MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL L. MORATO (IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MTRCB) AND THE MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, RESPONDENTS.

At issue in this petition is the citizen’s right of access to
official records as guaranteed by the constitution.

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records
officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board’s records
pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members
after a review of the movies and television productions.  It is on the basis of said slips that films
are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.

Acting on the said request, the records officer informed
petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.

Petitioner’s request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board
sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual
voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal.  It is
the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must
first secure his (the member’s) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes
to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable
conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to
deny any citizen seeking examination of the board’s records.

On February 27, 1989,
respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the
MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner.  In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance
from the chairman.  Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner’s request to
examine the voting slips.  However, it
was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the
decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive
Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato
for appropriate comment.

Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a
board meeting held on June 22, 1989.  In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on
the movie “Mahirap ang
Magmahal” notwithstanding the fact that said
movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification
“R-18 without cuts”.  He
explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review
Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June
22, 1988) which allows the chairman of the board “to downgrade a film
(already) reviewed especially those which are controversial.”

Petitioner informed the Board, however,
that respondent Morato possesses no authority to
unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).

After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary
to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest
respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally
reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the
constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof
is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).

The Justice Secretary’s opinion to the contrary notwithstanding,
respondent Morato opted to ignore it.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following:

“A.        MORATO AND THE
MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME
VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

“B.        MTRCB
RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL
DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS

“C.        MORATO AND THE
MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF
1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION
NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN EXCESS OF
THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.”

Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB
Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally
downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial
and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly
confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee
which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of
the members of the committee that reviewed the film.

Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should
be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

We disagree.  The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies simply provides that before a party
litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all
administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals,
165 SCRA 344 [1988]).  The rationale
behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of
practical considerations, comity and convenience, the courts of law will not
entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by
law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample
opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative
level.  If the error is rectified,
judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute.  The
applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as:  1) when no administrative review is provided
by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte
v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v.
Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing
v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA
340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v.
Veterans’ Backpay Commission [1969]; ; 4) where the
challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive
(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969];
National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963];
5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that  would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742
[1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo,
108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical
and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino,
43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).

The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence,
the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by
respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect.  At any rate, records are replete with events
pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in
the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to
filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary
and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). 
Respondents’ claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies must therefore fail.

Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by
respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues
raised by petitioner.  In this regard, We find respondents’ refusal to allow petitioner to examine
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review
committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner’s constitutional right of access to
public records.  More specifically, Sec.
7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:

“The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized.  Access
to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” (underscoring supplied)

As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this consitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies “the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right
and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.  Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary Act of the Legislature (Id. at p.
165).  What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28).” (See
also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136
SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte,
Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the
members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual
voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or
television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private
and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.

The term private has been defined as “belonging to or
concerning, an individual person, company, or interest”; whereas, public
means “pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large” (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]).  May the decisions of respondent Board and the
individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered
private?  Certainly
not.  As may be gleaned from the
decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no
doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office created
to serve public interest.  It being the
case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy.  The right to privacy belongs to the
individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or
officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.)
There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to
be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official functions.  To declare otherwise
would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of
protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting
slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but
rather public in character.  They are,
therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. 
Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on
the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody
of the official records sought to be examined. 
The constitutional recognition of the citizen’s right of access to
official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of
the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.  As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383
[1948]):

“Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the
duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records.  It is not their prerogative to see that the
information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it.  If
it be wrong to publish the contents
of the records, it is the legislature
and not the officials having custody thereof
which is called upon to devise a
remedy.” (underscoring supplied)

It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case
of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra,
upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in
Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended).  Consequently, We see
no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized,
should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundamental law
mandates.

The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standarads for Public Officials and Employees) which
provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of
official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door
Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court.  Suffice it to state, however, that the
exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar.  Petitioner’s request is not concerned with
the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made
after a decision or order has been rendered. 
Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or
matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right
of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra).

We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by
respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD
1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially those
which are controversial.  The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:

“SECTION 4.  Decision. – The
decision of the BOARD either approving or disaproving
for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still
and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview
must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from
the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose x x x.

“For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall
designate a sub-committee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake
the work of review.  Any disapproval or
deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so
designated.  After receipt of the written
decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be
made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee of
five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on
behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members
so designated and present at the second review session.  This second review session shall be presided
over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. 
The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered
within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for
reconsideration.

“Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture,
television program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must
be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval.  No film or motion picture intended for
exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on
television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject
matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its
entirety.

“The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the
exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or
television program in its entirety which shall be appealable
to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be
assisted either by an ad hoc committee he may create or by the Appeals
Committee herein created.

“An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the
Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its
recommendation to the President.  The
Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the
Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.

“The decision of the President of the Philippines on any
appealed matter shall be final.”

Implementing Rules and Regulations

“SECTION 11.  Review by Sub-Committee of Three.  – a) A proper application having been filed,
the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate
a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to
the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed application.  The Sub-Committee shall then preview the
motion picture subject of the application.

“b).  Immediately after
the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the
results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee.  After reaching a decision, the Sub?Committee
shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision
giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain
cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification.  The decision shall be in writing, stating, in
case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired
or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the
classification considered by the Sub-Committee memeber
dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.

“c)  The decision
including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the
Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant.

“SECTION 12.  Review by Sub-Committee of Five.  – Within five days from receipt of a copy of
the decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the
applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that
decision.  On receipt of the motion, the
Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which
shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion,
conduct a second preview of the film. 
The review shall; to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure
provided in the preceding section.

“SECTION 13.  Reclassification.  – An applicant desiring a change in the
classification rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three?  or Committee of Five
mentioned in the immediately preceding two sections may re-edit such film an
apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification.

“SECTION 14.  Appeal.  – The decision of the Committee of Five Board
Members in the second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision
disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may
himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of
the President for adjudication.

On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman
are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows:

“SEC. 5.  Executive Officer.  – “The Chairman of the BOARD shall be
the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. 
He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:

“(a)   Execute, implement and enforce the decisions,
orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD;

“(b)   Direct and supervise the operations and the
internal affairs of the BOARD;

“(c)  Establish the internal organization and
administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the
appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and

“(d)   Exercise such other powers and functions and
perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD.”

It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of
PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB,
is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a
decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or
television programs.

The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as
“General Patronage” or “For Adults Only” is vested with the
respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD
1986).  As Chief Executive Officer,
respondent Morato’s function as Chairman of the Board
calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of
the decisions or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.).  The power of classification having been
reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to
exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not
transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of
another.  Delegata
potestas non potest delegari – a delegated power cannot be delegated.  And since the act of classification involves
an exercise of the Board’s discretionary power with more reason the Board
cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an
established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a
subject of delegation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.  Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by
the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Medialdea,
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., no part.

Romero, J., did not take part
in the deliberations.