department of National Defense Amnesty Committee.— The Department of National Defense Ad Hoc
Amnesty Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “Committee”) shall be
tasked to receive and process applications, including oppositions
thereto, if any, and issue recommendations to the Secretary of
National Defense regarding its determination whether the applicants are
entitled to amnesty under Presidential Proclamation No. 75.….
SEC. 15. Submission to the Secretary of National Defense.—The Committee shall submit its recommendations to the Secretary of National Defense for approval
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of all documentary requirements
and/or from termination of the proceedings as the case may be.….
SEC. 17. Appeal.—The final decision or determination of the Department of National Defense shall be appealable to the Office of the President
by any party to the application within 10 days from notice of the
decision. The decision, however, shall be immediately executory even if
appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing shows that there was no undue delegation of the
power to grant amnesty to the Committee and the DND. Proclamation No. 75
is the operative act which granted amnesty to a specific class of
people. In particular, Proclamation No. 75 granted amnesty to active and
former personnel of the AFP and the PNP as well as their supporters who
have or may have committed crimes punishable under the RPC, the
Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or
incident to the Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila
Peninsula Incident.
The tasks given to the Committee and to
the Secretary of National Defense were only to receive applications for
amnesty and ascertain if (a) the applicants fall within the class of
people to whom the amnesty was granted and (b) the applicants complied
with the requirements prescribed under Proclamation No. 75. Under
Proclamation No. 75 and the Committee Rules of Procedure, if the
Committee confirms items (a) and (b), the Committee must recommend that
the applicant be granted a certificate of amnesty and the Secretary of
National Defense must approve this recommendation. They do not
exercise any discretion on the matter. Stated more simply, the Committee
and the Secretary of National Defense did not grant the amnesty but
only handled the task of implementing the administrative details of
claiming the amnesty already granted by former President Aquino.
Moreover, the respondents’ argument ignores the fact that the Secretary
of National Defense, in approving the Committee’s recommendation and
issuing the certificate of amnesty, acts as an alter ego of the
President. Thus, when former President Aquino ordered the DND to perform
the administrative task of processing amnesty applications, the
Secretary of National Defense was acting on behalf of the President. In
the eyes of the law, and under the doctrine of qualified political
agency, the acts of the Secretary of National Defense, “performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless, disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”[150]
The doctrine of qualified political agency recognizes the necessity of
allowing the President to delegate the performance of certain tasks in
the exercise of his or her constitutional powers because the President
cannot be expected to perform the multifarious functions of the
Executive.[151] Certainly, the
President cannot be expected to personally receive all applications for
amnesty, process them, and then issue the certificates of amnesty,
especially in this case where there were a total of 277 amnesty
grantees.[152]
Given
the foregoing, President Aquino did not unlawfully delegate his
constitutional power to grant amnesty to the Secretary of National
Defense and the Committee.
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The President cannot revoke an amnesty grant without concurrence from Congress
|
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution specifically requires
that the President can only grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress. Significantly, the same provision is silent as to whether an
amnesty may be revoked and whether the President can do so without
congressional concurrence.
That the President may grant amnesty and that such grant must
be with legislative concurrence have been enshrined as early as in the
1935 Constitution.
Article VII, Section 11 (6) of the 1935 Constitution states:
SEC. 11 (6) The President shall have the power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may
deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly.
This was also adopted in the 1973 Constitution. Specifically, Article VII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution reads:
SEC. 11. The President may, except in cases of impeachment,
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures
and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
Notwithstanding several constitutional changes, these two elements
have always remained – that the President has the power to grant
amnesty and that it must be exercised with the concurrence of the
legislature.
Similarly, our definition of amnesty as well as its
purpose have been consistent throughout our history. Amnesty connotes
the “general pardon to rebels for their treason and other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants the subjects of
another, who have offended by some breach of the law of nations.”[153]
It is granted to “classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.”[154]
In this country, amnesty has been historically granted to groups of
people who have committed crimes with political color. This is true as
well in the present case where Proclamation No. 572 was granted to those
who were involved in the Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off and the
Manila Peninsula Incident.
The effects of amnesty are also
unique. Amnesty “looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.”[155] A grant of amnesty has the force of law and the grantee stands in the eyes of the law as if they committed no crime.[156]
Thus, when compared to the President’s general pardoning power, the
effects of amnesty appear far reaching as it erases the crime itself and
the grantee is considered to not have committed the crime at all.
Amnesty, thus, serves not only as a means to grant reprieve from the
full force of our criminal laws, it also, and more importantly,
functions as a political tool in peace negotiations with rebel or
secessionist groups and in bringing those who took arms against the
government back into the fold.
Because of the unique nature of
amnesty, in that it is a political tool which, when used, effectively
grants an exemption from the application of our criminal laws to certain
groups of people to achieve a legitimate political end, it is but
logical that its grant requires the act of both the Executive and the
Legislative branches. The grant of amnesty involves policy choices which
require the confluence of the determinations of these two branches of
the Government.
The requirement that a grant of amnesty must be
the act of both the Executive and the Legislative branches also
functions as a check and balance. It ensures that amnesty is granted not
because of the personal motivations of any one person and that the
grant of amnesty is not co-opted for the personal political pursuits of
one person or group.
To be sure, there is no doubt that an
amnesty can be revoked for legitimate grounds. Specifically, where a
grant of amnesty is subject to conditions, and those conditions are not
met, then such grant may be revoked. As will be explained further in
this ponencia, such revocation, however, must comply with the
Constitution and any specific procedure laid out in the grant of amnesty
itself or in related rules issued for that purpose.
More
importantly, the Court rules that the revocation of a grant of amnesty
must be with the concurrence of the Legislature. Indeed, this is not
particularly stated in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
However, in interpreting Section 19, the Court is guided by the
importance of giving life to the checks and balance function of
requiring both the Executive and the Legislature to act in the grant of
amnesty and by the principle that a Constitutional provision must not be
interpreted in a manner that will render nugatory its very purpose.
Allowing the President to revoke a grant of amnesty without the
concurrence of the Legislature renders futile the participation of the
Legislature in its grant. To illustrate, the President could, for
whatever personal reasons, change his or her mind as to the propriety of
granting amnesty. While the Legislature may still be of the view that
such grant was necessary and proper, as reflected in its prior
concurrence, the President possessing the sole power to revoke a grant
of amnesty can simply do so and in the process utterly disregard the
Legislature’s own political determination and policy choice on the
matter. Moreover, the President may disagree with a prior
administration’s grant of amnesty and opt to revoke it, without allowing
the Legislature, which had precisely concurred in the grant, a chance
to participate in the decision-making process.
A system where
the President has a free reign in revoking an amnesty grant renders such
grant precarious and unreliable. Such a system removes an important
check in the exercise of this power, which may ultimately render amnesty
an ineffective political tool.
This case is a prime example of
the importance of requiring the concurrence of Legislature before a
grant of amnesty may be revoked. Legislative concurrence serves as a
check on both the procedure followed in, and the motivations propelling,
the revocation of an amnesty grant. Legislative concurrence ensures
that the power to revoke an amnesty grant cannot be held by the
President as a sword of Damocles against amnesty grantees.
|
Proclamation No. 572 is
unconstitutional; while the Court agrees with the People that it did not violate Trillanes’ constitutional right against warrantless arrests and bills of attainder, the Court rules that it did violate his constitutional rights against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy, and to due process and the equal protection of the laws |
The Court agrees with the People’s view that Proclamation No. 572
did not violate Trillanes’ constitutional right against unreasonable
arrests and bills of attainder. However, the Court finds that
Proclamation No. 572 violated Trillanes’ constitutional right against ex post facto
laws and double jeopardy, and to due process and the equal protection
of the laws. The issuance of Proclamation No. 572 constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Section
2 provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
This constitutional provision mandates that an arrest can only be
carried out on the strength of a judicial warrant issued after a finding
of the existence of probable cause. In the absence of a warrant, an
arrest is generally considered unreasonable within the meaning of
Section 2, save for a narrow set of exceptions.
Trillanes alleges
that his constitutional right against unreasonable arrests was violated
by Proclamation No. 572 which purportedly ordered his arrest without a
warrant, let alone any legal basis considering that the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Cases had already been dismissed seven years prior to the issuance of
Proclamation No. 572. He further claims that on the strength of
Proclamation No. 572, the respondents attempted to arrest him by sending
members of the AFP and the PNP to the Senate Building.[157]
The relevant provisions of Proclamation No. 572 read:
SEC. 2. Effects.
1. As a consequence, the Department of Justice and Court
Martial of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are ordered to pursue all
criminal and administrative cases filed against former LTSG Antonio
Trillanes in relation to the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula Incident.2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are ordered to employ all lawful means
to apprehend former LTSG Antonio Trillanes so that he can be
recommitted to the detention facility where he had been incarcerated for
him to stand trial for the crimes he is charged with. (Emphasis
supplied)
To be very clear, a presidential proclamation cannot be the basis
for a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, any proclamation or executive
issuance which directs the arrest of a person without a warrant is
unconstitutional. However, in this case, the Court does not find any
statement in the foregoing provisions which could be interpreted to mean
that former President Duterte expressly ordered the AFP and the PNP to
arrest Trillanes without a warrant.
In the interpretation of
statutes and government issuances, it is axiomatic that the text being
interpreted must be construed as a whole and not based on isolated
provisions or statements.[158]
Moreover, in cases where the text sought to be interpreted is capable
of two constructions, the interpretation which is consistent with the
law should be adopted.
Here, while Proclamation No. 572 did order
the apprehension of Trillanes, this is qualified by a specific
instruction to “employ all lawful means.” This belies Trillanes’
allegation that Proclamation No. 572 ordered his unlawful arrest.
Moreover, Section 2(2) of Proclamation No. 572 should be read together
with Section 2(1) which categorically ordered the DOJ and the Court
Martial of the AFP to pursue all criminal and administrative cases
against Trillanes. All these provisions, when construed together, show
that Proclamation No. 572 tasked the DOJ, the PNP, and the AFP to
proceed to prosecute Trillanes for criminal cases and administrative
cases arising from the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula Incident
and in this pursuit, to employ lawful means to arrest him to ensure that
he is made to stand trial for his purported violations of the law.
To reiterate, where a text is capable of two constructions, one which
would make it contravene the law and one which would make it valid and
legal, the latter construction should be adopted.[159]
The Court interprets Proclamation No. 572 to mean that the directive to
the AFP and the PNP to arrest Trillanes was qualified by the
instruction that the arrest should be by lawful means, that is, upon the
issuance of a warrant of arrest by a court of law, in any of the cases
filed against him.
The Court takes note of Trillanes’ allegation
that members of the AFP and the PNP attempted to arrest him without a
warrant on the same day that Proclamation No. 572 was published. The
Court, however, finds no support for the assertion that it was
Proclamation No. 572 which specifically ordered the PNP and the AFP to
arrest Trillanes without a warrant, as its language demonstrates
otherwise, as discussed.
Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.
A bill of attainder is a “legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a
judicial trial.”[160] In Misolas v. Panga,[161] the Court explained:
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element,
the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most
essential.[162]
Proclamation No. 572 does not impose punishment on a specific
group of people without judicial trial. To reiterate, Proclamation No.
572 only declared as void the prior issuance of a certificate of amnesty
in favor of Trillanes. On this ground, it directed the DOJ, the AFP,
and the PNP to prosecute Trillanes and arrest him to stand for trial
through lawful means. Thus, it does not impose a penalty upon Trillanes
without any judicial trial. Instead, Proclamation No. 572 intends to
remove a hurdle to Trillanes criminal prosecution by declaring as void
his amnesty. This, in turn, would allow the People to revive the
criminal cases filed against Trillanes so that he may be held for trial.
As such, Proclamation No. 572 does not penalize Trillanes without any
judicial trial. What it intended to do was to remove the blocks
preventing the People from proceeding with Trillanes’ criminal
prosecution so that he may be adjudged guilty by the courts after due
trial.
While Proclamation No. 572 does not violate Trillanes’
constitutional right against bills of attainder, it does, however,
violate his constitutional right against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law is defined as:
A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an
act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations
of such fact or deed…. It is a law which provides for the infliction
of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was
committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than was required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law
which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty;
every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[163] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is generally aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws.[164]
However, the Court has applied this constitutional prohibition in a
case where the legislation challenged is not strictly penal in nature
where its patent effect amounts to an ex post facto law. In particular, in Republic v. Eugenio,[165] the law resolved the question of whether the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA),[166]
a “provision which does not provide for a penal sanction but which
merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits.” The
Court ruled in the affirmative. In making this ruling, the Court
explained –
Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts
or deposits were involved in activities later on enumerated in Section 3
of the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of
absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank
accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either the written
permission of the depositor or a court order authorizing such
examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money
deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation.
The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute
confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the
account holder. For that reason, the application of the bank inquiry
order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions entered into
prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm,
offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause.
Thus, while Section 11[167] of the AMLA was not a penal law, the Court ruled that it violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it removed a layer of protection for account holders which existed prior to the enactment of the law.
The Court draws parallels between Republic
and this case. Specifically, while it is true that Proclamation No. 572
is not a penal law, it nonetheless strips Trillanes of a lawful
protection against criminal prosecution to which he has become entitled.
The ultimate effect of Proclamation No. 572 is clear – it would allow
the continuation of Trillanes’ criminal prosecution and would prevent
him from invoking his amnesty, over which he already has a vested right,
almost a decade after its grant.
That Proclamation No. 572 is
not a penal statute is no justification for exempting it from the
constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws. The Bill of Rights enshrines protections in favor of the individual against the State.[168]
The prohibition preventing the State from unlawfully and retroactively
stripping a person of a lawful protection, such as a grant of amnesty,
must apply equally to all branches of government, including the
Executive. As Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa aptly observed
during the deliberations in these consolidated cases, if a law cannot be
allowed to deprive an accused of a lawful protection to which they have
become entitled, then a presidential proclamation must similarly be
barred from doing so.
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution prohibits any person
from being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The right against
double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person of a crime of
which he or she has already been acquitted or convicted. Often described
as res judicata in prison grey, the purpose of the right against
double jeopardy is to “set the effects of the first prosecution forever
at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected
to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same
offense.”[169]
For a person to be able to invoke this constitutional protection
against double jeopardy, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of
the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.[170]
As to the
fourth element, the general rule is that for double jeopardy to attach,
the accused must have been acquitted or convicted in the first case or
the case was dismissed without his or her consent. Jurisprudence,
however; has recognized exceptions to the requirement that the dismissal
must have been without the consent of the accused.
In Bangayan v. Bangayan,[171] the Court said:
However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the
dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the
accused, to wit:(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect
of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a
failure to prosecute.[172] (Citations omitted)
In Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[173]
the Court explained that in instances where a criminal case is
dismissed based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, double
jeopardy attaches because the dismissal of the case is a judgment on the
merits and operates as an acquittal.[174]
Further, a dismissal on motion of the accused on the ground of
violation of the right to speedy trial also operates as first jeopardy
barring the accused’s prosecution for a second time. This is because
such a dismissal is not truly a “dismissal” but ought to be considered
as an acquittal as it was rendered due to the violation of an accused’s
constitutional right to speedy trial.[175]
Thus, double jeopardy attaches in these instances, notwithstanding the
fact that the dismissal was with the consent of or even upon the
instance of the accused, because the dismissal is a complete resolution of the case and is tantamount to an acquittal.
Where
an accused moves for the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground
that he or she has been granted amnesty, the Court rules that double
jeopardy applies. This is another exception in the same category as a
dismissal by reason of a demurrer to evidence or on the ground of
violation of the accused’s constitutional right to speedy trial.
Here, the nature of an amnesty is relevant. In Barraquinto, et al. v. Fernandez,[176] the Court ruled:
[A]mnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged; that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Amnesty is a
public act of which the court should take judicial notice. Thus, the
right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence
presented, either by the complainant or prosecution or by the defense,
can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is
regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force or law, not
only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had
never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty…[177]
In this regard, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the
grant of amnesty totally extinguishes criminal liability and may be
invoked to seek the quashal of an Information or the dismissal of the
criminal case.[178] Thus, the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground that the accused was granted
amnesty is a complete resolution of the case. It affirms that the
accused can no longer be prosecuted not because he is proven innocent,
but because he is deemed to not have committed any offense. In such
cases, the dismissal of the case must bar a second prosecution for the
same offense if the amnesty is to be given its full effect and if the
grantee is to be allowed to enjoy the complete benefits of a grant of
amnesty.
Thus, in seeking the revival of the criminal cases
despite their dismissal because of the amnesty granted in Trillanes’
favor, the People violated Trillanes’ constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
To be sure, the People’s argument is that there
can be no double jeopardy when the first dismissal was never valid as it
was issued on the basis of a void grant of amnesty. As will be
discussed more extensively below, there is a set procedure and
reglementary periods that should have been complied with in assailing
the validity of the amnesty grant to Trillanes. The People utterly
disregarded this procedure. In addition, at any event, and as will be
explained in this ponencia, there is no factual basis for the People’s position that the grant of amnesty to Trillanes is void.
Proclamation No. 75 provides the procedure for the processing of
applications for amnesty. This includes the procedure to oppose an
amnesty application and to appeal an amnesty decision to the Office of
the President.
Section 2 of Proclamation No. 75 states:
SEC. 2. Where to Apply. – The concerned AFP and PNP personnel
and their supporters may apply for amnesty under this Proclamation with
the ad hoc committee Department of National Defense (DND) which is
hereby tasked with receiving and processing applications – including
oppositions thereto, if any – for amnesty pursuant to this proclamation
and determining whether the applicants are entitled to amnesty pursuant
to this proclamation. The final decisions or determination of the DND
shall be appealable to the Office of the President by any party to the
application. The decision, however, shall be immediately executory even if appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the Committee Rules of Procedure, which the Committee promulgated pursuant to Proclamation No. 75, provide:
SEC. 9. Opposition.—Within fifteen (15) days from the
posting of the name of an applicant in the locations mentioned in
Section 8 hereof of the publication of the applicant’s name in the DND
and AFP website, whichever comes later, any person may file a sworn
opposition to the application or amnesty.….
SEC. 17. Appeal.—The final decision or determination of the Department of National Defense shall be appealable to the Office of the President by any party to the application within 10 days from notice of the decision. The decision, however, shall be immediately executory even if appealed. (Emphasis supplied)
Proclamation No. 75 and the Committee Rules of Procedure are
clear. Any opposition to an application for amnesty must be raised
before the Committee within 15 days from the posting of the names of the
applicants. Moreover, a party who disagrees with the decision of the
DND as to an amnesty application has the option of filing an appeal
before the Office of the President within 10 days from receipt of the
decision.
In this regard, Administrative Order No. 22, Series of 2011[179] (AO No. 22) prescribes the procedure for appeals to the Office of the President.[180] The relevant provisions of AO No. 22 state:
SEC. 1. Period to appeal. Unless otherwise provided by
special law, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from, or of the denial, in part or in
whole, of a motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance with
the governing law of the department or agency concerned.….
SEC. 14. Finality of decision. Decisions/resolutions/orders of
the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by
special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for
reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save
in exceptionally meritorious cases.….
SEC. 19. Application of Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall
apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, any party seeking the reversal of the decision of the DND
on an application for amnesty has the remedy of filing an appeal before
the Office of the President within 10 days from notice.
The
procedure and periods provided in Proclamation No. 75, Committee Rules
of Procedure, and AO No. 22 are significant because they establish when a
decision of the DND and the Office of the President becomes final and
executory.
As regards the decision of the DND on an
application for amnesty, this becomes final if no appeal is filed before
the Office of the President within ten days from receipt of the
decision. At this point, the decision can no longer be revoked, revised,
reversed, or altered.
In this case, the decision of the DND
granting amnesty to Trillanes became final, executory, and immutable
after the period to appeal prescribed. At that point, the DND no longer
had jurisdiction to review, reverse, revise, revoke, or alter the grant
of amnesty. Trillanes, in turn, was entitled to rely on the finality and
immutability of the grant of amnesty.
Seven years after the grant of Trillanes’ amnesty on January 21, 2011, the dismissal of the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Cases on September 7, 2011 and September 21, 2011 respectively, and the
finality of the DND’s decision granting amnesty, former President
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 572 which declared this amnesty void.
The respondents assert that former President Duterte had the power to
do this because as President at the time, he had the power of control
over all executive departments. Thus, the respondents argue that when
former President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 572, he was merely
correcting the error of the DND, over which he has control.
There is no question that the President has control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.[181]
The power of control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.”[182]
Thus, the President may reverse the decision of a subordinate and
substitute his judgment. However, while it is true that the President
has the power of control over the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices, including the DND, this power of control necessarily operates
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. In other
words, while the President can correct a perceived error of any of his
subordinates’ subject of his power of control, the President cannot use
his powers in a manner that will contravene the law.
The
President’s exercise of his power of control cannot violate the set of
rules laid out to ensure the correctness of decisions pertaining to the
grant of amnesty and the finality of this grant. The President, in the
guise of rectifying alleged errors in the decisions of a subordinate,
cannot upend fundamental principles guaranteeing that decisions must
become final and immutable at some definite point. The President, in
pursuit of ensuring that no purported void decision is enforced, cannot
disregard due process.
The Court highlights that Proclamation No.
75, the Committee Rules of Procedure, and AO No. 22 determine when a
decision of the DND on an amnesty application becomes final. In the
absence of an appeal to the Office of the President, the amnesty
decision becomes final ten days from receipt. These rules not only
define when a decision becomes final, it also allows an amnesty grantee
the right to rely on the effectivity of the amnesty and to the
reasonable expectation that once the decision becomes final and
immutable, his or her amnesty can no longer be disturbed. These
rules are fundamental to a grantee’s right to due process in that it
lays out the procedure for ensuring that an amnesty application is
processed correctly, that the decision on the amnesty application is
arrived at after a fairly rigorous procedure, and that the decision
becomes final and immutable.
The Court explained in Young v. Court of Appeals:[183]
Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from
the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further
alter or amend it, much less revoke it. This doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of
the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To
allow courts to amend final judgments will result in endless litigation.[184] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The importance of the rule that a decision must become final,
immutable, and unalterable at a particular point cannot be gainsaid. The
Court has ruled that it must be upheld even at the risk of occasionally
having decisions that are erroneous. In Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[185]
the Court reiterated that all litigation must come to an end, “however
unjust the result or error may appear. Otherwise, litigation would
become even more intolerable than the wrong or justice it is designed to
correct.”[186] As confirmed by the Court in Engr. Liwanag v. Commission on Audit,[187]
this doctrine applies equally to quasi-judicial agencies such as the
DND and the Committee acting as an amnesty processing and adjudication
board under Proclamation No. 75.
That decisions must, at some point, become final and
immutable is a cornerstone of any system for the adjudication of rights.
Parties who bring their case before the government so that the
government may rule on their rights and duties must be able to rely on
the fact that any decision rendered by the government will become final
and can no longer be disturbed. This is the very purpose why people
agree to submit their cases before the government – so that the
government may definitively determine their rights and obligations under
the law. If decisions could be altered at any time and if the
governmental body making the decisions is allowed to change its mind
whenever it feels the need to do so, the system itself will fail as
there would never be any real and definitive resolution of issues. In
such a system, parties cannot trust that a government’s pronouncement
will remain true and thus can be relied upon. A system where the
government is free to alter and disturb its rulings at any time is a
system that is bound to fail.
The Court holds that not even the President can disregard a
final and immutable decision. Allowing the President to revoke a
decision that has become final nearly a decade ago will make our system
of adjudication of rights unstable. When a President can at any time
decide that a decision of a subordinate quasi-judicial agency, much less
a court of law, can be revoked regardless of whether the applicable
rules provide that such a decision has become final and immutable,
quasi-judicial agencies under the Executive Branch and courts of law
will lose their credibility and reliability. An interpretation of the
presidential power of control which would authorize a President to alter
decisions even when they have become final will destroy the very
purpose for which quasi-judicial agencies and regular courts were
created to adjudicate specific issues. Parties will know no certainty
and their rights will be at the mercy of a President who is free to
change his mind and overturn them at any time.
The Court rules
that this holds true even in instances where the President’s ground for
revoking a decision is because such decision was purportedly erroneously
made or issued. The doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments
must be respected even at the risk of occasional error because the
importance of ensuring that decisions become final at some defined point
is a linchpin of any settlement mechanism. No government entity or
government official, let alone the President, may override this
fundamental principle.
Where the decision of a subordinate
agency or officer is sought to be revoked because it is allegedly void,
the lapse of the period to appeal it bars a President from unilaterally
declaring the decision revoked by invoking his power of control.
Procedural rules lay out the process for challenging void decisions and
resisting the execution of such decisions. As the Court held in Imperial v. Judge Armes,[188]
“[w]hile a void judgment is no judgment at all in legal contemplation,
any action to challenge it must be done through the correct remedy and
filed before the appropriate tribunal.”[189] No government entity or official, let alone the President, can ignore these procedural rules.
A President who disregards the rules determining when the decision of a
quasi-judicial agency becomes final and executory violates the due
process right of the person in whose favor the decision was rendered and
acts with grave abuse of discretion.
The right to due process is enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In Associated Communications & Wireless Services, Ltd. v. Dumlao,[190] the Court explained that in order to invoke the protection of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution:
[t]wo conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance
of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction
must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In
essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the
law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”[191] (Citations omitted)
The Constitutional right to due process is a “constitutional
safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, and
serves as a protection essential to every inhabitant of the country.”[192] In Ablong v. Commission on Audit,[193] the Court held:
Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of
justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty
of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very
validity of the law itself.[194] (Citation omitted)
In this case, Trillanes stands to be deprived of the benefits of
the amnesty through the issuance of Proclamation No. 572. As stated
earlier, Proclamation No. 572 was issued in disregard of the procedural
rules dictating how amnesty decisions of the DND can be challenged and
when such decisions become final. Proclamation No. 572 was also issued
in disregard of the rules setting out how purportedly void decisions,
where the appeal period has already lapsed, should be assailed. In
disregarding the applicable procedural rules in order to deprive
Trillanes of the benefits granted by his amnesty, Proclamation No. 572
violated his constitutional right to procedural due process. In the
revocation of his amnesty, Trillanes was not given the process that was
due him.
The Court emphasizes that the constitutional right to
due process is a safeguard against government abuse. It is a guarantee
against government action that violates “the ordinary norms of justice
or fair play.” In this case, the deprivation of Trillanes’ right to due
process is underscored by the fact that procedural rules were
disregarded in order to revoke an amnesty that was granted almost a
decade ago. Through all those years, Trillanes had the right to expect
that the grant of amnesty, which had become final and immutable, could
no longer be disturbed. And yet, the amnesty was revoked without any
warning or notice.
The Court also notes that the procedure
leading to the issuance of Proclamation No. 572 brooks too many
questions. It appears that the government had decided to look
specifically for Trillanes’ amnesty application form, seven years after
the grant of amnesty became final, without, it appears, any reasonable
ground for doing so. The President then proceeded to issue Proclamation
No. 572 without notice to Trillanes of the issue and without granting
him the opportunity to be heard.
To be sure, there is no existing
set of rules prescribing that notice and hearing is required before an
amnesty may be revoked. Nonetheless, it is fundamental that in
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is notice and
hearing. Considering that it had been seven years since Trillanes was
granted amnesty, that the amnesty had been fully enforced and the
pending criminal cases against him had been long dismissed, that the
ground for revoking his amnesty was factual in nature and thus could
have been explained had Trillanes been given the opportunity to do so,
and that the amnesty was about to be revoked way beyond the allowable
period for reversing the decision of the DND under the applicable rules,
justice, and fair play required that Trillanes should have been given
notice and the opportunity to be heard.
A ruling that would allow
the President to revoke decisions that have long become final without
even as much as a notice to the party in whose favor it was issued would
set a dangerous precedent. It could open the floodgates for the
Executive to review and reverse any decision rendered by the office or
those of his or her subordinates, regardless of the time that has lapsed
since its finality, on the pretext that the President is simply
exercising the power of control. Uncertainty in the finality of the
decisions of the government can be a sinister tool for oppression. In a
system where the President is free to review and reverse decisions
unprompted, without notice, and even when such decisions have become
final for years, there can be no peace and stability. The people will
always be at the mercy of the President. That is not the kind of
government that this country has strived to build and aspires to
perfect. That is not what a democratic government represents.
As Proclamation No. 572 violated Trillanes’ constitutional right to due process, the Court cannot but declare it void.
Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution also enshrines the constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, et al.,[195]
the Court explained that the equal protection of the laws is embraced
in the concept of due process, “as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play.”[196]
However, it was embodied in a separate clause “to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government.”[197]
The equal protection clause requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.[198]
It ensures that all persons are protected from intentional and
arbitrary discrimination whether by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution.[199]
The protection extended by the equal protection clause applies against
all official state actions and covers all departments of the government,
including the executive departments.[200]
This constitutional right, however, does not require absolute
equality. It only demands equality among equals. It permits of
classification provided that such classification is reasonable. In Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010,[201] the Court ruled:
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. ‘The classification will be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him.’The classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included
in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or ‘underinclude’ those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification.[202] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In this regard, the mere under-inclusiveness of a law or executive issuance does not necessarily render it invalid. In Biraogo, the Court further explained:
It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because
it happens to be incomplete. In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a
law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the ‘step by step’
process. ‘With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not
run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it
fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked.’[203] (Citations omitted)
In Biraogo, however, the Court found that the
under-inclusiveness of the assailed executive order rendered it
unconstitutional. In this case, which involved the constitutionality of
the creation of the Philippine Truth Commission, the Court found that
there was no inadvertence in specifying the acts of graft and corruption
of President Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration as the sole subject of
the Philippine Truth Commission’s duties. Instead, the Court found that
this constituted deliberate and intentional discrimination. The Court
said:
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1
chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous
administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that ‘to include other
past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the
commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.’ The reason given is
specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or ‘end corruption and the evil it
breeds.’….
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional. While the thrust of the PTC is
specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption,
Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the
provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations
in the guise of “substantial distinctions” would only confirm the
petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an
“adventure in partisan hostility.” In the case of US v. Cyprian, it was written: “A
rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held
or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union
activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise
of first amendment rights.”[204] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Assn., Inc.,[205]
the Court concluded that the drastic under-inclusiveness of the
assailed law rendered it unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection of the laws. The Court held:
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial
spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying
produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment. A ban
against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance
seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
‘underinclusive’ because the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with
respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the
legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.….
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive
classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the
classification serves legitimate political ends.[206] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
The foregoing leads the Court to conclude that Proclamation No.
572 also violated Trillanes’ constitutional right to the equal
protection of the laws.
It is clear and undeniable, from the very
language of Proclamation No. 572, that it was issued specifically for
the purpose of declaring void the grant of amnesty to Trillanes despite
the fact that the Secretary of National Defense issued numerous other
certificates of amnesty to applicants under Proclamation No. 75. There
were, in fact, 277 amnesty grantees under Proclamation No. 572. Since
the intent to single out Trillanes is patent and manifest, there must be
a showing that this classification is reasonable.
The
respondents argue that while Proclamation No. 572 applies only to
Trillanes, it is a valid classification because the grounds for
declaring the grant of his amnesty as void are personal to him, i.e.,
that he did not file an application form for amnesty and that he did not
admit guilt.[207] Significantly, the CA in the CA Decisions in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Cases ruled that the mere under-inclusiveness of Proclamation No. 572
does not render it void because the President can issue a similar
proclamation in the future should it find that the other amnesty
grantees also did not comply with the requirements for the grant of such
amnesty.
The factual findings of Branch 148, as affirmed by the
CA, and which the People did not deny, show that there was a total of
277 amnesty grantees under Proclamation No. 572 whose application forms
could no longer be located. This notwithstanding, only Trillanes’
certificate of amnesty was declared void. This glaring
under-inclusiveness undercuts the respondent’s claim that Proclamation
No. 572 was based on a reasonable classification. If Proclamation No.
572 was issued with the intent of correcting the purported error of the
Committee and the Secretary of National Defense, every one of the 277
amnesty grantees whose application forms could not be located should
have been covered by Proclamation No. 572 or of some other proclamation
declaring their certificates of amnesty void. There is no reasonable
distinction between Trillanes and all the other amnesty grantees, or at
least none was shown.
As to the CA’s view that the President
could still issue a similar proclamation in the future to cover any
other grantee who did not comply with the amnesty requirements, the
Court reiterates its ruling in Biraogo:
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the
President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the
PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other
past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be
covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will
still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would
decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This
will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order
No. 1 was ‘crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration.’[208] (Emphasis supplied)
Whether the other amnesty grantees whose application forms were
similarly not located by the DND will be the subject of any future
proclamation depends solely on the discretion of the President.
Meanwhile, the fact remains that, of all the 277 amnesty grantees, only
Trillanes was singled out to be the subject of Proclamation No. 572.
This is purposeful and intentional discrimination.
This
deliberate singling out of Trillanes is underscored by the fact that
there is no explanation as to why the government specifically sought for
a copy of his amnesty application form. There is no explanation as to
what triggered this process and whether there was any justifiable reason
to reopen the issue almost a decade after the certificate of amnesty
was issued. In Biraogo, the Court said, “[t]he public need to be
enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the investigation
to the previous administration only.” The same reasoning applies in
this case, there should be a valid justification for the decision to
reexamine the application for amnesty of Trillanes, and no other
grantee. There is no such explanation in this case.
This,
considered along with the fact that Trillanes was not even notified that
the government was apparently reviewing his amnesty application, let
alone given an opportunity to explain any alleged irregularity,
highlights the arbitrariness of the issuance of Proclamation No. 572.
When the machinery of the government is brought to bear down on an
individual in this way, fealty to the Constitution and the laws guards
against governmental abuse. In situations like this, the value of the
Bill of Rights becomes even more starkly clear. It is often an
individual’s last line of defense against the awesome powers of the
State. In the government’s zeal to carry out its duties, there may be
instances where it may attempt to explain a disregard of fundamental
rights as miniscule, justifiable, or even necessary. Yet even the
loftiest of intentions cannot justify a breach of the Constitution. The
rule of law is the people’s ultimate protection against abuse.
Thus, the Court upholds the rule of law and declares Proclamation No:
572 void for violating Trillanes’ constitutional right to the equal
protection of the laws.
The nullity of Proclamation No. 572 also determines the main issue in the Rebellion and Coup d’etat
Petitions. Since Proclamation No. 572 is void and has no force and
effect, it cannot be the basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
or HDO against Trillanes, let alone for the revival of the Rebellion and
Coup d’etat Cases. Nonetheless, the Court proceeds to rule on the issues in these cases to completely resolve the cases brought before it.
G.R. No. 256660
This is a Rule 45 petition where the People argues that the CA erred
when it ruled that Branch 148 did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case. The Court agrees with the CA on this point.
Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
pertains to errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment. It
is defined as an act that –
denotes capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical exercise of
power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law, or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[209]
Thus, where grave abuse of discretion is invoked as a basis to
reverse a decision, the party invoking it must meet a high bar. It is
not mere error that would warrant a review and reversal of a decision.
No court will rule that a lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion simply because of a disagreement as to how the evidence
should have been appreciated or how the law should have been applied.
Grave abuse of discretion connotes an error more serious than that. It
pertains to arbitrariness, capriciousness, and a deliberate misuse of
power.
The Court agrees with the CA that Branch 148 did not act
with grave abuse. On the contrary, as will be discussed more extensively
below, Branch 148 acted in accord with the applicable law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
|
The Best Evidence Rule does not apply in this case
|
The Court agrees with Branch 148 that the Best Evidence Rule (now
the Original Document Rule) does not apply to Trillanes’ amnesty
application form. Thus, it correctly allowed the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the existence of the amnesty application
form and the fact that Trillanes submitted it to the Committee.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, as revised, provides:
SEC 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing,
recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained
by local judicial processes or procedures;(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole;(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and
(e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (Emphasis supplied)
In Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave,[210]
the Court explained that the Best Evidence Rule applies “only when the
terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.”[211]
Thus, where the issue in the case does not pertain to the terms of a
written document but “concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms,
the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.”[212] In such a case, secondary evidence can be presented and admitted “even without accounting for the original.”[213]
In this case, the main subject of inquiry pertains to the existence of
the amnesty application form and the fact of its submission to the
Committee. The contents of the amnesty application form are not in
issue.
The People argues that the contents of the amnesty
application form are the subject of inquiry in this case because it is
purportedly where Trillanes’ admission of guilt is contained. Thus, the
People asserts that the contents of the amnesty application form must be
examined so as to confirm if Trillanes indeed admitted guilt.
Contrary to the People’s argument, the contents of the amnesty
application form are not only not in issue, it has already been admitted
by the parties. To be clear, the parties agree that there is a standard
format for the amnesty application form. There are no allegations in
the case that Trillanes may have used an entirely different format. In
this regard, it is significant to note that a sample amnesty
application form is a common exhibit of both Trillanes and the DOJ
during the trial before Branch 148.[214] Clearly then, the contents of the amnesty application form are not in dispute here.
As the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, Branch 148 correctly allowed
the introduction of secondary evidence to establish the existence of the
amnesty application form and Trillanes’ submission of the form to the
Committee.
|
Trillanes submitted an amnesty application form
|
The factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on the Court.[215]
Moreover, a Rule 45 petition brought before the Court pertains only to
questions of law. The Court is not a trier of facts and will not
reexamine the trial court’s factual findings and appreciation of the
evidence subject to a specific set of exceptions. No such exceptions are
present in this case.
In any event, the Court agrees with Branch 148’s conclusion,
as affirmed by the CA, that Trillanes did submit his amnesty application
form and admitted his guilt for his involvement in the Oakwood Mutiny
and the Manila Peninsula Incident. The Court further agrees with Branch
148’s and the CA’s conclusion that the DOJ’s evidence failed to prove
that Trillanes did not comply with the requirements under Proclamation
No. 75 and Concurrent Resolution No. 4. In truth, the only fact that the
DOJ was able to prove was that Trillanes’ amnesty application form
could not be located. This is not tantamount to the conclusion that no
such amnesty application form was filed at all.
That Trillanes
did, in fact, fill out an amnesty application form and submitted it to
the Committee which then processed it and recommended its approval to
the Secretary of National Defense who, in turn, approved it, is best
evidenced by the Certificate of Amnesty itself. The Certificate of
Amnesty, signed by Secretary Gazmin, categorically states that
Trillanes:
was granted AMNESTY on January 21, 2011 for his
participation/involvement in the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny and
November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege in Makati City, pursuant
to the provisions of Presidential Proclamation No. 75 issued on November
24, 2010 by His Excellency, President Benigno S. Aquino III.[216]
Under the Committee Rules of Procedure, the Committee reviews an
application for amnesty to ascertain if the applicant is qualified to
enjoy the benefits of the amnesty granted under Proclamation No. 75. The
Committee will then recommend either the approval or denial of the
application to the Secretary of National Defense. If the amnesty
application is approved, the Secretary of National Defense will issue a
certificate of amnesty.
In addition, Trillanes also presented
Resolution No. 2 issued by the Committee which listed the persons who
applied for amnesty on January 2, 2011. This list included Trillanes.[217]
This is also supported by Secretary Gazmin’s letter to former President
Aquino, dated January 25, 2011, which stated that there were a number
of applicants who applied for amnesty and whose applications were
granted.[218]
The
Committee and the Secretary of National Defense, in processing amnesty
applications, are entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official functions. The DOJ did not overcome this
presumption. To repeat, the DOJ’s evidence only established that
Trillanes’ amnesty application form could no longer be found in the
DND’s records. The overwhelming evidence consisting of official
documents, however, convincingly show that Trillanes complied with the
requirements to be entitled to amnesty under Proclamation No 75.
Considering that the Certificate of Amnesty is the official document
which confirms an applicant’s entitlement to the benefits of the amnesty
granted by Proclamation No. 75, it is adequate evidence to establish
that Trillanes complied with all the requirements. In the absence of
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, this is entitled to the
presumption that it was regularly and validly issued. That Trillanes’
amnesty application form could no longer be located in the DND’s
records, along with the application forms of all the other 276 amnesty grantees,[219]
does not affect the validity of the Certificate of Amnesty,
particularly in this case where, to repeat, the DOJ was only able to
establish that it no longer exists in the records and not that Trillanes
never submitted it.
The Court further agrees with the CA and
Branch 148 that Trillanes’ inability to submit a copy of the amnesty
application form is justifiable. As the CA held:
At this juncture, the Court, in concurrence with public
respondent, finds that the reason for the non-presentation of the
original copy of the application form was justifiable. Per Col.
Berbigal’s testimony, it was duly established that all the applicants
including herein private respondent were only given one (1) copy each of
the said application form. This single application form once
accomplished was then submitted to the Secretariat for processing.
Hence, the applicant-grantees including herein private respondent
naturally had no personal or receiving copy.….
Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary and for the
reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to private
respondent for his failure to present the original or even at least a
copy of the said application form. The Court concurs with public
respondent that such application form may also be considered as a record
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
which in this case was established to have been actually filed by
private respondent with the Secretariat and the Committee. It is
unfortunate, however, that this document was apparently lost and/or made
unavailable while in the custody of the said public officer or office
through no fault on the part of private respondent after the lapse of
about seven (7) years from the time of its actual filing. Lamentable as
it is, since this entire controversy is anchored on the purported
inexistence of this application form, it would be certainly unfair,
however, if private respondent or any other applicant-grantee for that
matter would be allowed to suffer the consequences of the negligence or
inefficiency of said public officer or office.[220]
Moreover, that Trillanes did submit an amnesty application form
which also contains his admission of guilt, is also corroborated by the
testimony not only of Trillanes’ witnesses, but also by one of the DOJ’s
own witnesses.
In particular, Col. Josefa C. Berbigal, head of
the Secretariat of the Committee, testified that she personally received
Trillanes’ amnesty application form, examined it to ensure that it was
properly filled out, directed Trillanes to read the portion of the
application where he admitted his guilt and administered the oath to him
attesting to the completeness and truthfulness of the information
stated in the amnesty application form.[221]
This is corroborated by the testimony of Col. Honorario S. Azcueta, the
Chairman of the Committee, who stated that he personally deliberated on
Trillanes’ amnesty application and assessed that Trillanes’ amnesty
application form fully complied with the requirements under Proclamation
No. 75.[222]
Dominador
Rull, Jr. and Emmanuel Tirador also testified that they were present
and personally witnessed Trillanes file his amnesty application form on
January 5, 2011.[223]
Further, the prosecution’s own witness, GMA News Report Mark Dallan
Merueñas, confirmed in open court that he saw Trillanes file his amnesty
application form. He testified:
“We are man enough to admit that we have broken the rules.”
Navy Lt. Senior Grade and incumbent Senator Antonio Trillanes IV after
he availed of the government amnesty on Wednesday, along with the other
Magdalo soldiers.”
application form and signed sections that state they were agreeing to
their “general admission of guilt” that they violated military rules and
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).”
are saying that he did not apply for amnesty. So do you affirm and
confirm before this Honorable Court that he did apply for amnesty?
Branch 148’s appreciation of the credibility and weight of the
testimonies of these witnesses is binding on the Court as the trial
court was in the best position to observe their demeanor.[225]
Given the foregoing, the Court affirms the CA’s and Branch 148’s
ruling that Trillanes did submit his amnesty application form.
|
Trillanes admitted guilt for
violations of the RPC, the Articles of War, and other laws, arising from his involvement in the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula Incident |
The People argues that even if Trillanes filed an amnesty
application form, the general admission of guilt included in the
application form is not the admission of guilt required by the
Constitution to entitle him to the benefits of amnesty. According to the
People, the admission of guilt must be for the specific crime charged.[226]
The Constitution itself does not expressly require an
admission of guilt before a person may be entitled to amnesty. In the
early amnesty cases resolved by the Court, the rule was that admission
of guilt was not necessary. However, in Vera v. People of the Philippines (Vera),[227]
the Court clarified that an admission of guilt is a pre-requisite to
avail of the benefits of an amnesty. In Vera, the Court reversed the
ruling in earlier cases that an admission of guilt is not a condition
precedent to qualify for amnesty. The Court said:
But the said cases have been superseded and deemed over-ruled by
the subsequent cases of People vs. Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26,
1950, 86 Phil. 219) and People vs. Guillermo, et al. (L-2188, May 19,
1950, 86 Phil. 395), wherein we held that —It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or
seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not
committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any
use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove
the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the
pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.[228] (Emphasis in the original)
An applicant for amnesty must admit that he or she committed the
act subject of the amnesty and that this act is a crime for which he or
she would have been held liable. Because the grant of amnesty often
pertains to a class of people who committed a particular category of
crimes, it is not always necessary that the admission of guilt must
pertain to a specific crime for which an amnesty applicant is being
charged. It is even possible that no crime has been charged yet it would
make the admission of guilt to one specific crime impossible. The Court
rules that it is sufficient that (a) an applicant for amnesty admits
that he or she committed the acts which are or may be penalized by law
and which are subject of the grant of amnesty and (b) that these acts
are criminal in nature for which he or she would be held liable without
an amnesty.
In this case, Concurrent Resolution No. 4 recommended
to President Aquino the inclusion of a requirement that an applicant
for amnesty must admit guilt. Concurrent Resolution No. 4 stated:
Resolved, further, That both Houses of Congress adopt the
following recommendation to the President of the Philippines for
inclusion in the implementing rules and regulations of the Amnesty
Proclamation:(b) No application for amnesty shall be given due course without
the applicant admitting his guilt or criminal culpability of any or all
of the subject incidents in writing expressed in the application;
Pursuant to this, the Committee Rules of Procedure provided in Section 11:
SEC. 11. Deliberations by the Committee; Admission of Participation and Guilt.—The
Committee may, in the presence of a quorum conduct deliberations or any
other investigative proceedings to clarify or resolve issues. A
majority of all the members constitutes a quorum to conduct official
proceedings. All decisions of the Committee shall be approved by a
majority vote of all the members.No application shall be approved without an express admission
by the applicant of actual involvement/participation in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and/or the November 29, 2007 Peninsula
Manila Hotel Incident and that such involvement/ participation
constituted a violation of the 1987 Constitution, criminal laws and the
Articles of War, as indicated in the application form. No application shall likewise be approved without a recantation
of all previous statements, if any, that are inconsistent with such
express admission of actual involvement/participation and guilt. (Emphasis supplied)
The recommendation in Concurrent Resolution No. 4 and the
requirements provided in the Committee Rules of Procedure operationalize
the requirement in jurisprudence that the admission of guilt is a
condition precedent to qualify for amnesty. In particular, an applicant
for amnesty under Proclamation No. 75 must admit his or her involvement
or participation in three specific incidents: the Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off, and the Manila Peninsula Incident.
Moreover, an applicant must also admit that such involvement or
participation is a violation of the Constitution, criminal laws, and the
Articles of War.
In this case, the evidence on record show that
Trillanes admitted that he participated in the Oakwood Mutiny and the
Manila Peninsula Incident and that his participation constituted a
violation of the Constitution, the RPC, and the Articles of War. In
particular, the statement provided in the application form states:
I acknowledge that my involvement/participation in the subject
incidents constituted a violation of the 1987 Constitution, criminal
laws and the Articles of War. I hereby recant my previous statements
that are contrary, if any, to this express admission of
involvement/participation and guilt.[229]
This statement in the amnesty application form, which, as
established in this case, was duly filled out by Trillanes, complies
with the requirement that an amnesty applicant must admit his or her
guilt. It is therefore clear that Trillanes complied with all the
requirements to qualify for amnesty under Proclamation No. 75.
Because of the factual findings of Branch 148, as affirmed by the CA and
by the Court, that Trillanes submitted an amnesty application form and
admitted his guilt, the inevitable conclusion is that there was no
factual basis for the issuance of a Proclamation No. 572.
Thus,
in addition to the unconstitutionality of Proclamation No. 572, its lack
of factual basis justifies the denial of the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case.
To reiterate, Proclamation No. 572 is void and has no force and effect.
It cannot be the basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or an
HDO against Trillanes. Nor can it serve as basis to reopen the Coup d’etat Case against Trillanes. This case was dismissed through the Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case which has become final, executory, and immutable.
|
The Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case is final and immutable
|
The Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case issued by Branch 148 became final and executory in 2011. A final and executory decision is immutable.[230] It cannot be altered, modified, reversed, let alone reopened.[231]
The People argues that the Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat
Case never attained finality because it is a void decision considering
that Trillanes was purportedly not qualified for amnesty. Therefore, the
said Order had no force and effect and could be disregarded at any
time.
In Imperial v. Judge Armes,[232] the Court defined void judgments, thus:
A void judgment is no judgment at all in legal contemplation. In Cañero v. University of the Philippines we held that-
….A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to
a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.
It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to
enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and
the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment.” …A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a void judgment.
This want of jurisdiction may pertain to lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the person of one of the parties.A void judgment may also arise from the tribunal’s act
constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[233] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
A judgment is considered void where it was issued by a court
without jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of one
of the parties or where the court acted with grave abuse of discretion.
This should be distinguished from a wrong judgment, or one that is based
on an erroneous application of the law or appreciation of the evidence
on record. A mere erroneous judgment, when rendered by a court that has
jurisdiction and does not act with grave abuse, is not a void judgment. A
wrong judgment is not a void judgment.[234]
As held by the Court in Davao ACF Bus Lines v. Ang:[235]
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.[236]
The Court cannot overemphasize that once a judgment attains
finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It cannot be modified,
let alone reversed, even if the modification or reversal is intended to
correct a perceived erroneous conclusion of law or fact. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments is rooted on public policy that, “at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments become final at some definite point in
time.”[237]
Here, Branch 148 certainly had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties when it issued the Dismissal
Order in the Coup d’etat Case. It also did not act with grave
abuse of discretion considering that it simply gave effect to the
certificate of amnesty granted to Trillanes, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 75.
Even assuming that the People were correct that Trillanes
did not comply with the requirements to qualify for amnesty, Branch
148’s Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case would have only
been erroneous but not void. As the dismissal was not assailed within
the period provided in the rules, it necessarily became final and
executory and thus, immutable. It can no longer be modified or reversed.
The Court recognizes that there are exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments, such as when there is a need to correct
clerical errors,[238] in the case of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,[239]
and when the existence of a supervening cause or event would render the
enforcement of a final and executory judgment unjust and inequitable.[240]
It would have been possible for the People to argue that the alleged
discovery of Trillanes’ non-compliance with the requirements to qualify
for amnesty was a supervening event which would make the execution of
the Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat Case unjust and
inequitable. However, as the Court has already ruled, there is no basis
for this allegation and Branch 148, as affirmed by the CA, was correct
in its factual conclusion that Trillanes submitted his amnesty
application form and admitted his guilt.
Branch 148, therefore, properly dismissed the Omnibus Motion in the Coup d’etat Case. The Court affirms the Assailed CA Decision in the Coup d’etat Case on this issue.
G.R. No. 256078
This Rule 45 Petition filed by the People challenges the CA’s ruling
that Branch 150 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
DOJ’s Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case.
In the Assailed CA
Decision in the Rebellion Case, the CA concluded that Branch 150
committed grave abuse of discretion when it reopened the Rebellion Case
by granting the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion, despite the fact that the
Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case is final and immutable and did not
grant Trillanes adequate opportunity to be heard.[241] The Court agrees with the CA.
It is undisputed that at the time the DOJ filed the Omnibus Motion in
the Rebellion Case, the Dismissal Order had been final and fully
executed since 2011. The People alleges that the Dismissal Order in the
Rebellion Case never became final because it is purportedly void. The
Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 256660 also applies in this case.
The
People asserts in this case that the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion
Case is void because Branch 150, in ordering the dismissal of the
Rebellion Case against Trillanes, acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The People’s argument, therefore, is that Branch 150 acted capriciously,
whimsically, and arbitrarily when it dismissed the Rebellion Case.
However, the People also admitted in the Reply,[242]
dated August 1, 2021, filed before the Court that Trillanes’ “failure
to comply with the basic requirements of Proclamation No. 75 was not a
situation contemplated by the RTC of Makati, Branch 150 in dismissing
the criminal case against him a few years back.”[243]
Branch 150 properly dismissed the Rebellion Case in 2011 on the
strength of the certificate of amnesty issued to Trillanes under
Proclamation No. 75. The trial court was correct to give force and
effect to the amnesty granted to Trillanes and to presume that official
duties were regularly performed in the processing of Trillanes’ amnesty
application. At that point, there was no reason for Branch 150 to refuse
the dismissal of the case.
As in the Dismissal Order in the Coup d’etat
Case, even assuming that the People is correct in claiming that
Trillanes did not comply with the requirements to qualify for amnesty,
the Dismissal Order in the Rebellion Case would have only been
erroneous, but not void. The Order would have nonetheless remained final
and immutable. In such a case, the People could have argued that the
Dismissal Order in the Rebellion case cannot be enforced because of
supervening events, i.e., the discovery that Trillanes did not file his
amnesty application and did not admit guilt. However, that is not the
case here where it has already been duly established that Trillanes did
in fact submit an amnesty application form and made an admission of
guilt.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that Branch 150
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the DOJ’s Omnibus
Motion in the Rebellion Case, and thus reopened the Rebellion case,
without giving Trillanes adequate opportunity to present evidence. It is
established that “when there is a denial of due process, there is grave
abuse of discretion and the writ of certiorari is proper.”[244] In refusing to give Trillanes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, Branch 150 violated his right to due process.
In resolving the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case, Branch 150
was confronted with the same factual issue raised in the Coup d’etat
Case in Branch 148. Branch 150, however, did not conduct a complete
evidentiary hearing, despite Trillanes’ request, and opted to conduct a
summary hearing and to allow the parties to submit their affidavits and
documentary evidence.
To be sure, there is no specific rule
requiring the conduct of a full evidentiary hearing in resolving the
Omnibus Motion in the Rebellion Case. Nonetheless, given the
circumstances of this case, due process demanded the conduct of an
evidentiary hearing.
First, the ultimate issue presented before
Branch 150 was factual. This means that in resolving the dispute, Branch
150 had to determine what facts were duly established by the parties
through the presentation of evidence. The presentation of relevant,
admissible, and credible evidence is the tool provided in our procedural
rules for parties to prove their factual claims. Within the context of
the right to procedural due process, the opportunity to present evidence
to establish a party’s factual allegations is the process that is due.
This is particularly highlighted in this case where the evidence
consisted of documents which required proper identification and
authentication, as well as testimonies which should have been subjected
to cross-examination. While Branch 150 did allow the parties to submit
their witness affidavits and documentary evidence, none of the witnesses
were presented in court to identify their affidavits and to face
cross-examination. None of the documentary evidence submitted were
identified and authenticated. Thus, none of these pieces of evidence
were even admissible. This means that while Branch 150 went through the
motion of accepting the parties’ evidentiary submissions supposedly to
accord them due process, it, in truth, did not give the parties, and
particularly Trillanes, an adequate opportunity to be heard. Due process
requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard and not just the
semblance of a hearing.
Second, it is undisputed here that the
Rebellion Case was dismissed in 2011, or nearly a decade before the
filing of the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion. The Dismissal Order in the Rebellion
Case was final and immutable. The DOJ’s Omnibus Motion sought to reopen
this dismissed case and compel Trillanes to stand trial despite the
issuance of an amnesty through a decision that similarly became final
and immutable in 2011.
If Trillanes were to lose the benefits of
the amnesty granted to him based on the DOJ’s claim that he did not
comply with the requirements under Proclamation No. 75, fair play
mandated that Trillanes should be accorded a sufficient opportunity to
present his case. That Branch 150 could so easily disregard the doctrine
of immutability of judgments without granting Trillanes’ request for an
evidentiary hearing and with no adequate explanation, convinces the
Court that Trillanes was deprived of due process in this case. The Court
agrees with the statement in the Assailed CA Decision in the Rebellion
Case:
We are therefore of the view that the peculiar circumstances of
the case necessitate a full, evidentiary hearing. Ordinarily, judges
would have the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents readily
available to aid in the determination of probable cause in issuing a
warrant of arrest, but the ordinary circumstance does not obtain here.
The matters alleged in the Omnibus Motion, especially those relating to
the factual bases of Proclamation No. 572, refer to documents and
evidence not readily available to the respondent court. The novelty of
the issues presented also warranted a closer and deeper inquiry.
Fundamentally, providing the parties the opportunity to present their
evidence is essential before the respondent court can reasonably
determine the novel issues and factual matters that were raised.We take the opportunity at this point to observe that: The
summary hearing approach taken by the respondent court stands in stark
contrast to the hearing in-full-measure approach of the RTC of Makati –
Branch 148, that also tackled a similar Omnibus Motion in the coup d’etat
case. In both the RTC of Makati – Branch 150 (respondent court herein)
and Branch 148, the same questions of facts were asked: Did the
petitioner apply for amnesty? Did he admit his guilt? Did he comply with
all requirements? Proclamation No. 572 posited in the negative, thus
the revocation of the amnesty. Because of the factual premise that the
petitioner’s rebellion and coup d’etat cases have been dismissed by the courts, no less, more than seven years earlier, a proper judicial inquiry became a necessity.[245]
Thus, given the foregoing, the Court rules that Branch 150 acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it reopened the Rebellion Case
without granting Trillanes a meaningful opportunity to present his case.
The Court, therefore, affirms the CA’s Decision nullifying the Assailed
Decision in the Rebellion Case.
The Court further deems it
necessary to clarify that its ruling in G.R. No. 256660 that Trillanes
submitted an amnesty application form and admitted his guilt operate as res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment as to this issue.[246]
As such, the issue of whether Trillanes complied with the requirements
for the grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 75, can no longer be
relitigated whether in the Rebellion Case, or any other case that may be
filed on this issue.
Conclusion
The development of the rule of law in this country has been
influenced, in no small measure, by the people who have served as
President. The history of our constitutional law, specifically, is
replete with stories about Presidents testing the parameters of their
power. Many of the Court’s most important decisions grappled with the
limits of presidential power and how it must be reconciled with the
people’s fundamental rights. Indeed, the awesome powers of the Chief
Executive are necessary in our political system. But these same powers
make the position of President highly susceptible to abuse. Nonetheless,
throughout history, whenever the Court is called to determine whether a
President has gone beyond the limits of his or her power or whether the
exercise of such powers is justified by the evil sought to be thwarted,
the Constitution and the law have always been our guide.
In
resolving the important questions that have defined our political and
constitutional history, the Court has always found its mooring in the
rule of law. This case is no different. The Constitution vests important
powers in the great branches of the government, but also places
sensible limits on these powers to protect the individual from the
State. These limits are operationalized in our procedural rules, which
emphasize the right to be informed, the right to be heard, and the right
to obtain a resolution of their issues not only expeditiously but also
with finality and certainty.
Thus, in determining questions of
power and right, the Constitution and the rule of law are our anchor and
our rudder. The duty of this Court is to ensure that it remains ever
true.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction, dated September 5, 2018 filed by petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV in G.R. No. 241494 is GRANTED. Proclamation No. 572 is declared VOID.
Further, the Petition for Review with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Set the Case for Oral Argument, dated June 15, 2021 filed by the People
in G.R. No. 256660 is DENIED.
Finally, the Petition for
Review with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Set the Case for
Oral Argument, dated March 24, 2021, in G.R. No. 256078 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. and Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 92.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 93.
[4] Id. at 93.
[5] Id. at 55.
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), p. 89.
[7] Proclamation No.
75 (2010) Granting Amnesty To Active And Former Personnel Of The Armed
Forces Of The Philippine, Philippine National Police And Their
Supporters Who May Have Committed Crimes Punishable Under The Revised
Penal Code, The Articles Of War And Other Laws In Connection With The
Oakwood Mutiny, The Marines Stand-Off And The Manila Peninsula Incident.
[8] Proclamation No. 75 (2010), sec. 1.
[9] Proclamation No. 75 (2010), sec. 2.
[10] Proclamation No. 75 (2010), sec. 3.
[11] Proclamation No. 75 (2010), sec. 2.
[12] CONST., art. VII, sec. 19 provides:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 44–47.
[14] Id. at 46.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 162–163.
[16] Id.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 178–182; penned by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel of Branch 148, Makati City.
[18] Id. at 181.
[19] Id. at 166–169.
[20] Id. at 187.
[21] Id.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), p. 36.
[23] Id. at 506.
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 55–56; penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, Makati City.
[25] Id.
[26] Rollo (G.R No. 241494), p. 56.
[27] Id. at 57–58.
[28] Id.
[29] Proclamation No. 572 (2018)
[30] Id. at 3.
[31] Id. at 1–2.
[32] Id. at 3.
[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), p. 15.
[34] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 194–196.
[35] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), pp. 172–175.
[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 3–19.
[37] Id. at 8–9.
[38] Id. at 80.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 241–272; penned by Presiding Judge Andres Bartolome Soriano.
[42] Id. at 272.
[43] Id.
[44] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), p. 56; penned by Presiding Judge Andres Bartolome Soriano.
[45] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 23.
[46] Id. at
91–157. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in
by Associate Justices Perpetua Susana T. Atal-Paño and Raymond Reynold
R. Lauigan of the Special 11th Division, Manila.
[47] Id. at 123–133.
[48] Id. at 133–156.
[49] Id. at 156.
[50] Id. at 13–87.
[51] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), p. 231.
[52] Id. at 219–240; penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda
[53] Id. at 239.
[54] Id.
[55] Id. at 232.
[56] Id.
[57] Id. at 235.
[58] Id. at 237–238.
[59] Id. at 240.
[60] Id. at 241–246.
[61] Id. at 247–307.
[62] Id. at 312–314.
[63] Id. at
83–147. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and
Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale.
[64] Id. at 125–131.
[65] Id. at 134–143.
[66] Id. at 143.
[67] Id. at 143–144.
[68] Id. at 146–147.
[69] Id. at 31–84.
[70] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 19–22.
[71] Id. at 23–24.
[72] Id. at 24.
[73] Id. at 24–25.
[74] Id. at 25–26.
[75] Id. at 29.
[76] Id. at 29–31.
[77] Id. at 31–32.
[78] Id. at 82–160.
[79] Id. at 100–102.
[80] Id. at 96–107.
[81] Id. at 121–126.
[82] Id. at 107–109.
[83] Id. at 109–111.
[84] Id. at 111–113.
[85] Id. at 113–122.
[86] Id. at 122–126.
[87] Id. at 137.
[88] Id. at 141–143.
[89] Id. at 297–377.
[90] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), pp. 40–56.
[91] Id. at 56–58.
[92] Id. at 59.
[93] Id. at 61–64.
[94] Id. at 899–910.
[95] Id. at 920.
[96] Id. at 923–926.
[97] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 30–35.
[98] Id. at 36–39.
[99] Id. at 35.
[100] Id.
[101] Id. at 45.
[102] Id. at 47.
[103] Id. at 49–50.
[104] Id. at 51–55.
[105] Id. at 975–985.
[106] Id. at 1011–1019.
[107] Id. at 985–997.
[108] Id. at 997–999.
[109] Id. at 999–1003.
[110] 457 Phil. 740 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo].
[111] Id. at 747–748.
[112] 787 Phil. 367(2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[113] Id. at 388.
[114] Id. at 387.
[115] Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation, 669 Phil. 427, 434 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[116] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), p. 80.
[117] 849 Phil. 120 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
[118] Id. at 166–167.
[119] Id. at 331–335.
[120] 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[121] Id.
[122] 849 Phil. 120, 173–175 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
[123] See Bayan-Muna, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 182734, June 27, 2023 [Per J. Gaerlan, En Banc].
[124] Rules of Notarial Practice (2004), Rule VIII, Sec. 2 (c).
[125] Rules of Notarial Practice (2004), Rule XI.
[126] Cong. Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, Jr., 684 Phil. 632, 643 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc].
[127] Id.
[128] 103 Phil. 1051 (1957) [Per J. Concepcion].
[129] Id. at 1067.
[130] The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 751 Phil. 301, 337–338 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[131] 258 Phil. 479 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
[132] Id. at 506.
[133] 280 Phil. 829 (1991) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
[134] Id. at 840.
[135] 460 Phil. 830 (2001) [Per Carpio Morales, En Banc].
[136] Id. at 912.
[137] Id.
[138] 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[139] The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., 751 Phil. 301, 338 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[140] Id. at 338–342.
[141] 279 Phil. 920 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
[142] Id. at 934–936.
[143] 93 Phil. 1011 (1953) [Per C.J. Paras].
[144] 90 Phil. 396 (1951) [Per J. Jugo].
[145] Id.
[146] 236 Phil. 462 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
[147] Id.
[148] G.R. No. 203353, February 14, 2023.
[149] G.R. No. 209216, February 21, 2023.
[150] Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463 (1939) [Per J. Laurel].
[151] Atty. Manalang-Demigilla v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines, 705 Phil. 331, 347–348 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[152] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 246.
[153] Villa v. Allen, 2 Phil. 436 (1903) [Per J. Cooper].
[154] Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 647 (1949) [Per J. Feria].
[155] Id.
[156] Id. at 648.
[157] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 15–16.
[158] Fort Bonifacio Dev’t. Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 617 Phil. 358, 366–367 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[159] See San Miguel Corp. v. Avelino, 178 Phil. 47, 53 (1979) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
[160] People v. Ferrer, 150-C Phil. 551 (1972) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
[161] 260 Phil. 702 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
[162] Id.
[163] People v. Sandiganbayan, 286 Phil. 347 (1992) [Per J. Griño-Aquino, En Banc].
[164] Presidential Ad Hoc-Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 572 Phil. 71, 87 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[165] 569 Phil. 98 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[166] Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
[167] Sec. 11.
Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426,
as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire
into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking
institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any
competent court in cases of violation of this Act when it has been
established that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments involved are in any way related to a money laundering
offense: Provided, That this provision shall not apply to deposits and
investments made prior to the effectivity of this Act.
[168] See People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
[169] Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 258-A Phil. 620 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[170] Rules of Court, rule 117, Sec. 7.
[171] 675 Phil. 656 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[172] Id. at 667.
[173] Id.
[174] 258-A Phil. 620 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[175] People v. Cloribel, 11 SCRA 805 (1964) [Per J. Regala, En Banc].
[176] 82 Phil. 642 (1949) [Per J. Feria].
[177] Id. at 649.
[178] See People v. Nanadiego, 261 Phil. 953 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
[179] Prescribing Rules And Regulations Governing Appeals To the Office Of The President Of The Philippines.
[180] Administrative Order No. 22 (2011), par. 3.
[181] CONST, art. VII, sec. 17.
[182] Department of Energy v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 260912, August 17, 2022 [Per J. Singh, Third Division].
[183] 281 Phil. 645 (1991) [Per J. Davide, Third Division].
[184] Id. at 662.
[185] 275 Phil. 20 (1991) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
[186] Id. at 39–40.
[187] 858 Phil. 865 (2019) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[188] 804 Phil. 439 (2017) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
[189] Id. at 445.
[190] 440 Phil. 787 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
[191] Id. at 804.
[192] Engr. Liwanag v. Commission on Audit, 858 Phil. 865, 883 (2019) [ Per C.J. Bersamin].
[193] 879 Phil. 121 (2020) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc].
[194] Id. at 131.
[195] 298 Phil. 502 (1993) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
[196] Id. at 512.
[197] Id.
[198] Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) [Per J. Labrador].
[199] Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 458 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[200] Id. at 459.
[201] Id.
[202] Id. at 459–460.
[203] Id. at 465.
[204] Id. at 463–464.
[205] 793 Phil. 17 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[206] Id. at 73–77.
[207] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), pp. 133–136.
[208] Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 466 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[209] G & S Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 7, 22 (2002) [Per J. Bersillo, Second Division], citing Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 248 Phil. 394, 401–402 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division] and Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509–510 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[210] 717 Phil. 54, 57 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[211] Id. at 57.
[212] Id. at 67.
[213] Id.
[214] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 270.
[215] Bautista v. Spouses Balolong, 879 Phil 53, 63 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division].
[216] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), p. 53.
[217] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 184–186.
[218] Id. at 188.
[219] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 266.
[220] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 143–144.
[221] Id. at 261.
[222] Id.
[223] Id.
[224] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), pp. 262–263.
[225] See Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 366 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[226] Rollo (G.R. No. 256660), p. 235.
[227] 117 Phil. 170 (1963) [Per J. Barrera].
[228] Id. at 174–175.
[229] Rollo (G.R. No. 241494), p. 65.
[230] See Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 136 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago].
[231] Id. at 346.
[232] 804 Phil. 439 (2017) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
[233] Id. at 458–459.
[234] Davao ACF Bus Lines v. Ang, 850 Phil. 778, 784–787 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
[235] Id.
[236] Id. at 785.
[237] Id. at 786.
[238] See FGU Insurance Corp. v. RTC of Makati City, Br. 66, 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[239] Libongcogon, et al. v. PHIMCO Industries, Inc., 736 Phil. 643, 655 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[240] Id. at 657.
[241] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), p. 144.
[242] Id. at 1104–1144.
[243] Id. at 105.
[244] Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 290 Phil. 535 (1992) [Per J. Campos Jr., En Banc].
[245] Rollo (G.R. No. 256078), pp. 144–145.
[246] Tala Realty Services Corp., Inc. v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 788 Phil. 19, 30 (2016) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
LEONEN, SAJ.:
A driver’s license validly
issued cannot be rendered invalid if the State, through an
administrative agency, cannot present the application that the license
applicant had submitted to it previously. In the same vein, the
appointment of a judge who has been sitting in the bench for 30 years
cannot be invalidated if the Judicial and Bar Council can no longer
present the judge’s application submitted to it 30 years prior. Rights
that have already been vested cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn,
regardless of the change in administrations.
Before us is the case of former Senator Antonio “Sonny” F.
Trillanes IV (Trillanes), a former member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. In 2003, Trillanes, with a group of other soldiers known as
the Magdalo Group; took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City. The members of the Magdalo Group were promptly charged with the
crime of coup d’etat for the attempted mutiny. In 2007, during
the hearing of their criminal case before the trial court, the Magdalo
Group walked out of the court room to take over the Manila Peninsula
Hotel to call for the ouster of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.[1] They were likewise charged with rebellion for the Peninsula incident.[2]
In 2010, then President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Proclamation No. 75, which provided, among others:
SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted
to all active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their
supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila
Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor; Provided that amnesty shall
not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity and other
crimes committed for personal ends.
The Proclamation further stated:
SECTION 4. Effects. –
(a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any
criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related
to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident
without prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability for injuries or
damages caused to private persons.(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect
the restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees
that may have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of
any executive, administrative or criminal action or proceedings against
the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including criminal
conviction or any form, if any.
To process the applications for amnesty in relation to Proclamation
No. 75, the Department of National Defense created a committee which
promulgated the Department of National Defense Amnesty Committee
Circular No. 1, titled the “Rules of Procedure of the DND Ad Hoc Amnesty
Committee for the Implementation of Presidential Proclamation No. 75.”[3] The second paragraph of Section 11 of these Rules in particular, provides:
No application shall be approved without an express admission
by the applicant of actual involvement/participation in connection with,
in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and/or the November 29, 2007 Peninsula
Manila Hotel Incident and that such involvement/participation
constituted a violation of the 1987 Constitution, criminal laws and the
Articles of War, as indicated in the application form. No application
shall likewise be approved without a recantation of all previous
statements, if any, that are inconsistent with such express admission of
actual involvement/participation and guilt.
On January 21, 2011, the Department of National Defense granted
amnesty to Trillanes, as shown by a Certificate of Amnesty signed by
then National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin. Trillanes presented
this Certificate to the trial courts where his coup d’etat and rebellion
cases were pending, in support of his Motions to Dismiss. Acting on his
Motions, the trial courts dismissed the cases against him.[4]
In the 2016 National and Local Elections, then Davao City Mayor Rodrigo
R. Duterte was elected president. Trillanes, then a senator, had become
a vocal critic of former President Duterte.
On August 31, 2018, then President Duterte issued Proclamation
No. 572, or the “Revocation of the Department of National Defense Ad
Hoc Committee Resolution No. 2(#1) dated January 31, 2011 insofar as it
granted Amnesty to Former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV.” The Proclamation
claimed that Trillanes did not comply with the conditions of
Proclamation No. 75, as he allegedly did not admit to his guilt in the
Oakwood and Peninsula incidents:[5]
WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, a grantee
under Proclamation No. 75, did not file an Official Amnesty Application
Form as per the Certification dated August 30, 2018 issued by Lt. Col.
Thea Joan N. Andrade, Chief Discipline, Law and Order Division of the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, J1 starting that
“there is no available copy of his application for amnesty in the
records”;WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, never
expressed his guilt for the crimes that were committed on occasion of
the Oakwood Mutiny and Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege, stating that “they
were not admitting guilt to the mutiny and coup d’etat charges lodged
against them both in the civil and military courts” and “I would like to
qualify that we did not admit to the charge of coup d’etat or anything
na ifinile sa amin kasi we believe na hindi iyon and nararapat na
i-charge sa amin[.]”[6]
On September 4, 2018, the Department of Justice filed a Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure Order and
Alias Warrant of Arrest against Trillanes before Branch 148, the trial
court where the coup d’etat case had been pending. It also filed a
Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold
Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest before Branch 150, the trial court
where the rebellion case had been pending.[7]
Trillanes alleged that on the same day, members of the Philippine
National Police and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines attempted to arrest him
while he was in the Senate Building.[8]
The primordial issue before this Court is the validity of Proclamation No. 572 and its subsequent effects on the coup d’etat and rebellion cases against Trillanes.
I concur with the ponencia
that Proclamation No. 572 should be declared void, as it undoubtedly
singled out Trillanes, violating his constitutional rights:
It is clear and undeniable, from the very language of
Proclamation No. 572, that it was issued specifically for the purpose of
declaring void the grant of amnesty to Trillanes despite the fact that
the Secretary of National Defense issued numerous other certificates of
amnesty to applicants under Proclamation No. 75. There were, in fact,
277 amnesty grantees under Proclamation No. 572. Since the intent to
single out Trillanes is patent and manifest, there must be a showing
that this classification is reasonable.. . . .
This deliberate singling out of Trillanes is underscored by the
fact that there is no explanation as to why the government specifically
sought for a copy of his amnesty application form. There is no
explanation as to what triggered this process and whether there was any
justifiable reason to reopen the issue almost a decade after the
certificate of amnesty was issued . . . .This, considered along with the fact that Trillanes was not even
notified that the government was apparently reviewing his amnesty
application, let alone given an opportunity to explain any alleged
irregularity, highlights the arbitrariness of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 572.When the machinery of the government is brought to bear down on
an individual in this way, fealty to the Constitution and the laws
guards against governmental abuse. In situations like this, the value of
the Bill of Rights becomes even clearer. It is often an individual’s
last line of defense against the awesome powers of the State. In the
government’s zeal to carry out its duties, there may be instances where
it may attempt to explain a disregard of fundamental rights as
miniscule, justifiable, or even necessary. Yet even the loftiest of
intentions cannot justify a breach of the Constitution. The rule of law
is the people’s greatest protection against abuse.[9]
I agree that Proclamation No. 572 was in clear violation of
Trillanes’s right to due process and equal protection of the laws, as he
was the only amnesty grantee under Proclamation No. 75 to have come
under Proclamation No. 572. I likewise agree that Proclamation No. 572
should be declared void for violating the constitutional provision
against ex post facto laws and that upholding its validity would violate his right to double jeopardy.
In my view, however, Proclamation No. 572 should also be declared void
for being in the nature of a bill of attainder. I am also of the opinion
that Proclamation No. 572 cannot be used as basis to allow the
warrantless arrest of Trillanes.
I explain further.
I
Preliminarily, express my concurrence with the ponencia‘s pronouncement that this case was ripe for adjudication, as it involves conflicting legal rights or a contrariety of rights.[10] In Calleja v. Executive Secretary:[11]
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. The issues presented must be definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
interests. There must be a contrariety or legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. All these are in line with the well-settled rule that this
Court does not issue advisory opinions, nor does it resolve mere
academic questions, abstract quandaries, hypothetical or feigned
problems, or mental exercises, no matter how challenging or interesting
they may be. Instead, case law requires that there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts.[12]
In Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry,[13]
this Court further stressed that a case is ripe for adjudication when
there is a clear and convincing showing of contrariety of the parties’
legal rights.[14] To establish
an actual case, the allegations of the parties must clearly demonstrate
that that there is contrariety of rights and there is no other way to
interpret the assailed governmental act than that it is
unconstitutional.
Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell[15] further laid down the guidelines in determining the existence of clear and convincing contrariety of rights:
Thus, in asserting contrariety of rights, it is not enough to
merely allege an incongruence of rights between the parties. The party
availing of the remedy must demonstrate that the statue is so contrary
to his or her rights that there is no other interpretation other than
that there is a factual breach of rights. There can be no clearly
demonstrable contrariety of rights when there are possible ways to
interpret the statutory provision, ordinance or a regulation that will
save its constitutionality. In other words, the party must clearly
demonstrate contrariety of rights by showing that only possible way to
interpret the provision is unconstitutional, that it is the very lis mota of the case, and therefore, ripe for adjudication.[16]
Here, Trillanes argues that the President’s issuance of
Proclamation No. 572 singled him out and targeted him, violating his
right against warrantless arrests, double jeopardy, due process, and
equal protection of laws. Respondents, however, argue that such issuance
was within the power of clemency granted to the President.
If
the Proclamation is upheld as a valid exercise of presidential power,
and if the violation to fundamental rights is clear, it could
potentially give subsequent administrations the power to render void any
prior act of the previous administration, regardless of violations to
an individual or a group’s fundamental rights.
The violation of
one’s right against warrantless arrests, double jeopardy, due process,
and equal protection of laws carries with it, among others, a loss of
the fundamental right to liberty. This violation is so egregious and so
imminent that this Court cannot interpret the assailed government act
other than that it is unconstitutional. There is, thus, an allegation in
the Petitions of a clear contrariety of rights between the parties.
II
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Thus, as a general rule, no arrest shall be made without a corresponding warrant of arrest.
This is not to say that all warrantless arrests are invalid. The Rules
of Court provides for exceptions where a person may be lawfully
arrested, even without any warrant of arrest having been issued:
RULE 113
Arrest
. . . .
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
In this case, Trillanes alleges that members of the
Philippine National Police and the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines attempted to
arrest him[17] while their application for warrants of arrest was still pending before the trial courts.
Any arrest made in this specific instance would be invalid. The mere
issuance of Proclamation No. 572 did not grant to State forces the power
to rearrest Trillanes in connection to his coup d’etat and rebellion cases. This is clear from the wording itself of Proclamation No. 572, which provides:
SECTION 2. Effects.
1. As a consequence, the Department of Justice and Court Martial
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are ordered to pursue all
criminal and administrative cases filed against former LTSG Antonio
Trillanes in relation to the Oakwood Mutiny and the Manila Peninsula
Incident.2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are ordered to employ all lawful means to apprehend
former LTSG Antonio Trillanes so that he can be recommitted to the
detention facility where he had been incarcerated for him to stand trial
for the crimes he is charged with.[18]
The directive to “employ all lawful means” carries with it the
implied instruction to carry out the arrest according to what the law
provides. In this instance, there must first be a warrant of arrest. The
pending applications for a warrant of arrest on the same day as the
alleged attempt to arrest Trillanes clearly shows that the Executive
department knew that a warrant of arrest was necessary. Thus, to proceed
without a warrant would make any arrest invalid.
III
Proclamation No. 572 is void as it violates Trillanes’s right against double jeopardy.
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution states:
SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy or
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Melo v. People[19] explains the concept of double jeopardy, thus:
[Double jeopardy] meant that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It
is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the
common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always
existed. It found expression in the Spanish Law and in the Constitution
of the United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one
of the fundamental rights of the citizen.[20]
Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court[21] likewise expounds:
Fittingly described as “res judicata in prison grey,” the
right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for
a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The
purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the
danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.[22]
The Rules of Court provides the instances when a subsequent charge
constitutes a violation of the right against double jeopardy. Rule 117,
Section 7 provides:
Rule 117
Motion to Quash
. . . .
SECTION 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
— When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Under this provision, double jeopardy has the following elements:
“(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent
court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which [they]
had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without [their] express consent.”[23]
The ponencia,
thus, correctly found that “[w]here an accused moves for the dismissal
of a criminal case on the ground that he or she has been granted amnesty
. . . double jeopardy applies.”[24]
Even if such dismissal was with Trillanes’s express consent, his
rearrest on the basis of these cases constituted double jeopardy.
Under the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is completely extinguished by a grant of amnesty:
ARTICLE 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
. . . .
(1) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects[.]
People v. Nanadiego[25]
states that “[i]t has been consistently ruled by this Court that
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which [they
are] charged; that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though [they] had committed no offense.”[26]
Thus, considering that the practical effect of amnesty is the complete
extinguishment of the offense, it would be illogical for any grantee of
an amnesty not to seek the dismissal of their cases filed before the
courts. The dismissal would be on the merits. Any subsequent
reindictment on the same offense would be double jeopardy.
Caes
likewise recognizes that there can be double jeopardy even if the
dismissal of the prior case was made on the motion of the accused:
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to
be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the
dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where
the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect
of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. In People v. City of Silay,
for example, the trial court dismissed the case on motion of the
accused on the ground of insufficiency of the prosecution evidence. The
government came to this Court on certiorari, and the accused pleaded
double jeopardy. Our finding was that the case should not have been
dismissed because the evidence submitted by the prosecution was not
insufficient. Even so, the petitioner had to be denied relief because
the dismissal amounted to an acquittal on the merits which was therefore
not appealable. Justice Muñoz-Palma said: “However erroneous the order
of the respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, such error cannot now be lighted because of
the timely plea of double jeopardy.”The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on
motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy
trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute . . . .[27] (Citations omitted)
In this instance, a motion to dismiss based on a grant of clemency
operates as a dismissal on the merits. The dismissal is considered
final. Any subsequent prosecution of these cases should be considered a
violation of the right against double jeopardy.
IV
Proclamation No. 572 is in the nature of a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law and should be struck down as unconstitutional.
Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution succinctly mandates that “[n]o ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.”
People v. Ferrer[28] explains the concept and nature of a bill of attainder:
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional
ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and
thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil
that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out or a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.[29]
I am aware that only legislative acts can be classified as bills of attainder, and that Montenegro v. Castañeda[30] has stated that a presidential proclamation, not being a legislative act, cannot be considered as such.
Proclamation No. 572, however, seeks to prosecute Trillanes and only Trillanes for the offenses of coup d’etat
and rebellion in relation to the Oakwood and Peninsula incidents. It
was specifically employed “to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities” and it “[singled] out . . . a definite class, [and imposed] a
burden on it,”[31] which are the very evil’s sought to be prevented by the prohibition on bills of attainder.
In this case, the reason for the withdrawal of Trillanes’s grant of
amnesty had not been sufficiently proven. There was no process by which
Trillanes was given a chance to prove that his application was invalid.
The Proclamation had immediately concluded that “he did not comply with
the minimum requirements to qualify under the Amnesty Proclamation.”[32] It immediately provided for a punishment, that is, the voiding of his grant of clemency, without just cause.
Proclamation No. 572 should likewise be declared unconstitutional for being in the nature of an ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is one that:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense;(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful; and(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
The mere title of the issuance in itself already states its ex post facto nature, “insofar as it granted Amnesty to Former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV.”
The Proclamation recognizes that Trillanes already benefitted from a
proclamation of amnesty and seeks to void that protection.
The grant of amnesty had already become final and can no longer be disturbed, even by a subsequent administration:
These rules not only define when a decision becomes final, it
also allows an amnesty grantee the right to rely on the effectivity of
the amnesty and to the reasonable expectation that once the decision
becomes final and immutable, his or her amnesty can no longer be
disturbed.[34]
The provisions of the Proclamation likewise outscore its seemingly
vindictive nature. Aside from the title, which singles out Trillanes’s
application among the other amnesty grantees, the grounds for the
revocation do not stand the test of scrutiny and can be overturned by a
mere presentation of contrary evidence:
WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, a grantee
under Proclamation No. 75, did not file an Official Amnesty Application
Form as per the Certification dated August 30, 2018 issued by Lt. Col.
Thea Joan N. Andrade, Chief Discipline, Law and Order Division of the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, J1 starting that
“there is no available copy of his application for amnesty in the
records”;WHEREAS, former LTSG Antonio Trillanes IV, O-11797 PN, never
expressed his guilt for the crimes that were committed on occasion of
the Oakwood Mutiny and Peninsula Manila Hotel Siege, stating that “they
were not admitting guilt to the mutiny and coup d’etat charges
lodged against them both in the civil and military courts” and “I would
like to qualify that we did not admit to the charge of coup d’etat or anything na ifinile sa amin kasi we believe na hindi iyon and nararapat na i-charge sa amin.”WHEREAS, despite former LTSG Trillanes IV’s failure to apply for
amnesty and refusal to admit his guilt, his name was nonetheless
included among those granted amnesty pursuant to DND Ad Hoc Committee Resolution No 2 approved by former Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin[.][35]
As the ponencia states:
The factual findings of Branch 148, as affirmed by the CA, and
which the People did not deny, show that there were a total of 277
amnesty grantees under Proclamation No. 572 whose application forms
could no longer be located. This notwithstanding, only Trillanes'[s]
certificate of amnesty was declared void. This gross under-inclusiveness
undercuts the respondent’s claim that Proclamation No. 572 was based on
a reasonable classification. If Proclamation No. 572 was issued with
the intent of correcting the purported error of the Committee and the
Secretary of National Defense, every one of the 277 amnesty grantees
whose application forms could not be located should have been covered by
Proclamation No. 572 or of some other proclamation declaring their
certificates of amnesty void. There is no reasonable distinction between
Trillanes and all the other amnesty grantees, or at least none was
shown.[36]
In any case, even the ponencia upholds the trial court’s finding that Trillanes did submit his application form.[37]
Amnesty, once granted, is final and immutable. A subsequent
administration cannot revoke it based on a mere supposition that there
was no application made, merely because records of the application
cannot be found.
Proclamation No. 572 clearly shows the potential
for abuse of subsequent administrations for revisiting applications
that have already been granted by a prior administration. If upheld,
this Court’s ruling would render any decision of any institution,
whether administrative or judicial, subject to the whim of a subsequent
administration.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to the GRANT the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction in G.R. No. 241494. I further vote to DENY
the Petition for Review with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Set the Case
for Oral Argument dated June 15, 2021 in G.R. No. 256660, and the
Petition for Review with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Motion to
Set the Case for Oral Argument in G.R. No. 256078.
Proclamation No. 572 should be declared VOID
for violating the constitutional right against due process, equal
protection of the laws, warrantless arrests, and double jeopardy, as
well as the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
[1] Ponencia, p. 3.
[2] Id. at 4.
[3] Id. at 6.
[4] Id. at 8–9.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 10.
[7] Id. at 11.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 57–59.
[10] Id. at 34.
[11] G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].
[12] Id.
[13] G.R. No. 203352, February 14, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[14] Id.
[15] G.R. No. 209216, February 21, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[16] Id.
[17] Ponencia, p. 11.
[18] Id. at 10–11.
[19] 85 Phil. 766 (1950) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].
[20] Id. at 768.
[21] 258-A Phil. 620 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[22] Id. at 626–627.
[23] Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 258-A Phil. 620, 627 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[24] Ponencia, p. 46.
[25] 261 Phil. 953 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
[26] Id. at 963.
[27] Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 258-A Phil. 620, 627–628 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[28] 150-C Phil. 551 (1972) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
[29] Id. at 564–565.
[30] 91 Phil. 882, 885 (1952) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
[31] People v. Ferrer, 150-C Phil. 551, 565 (1972) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
[32] Proclamation No. 572 (2018), sec. 1.
[33] In the Matter of the Petition for the Declaration of the Petitioner’s Rights and Duties under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132, 146 Phil. 429, 431–432 (1970) [Per J. Makasiar, En Banc].
[34] Ponencia, p. 52.
[35] Proclamation No. 572 (2018), Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Whereas Clauses.
[36] Ponencia, pp. 59–60.
[37] Id. at 63–64.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia in finding Proclamation No. 572, series of 2018[1] (Proclamation No. 572), which revoked the amnesty granted to Antonio “Sonny” F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), to be void.
I submit this Concurring Opinion to emphasize that: (a) a President
cannot revoke a grant of amnesty without the legislature’s concurrence;
and (b) Proclamation No. 572 is an ex post facto law.
Brief review of the facts
Seven years after the grant of the amnesty of Trillanes through Proclamation No. 75, series of 2010[2] (Proclamation No. 75) the dismissal of the rebellion and coup d’etat
cases in 2011, and the finality of the decision of the Department of
National Defense (DND) granting amnesty, former President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 572 which declared the amnesty void.
Under the Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 572, the basis of revoking
Trillanes’ amnesty is that he did not file an Official Amnesty
Application Form per the Certification dated August 30, 2018 issued by
Lt. Col. Thea Joan N. Andrade, Chief, Discipline, Law and Order Division
of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, stating that
there is no available copy of his application for amnesty in the
records.[3] Consequently, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Court Martial of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines were ordered to pursue all criminal and administrative
cases filed against Trillanes in relation to the Oakwood Mutiny and the
Manila Peninsula Incident.[4]
Because of Proclamation No. 572, the DOJ filed two motions captioned “Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest” (Omnibus Motion) in the Regional Trial Courts[5] where the rebellion and coup d’etat cases were previously pending.
Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (RTC-Branch 148), where the coup d’etat
case was pending, denied the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion and concluded that
Trillanes filed his amnesty application in the prescribed form in which
he also admitted guilt. It ultimately ruled that Proclamation No. 572
was valid but that Trillanes was entitled to amnesty because he complied
with the requirements under Proclamation No. 75. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA), but the same was denied by the latter. Even as the CA
held Proclamation No. 572 to be valid, it also ruled that RTC-Branch 148
correctly denied the Omnibus Motion because the prosecution failed to
prove that Trillanes did not submit an amnesty application form and did
not admit guilt.[6]
On
the other hand, Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City (RTC-Branch 150),
where the rebellion case was pending, granted the DOJ’s Omnibus Motion.
Trillanes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning
the said grant. The CA granted Trillanes’ petition and held that since
the grant of the motion to dismiss had become final and executory, the
RTC no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the Omnibus Motion filed by
the DOJ. According to the CA, the DOJ should have used Rule 38 (relief
from judgment), Rule 47 (annulment of judgment), or Rule 65 (petition
for certiorari) to assail the supposed invalid grant of amnesty
to Trillanes instead of simply filing the Omnibus Motion in the court
where the case had been previously filed.[7]
Hence, the present consolidated cases.
In G.R. No. 241494, Trillanes assails before the Court the validity of
Proclamation No. 572. This petition was filed while the respective
Omnibus Motions in the coup d’etat and rebellion cases were still pending.
G.R. No. 256660 (coup d’etat
Petition) is filed by the DOJ where it submits that the CA erred in
ruling that RTC-Branch 148 did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the Omnibus
Motion in the coup d’etat case.
G.R. No. 256078
(rebellion Petition) is also filed by the DOJ, arguing that the CA erred
when it concluded that the Dismissal Order in the rebellion case could
not be set aside through a mere motion. For the DOJ, since the Dismissal
Order is a void judgment, it did not become final and executory.
Moreover, RTC-Branch 150 did not err when it conducted a summary and not
a full-blown hearing to resolve the Omnibus Motion in the rebellion
case.
As identified by the ponencia, the substantive
issues in the present consolidated cases are the following: (a) whether
Proclamation No. 75 is invalid because former President Benigno S.
Aquino III (former President Aquino III) unduly delegated his
constitutional power to grant amnesty to the DND and the ad hoc committee of the DND; and (b) whether Proclamation No. 572 is unconstitutional.[8]
I fully concur with the ponencia‘s disposition of both issues above. However, by this Concurring Opinion, I delve deeper into the second issue.
As stated at the outset, I agree that Proclamation No. 572, which
revoked the grant of amnesty to Trillanes, is void and unconstitutional
for violating Trillanes’ constitutionally guaranteed rights to due
process and equal protection of laws. I fully agree with the ponencia‘s
ruling that the decision of the DND granting amnesty to Trillanes
became final, executory, and immutable after the period to appeal had
prescribed. Considering that it had been seven years since Trillanes was
granted amnesty, that the amnesty had been fully enforced and the
pending criminal cases against him had been dismissed, that the ground
for revoking his amnesty was factual and thus could have been explained
had Trillanes been given the opportunity to do so, and that the amnesty
was about to be revoked way beyond the allowable period for reversing
the decision of the DND under the applicable rules, justice and fair
play required that Trillanes should have been given notice and the
opportunity to be heard.[9]
Trillanes was not afforded any opportunity to present his side on the
alleged factual findings that formed the basis for Proclamation No. 572.
Indeed, Proclamation No. 572 was issued in clear disregard of the
procedural rules and principles of justice and fairness. The revocation
of Trillanes’ amnesty, especially after such an extended period, is
deeply concerning. Trillanes’ rights to due process and a fair hearing
should have been respected.
Furthermore, Proclamation No. 572
contains an unconstitutional and arbitrary classification insofar as it
targets Trillanes alone, to the exclusion of all other amnesty grantees,
by declaring the grant of amnesty to him void ab initio.[10]
I also agree with the ponencia
that the validity of Proclamation No. 572 is not a political question
that is dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.[11]
Political
questions are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislature or executive branch of the government.[12]
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
consolidated cases, as they transcend the boundaries of a mere
political question. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia,
Trillanes raises questions pertaining to the limits imposed on the power
of the President to grant an amnesty and revoke it. In essence, the
Court is called upon to determine whether Proclamation No. 572, in its
issuance and effect, complies with the Constitution and whether it
infringes upon the Bill of Rights. These are matters that necessitate a
careful legal analysis and interpretation of our fundamental law, and
they are well within the purview of the Court’s jurisdiction, as
provided in Article VIII, Section 5(c) of the Constitution.[13]
The issue, therefore, is justiciable rather than political, since it
involves the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
In fact, the present consolidated cases present a troubling instance of
political oppression. The Court is called upon to confront a situation
where the very foundations of our democracy and the rule of law appear
to be under threat. Trillanes has raised concerns that extend far beyond
mere political questions. He has alleged political oppression in the
form of revocation of amnesty that appears politically motivated and
designed to silence a vocal critic.
Moreover, I fully concur with the ponencia‘s
ruling that the President cannot unilaterally revoke an amnesty grant
without the concurrence of Congress. As aptly highlighted in the ponencia,
although the Constitution does not explicitly address revocation,
granting the President sole authority in this matter would render futile
the participation of the legislature in its grant.[14]
Indeed, the question of whether the President alone can revoke the
grant of amnesty without the legislature’s concurrence is a vital legal
issue that is pertinent to the present consolidated cases. It is
intertwined with the interpretation of Proclamation No. 572 and its
implications. Addressing the question of whether the President, acting
unilaterally, can revoke a grant of amnesty without the legislature’s
concurrence is necessary to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the
legal landscape surrounding amnesty revocation. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that the CA Decision[15]
dated May 31, 2021 already weighed in on this, asserting that
Proclamation No. 572 represents a valid exercise of the President’s
constitutional power of control over all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices.[16]
Our
present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among
the three branches of government. The legislature is generally limited
to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and
the judiciary to the interpretation of laws. This separation is intended
to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that
might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in their exercise to the
detriment of our republican institutions. The doctrine of separation of
powers is intended to secure action, forestall overaction, prevent
despotism, and obtain efficiency.[17]
However, it is also often necessary for certain powers to be reposed in
more than one department so that they may better collaborate with and,
in the process, check each other for the public good.[18]
This blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the
complexities brought about by a rapidly developing society and which the
traditional branches of government have difficulty coping with.[19]
An example is the grant of amnesty by the President which requires the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress under Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,
former President Aquino III issued on November 24, 2010, Proclamation
No. 75, which reads in part:
GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL
INCIDENTWHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and
former personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and their supporters have or may have
committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles
of War and other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the
July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marine[s] Stand-Off and
the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident;WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of
society urging the President to extend amnesty to said AFP and PNP
personnel and their supporters;WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the President the power to grant amnesty;
WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active
and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and their supporters will
promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just,
comprehensive and enduring peace and is in line with the Government’s
peace and reconciliation initiatives;NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, do hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby
granted to all active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as
their supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula
Manila Hotel Incident who shall apply therefor; Provided that
amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity
and other crimes committed for personal ends.. . . .
SECTION 4. Effects. –
(a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish
any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or
related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private persons, if any.(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall
effect the restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of
the grantees that may have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by
virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or
proceedings against the grantee in connection with the subject
incidents, including criminal conviction or [sic] any form, if any.(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines with the rank of up to Technical Sergeant and personnel of
the PNP with the rank of up to Senior Police Officer 3, whose
applications for amnesty will be approved shall be entitled to
reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws and
regulations. However, they shall not be entitled to back pay during the
time they have been discharged or suspended from the service or unable
to perform their military or police duties.(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with
the rank of Master Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of at
least Senior Police Officer 4 whose application for amnesty will be
approved shall not be entitled to remain in the service, reintegration
or reinstatement into the service nor back pay.(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not
reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to retirement and
separation benefits, if qualified under existing laws and regulation, as
of the time of their separation, unless they have forfeited such
retirement benefits for reasons other than the acts covered by this
Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to
their retirement and separation benefit upon their actual retirement.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted
Concurrent Resolution No. 4 on December 13, 2010 and December 14, 2010,
respectively. Relevant portions of the Resolution party read:
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75 OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2010
ENTITLED “GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL
INCIDENT”WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides
that the President shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress;. . . .
WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President
that in order to promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a
just, comprehensive and enduring peace and in line with the
Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives, there is a need to
declare amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of the
AFP and PNP and their supporters;WHEREAS, it is the sense of both Houses of Congress that it is
imperative that an amnesty partaking the nature proclaimed by His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, is necessary for the
general interest of the Philippines[.]
The act of granting amnesty under Proclamation No. 75 was approved
by former President Aquino III and concurred in by the majority of all
the members of Congress. It is not within the purview of any individual,
regardless of the office, to unilaterally revoke such a grant of
amnesty. The President’s authority to unilaterally revoke such an
amnesty proclamation, previously issued with the concurrence of the
former President and the majority of the members of both houses of
Congress, must be subject to a similar requirement of concurrence from
the legislative branch. It follows logically that the revocation of an
amnesty should require a similar level of consensus. To do otherwise
would be to allow the executive to effectively override and render
nugatory the concurrence previously granted by Congress. It would
undermine the separation of powers of government and the very principles
that underpin our constitutional democracy. Allowing an amnesty
proclamation to be revoked by the President alone would open the door to
politically-driven decisions, weakening our commitment to the rule of
law.
The shared power of the President and Congress to grant amnesty
reflects a profound understanding of the delicate nature of such power,
as it entails the absolution of even the most serious crimes committed
by individuals or groups. As an early Philippine case[20]
noted, “[a]mnesty commonly denotes the ‘general pardon to rebels for
their treason and other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended
by some breach of the law of nations.”‘[21]
It is also worth noting that the Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 75
explicitly states that the grant of amnesty is aimed at promoting an
atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive, and
enduring peace and is in line with the government’s peace and
reconciliation initiatives.[22]
This recognition reflects the government’s acknowledgment that amnesty
is essential to conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. If a
President can unilaterally revoke an amnesty previously granted by his
or her predecessor and majority of all the Members of Congress, it sends
a message to those who may consider participating in future peace
negotiations that the terms of their amnesty are subject to the whims of
future Presidents. The unpredictability and arbitrariness of
whether a future President alone will honor commitments made by his or
her predecessor threatens the credibility of the government’s efforts to
maintain peace and reconciliation.
In People v. Patriarca, Jr.,[23] the Court discussed the effect of an amnesty, thus:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some
breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which
completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.[24] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In the present consolidated cases, Trillanes applied for and was
unquestionably granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 75. This is
evident not only from the issuance of the Certificate of Amnesty to
Trillanes by then DND Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, but also from the
dismissal of all cases pending against him by RTC-Branch 148 and
RTC-Branch 150.
The grant of amnesty resulted in the complete erasure of the crimes for which Trillanes had been charged.
Consequently, any subsequent attempt to revoke this amnesty is, in
essence, an exercise in futility. Considering that amnesty had been
granted to Trillanes, there is effectively no more criminal liability
left to revive. Any criminal liability on the part of Trillanes had
already been completely extinguished by the amnesty granted to him. His
liability had been expunged, and he is now exonerated in the eyes of the
law.
In this connection, I submit the view that the grant of amnesty upon Trillanes resulted in a vested right.
A vested right is one which is absolute, complete, and unconditional,
to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To be vested
in its accurate legal sense, a right must be complete and consummated,
and one which the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested of
without his or her consent.[25]
The term expresses the concept of a present, fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.[26]
Once amnesty is granted, it is binding and effective.[27]
When an individual or group is granted amnesty, their criminal
liability for past offenses is fully extinguished. It obliterates past
offenses and offers the individual or group a clean slate. They stand
before the law as if they had never committed those offenses. This
creates an expectation of finality and a recognition of a vested right
to be free from prosecution and punishment for the covered offenses. To
my mind, once amnesty is granted, it becomes a vested right of the
recipient. It is not a mere privilege that can be whimsically withdrawn
by the President alone. As such, there is no doubt that the grant of
amnesty upon Trillanes is a vested right, as it embodies the essence of
an absolute, complete, and unconditional right that is protected against
arbitrary State action. The decision granting amnesty to Trillanes had
been in force for seven years, during which the amnesty was fully
enforced, and all pending criminal charges against Trillanes were
dismissed.
I also agree with the ponencia‘s ruling that Proclamation No. 572 amounts to an ex post facto law, which is prohibited under Article III, Section 22 of the Constitution:
SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
In Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,[28] the Court enumerated the seven instances of ex post facto legislation as follows—
act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed;
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant;
civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; [and]
accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
a proclamation of amnesty.[29] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Even though Proclamation No. 572 is not a statute but a mere
presidential proclamation, the revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty falls
within the purview of the seventh instance of an ex post facto law.
A presidential proclamation is an act of the President that is
promulgated to fix a date or declare a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, and shall have the force
of an executive order.[30] On
the other hand, an executive order is an act of the President that is
promulgated to provide for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers.[31]
If
a law cannot deprive an accused of some lawful protection to which he
or she has become entitled such as the proclamation of amnesty, then a
presidential proclamation, which is at a level subordinate to a statute,
is similarly, if not more, restricted from doing so.
Amnesty, once granted, bestows upon an individual a lawful protection,
as it operates in such a way that it overlooks and obliterates the
offense an individual is charged of to the extent that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he or she
had never committed any offense. It is a legal safeguard that cannot be
stripped away without due process. The revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty
through Proclamation No. 572 effectively punishes him for something he
had previously been granted protection against. Thus, Proclamation No.
572 squarely fits within the purview of an ex post facto law,
especially when measured against its specific definition that speaks to
depriving a person of lawful protection such as amnesty.
In all, I VOTE to declare Proclamation No. 572 void and unconstitutional, and GRANT the Petition filed by Trillanes in G.R. No. 241494. Further, I VOTE to DENY the Petitions filed by the DOJ in G.R. No. 256660 and G.R. No. 256078.
[1] Revocation of the
Department of National Defense Ad Hoc Committee Resolution No. 2(#1)
dated January 31, 2011 insofar as it Granted Amnesty to Former LTSG
Antonio Trillanes IV, signed on August 31, 2018.
[2] Granting Amnesty to
Active and Former Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police and Their Supporter who may have Committed
Crimes Punishable Under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War and
Other Laws in Connection with the Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-Off
and the Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident, signed on November 24, 2010.
[3] Proclamation No. 572, 10th Whereas Clause.
[4] Proclamation No. 572, sec. 2.
[5] Branch 150 and Branch 148, Regional Trial Court, Makati City.
[6] See ponencia, pp. 12–13.
[7] See Id. at 14–17.
[8] Id. at 34–35.
[9] Id. at 54.
[10] Id. at 57–58.
[11] See Id. at 30–34.
[12] Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067 (1957) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
[13] Ponencia, p. 32.
[14] Id. at 37, 39–40.
[15] Rollo
(G.R. No. 241494), Vol. 2, pp. 566–632. Penned by Associate Justice
Edwin D. Sorongon and concurred in by Associate Justices Perpetua Susana
T. Atal-Paño and Raymond Reynold R. Lauigan, Special Eleventh (11th) Division, CA, Manila.
[16] Id. at 601.
[17] J. Ynares-Santiago, Separate Opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 536 Phil. 1, 147–148 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing JUSTICE ISAGANI A. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 71 (1995 ed.), citing further Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.
[18] I CARLO L. CRUZ, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION 91 (2016).
[19] J. Kapunan, Dissenting Opinion in Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 997 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[20] Villa v. Allen, 2 Phil. 436 (1903) [Per J. Cooper, En Banc].
[21] Id. at 439.
[22] Proclamation No. 75, 4th Whereas Clause.
[23] 395 Phil. 690 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
[24] Id. at 699.
[25] Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 185 Phil. 238, 254–255 (1980) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division].
[26] Republic v. Miller, 365 Phil. 634, 638 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[27] People v. Crisola, 213 Phil. 1, 2 (1984) [Per C.J. Fernando, Second Division].
[28] 361 Phil. 251 (1999) [Per J. Martinez, En Banc].
[29] Id. at 274–275.
[30] ADM. CODE (1987), Book III, Title 1, Chapter 2, sec. 4.
[31] ADM. CODE (1987), Book III, Title 1, Chapter 2, sec. 2.