G.R. Nos. L-6601-02. December 29, 1956

100 Phil. 635

[ G.R. Nos. L-6601-02. December 29, 1956 ]

TESTAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE JOSE V. RAMIREZ. JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ DE LA CAVADA, PETITIONER, ESPERANZA RAMIREZ DE CORTABITARTE, ELSA RAMIREZ DE CHAMBERS, LILY RAMIREZ VIUDA DE PFANNENSCHMIDT AND HORAGIO RAMIREZ, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES, JOSE MA. CAVANNA AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT O£ BELEN T., RITA E., RAMON A., GEORGE P., AND JOSE E., ALL SURNAMED RAMIREZ, MOVANTS AND APPELLEES, VS. ANGELA M. BUTTE, LEGATEE AND APPELLANT.

TESTAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE JOSE V. RAMIREZ. JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ DE LA CAVADA, PETITIONER, ANGELA M. BUTTE, HEIR-PROPOITENT AND APPELLANT, VS. ESPERANZA RAMIREZ DE CORTABITARTE, ELSA RAMIREZ DE CHAMBERS, LILY RAMIREZ VIUDA DE PFANNENSCHMIDT AND HORACIO RAMIREZ, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

D E C I S I O N



CONCEPCION, J.:

These are two appeals,  taken by Angela M. Butte,  from two different orders of the Court  of  First Instance of Manila, in Special Proceedings No. 15026 thereof, entitled “Testamentary  Proceedings of  the late Jose V.  Ramirez, Jose Eugenio  Ramirez de la  Cavada,  petitioner”.   The first appeal (G. R. No. L-6601) is from an order of said court, dated November 18, 1952, appointing the Bank of the Philippine  Islands as  regular  administrator  of the estate of said  deceased.  The second appeal (G. R. No. L-6602) refers to an order of said  court, dated January 21,  1953,  denying the probate  of Exhibit C,  the  alleged will and testament of the deceased.

The facts pertinent of the first appeal (G. R. No. L-6601) are: On October  30, 1952, Jose Ma. Cavanna, acting as attorney-in-fact of Belen T., Rita E., Ramon  A.,  George P.,  and Jose  E., all surnamed  Ramirez,  filed,  in said testamentary proceedings, a motion stating that they are creditors of  the  late Jose  V. Ramirez, who was  their attorney-in-fact and,  as such, had, in his possession, certain sums (“ciertas cantidades”) belonging to the movants, and that, in order that their claim against the decedent could be  filed,  a  regular administrator was necessary, for which reason they prayed that the Bank of the Philippine Islands, which was the  special administrator  of said estate, be appointed its regular administrator.  On November 6, Angela M. Butte, who was named, in said Exhibit C, as heir to, or legatee of, the free portion of (one-third of) the estate of the deceased, filed a pleading alleging that she was not in a position to answer said motion of October 30,1952, owing to the failure thereof to specify the amounts therein referred to, and praying that action  on said motion be  deferred  Until  after Cavanna  shall have  submitted a bill of particulars and said Mrs. Butte shall have filed her answer  to said motion.  The next day, counsel for Esperanza Ramirez de Cortabitarte, Elsa Ramirez de Chambers, Lily Ramirez Vda. de Pfannenschmidt and Horacio  Ramirez, the legitimate children of  the deceased,  who was a  widower,  filed a statement urging the  court  to grant Cavanna’s aforementioned motion.  This the lower court did in an order dated November 18,  1952.  A reconsideration of this order having been denied, Mrs. Butte filed notice of her intention to appeal therefrom.

Upon the submission of her record on appeal, Cavanna and the children of the decedent objected to its  approval, upon the ground that Mrs. Butte has no right to  intervene in the case  and that  said record on appeal had been filed beyond  the  reglementary period.   The lower court overruled this objection and approved said record on  appeal. The appellees now insist that the appeal  should  not be entertained  for  the reasons above stated.

As regards the first, suffice it to say that,  in said Exhibit C,  one-third (1/3)  of the estate  of the decedent is bequeathed to Mrs. Butte.   Although, when the order complained  of was issued (November 18, 1952), Exhibit  C had not, as yet, been probated as the last will and testament of the decedent, and, subsequently thereto (on January 21, 1953), the lower court refused to allow said instrument to probate, the order to this effect has not become final, owing to the other appeal

Appellees’  second objection to the appeal is predicated upon the theory that appellants motion for reconsideration of the order appealed from does not suspend the running of the reglementary period to perfect the appeal, because said  motion, according  to the appellees, is not one for new  trial.  Said motion for  reconsideration is premised, however, upon the  theory that the appointment of a  regular administrator, pending the probate of a will, violates Rule 81, section 1, of the  Rules of  Court,  and,  hence, is contrary to law.   In short, it partakes of the nature of a motion for new trial (Rule 37, section 1, Rules of Court) and,  as  such, it suspended the running of the period to appeal.

Referring,  now, to the  merits  of the appeal from the order appointing a regular  administrator, the  question raised is whether  said  order contravenes Rule  81, section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading:

“Appointment of  special administrator.—When there is delay in granting letters testamentary  or  of administration occasioned  by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other  cause, the  court may  appoint  a  special  administrator to collect  and take charge of the  estate of the  deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and  executors or administrators thereupon appointed.”

Appellees maintain the negative, upon the ground that this section applies only  when the decedent has left a will directing the appointment of a particular person as executor thereof and  that  Exhibit C is silent  thereon;  but,  such pretense is not borne out by the text of the above-quote provision.  What is more, the authority therein given for the appointment of a special administrator, “when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, occasioned by an appeal  from the allowance or disallowance  of a will”—which is precisely the situation  obtaining in  the case at bar—”or  from any other cause”,  implies necessarily a denial of the  power to appoint a regular administrator during the pendency of said appeal. Indeed, what need would there be to appoint a special administrator,  if, at  any rate, a regular  administrator could, in the meanwhile, be properly appointed?

Appellees  stress the fact that they  represent, at least, two-thirds {2/3) of the  estate of the deceased,  and that, at best, appellant could have no more than one-third  (1/3) thereof, and, hence, a  minority  interest therein.   This is, however,  immaterial to  the issue  before us, for,  if Exhibit C were probated, such interest would be a factual reality and, hence, she would have an incontestable right to be heard on the choice of a regular administrator.   In the present case, she was even denied the opportunity to take remedial measures for the preservation of said right. She  prayed that action  on Cavanna’s  motion of October 30, 1952, be  deferred, because the allegations therein were not sufficiently concrete to enable  her to answer thereto. It was  alleged in said motion that the principals of Cavanna were  creditors  of the decedent, because  the latter had in his possession “ciertas cantidades” (certain sums) belonging to  them.   No averment was made as to amount, time, place, transaction or other circumstances which would reasonably permit the identification of the credits or sums referred to  in said motion.  Upon the  other hand, Cavanna’s principals  had  sued the  appellant in  civil  case No.  17610 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the recovery of P38,333.20 allegedly due from her by way of rentals of a real property leased to her by the decedent and Ramon V.  Ramirez, and  damages.  Appellant maintains that,  if  the  sum  of  money involved in such  civil case No.  17610 were the same  object of said motion of October 30, 1952, then she could  oppose  the latter upon the ground that the movants are not creditors of the deceased.  Hence, she sought a bill of particulars and urged the court to defer action until  the filing thereof and of her answer to said motion.  Instead, the court granted the motion, which was not even verified, in violation, not only of said Rule  81, Section 1, of  the Rules of Court, but, also, of the due process clause.

With respect to the second appeal (G. R. No. L-6602), it appears that Jose V.  Ramirez died  in Zurich, Switzerland, on October 20, 1951.  Four (4)  days later, or on October 24, 1951, Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo filed with the Clerk of the Court  of First Instance of  Manila,  the document Exhibit C.  The same consists of five (5) sheets. On  the  first, which appears  to be a cover,  the following is typewritten:


“TESTAMENTO CERRADO  Y ULTIMA  VOLUNTAD
DE
JOSE V. RAMIREZ

(JOSE VIVENCIO RAMIREZ Y MIRANDA)”


About two (2) inches below is a handwritten note, with signatures and rubric at the foot thereof, reading:

“NOTA:—Ademas de la hipoteca mencionada en la Clausula Tercera de este Testamento, debo ademas a  Mrs. A. M. Butte otra de P12,500.00 y una ultima de  P12,000.00 de Horacio garantizada por mi.

Las tres  obligaciones estan aim pendientes de pago  hoy 31 Enero 1949.

  (Sgd.)  J. V. RAMIREZ”

The other pages read as  follows:


“ORIGINAL

        Pagina, Primera (la)


TESTAMENTO CERRADO Y  ULTIMA VOLUNTAD DE
JOSE V.  RAMIREZ
……….(JOSE  VIVENCIO  RAMIREZ Y  MIRANDA)………….
_________

“EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS TODOPODEROSO, AMEN:

“Yo, Jose V.  Ramirez, de 69  anos de edad,, viudo, domiciliado temporalmente en  mi oficina, cuarto  No.  221 del  Samanillo  Bldg., Escolta No. 619, de la Ciudad de Manila, Islas Filipinas, hallandome en el cabal uso de mis  facultades mentales, con la capacidad necesaria para testar  y no obrando  en  virtud de amenza,  fuerza  6 influencia extrana  de persona alguna, por el presente, otorgo libre y voluntariamente  mi ultima voluntad  6  disposicion para despues de mi muerte en este  documento que declaro ser mi testamento cerrado, y  atestiquot  ………………………………………………………………………….. CAUSULA PRIMERA:—Declaro ser  bijo de Don  Jose Fausto  Ramirez y Dona Dolores Miranda, ambos ya difuntos,  haber nacido en esta Giudad de Manila, Islas Filipinas,  de nacionalidad fiilipina,  y haber contraido unicas nupcias con mi esposa Dona Eloisa  Eugenia de Marcaida, ya difunta, con quien he tenido cuatro hijos llamados Esperanza, Elsa, Lily y Horacio, todos vivo3 y inayores  de edad. La  primera se halla casada  con Don Modesto de  Cortabitarte, la segunda tambien casada con Don Hugo B. Chambers, la tercera viuda de Federico Ffannenschmidt; y eluarto soltero, todos residentes en la Ciudad de Manila ……………………………………………………………………
CLAUSULA SEGUNDA—Declaro tambien que he  nacido,  he vivido y quiero morir en el seno de la Iglesia Catolica Apostolica Romana, y eft mi deseo y asi ruego lue a mi muerte, mi entierro sea muy modesto,  se celebre una misa de cuerpo presente en  la Parroquia de mi ninez, la Iglesia de  Binondo, y se me  entierre  si muero en mi actual viudez, en el Lote qu«e poseemos en el Cementerio Cat61ico de la Loma,  y si  muriera estando casado por segunda vez,  deberan enterrarme donde mi viuda designare.  Si mi muerte occurriese en Europa,  deseo  que me  entierren en el  Mausoleo  de la familia Ramirez  en Asnieres Seino, Francia,  al lado de mi querido Padre


 “ORIGINAL
 

      Pagina Segunda (2a)

Don Jose Fausto  Ramirez;  todos estos actos deben celebrarse de acuerdo con las reglas  y ritos  de la Iglesia Catolica Apostolica Romana.   Deseo que una vez que mi cadaver este colocado en su ataud, se cierre este asi  como la ventanilla de cristal si hubiere enterrarme donde mi viuda designare.  Si  mi muerte oeeurriese en a los curiosos la faz del que ya se fue.  Al ido, dejarle en paz.

CLAUSULA TERCERA—Declare que poseo actualmente acciones de Central Luzon Milling  Co. Inc. y una participacion de una sexta parte  1/6  de  la  finca  situada  en  la  calle  Escolta  Nos.  161  al 169 y Plaza de Santa Cruz Nos. 1 al 31, de esta  Ciudad de Manila, detalladamente descrita  en el Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 69363 del Registro de Titulos de Manila, y que estos y otros que pueda  adquirir en lo sucesivo, y  existan a mi nombre al tiempo de mi muerte, ser4n el caudal  de mis propiedades, incluso los creditos y debitos que existan  anotados  en mis Libros de contabilidad,  asf como las  obligaciones (obligaciones) debidamente escrituradas ante Notario Publico aunque no estuviesen registradas, pues actualmente tengo  una obligaci6n hipotecaria no registrada  4 favor  de Dona Angela Montenegro viuda de Butte, que pudiera no estar  pagada si yo muriera antes del vencimiento convenido para el pago.”

CLAUSULA  CUARTA.—Nombro e instituyo como  mis herederos;

… amis  ya  nombrados cuatro  hijos  Esperanza, Elsa,  Lily y Horacio el primer UN tercio  (1/3) de la legitima, que les corresponde por partes  iguales.”

„.. a mis,  hijo  Horacio y cuatro nietes,  llamados Sonia y Aitor apellidados Cortabitarte, Doreen y Maureen appellidados Chambers, el  segundo UN  tercio  (1/3)  de la legitima para mejora, en  la  proportion  siguiente;   Una  tercera parte   de dicho UN  tercio para mejora, para Horacio; la otra tercera parte, para Sonia y Aitor; y la ultima tercera parte, para Doreen y Maureen, en partes iguales  los cuatro nietos, o para mayor claridad, una aexta (1/6) del UN tercio, para cada uno de mis nietos.”

….  a  mi   apreciada  amiga  Dona Angela  Montegro  viuda de Butte, el  restante un tercio (1/3) de libre disposicion, como sincero agradecimiento  por las desinteresadas y grandes ateneiones que he mereddo y sigo  mereciendo de ella, asi como por el apoyo moral y material que me ha brindado en los momento mas

“ORIGINAL

       Pagina  Tercera (3a)

criticos  de mi  vida.  Expontaneamente declaro  que  las atenciones referidas  me  han servido  para poder vivir  y sobrellevar con  menos dolor,  los sinsabores  que he experimentado y sigo  experimentado en  estos ultimos dias de mi existenda.”

….CLAUSULA QUINTA.—Unego  4 la caritativa  Dona Angela Montenegro viuda de Butte, haga la caridad de atender 4 mis desamparados primos  carnales Josefa y Vicente  apellidados  Butron y Miranda, ya de avanzada edad, 4 quienes siempre he dado una ayuda mensual, ruego repito, les  de si es posible una ayuda ¦mensual de viente pesos  (P20.00)  a la primera y dies pesos (P10.00)  al segundo, mientras vivan, como e3 mi proposito xnientras yo viva………..

.CLAUSULA SEXTA.—Declaro que este es el primer testamento que otorgo y por consiguiente, declaro nulo y sin efecto, cualquier otro testamento que apareciese con anterioridad a  esta fecha, siendo mi deliberada voluntad que al presente testamento, hasta que no se haya modificado por mi, se tenga como el unico testamento que exprese mi ultima voluntad, la cual deseo se cumpla exacta y fielmente en todas y cada una  de sus clausulas………….

“En Testimonio de todo lo cual, y  a los efectos que tuviere lagar,  firmo  esta  ultima ‘ voluntad y  testamento,  extendido en espanol que es el idioma que mas hablo y escribo a maquinilla por mi mismo, integrado de cuatro paginas utiles incluyendb la pagina final del atestiguamiento; firmo y rubrico al pie del mismo  asi como al margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las referidad  cuatro paginas, en preseneia de los testigos mas abajo aelacionados, quienes atestiguan todas y cada una de las cuatro paginas del mismo,  suscribiendo al pie del atestiguamiento y en al margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de la paginas en mi preseneia yen preseneia de todas y cada uno de ellos,  hoy veintiocho  (28)  de Agosto  de mil novecientos cuarenta y cuatro  (1944),  k las 11 de la mafiana, en esta Ciudad de Manila, Islas Filipinas………….

    (Sgd.)  “J. V. RAMIREZ
     Firma del Testador”

            “ATESTIGUA-


“ORIGINAL

      Pagina,  Cuarta (4a)

“MIENTO.

“Nosotros, Josi Ha. Cavanna, Juan Blanco y Arsenio Ventosa, todos mayores de edad y de esta Ciudad de Manila, declaramos y aflrmamos  solemnemente que  en el  documento preinserto conocido  como ultima voluntad y  testamento de  Don  JOSE  V.  RAMIREZ  ha sido  otorgado por este  Sefior, conocido por nosotros, sin que haya mediado violencia, intimidaci6n ni influencia extrana de ningun genero,  hallandose dicho  testador en el pleno  y cabal uso  de sus f acultades mentales, habiendose  redactado dicho testamento en espanol que es idioma que el y nosotros conocemos.

“Atestiguamos que  Don Jose V. Ramirez  ha suserito  su nombre al pie de  este testamento y ha fiimado en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de la cuatro paginas induyendo esta, en preseneia de todos y cada uno  de nosotros.  Las paginas de este  documento van numeradas correlativamente en la parte  superior con numeros.

“EN TESTIMONIO  DE TODO CUAL, lo suscribimoa tambien nosotros y lo finnamos al pie y al margen izquierdo de todas y cada ona de las  cuatro paginas de que consta este documento en  presencia del testador y en la de todos y cada uno de nosotros, hoy a veintioeho (28) de Agosto de mil nuevecientos  cuarenta y  cuatro (1944.)”

“(Sgd.)  Jose M. Cavanna (Sgd.)  J. Blanco
  Jose Ma.   Cavanna    Juan Blanco
(Sgd.)  Aksenio Ventosa
Arsenio   Ventosa”

On the left hand margin of each one of these four  (4) pages  (excluding the cover) the  signatures  and rubrics purporting to be those of Jose  V.  Ramirez, Jose Ma.  Cavanna, Juan Blanco  and Arsenio  Ventosa appear in  the order  given,  from the bottom  to the top.  As  already adverted to, a signature and  rubric, purporting to be those of the deceased Jose V. Ramirez, appears, also, at  the foot of the above quoted handwritten note on the cover of Exhibit C.

On October 27,1951, Jose Eugenio Ramirez de la Cavada, a  brother  of the deceased, filed, with said court, a petition for the probate of the aforementioned Exhibit C, as  the last  will and testament of  said  decedent.   His aforementioned legitimate children objected to the petition, upon the ground that  Exhibit C does not have  the conditions essential to its validity and has not been executed with the  requisite  formalities.  At the hearing of said petition, the following appeared: (a.)  Attys. Eiguren and Alcuaz, for the petitioner; (b)  Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, for the children and  grandchildren of the decedent;  and (c) Attys. Delgado and Flores, for appellant herein.  Oral and documentary evidence were introduced, the most  important for  purposes of this appeal,  being the testimony of Juan Blanco, Arsenio J. Ventosa, Jose Ma.  Cavanna, Vicente Alvarez and  Amadeo Cabe.

As soon as  Exhibit C was shown to  Juan Blanco,  he said—without examining its  contents—that he did not remember having  seen it before.  Upon being confronted with the signatures, on Exhibit C, reading “J. Blanco”, the witness admitted that they seem to be his signatures, adding,  however,  that he remembers nothing about it (“no tengo idea de esto”).  He testified, also,  that he had been an employee of the  decedent for many years; that he (witness)  was working in the office of the decedent, at the Samanillo Building, Escolta, Manila, on August 28, 1944, the date of Exhibit C; that the decedent was then in full  possession of his mental faculties; that the  signatures,, on Exhibit C, reading J. V. Ramirez, are genuine signatures of the decedent; that the “nota” on the cover of Exhibit C  is in decedent’s  handwriting;  that  the signatures on  Exhibit  C  reading Jose  M.  Cavanna and Arsenio Ventosa seem to be  the genuine signatures  of these persons.  Upon further questioning by  appellant’s counsel, the witness  admitted that the signatures on Exhibit C reading  F, Blanco and Jose M. Cavanna are his genuine signatures and  those  of  Atty.  Cavanna, respectively, but Blanco added that some one, whose identity he does not recall, brought the document to his desk, in the aforesaid office, and that he signed Exhibit C without reading it and without knowing what it was.

Arsenio J.  Ventosa  declared  that the signatures on Exhibit C, reading Arsenio Ventosa, look like, and seem to be, his signatures; that he neither admits nor denies the genuineness  thereof;  and that there is  no difference between said signatures and his genuine signatures, except that the former do not bear the initial “J” which he writes between his name  and surname.  It appears,  however, that  he, also,  used to sign without said initial—as indicated in the samples of his signatures, at different times, prepared by the witness in open court, and  marked as Exhibit D-l—although he claimed to have given up such practice many  years  before August 28, 1944.

Jose  M. Cavanna  identified his  signatures  and  those of the decedent on Exhibit C, but said that he remembered none  of  the details  surrounding  its execution,  although he assumed that the  legal formalities  must  have been complied with, for  otherwise he would  not have  affixed his signatures thereon.

Testifying for the appellant, Vicente  Alvarez declared that  he was a messenger of the decedent on August 28, 1944 and many years prior thereto; that, on said date, the decedent signed Exhibit C in his office, at Samanillo Building,  at the foot of  the third  page of the body thereof and on the left hand  margin of  the four (4) pages of which  it consists (excluding the cover, but including the attestation clause) in  his  presence and  that of Jose M. Cavanna, Juan Blanco and Arsenio Ventosa; and  that these attesting witnesses signed on the left hand margin of said four  (4) pages and at the foot of the attestation clause, in the  presence of each other and of the testator, as well as in his (Alvarez’) own presence.

Appellant introduced, also,  the testimony  of  Major Amadeo  Cabe, handwriting expert of the Manila Police Department, who asserted  that the signatures  on Exhibit C reading Arsenio Ventosa and the sample signatures of the latter on Exhibit D-l had been  written by one and the same hand.

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the lower court concluded that “the requirements of the law had not been complied with” in the execution of. Exhibit C and, accordingly,  denied  the  admission  thereof  to probate.  Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to agree with said conclusion for the following reasons, to wit:

  1. It is clear from the testimony of Juan Blanco, Jose M. Cavanna and Vicente Alvarez that the signatures on Exhibit C, reading  “J.  V.  Ramirez”,  are authentic signatures oi the  decedent.  Indeed, in opposing the  probate of Exhibit C,  his children do not question the genuineness of the  signatures thereon of their deceased father.  What is more, the latter’s own brother applied for the admission of Exhibit C to probate, thus indicating ^that he believed these signatures to  be authentic.

  2. The  signatures on Exhibit C, reading  “J.  Blanco” and “Jose M. Cavanna” are, likewise, genuine.  Both admitted this fact, although reluctantly, on the part of Juan Blanco.

  3. The signatures on Exhibit 0, reading “Arsenio Ventosa” are, also, authentic.  Arsenio  J. Ventosa declared that they look like, and seem to be, his signatures.  He even admitted that there is no difference  between  the former and the latter,  except that his middle initial  “J” does not appear in  the former.  It appears, however, that he used to sign without said middle initial, and, although he claims to have given up such practice many years ago, the testimony of Major Cabe,  and a comparison of Ventosa’s admittedly genuine signatures  on Exhibits D-l, E and E-l,  with the aforementioned signatures on Exhibit C, leave no room for doubt on the latter’s genuineness.

  4. Jose  M.  Cavanna  stated  that he assumed that  the requisites formalities must have been complied  with, for, otherwise,  he would  not have  affixed  his1 signatures on Exhibit C.   Indeed, the decedent, Juan Blanco and Arsenio Ventosa were, on August 28, 1944, working in the same office, at the Samanillo Building, Escolta, Manila.  Moreover, the first used to  send for his, counsel, Jose M.  Cavanna, whenever the services of the latter were needed. Hence, in the  ordinary course  of events, Atty. Cavanna would have been called, and would have gone, to the office of the decedent.  In short,, inasmuch as each and every one of them were  in the same place, at the time of  the execution  of Exhibit C, and both the testator  and Atty. Cavanna were well posted on the formalities essential to the validity of wills, it was only natural and logical for the  testator  and the attesting  witnesses to sign on  Exhibit C in the presence of each other.

  5. According to  Mr.  Cavanna, he  was very  careful in the observance of the legal requirements,  so much so that, as a matter of policy, he saw to it that attesting witnesses signed in the following order,  namely: first—immediately after the testator—the youngest; then the oldest; and last, the one whose  age is intermediate between both.  The signatures on the left hand margin of  the four (4) pages of Exhibit C  (excluding the cover) appear to have been written in such order, from the bottom to  the top—the decedent’s  at  the  bottom; then comes that  of Cavanna, 53 years of age; next is the signature  of Blanco, 74 years of age; and last the signature of Ventosa,  68 years of age.  These witnesses  signed, also, at  the foot of the attestation clause in the same order: on the left  (immediately below said clause),  Cavanna; on  the  right,  Blanco; and midway between, but below, both, Ventosa.  It is apparent that the aforementioned practice of Cavanna was  strictly adhered to in Exhibit  C and that, accordingly, he must have supervised its execution and seen  to it that the same took place  in accordance with law.

  6. The  signatures of the  attesting  witnesses,  appear to have been  written  with the same  pen and  ink, thus indicating  that  they were affixed on  the same occasion and in the presence of each one of the signatories to Exhibit  C.

  7. According to  Cavanna, the decedent was a very cautious  and methodical,  and this  is fully born out  by the record.  Thus:

(a) He typed Exhibit C personally.

(b) On  the cover and on  “Pagina  Primera  (1-a)” thereof, he specified that it was a closed (“Cerrado”) will.

(c) Below his name  “Jose V. Ramirez” (in both fcages) he typed, in parenthesis, his full names and surnames ” (Jose Vivencio Ramirez y Miranda)”.

(d) On the upper margin of each one of the four (4) pages (excluding the cover), he affixed, in lavender  ink, a rubber stamp reading “original”.

(e) On the right side of  said  margin he typed, uniformly,  the page number, in  words and figures: “Pdgina

Primera (l-a)”t Pagina Segunda  (2a)”,  Pagina Tercera

(3a)” and  Pagina Quarta (4a)”,  all underlined, Capitalizing  the first letter of  each word, with an accent on the first “a” of “Pagina”, and a dot under the letter “a” in (la),  (2a), (3a), and  (4a).

(f)  The wording of Exhibit C is carefully chosen.

(g) In the opening  paragraph  thereof, he set forth the circumstances establishing his capacity to make a will.

(h.) in its first clause, he stated the facts pertinent to his birth, marriage and children.

(i)  The  second clause, dealing with the arrangements for his funeral, contained special provisions for the event of his death, either while a widower, or should he contract a  second marriage,  or  while abroad,  with the  express direction that his casket, including its glass opening, if any, be closed “y no se abra mas, evitando asi la irreverente costumbre de exponer a los curiosos, la faz del que ya se fue”, .al ido, dejarle en paz  *  *   *.

(j)  The third clause described his estate, without overlooking such property as may subsequently be acquired and may exist at the time  of his  death, as well as his debts,  including his obligations

“debidamente escrituradas ante Notario Publico aunque no estuviesen registradas, pues actualmente tengo una obligation hipotecaria no registrada a favor de Dona Angela Montenegro Viuda de Butte, que pudiera no estar pagada si  yo muriera antes del vencimiento convenido para el pago”.

(k)  In. the fourth clause,  he named his heirs and their respective shares:  (1)  one-third of  his  estate,  or  the strict legitime, to be divided equally among his four children, (2) his only son and his four  (4)  grandchildren shall get the “mejora” portion,  in the proportion of one-third (1/3)  for the former,  and one  (1/6) for each one of the latter; and  (3) the appellant shall inherit the free portion.

(l)  In the fifth clause, he asked appellant to help his poor relatives therein named.

(m)  In the sixth  and last clause, he declared explicitly that Exhibit C is the first and only will ever executed by him.

(n) The closing paragraph  describes  in detail the formalities with which Exhibit C was executed, strictly in accordance with law.

(o)  This was reiterated  in  the  attesting clause.

(p) Each paragraph of Exhibit C is closed with dashes, evidently, to forestall,  insertions therein.

(q)  Obviously, for the same purpose, dashes precede the opening phrase of each clause.

(r)  He  typed the  incomplete  word  “atestigua”  at the foot of “P&gina Tercera  (3a)”, and placed the last two syllables (“miento”)  of said word on the left top margin of “Pagina Ctuarta  (4d)”, likewise to avoid substitution of the last page.

(s)  Upon  its execution,  Exhibit C was placed in the envelope Exhibit C-3,  which  was sealed with a sealing wax.   A carbon copy of Exhibit C, marked Exhibit S,  on which a rubber stamp, reading “duplicado”, appears, was placed in another envelope (Exhibit S-1), which was similarly sealed.   On both envelopes he had typed the following:

“TESTAMENTO CERRADO Y ULTIMA VOLUNTAD  DE JOSE V. RAMIREZ (JOSE VIVENCIO RAMIREZ Y  MIRANDA)

Para ser abierto solamente despues de mi muerte”

His  signature  appears, also, at the foot of these inscriptions.   The two  (2)  envelopes were kept in decedent’s safe in the Samanillo  Building.

(t)   On January 31,  1949,  he opened said envelopes at one end thereof, without breaking the aforementioned wax seals.  Thereupon, he  wrote,  on  the cover  of Exhibit C, the “nota”  transcribed  on page seven (7)  hereof. Then  he placed Exhibit C insides Exhibit C-3, -and Exhibit S  inside Exhibit S-1,  and wrote, below the above- quoted inscriptions on  said Exhibits C-3 and  S-1:

“Abierto por mi hoy 31 Enero 1949 para inscribir una Nota en la cubierta del mismo.

  (SGD)  J. V, RAMIREZ”


Thereafter, Exhibit C-3, containing Exhibit C, was placed in another envelope, marked  Exhibit C-2, on  which he typed:

“TESTAMENTO CERADO  Y  ULTIMA VOLUNTAD DE JOSE V.  RAMIREZ  (JOSE VIVENCIO RAMIREZ Y MIRANDA)

Para ser abierto solamente despues de mi muerte.

Then, he signed at the foot thereof, and wrote “31 Enero 1949” under his  signature.

Exhibit S-1, containing Exhibit S, was, in turn, placed inside the  envelope Exhibit S-2,  on which the  following appears, in his handwriting:

“Duplicado del Testamento Cerrado de J. V. Ramirez para ser abierto solamente’ despues de mi nraerte. El Original esta en poder de Mrs. A. M. Butte.

(Sgd.)  J. V. Ramirez
     31 Enero 1949″    

Said Exhibits  C-2 and  S-2, were, likewise,  sealed with sealing wax.

(u) Before his last trip  to  Europe, for medical treat’ ment, the decedent delivered Exhibit C-2 (with  Exhibits C and C-l  therein) to Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, with instructions to act in accordance with  law, in the event of his death.   The decedant left Exhibit S-2 (containing Exhibits S  and S-l) in the possession of his son-in-law and attorney-ih-fact, Modesto  de  Cortabitarte.

It is inconceivable that  one who  prepared  Exhibits C and S and handled it with such extreme care, should fail to observe the  very formalities which he described in said instrument with scrupulous accuracy.

  1. The decedent  had  a high sense of honor and integrity.  He had no possible  reason to state one thing in Exhibit C, in order to do something else.  He had a perfect legal right to dispose of his estate in the manner therein set forth.   He could have had no motive, therefore, to advisedly  commit irregularities in the  execution thereof.
  2. In an effort to approach the subject  from all  conceivable angles,  we  have  even considered the  question whether he  may have prepared  Exhibit C  for the sole purpose of pleasing the appellant, with no intent,  on his part, of executing it as his last will and testament, and, for such reason,  refrained purposely from complying with the formalities essential to  its validity.  Such possibility cannot  reasonably be entertained,  however,  without detracting from his established probity and decency.  Besides, he  would  not have taken pains in inserting the  details appearing  in Exhibit C, had he not meant the same to be his last will.   Neither would he have displayed the caution adverted to  above, in placing  Exhibits  C and S  in  the envelopes,  Exhibits C-3 and S-l; in sealing the same; in later opening both envelopes; in writing the note3 already referred to on Exhibits C, C-3 and S-l; in placing Exhibits C and C-3 inside Exhibit  C-2, and Exhibits S  and S-l inside S-2; in sealing Exhibits C-2 and S-2; and in writing on  Exhibit S-l the inscription appearing thereon.   Again, before his  last trip to Europe, he wotdd not have delivered said envelope, Exhibit S-3 containing Exhibit Cs duplicate, Exhibit S, and its envelope Exhibit S-l; to his son-in-law and attomey-in-fact,  Modesto Cortabitarte.  This particular act clearly evinced  the  intent of the decedent to give due course to Exhibit C as his  last  will and testament.
  3. Despite the testimony of Juan Blanco, to the effect that he signed Exhibit C on his own desk, without knowing its contents,  and, presumably, without the presence of the  testator  and the other attesting witnesses, we  are satisfied, from all the evidence presented, that said instrument was executed in the manner required by law.

Indeed, the very appellees assert that  Juan Blanco  has committed numerous contradictions,  which is  a fact (appellees’ brief, p. 37).  Moreover, the decedent, Blanco and Ventosa were working in the same office and Atty. Cavanna had evidently gone thereto, upon the request of the first, his client.  Thus, being together, it would be absurd to believe that the decedent did not cause Exhibit C to be signed by them, in the presence of each other.   Again, the genuineness of the signatures on Exhibit C  has been  established beyond any possible  doubt.  This  and the fact that  the testator and  Atty. Cavanna were well posted on the formalities essential to the  validity of wills, suffice to  raise the presumption that said formalities have been complied with.

“With respect to the  will now in question a prima facie case for  the establishment of the  document was  made out when it appeared that  the instrument  itself  was  properly  drawn  and attested and that all of  the  signatures  thereto  are authentic. These facts  raise  a presumption  of regularity;  and  upon these facts alone the will should  be admitted  to probate in the absenee of proof showing that some fatal irregularities occurred. And such irregualrity  must, be proved by  a preponderance of the evidence before probate  can be denied.”  (Fernandez  vs. Tantoco,  49 Phil., 380, 385.)

“* * * When  it appears from  the evidence that the  signatures to a will is  the genuine signature of  the testator and that the  attesting witnesses subscribed  in his presence,  a  prima facie case is  made in favor of the due  execution  of the  will;  and this prima facie  case   is not overcome  by  the  mere  fact that  the subscribing witnesses  testify that  they failed to  notice whether or  not  the will was  signed.” (I Alexander’s Commentaries on Wills, pp.  694-695.)

“A rebuttable presumption of  the due  execution of a will  which purports to  be signed by the  testator and  the requisite  number of attesting witnesses  arises on proof of the genuinensess of  the signatures  of the  testator and the witnesses, at least where  the will contains a complete attestation clause reciting  an observance of all statutory requirements in the execution of  wills.  *  *  *.

*           *           *           *           *           *

“The  presumption of due execution  which arises on proof of  the signatures of the testator and the witnesses to a  will containing an attestation clause which  recites  an observance of the statutory requirements  for the execution  of  a  will  exists,  notwithstanding there is  a failure  of memory on the part of the witnesses  as to the facts of  execution.  As  stated,  the presumption  does not need the  support of the affirmative memory of  a subscribing witness.” (57  Am. Jur.,  pp.  576-577.))”

This presumption has  been abundantly bolstered up  by the  other circumstances  adverted to above.

Upon the other hand, the attitude of the attesting witnesses is readily understandable.  Appellant is a stranger to the family of the deceased, whereas said attesting witnesses have a special  attachment to the members thereof. Thus, Juan Blanco and his wife were first cousins of the deceased wife of Don Jose V. Ramirez,  and, hence, are uncles of his children.  Apart from  having been an  employee of the deceased, Arsenio J. Ventosa used to work for his (decedent’s)  son-in-law, Modesto  de Cortabitarte. In fact, when Ventosa took the witness stand, one of his children was an employee of Mr. Cortabitarte.  Atty. Cavanna had, for  many  years, been counsel for the Ramirez family.  He still treats  Mr.  Cortabitarte  as his  “jefe”. What is more, Horacio Ramirez, one of the children of the deceased, is a business partner of Mr.  Cavanna.  As pointed out above, Mr. Cavanna is, also, the attorney-in-fact for other relatives  of the deceased.  Under these conditions, it is only  natural that they should be biased against the appellant—whom they evidently regard  as an intruder— and against the legacy in her favor, which they, in “all probability, consider immoral.  In fact, Mr. Cavanna was critical of the very private life of the decedent, whom he characterized as not being a practical Catholic.

However, the decedent had  a perfect  legal right, to dispose of the  free  portion of his estate  in  favor of whomsoever he shall choose,  subject to  the limitations imposed by law, none of which are applicable to the case at bar.  Besides, it is our bounden duty  to  enforce such law and  it would  be immoral—apart from illegal—for us not to  do so, if we  felt,  as we do, that  the requisite formalities had been  complied with.

In Florentino vs.  Francisco  (57 Phil.,  742, 750-751), it was held:

“When a will is contested it  is the duty of the proponent  to call all of  the attesting witnesses,  if available, but  the validity of the will in no  wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of  the will rests.   (Fernandez vs.  Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380).  It is sufficient if  the court is  satisfied from all the proof that the will  was executed and  attested in the  manner required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will  was properly executed and the order admitting it to probate was  entirely proper.”

This view was,  in effect, incorporated in Rule  77, section 11,  of the Rules  of Court, reading:

“If the will is  contested, all the subscribing witnesses present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and  the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily  shown to the court.  If all or some of the  subscribing witnesses are present  in the Philippines but outside the  province where the will has been filed, their deposition must.be taken.  If all or some of the  subscribing witnesses  produced and examined testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are  otherwise of  doubtful credibility, the will may be  allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner  required by law.”

In line with the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the lower court erred in denying the admission of Exhibit C to  probate, and that the  latter  should be allowed.

Wherefore,  the orders  appealed from are hereby  reversed and said Exhibit C is hereby  admitted to probate, as the  last will and  testament  of the deceased  Jose V. Ramirez, with the  costs  of  both instances against the appellees.   It is so  ordered.

Paras,  C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, Reyes, J. B.  L., Endenda, and Felix, JJ., concur.






Date created: October 13, 2014




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