G.R. No. L-9137. August 31, 1956

Petitioners  are employees and  laborers of the Master Shirt  Company  and members of  the  Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa ng  Damit  labor union, On April 24, 1955, petitioners, with  other workers  affiliated with the Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa  ng Damit,  after  a protest against the unjust dismissal made by the factory management  of one Amelia Sumulong declared a strike, and as a consequence thereof,  placed  a  picket line outside the factory compound. On  May  10,  1955, respondents, also workers of  the same shirt company  and members of a rival union, the Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Master Shirt  Company, brought suit before the Court of First Instance  of Manila asking for  the  issuance  of a writ of preliminary injunction; and  on the same  date,  without previous hearing and  on the basis alone of  sworn  affidavits submitted by the  respondents, the Court of First Instance issued the  writ  prayed for, stating  the  reasons therefor in his order of May 10, 1955 as follows:

 “The plaintiffs, in  a verified complaint,  alleged that,they are non-striking employees of the Master  Shirt Factory who,  among other things, were prevented through acts of coercion and violence by the defendants from taking their meals at the factory, which they have chosen as their  temporary  home during the pendency of the strike. Affidavits showing the defendants’ unlawful  conduct in intercepting the food supplies being delivered to the plaintiffs and the defendants’ employment of force  and intimidation to prevent  any breaking through their  picketline, were attached to the  complaint. 

The  plaintiffs made it  clear that  unless  a restraining order  is issued  by this court they  would  not  be able to pursue their means of livelihood and possibly starve.  In the face of  such appeal the court cannot  simply folds its arms  and  do  nothing to prevent a party from  exercising a very human right—to eat.

This court believes that while picketing is an extension  of the right to free  speech, it should not  be exercised so as to deprive others  of their right to eat and, consequently, to  live.  The right to live  is a right to which  everyone is entitled, regardless of whether he is an employer or an employee,  a striker  or non-striker, and under our  system of government no one is above the law and everyone is entitled to its equal protection.

In view of the  foregoing consideration,  the court hereby  orders that, upon the filing  by the plaintiffs of a bond  in the amount of P10,000  to  answer for whatever damage  that may occur to the defendants  and pending the determination of the merits of the complaint, the defendants, their attorneys, agents  or representatives should immediately—   

(a) refrain and desist from obstructing, stopping, blocking, coercing, intimidating, or in any way or manner preventing the  plaintiffs  and other co-employees  from going  in  and out of the above-mentioned  factory  in pursuance of  their  word and .livelihood;

(b) refrain and desist from obstructing, stopping, blocking, coercing, intimidating, or in any way or manner preventing or hampering any and  all deliveries of food and  other necessities for the plaintiffs and all  deliveries  of goods  or merchandise  on which the plaintiffs work in pursuance  of their livelihood; 

(c) refrain  and  desist from  any, all  or  similar unlawful acts heretofore  committed  and  threatened  to  be committed against the plaintiffs.”  (Annex “A”, Petition.)

The  next day,  May  11, 1955,  petitioners  moved  to  dissolve the injunction, challenging the jurisdiction  of the court  in  issuing  the  same on the  ground that under Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial Relations has exclusive  jurisdiction  to issue  writs of  preliminary injunctions in labor  disputes.   The respondent judge denied petitioners  motion to dismiss;  wherefore,  they filed  this petition for certiorari  and prohibition before this Court.

The  main issue  raised by petitioners  is  the jurisdiction of the respondent judge  in issuing the injunction in question.   The  question  of  whether or not the ordinary courts  can issue injunctions in labor disputes has  been recently decided by us in  the  case  of PAFLU vs.  Hon. Bienvenido  Tan,  et  al.  (supra, p. 854), promulgated August 31,  1956, wherein we held that  by the  passage of Republic Act No.  875,  the  jurisdiction  of the Court of Industrial Relations  has  been  limited to the  following cases:

 “(1)  when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the  industrial court  (Section 10, Republic Act No, 875);  (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment under  the Bight-Hour Labor Law  (Commonwealth Act  No. 464); and (4)  when it involves an unfair labor  practice (Section 5[a], Republic Act No. 875)”;

and that in  all other cases involving  labor disputes  not falling within the jurisdiction of  the Industrial Court above enumerated, it is  the  ordinary courts of  justice who have the power to issue injunctions.

There  are,  however,  admissions  in  this  case by both parties that the acts  against  which  the  injunction in question  was obtained  constitute unfair  labor practices (Petition, p. 4; Answer, p. 9).  If we are to go by these admissions,  then  the  application  for  injunction would have been exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations  and  beyond the jurisdiction of  the respondent Court of First  Instance.

On the other hand, assuming that the respondent court had jurisdiction, the injunction issued by it is nevertheless void because the procedure laid down by section 9  (d) of Republic  Act No.  875 was not followed in its issuance. Respondents argue that they  did  not comply with  said procedure because  they sought out the injunction under section 6, Rule 60  of the Rules of Court and not under the  provisions of Republic Act No. 875.  This argument has, however, already been ruled out by us in the same case of PAFLU vs. Tan case, supra, where we said:

“We believe however  that in order that an injunction  may be properly issued the procedure laid down  in section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 should be followed and cannot be granted ex parte as allowed by  Rule 60, section 6,  of the Rules  of .Court.  The reason is that the case,  involving as it does a labor dispute, comes Tinder  said section 9(d)  of  the  law.   That procedure requires that there should be a hearing at’ which the  parties should be given an  opportunity for cross-examination, and  that  the other conditions required by said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief must be  established and stated in the order of the court. Unless this procedure is followed,  the proceedings would be invalid and of no effect.  The court would  then be acting in excess of its jurisdiction.”

Under section 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875, an injunction ex parte can be issued only “upon testimony under oath, sufficient,  if sustained, to  justify the court in issuing a temporary  injunction  upon hearing  after  notice”.   In other  words, there  is  still  necessity  for a hearing at which sworn testimony for the  applicants  would be  received, and  not only that, the  court should be  satisfied that such  testimony would stand under cross-examination by the Court and be sufficient  to overcome  denial by the defendants.  As no hearing was  held in the Court below and the injunction issued on the basis of mere affidavits submitted  by respondents  (petitioners-applicants  in  the Court below), the  injunction in  question  is void for not having been issued  in  accordance  with  provisions  of Republic Act No.  875.

It  should be noted  that even if the  writ  had been properly issued, the express statutory provision is to the effect that a temporary restraining  order  issued ex parte “shall be  effective for no longer  than five days and shall become void at the  expiration  of said five days” (also section 9  (d), Republic Act No. 875).   The injunction in question,  having been  issued ex parte, therefore  became void and of no effect after  the fifth day of its issuance, by operation of law and without any further  need of judicial pronouncement.

The petition  for certiorari is granted and the writ of preliminary injunction  issued  by  the  respondent judge is declared null and void,  with  costs against respondent workers Victoria  Gonzales, et al.   So  ordered.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia,,  and Felix,  JJ., concur.