G.R. No. L-9531. May 14, 1958

The plaintiff-appellee filed against the defendants-appellants an action for
foreclosure of mortgage on August 20, 1954. The deed of mortgage sued upon was
attached to the complaint as Annex “A”. After having been granted an extension,
the appellants filed an answer on September 30, 1954, alleging:

“1. That they admit paragraph 1 of the complaint;

“2. That the defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth
of the material averments of the remainder of the complaint; and

“3. That
they hereby reserve the right to present an amended answer with special defenses
and counterclaim.”

As the appellants did not file any amended answer, the appellee moved on
November 15, 1954 for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer
failed to tender an issue. The lower court granted appellee’s motion in the
order dated December 28, 1954 and thereafter (on December 29, 1954) rendered,
judgment in favor of the appellee. In granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the lower court held “that the denial by the defendants of the
material allegations of the complaint under the guise of lack of knowledge is a
general denial so as to entitle the plaintiff to judgment on the
pleadings.”

In the present appeal taken by the defendants, the question
raised is whether the allegation of want of knowledge or information as to the
truth of the material averments of the complaint amounts to a mere general
denial warranting judgment on the pleadings or is sufficient to tender a triable
issue.

Section 7 of Rule 9 of the Rules of court, in allowing the defendant to
controvert material averments not within his knowledge or information, provides
that “where the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of material averment, he shall so state and this shall
have the effect of a denial. This form of denial was explained in one case as
follows:

“Just as the explicit denials of an answer should be either general or
specific, so all denials of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
should refer either generally to all the averments of the complaint thus
intended to be denied, or specifically to such as are to be met by that
particular form of plea. The answer should be so definite and certain in its
allegation that the pleaders’ adversary should not be left in doubt as to what
is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief, Under this form of denial employed by
the defendant, it would be difficult, if not impossible to convict him of
perjury if it should transpire that some of his denials of knowledge, etc., were
false, for he could meet the charge by saying that his denials referred only to
matters of which he had in fact no knowledge or information.” (Kirachbaum vs.
Eschmann, 98 NE 328, 329-330.)

This is a foreclosure suit. It is alleged that the appellants are jointly and
severally indebted in the sum of P9,906.88, secured by a mortgage. A copy of the
mortgage deed was attached to and made a part of the complaint. There are also
allegations of partial payments, defaults in the payment of outstanding balance,
and a covenant to pay interest and attorney’s fees. v It is hard to believe that
the appellants could not have had knowledge or information as to the truth or
falsity of any of said allegations. As a copy of the deed of mortgage formed
part of the complaint, it was easy for and within the power of the appellants,
for instance, to determine and so specifically allege in their answer whether or
not they had executed the alleged mortgage. The appellants could be aided in the
matter by an inquiry or verification as to its registration in the Registry of
Deeds. “An unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records,
the means of information concerning which are within the control of the pleader,
or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute
an effective denial,” (41 Am. Juris., 399, citing Dahlstrom vs. Gemunder, 92,
NE 106.)

It is noteworthy that the answer was filed after an extension granted by the
lower court, and that while a reservation was made to file an amended answer, no
such pleading was presented. If these show anything, it is that the appellants
obviously did not have any defense or wanted to delay the proceedings.

The form of denial adopted by the appellants, although allowed by the Rules
of Court, must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith,—certainly neither
for the purpose of confusing the advei’se party as to what allegations of the
complaint are really put in issue nor for the purpose of delay.

“* * * no court will permit its process to be trifled with and its
intelligence affronted by the offer of pleadings which any reasoning person
knows can not possibly be true. * * * ‘The general rule that the Court is not
bound to accept statements in pleadings which are, to the common knowledge of
all intelligent persons, untrue, applies just as well to the provisions of Rule
S(b), 28 U.S.C.A. following Section 723c, as to pleadings under the State
statute.’ ” (Nieman vs. Long, 51 F. Supp. 30, 31.)

“This rule, specifically authorizing an answer that defendant has no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the
fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is to the knowledge of the court
as plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of
ignorance must be palpably untrue.” (Icle Plant Equipment Co. vs. Martocello,
D.C. Pa. 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.