G.R. No. 85771. November 19, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BAYANI DE LOS REYES Y PUSTIGO, @ “ANIE”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At his arraignment on 17
June 1987[1]
in Criminal Case No. ML-240 of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Third Judicial Region, accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty to an Information charging him and one Mando
Doe with the crime of Robbery with Rape, committed as follows:
x x
x
“That on or about October 15, 1986 at nighttime purposely
sought to better accomplish their criminal design in Mariveles,
Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to gain, did then and there with the use of
firearm (sic) and bladed weapon willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab,
divest and carry away one (1) Seiko Five Man’s Wrist Watch, valued at P500.00;
one (1) gold ring with diamond stones, worth P500.00; and cash money in the sum
of P500.00, belonging to Emily R. Punzalan, one (1) Seiko
Five Men’s (sic) Wrist Watch, gold plated and one (1) military ID amounting to
P1,200.00, belonging to Graciano Hernandez, against
the will and without the consent of the said owners, to their damage and
prejudice in the total sum of P2,700.00 and the said robbery was accompanied by
rape, that is by means of force, intimidation and abuse of superior strength
while armed with a bladed weapon, the accused Bayani
de los Reyes, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the offended party, Emily R. Punzalan,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW:
Balanga, Bataan, May 22, 1987.”[2]
x x
x
The other accused was not brought to the
jurisdiction of the court and remains at large.
After trial on the merits, the trial court[3]
promulgated on 13 October 1988 a decision[4]
finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with rape as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 767, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the offended
party, Emily R. Punzalan, in the amount of P25,000.00 and to pay her the amount of P500.00 for the cash money stolen from
her which was not recovered; and to pay the proportionate share of the costs.
The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
x x x
“WHEREFORE, the Court
finds the accused Bayani de los
Reyes y Pustigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation of the crime of robbery with rape as defined
and penalized under Article 294, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 767, and as charged in the information, with the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, without any mitigating
circumstance to off-set the same, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and ordering him to indemnify the offended party Emily Punzalan
in the amount of P25,000.00, and to pay the latter the amount of P500.00 for
the cash money stolen from her and unrecovered,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
proportionate share of the costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Immediately after the promulgation, accused-appellant (hereinafter referred to as
Appellant), filed a Notice of Appeal wherein he manifested his intention
to appeal from the decision to the Court of Appeals on questions of facts and law.[5]
Obviously, the appeal should be presented to this Court.[6]
Quite correctly, however, the trial court forwarded to this Court the records
of the case and, in Our Resolution of 11
January 1989,[7]
We accepted the appeal.
The facts of the case are sufficiently summarized in the Brief
for the People as follows:
“At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of 15 October 1986,
private complainant Emily Punzalan went out of her
house in San Isidro, Mariveles, Bataan,
to collect payment for the ‘tocino‘ which she had
sold on credit to a certain Cora Haluot. (tsn, 6 August 1987, pp. 8-9; tsn, 27 August
1987, pp. 6, 11). She
encountered her friend of around 10 years, the other private complainant, Graciano Hernandez, in the canteen of her house, and since
it was payday they invited each other to supper. (tsn, 27 August 1987, pp. 16-17). After eating supper in an eatery near the
municipal building, they proceeded to the house of Cora Haluot
at Bonifacio Street. (id., p. 6). Cora Haluot was not
around, so private complainant Emily Punzalan invited
the other private complainant Graciano Hernandez, to
enjoy the breeze at the old pier along Bonifacio Street. (tsn, 6 August 1987, pp. 7-8; tsn, 27 August
1987, p. 19; tsn, 10 September 1987, p. 4). While there, private complainant Emily Punzalan happened to sit down on a rock with feces. (tsn, 6 August 1987, p. 8). So Emily removed her soiled pants to wash it
off with sea water. (id., pp.
8-9). When she was about to wash her
pants, accused-appellant Bayani de los Reyes and another accused, a certain Mando, approached them.
(id., p. 9).
Accused-appellant Bayani de los Reyes informed the couple that they (the two accused)
were barangay tanods, and
that strolling around the pier was prohibited.
(id., p. 9). Private
complainant Emily Punzalan retorted that how could it
be so when the pier was a public place, while private complainant Graciano Hernandez apologized, saying that he was not aware
of any such prohibition, and that they were not ‘katalo‘. (id., p. 10). Soon thereafter, the two accused walked some
5 meters away from the two private complainants, during which period of time
Emily Punzalan hurriedly put on her soiled
pants. She was about to button the same,
when the accused returned and collared them (the private complainants). (id.; tsn, 1 October 1987, p. 6). Mando pointed a gun
at private complainant Graciano Hernandez while
accused-appellant Bayani de los
Reyes pulled the hair, and pointed a dagger at the left side of the neck, of
private complainant Emily Punzalan, at the same time
pulling the latter to the cemented portion of the old pier some 12 meters away
from the other two. (tsn,
6 August 1987, pp. 10-11; tsn, 10 September
1987, pp. 19-22; tsn, 1 October 1987, p. 7).
Upon reaching the cemented portion of the pier, accused-appellant Bayani de los Reyes ordered, with
the dagger still pointed at the left side of the neck of private complainant
Emily Punzalan, the latter to lie down and to remove
her pants and panty, to which the latter, being so frightened, complied. (tsn, 6 August 1987, pp. 11-12; tsn, 10 September
1987, p. 24). After removing
his pants, the accused-appellant, then, placed himself on top of private
complainant Emily Punzalan, who was crying
helplessly, and ‘[h]is organ went in and out of [private complainant Emily Punzalan’s] organ’ for about 15 minutes; after which,
accused-appellant ordered said private complainant, to put on her panty and
pants. (tsn, 6 August 1987, pp. 12-13; tsn. 10 September
1987; pp. 25, 27).
Accused-appellant, then, brought private complainant Emily Punzalan to the other two.
(tsn, 6
August 1987, p. 13). Accused
Mando asked private complainant Emily Punzalan if she has a residence certificate, to which the
latter replied in the negative. (id.)
Frisking Emily Punzalan from her breasts to her
private parts, accused Mando removed, upon
instruction of the accused-appellant, private complainant’s P500.00 from her
wallet. (id., pp. 13-14). Furthermore, accused Mando,
likewise upon instruction of the accused-appellant Bayani
de los Reyes, took Emily Punzalan’s
white gold ring with three diamond stones and Seiko black dial watch, and private complainant Graciano Hernandez’ Seiko gold-plated watch and military
ID. (id., pp. 14-15; tsn, 1 October
1987, p. 7).
Subsequently, accused-appellant Bayani de
los Reyes told accused Mando
to get a ‘banca.’ (tsn, 6 August 1987, p. 15). Private complainant Emily Punzalan
pleaded with the two accused to take pity on them and said that they will just
forget the incident. (id.) The
accused-appellant was willing to allow private complainant Emily Punzalan to go home (in fact, he wanted her to go home
naked) so long as the other private complainant, Graciano
Hernandez, would stay behind. (id., pp. 15-16). Pleading with the two accused, the two
private complainants were finally allowed to go home with their assurance that
they will forget the incident. (id., tsn,
10 September 1987, p.
28). Private complainant Emily Punzalan got home at past 10:00
o’clock in the evening. (tsn, 6 August 1987,
p. 16).
The following day, 16 October 1986, the two complainants reported
the incident to the Mariveles Police Station, private
complainant Emily Punzalan identifying her assailant
as a fully bearded man, upon which information, the investigating officer,
P/Cpl. Isidro Ruiz, immediately called his fellow policemen, boarded a vehicle,
proceeded to the place of the incident, and upon information gathered from an
informant, contacted the wife of accused-appellant Bayani
de los Reyes, who voluntarily surrendered to him the
two watches and the ring belonging to the two private complainants. (id., pp. 18, 27-28; tsn, 1 October
1987, p. 11; tsn, 11 November 1987, pp. 20-21).
Upon advice, Emily Punzalan proceeded to the Municipal Health Office in front
of the Municipal Hall and was examined by Dr. Willie Calimbas
at about 9:00 o’clock that
morning. (tsn,
6 August 1987, pp. 20-21;
Exhibit B, p. 236, Records).
When the complaint was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles for preliminary investigation, the wife and
mother of accused-appellant Bayani de los Reyes approached private complainant Emily Punzalan repeatedly for the settlement of the case. (tsn, 6 August 1987, pp. 23-27). They even went to the house of the private
complainant; but, since the latter’s parents were not informed of the incident
which had happened to their daughter, said private complainant, to get rid of the
two visitors, told them that she had
forgiven the accused-appellant, and, upon the suggestion from the two, agreed
to follow them to the Municipal Building to sign the necessary papers for the
dismissal of the case against the accused-appellant. (id., pp. 24-25). Emily Punzalan did
not follow the wife and mother of accused-appellant since it was never her
intention to withdraw from the case. (id.,
p. 25). At another time, the mother and
the wife of the accused-appellant visited private complainant Emily Punzalan at her workplace in the Pasig
Textile factory (Mariveles, Bataan) (id., p. 26). On that occasion, they offered to double the
P500.00 taken from, and gave a wristwatch to, said private complainant, which
the latter refused, saying that it was not her birthday. (id.).”[8]
Dr. Calimbas recorded[9]
the following findings at the time he conducted the medical examination of
Emily Punzalan:
“1. Abrasion along the
vertebral line at the level of the lumbar area back.
2. Contusion entero medical aspect lower 3rd level of the thigh left.
3. Contusion and abrasion
superficial around the vaginal area.
4. Hymen — with caruncles.
5. Vaginal wall — slightly
hyperamic.
Smear done — negative.
Vaginal discharge — perivaginal orifice.”
Upon the other hand, appellant presented a different version of
what transpired on the night the crime charged was committed. His version, as summarized in his Brief, is
as follows:
“In the evening of October 15, 1986, while accused-appellant,
a fisherman and his wife were strolling along the old pier at Bonifacio street in Mariveles,
they caught a couple, completely naked, making love inside a banca which they own.
They recognized the couple, Emily Punzalan and
Graciano Hernandez, as both of them live near their
place (TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 5).
As it was the very same banca which he
uses to earn a living, accused-appellant felt insulted and thus berated the
couple. The couple apologized, but
accused-appellant could not be restrained.
To teach the couple a lesson, he took their clothes and brought it home
with him.
Upon reaching home, accused-appellant placed the confiscated
clothes under his bed and immediately left again to report the incident to a barangay councilman.
Failing to find the barangay councilman, he
proceeded to the house of a policeman residing in their barangay,
who in turn told him that he (the policeman) would take care of
everything. When accused-appellant
returned to his home, he found out that his wife, taking pity on the couple,
returned back the confiscated clothes (TSN, January 28, 1988, p. 26).
In the early morning of the following day, accused-appellant while
preparing his fishing equipment, found under his bed wristwatches and a ring
wrapped in a handkerchief.
Accused-appellant entrusted the wristwatches and the ring to Cpl. Isidro
Ruiz of the Mariveles police, who in turn promised to
deliver the same to the owners. (TSN,
February 17, 1988, p. 8).”[10]
In finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged, the trial
court made the following well-written findings and conclusions:
x x x
“Judging from the
attendant circumstances, the Court is inclined to give more credence to the
prosecution’s version of the incident which is consistent with the material
and physical facts of the case.
To begin with, complainants Graciano and
Emily have positively identified the accused as one of the two malefactors who
staged the robbery-rape in question.
This identification is even more reinforced by the confirmation of the
accused placing himself at the scene of the crime during its commission. The sequence of events would reveal that said
complainants have had ample opportunity of having a good look at the accused.
Firstly, when they were initially accosted by said accused during which a short
conversation transpired between them; secondly, when the accused upon
departing, momentarily returned and again accosted them and it was at this
juncture that the rape on Emily was committed; and, thirdly, when finally the
accused divested them of their personal effects. More particularly, since Emily
was the victim of the assault herself, she thus came face to face with her
abuser. This is another clinching factor
that enabled her to recollect, if not retain a clear memory of the face of said
accused. ‘It is the natural reaction of
every victim of criminal violence to strive to know the identity of the
assailant’ (People vs. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109 (1962);
People vs. Catipon, G.R. Nos. L-49264-66, Oct. 9, 1985).
What further made recognition much easier is the illumination coming from the
public hospital some 14 meters away which gave Emily a clearer view of the accused’s facial features.
Besides, the accused made no effort to cover his face or resort to any
disguise when perpetrating the crime. As
held by the Supreme Court: ‘Where clear
and positive identification is made by the People’s witnesses regarding the
participation of the accused in the crime against him, his denial and
explanation cannot overcome such evidence.
(People vs. Chavez, et al., 81
OG No. 16. p. 1612).
There is nothing in the records that would show that complainant
Emily had any bias or prejudice against the accused. Her court testimony was given in a direct,
coherent and forthright manner and devoid of any suspicious circumstance. The Court finds no marked inconsistencies in
her court declaration as contrasted to and which substantially dovetails with
what she narrated in her sworn statement (Exh.
“A”) executed by her the day following the tragic incident before the
police investigator spontaneously at a time when the facts relating thereto
were still fresh in her mind and when extraneous influence was not yet exerted
upon her and her only motive was to tell the truth in the interest of
justice. To the mind of the Court, the
fact that she lost no time in denouncing the wrong done to her to the police
and revealing the details of the incident in question at the same time
specifically describing the accused as a bearded man, and whose nickname is ‘Anie‘ which easily led to the recovery by the police of part
of the stolen articles and the prompt arrest of the accused, bespeak of
spontaneity, candidness and reliability on her part.
The testimony of Graciano, the
other complainant, equally positive, categorical and unequivocal,
complements and affirms that of Emily’s to the effect that the accused was
Emily’s rapist. His recognition of the
culprits is positive and absolute.
According to him, he was present at the scene of the crime as he was
then with Emily so that he actually witnessed at close range the commission of
the dastardly crime, being then held at bay with a gun pointed at him by the
accused, Mando Doe, while the accused delos Reyes was ravishing Emily. His narration of the events of which he has a
direct and immediate knowledge strikes the Court as positive, credible and
probable and would suffice to mark said accused as the one who raped Emily and
victimized them of their personal belongings.
It is true that Graciano was himself a
victim with respect to the robbbery aspect of the
incident and an intimate friend of Emily and, therefore, may have in his heart
a desire to avenge the wrongdoing committed on his person and that of
Emily. But while revenge is a normal
reaction in a person who was aggrieved by the felonious act of another, it does
not follow that vindictiveness should
be directed aimlessly so as to include even innocent persons. (Cf. People vs. Sarabia,
et al., GR No. L-27422, Jan. 30, 1984,
83 OG No. 47, p. 6068). Neither does
such closeness of relationship necessarily taint Graciano’s
testimony nor detract therefrom the probative credit
that should otherwise be accorded to it; nor does the same prove prejudice or
bias (Cf. People vs. Ciria, 106 SCRA 383); it may
indicate at most the need for some caution in its assessment but it should not
be deemed as impairing testimonial credit (People vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426;
People vs. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500), specially where, as here, the testimony of Graciano finds ample corroboration as regards material
details not only from the declarations of Emily and other prosecution witnesses
but also from the testimony of the accused himself who, as earlier adverted to,
admitted his presence at the crime scene although with a different version of
the incident (Cf. People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., GR No. 3983, March 14, 1988).
At any rate, as between the positive and categorical declarations
of the two principal prosecution witnesses, Emily and Graciano,
and the mere denial constituting self-serving negative assertions of the
accused and his sole witness, his wife Imelda, that no such unusual incident
involving the accused occurred on that night in question, the choice is not
hard to make, for the jurisprudence on the matter is that positive statement is
stronger and attains greater evidentiary weight than negative evidence (People
vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473; People vs. Bocasas, 137
SCRA 531; People vs. Paseo, Jr., 137 SCRA 137).
Confirmation of Emily’s account of her defloration also came from
Dr. Willie Calimbas, the Rural Health Physician who,
after examining her physically and genitally barely 12 hours after the
incident, found the presence of fresh injuries such as abrasions (or scratches
or bluish spots) and contusions on her body.
Notably, the contusions and abrasions at the skin surface surrounding
the vagina were, as explained by the examining physician, caused by the force
applied on the victim resulting in trauma and hyperemia (blood congestion) due
to the forceful penetration of a hard object, like a penis, into the vaginal
wall. This physical evidence which is of
the highest order, stamps Emily’s
testimony of how she was forcibly ravished by the accused with the impress of
solid truth, and gives the lie to the latter’s protestations of innocence. The fact that complainant is no longer a
virgin as of the date of (sic) incident is of no material consequence. ‘Virginity is not an essential element in
rape and the character of the offended party in rape committed by force is
immaterial.’ (People vs. Ramos, GR No. L-49281, Aug. 27, 1987).
Equally complementing
complainants’ story is the testimony of P/Cpl. Isidro Ruiz, the police
investigator. In a direct and coherent
manner, he declared that upon learning from an informant that complainants’
stolen articles were in the possession of the accused’s
wife, Imelda, he immediately contacted the latter who, therewith, voluntarily
surrendered to him the subject items consisting of two wrist watches and a gold
ring. He added that when he asked Imelda
where she got said jewelries, she replied that her husband entrusted them to
her for safekeeping. The recovery of the
stolen items the day after the incident apparently cracked the case for the
police for then it led to the early fall of the accused in their hands that
same day and to his having to account for his misdeeds. Doubtless, these proven physical facts would
suffice to connect, if not incriminate the accused to the robbery-rape
in question. Assuredly, there can be no
clearer proof of asportation by said accused of the
personal effects of complainants than that of their recovery from the
possession of his wife. Incidentally,
the testimony of Corporal Ruiz anent the fact of recovery was neither rebutted
nor belied by the accused which thereby renders it well-nigh conclusive against
the latter. And the court has no reason
to disbelieve the testimony of this police officer who, as such, has the duty
and moral obligation, in the interest of fairplay and
as an act of simple justice, to defend the truth as he is oath bound to
do. ‘There is nothing on record to suggest
that he was moved by any motive other than simply the carrying out of his
official mission or duties’ (People vs. Patag, 144
SCRA 429 (1986). In fact, the accused
was even candid enough to admit that he has (sic) no quarrel or
misunderstanding with Corporal Ruiz prior to the incident in question (t.s.n., p. 27, Feb. 17, 1988) and does not know why he
would so testify that way (t.s.n., p. 26). The principle of law that a person in
possession or control of the stolen goods is presumed to be the author of the
larceny well applies to the accused even if they were recovered from his wife
specially since he miserably failed to discharge the burden of accounting for
and justifying his possession thereof.
It would be naive for the Court, indeed, if it fails to conclude from
this proven fact the culpable participation of the accused in the crime in
question.
The motivation which the accused seemingly ascribes to complainants
— which is revenge for having upbraided them after he had surprised them in
the act of lustful coupling on board his banca, is
too crude and shallow and obviously a desperate, albeit vain attempt at seeking
exculpation. The Court’s appreciation of
human values rejects the purported motive as fanciful and illogical. In the first place, since it was allegedly
complainants’ despicable sexual conduct that has infuriated the accused there
was, therefore, no sound reason for them to stir up any kind of vengeful retaliation, i.e., by
falsely incriminating the accused of a very grave crime carrying capital
punishment. And, secondly, complainants’
natural instinct would have been to just remain silent or to hide such immoral
assignation on their part which, if divulged, would certainly put them to great
shame and scandal, if not make of themselves the object of gossip in their
community. Yet, when they opted to face
cruel realities by exposing with immediacy the sexual assault and robbery
committed by the accused, it was because to them the crime, grave as it is, was too much to bear and keep to
themselves and should not remain unpunished.
Moreover, it is hardly believable and so unnatural that Graciano and Emily would be so bereft of inhibition or any
sense of modesty as to commit sexual congress on board a banca
moored along the sea shore at the old pier.
As a matter of decency, they could have at least mutually agreed to a
more secret trysting place than in such venue — an open space with anyone
expected to just appear from nowhere and thus reveal their promiscuity.
In the same vein, the claim of the accused and his wife, Imelda,
that Emily and Graciano were then completely naked
when they surprised them in the act of sexual indulgence, equally defies the
rational limits, if not realties
of human behavior. For sure, not even
those of wanton disposition would strip themselves of all their clothings, including such personal effects as wrist watches
and ring when gratifying their libidinous urge more so in a public place and with a time constraint. What they have to simply do if they were so
lustfully disposed was just to lower their underwear and be done over with in such short moment as possible without necessarily undressing themselves
completely.
Of note also is that
the accused made no imputation of any sort that Emily is a woman of loose morals
or ill-repute with the habit of satisfying her sexual urge even in a public
place which, as in this case, is a few meters distant from a busy street and a
public hospital and frequented by night strollers.
Evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
reliable source, but it must in addition, be credible in itself. Stated otherwise, it must be natural,
reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe (People vs. Peña, Jr., GR No. L-72354, June 30, 1987).
Moreover, it has long been held that no young Filipina of decent
repute would publicly admit that she has been criminally abused and ravished
unless that is the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her
honor (People vs. Ramilo, GR No. L-52230, Dec. 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 256 and
cases cited therein). Herein, it is
rather inconceivable that a simple and unsophisticated provincial woman like
Emily who was still possessed of the traditional and proverbial modesty of a
Filipina, would be that callous as to deliberately fabricate a tale of an
assault on her chastity and to suffer torment, if not ignominy of having to testify in a court of justice about
a grievous wrong done to her by the accused if in truth she was not really
raped and her only motive was revenge.
The records of the case do not indicate that she had any motive other
than an honest desire of obtaining justice and redress for the bestial act
committed on her (Cf. People vs. Tejada, 109 SCRA
176; People vs. Cayado, et al., GR No. L-47398, March 14, 1988).
As sequel, if Emily was merely fabricating her story of robbery
with rape, she would easily be snarled and caught in the web of her own
prevarications during the laborious grind of a public trial. Certainly, she should feel deterred by the
grave consequences of such willful falsehood which could easily be unmasked as
such by the medical findings that would be made after a thorough examination of
her body. It was the truth of her story
that gave her the courage and boldness fearlessly to face interrogation by the
police authorities and medical examination, both effective means to verify the
truth of her serious accusation (Cf. People vs. Clarin,
GR No. L-47200, Oct. 30, 1981,
78 OG No. 52, p. 7276). And the Court is
convinced that Emily’s testimony was given with sincerity and candor. It leaves no room for the slightest doubt
that it is not a mere concoction so that it has no hesitation to accept the
same as the more credible version as against that of the mere denial of the accused. It is true that the location where
complainant was sexually assaulted, i.e., atop a concrete portion at (sic) old
pier, is a place where people usually pass by and stroll and located about a
few meters distant from the road and a public hospital. But this does not render the commission of
the crime improbable, the Court being charged with notice of the fact that rape
has been committed even in vicinities or places where people usually gather or
pass by, such as in parks and by a roadside (People vs. Vidal, 127 SCRA 168
(1984); People vs. Mesias, 127 SCRA 192 (1984) and
People vs. Lopez, 141 SCRA 386 (1986).”[11]
It appreciated against the appellant the aggravating circumstance
of nighttime on the ground that the appellant deliberately waited for nighttime
before perpetrating the crime to avoid discovery, if not minimize the risk of
capture.
Appellant, assisted by the then Citizens Legal Assistance Office
(now Public Attorney’s Office), interposes a lone assignment of error in his
Brief,[12]
to wit:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO MEET THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT AND TO OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.”
in support of which he contends that: (1)
it is highly improbable that the offense would be committed under the
circumstances the offended party, Emily Punzalan,
testified to; (2) the testimony of Emily is replete with and beset by serious
inconsistencies which render the same unworthy of belief; (3) the injuries
suffered by Emily were not proven by the prosecution to be the result of rape;
(4) certain material facts were not appreciated by the trial court; and (5)
there was no intent of gain on his part.
As to the first, appellant claims that the crime was allegedly
committed along Bonifacio
Street, which is a busy street even at
nighttime. There are at least fifty (50)
houses along said street, the nearest being only about thirty (30) meters away
from the place where the crime was allegedly committed. Furthermore, the site of the alleged crime is
only about fourteen (14) meters away from a public hospital. Emily also testified that there were three
(3) persons and a couple who were about thirty (30) meters from the crime
scene. If it is indeed true that she
shouted and cried at the time she was allegedly being abused by the Appellant,
then it would have certainly attracted the attention of the people nearby.
As to the second contention, Appellant points out several alleged
contradictions and inconsistencies in Emily’s testimony. Thus, while she testified during the direct
examination that it was the Appellant himself who removed her pair of pants and
panty, she completely changed her answer on cross-examination when she claimed
that it was she who removed the pair of pants and panty upon order of the
appellant. Moreover, she averred that she had never met the
appellant before the incident and that it was only Cpl. Isidro Y. Ruiz who
identified the perpetrator from the description she gave; yet, Cpl. Isidro Y.
Ruiz testified that appellant was identified by the private complainant
herself, even giving his first name.
Lastly, she attested to the fact that aside from her hair being pulled
by the appellant, no other physical violence was committed before and during
the rape. However, her companion, Graciano Hernandez, claimed that he saw the appellant
“box” Emily’s thighs before she was raped. Appellant avers that these inconsistencies in
the account of the incident cannot but create doubt as to their truthfulness
and sincerity.
Appellant likewise challenges the decision of the court a
quo on the basis of the negative finding of spermatozoa within the
victim’s sexual organ. Although
admitting that the absence of spermatozoa does not negate rape, its absence
when the private complainant was examined the day after the alleged incident
strengthened his claim that he caught the couple making love, and belied
Emily’s allegation that the Appellant raped her. The Appellant’s unexpected arrival prevented
the couple, specifically the man, from reaching the climax of their sexual act,
thereby accounting for the absence of spermatozoa.
As to the robbery aspect of the case, appellant submits that there was no intent to gain as it is
an undisputed fact that the alleged stolen items were returned to the proper
authority the next day.
In the Brief for the People, the Solicitor General nixes all the
contentions of Appellant and prays that the decision appealed from be affirmed in
toto.
We now address the points raised in the Appellant’s Brief.
The first point raised by appellant is drawn from conclusions
which are not supported by facts. There
is no evidence on record as to the length of Bonifacio
Street, along which lies the pier, the place of the incident, and as to the
distance between or among, or the density of, the houses lining said street. The house nearest the scene of the crime,
which was not even shown by the records to be inhabited, was thirty (30) meters
away. Furthermore, the incident occurred
between 8:30 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock in the evening with the perpetrators
using a gun and a dagger to ensure the silence and cooperation of the
victims. As to the presence of people
other than the appellant and his co-accused,
it was clearly established from the testimony of Emily that they had already
left. Thus, on her cross-examination,
Emily Punzalan declared:
“A. ATTY. CAINOY:
Q When you were already removing your pants,
the three teen-agers as well as the two persons whom, according to you, you
happened to pass by then, were they still around?
A The three teen-agers who were near our place
left before I removed my pants, sir, but the two
persons by the banca were still there.[13]
B. ATTY. CAINOY:
Q What
was their only statement when, according to you, they introduced themselves to
you and to Graciano Hernandez as barangay
tanods?
A That it was prohibited for anybody to go to
that place, sir.
Q What else?
A And I told them why it was prohibited when it was a public place.
Q At that precise moment, Miss Witness, have
you already put on your pants?
A Yes, sir, only I was not able to button it.
Q What else happened after that?
A
After they told us that it was
prohibited, sir, Gary told them, ‘Sorry,
we do not know that it was prohibited’ and that ‘we are not katalo’.
Q At
that precise moment, did you also noticed (sic) the whereabouts of those two
persons whom, according to you, you happened to pass by earlier?
A We did not notice the two persons anymore,
sir, because Bayani returned.“[14]
(Underscoring
supplied)
This would explain why no one heard the
shouts of Emily. And even assuming arguendo that the couple remained where they
were, it must be pointed out that the robbery was committed near the seashore
at a distance of approximately thirty (30) meters from the couple, and the rape
was committed at a place twelve (12) meters away from where the robbery was
committed. It was quite far to have
alerted the said couple to the ongoing rape.
We have previously ruled that it is not necessary that the place where the rape is committed be isolated. In not a few instances, We held that rape can
be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, and even inside a house where there are other occupants.[15]
The claim of contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony
of Emily is not persuasive. They are on
minor matters. We have held that minor
inconsistencies do in fact strengthen rather than weaken the witness’
credibility.[16]
Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses are but natural, and even
enhance their credibility as witnesses as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses given were honest and unrehearsed.[17]
They even tend to show sincerity and absence of connivance.[18]
Besides, as the People explained in its Brief, the change in her version about
who took off her pants and underwear can be explained by her state of mind at
the time of the rape. She was
understandably in shock and too afraid to have clearly remembered such a
detail.
The alleged contradiction
with regard to the identification by Emily of the appellant is more apparent
than real. As correctly put by the
People in its Brief, no contradiction exists:
x x x
“Such contention is totally without merit. There is no contradiction nor (sic)
inconsistency between the testimony of private complainant that she had not met
the accused-appellant prior to the incident and that she knew the latter’s first name. The private complainants knew the first names
of the two accused since the latter had addressed each
other during the robbery incident. As
testified by Cpl. Ruiz, neither of the private complainants knew the full name
of the accused-appellant Bayani de los Reyes; in fact, they identified the two accused by
their nicknames only, i.e., Annie and Mando.”[19]
The asserted divergence between the claims of Emily that no other
physical violence was inflicted on her aside from the pulling of her hair and
that of her companion, Graciano Hernandez, who
testified that the appellant “boxed” the victim’s thighs is an
outright misunderstanding of the testimony of Graciano. All that he said was:
“FISCAL
VIANZON:
Q And what happened else, if any after that?
A That if we tell anybody about it we will be
killed, sir.
Q What else happened after that?
A I
was told by my companion that
she was done harm and she was boxed on
her both thighs and she was raped, sir.”[20]
(Underscoring supplied)
It is crystal clear that Graciano did
not categorically state that the appellant “boxed” the victim’s
thighs.
As to the claim that the negative finding of spermatozoa supports
the appellant’s version of the
incident, We have said time and again that the absence of spermatozoa cells in
the genital organ does not negate rape, the slightest penetration even without
emission being sufficient to constitute the offense.[21]
In the case at bar, the absence of the sperm cells was explained by the
examining rural health physician, Dr. Willie G. Calimbas,
in his testimony:
“A. COURT:
Q Now,
considering that doctor, your finding would conclude that the victim has such
sex or intercourse immediately before you examined her?
A By the findings that I had, your Honor, all
I can say is that there could be or there could not been (sic) any sexual
penetration or sexual contact.
Q Why
do you say so?
A Because the Smear done was negative,
vaginal wall; the hyperimic of the vaginal wall is
strong as when you find something like sperm inside the vagina and this, if the
patient is a virgin it could appear as lacerations, this could be stronger than
caruncles, however, I said it could be because there
are contusions around the vaginal area and vaginal discharge which could also
be coming from the outside, your Honor.
Q Now,
if the victim would have washed off her vagina after the contact, would you say that actually your findings
would be negative
on the sperm cells?
A It
is a possibility, your Honor.[22]
B. FISCAL VIANZON:
Q You likewise mentioned a finding vaginal
discharge (sic) peri vaginal orifice, will you please
tell us what you mean by this?
A This could be discharge from outside or it
could be discharge coming from the inside of the vagina so, I just state this
to find out if this is significant because this
discharge which may come from the outside
could be the semen of the male
person, sir.”
The last point raised by the appellant, which has reference to
the charge of robbery, is the absence of intent to gain in the taking of the
clothes and jewelry as allegedly shown by his professed desire just to teach
the victims (Emily and Graciano) a lesson and the subsequent return of
the goods the day following the incident.
This claim is preposterous and easily burdens one’s credulity. For one, the trial court correctly
discredited the version of the appellant as
incredible. For another, even if
appellant’s version as to the reason why he wanted to teach them a lesson were to be believed, it must be
stressed here that when he entrusted
the clothes and the jewelries to his wife, he never told her the reason therefor,
much less of his plan to turn
them over to the proper authorities.
Counsel for appellant brought out on the cross-examination of Cpl. Isidro
Ruiz the following testimony which convincingly proves intent of gain:
“ATTY. CAINOY:
Q Now, when
you were able to locate the wife of Bayani de los Reyes, did you ask her the reason why the items, meaning to say the jewelries; seiko watches and one diamond ring were in her possession?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
what was the answer she gave
you?
A It
was entrusted to her by her husband, sir.
Q
And did you also ask the wife of Bayani de los Reyes if she knew the reason why these jewelries were
entrusted to her by her husband?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
what was the answer given to you by the wife of Bayani
de los Reyes?
A She
said for safe-keeping, sir.
Q Did she not tell you that the jewelries were entrusted to
her by her husband because they will have to turn over these jewelries to proper authorities say, the INP police station of Mariveles, Bataan?
A No,
sir.”[23]
(Underscoring supplied)
Finally, in his
testimony, appellant claimed that he only gathered and brought home Emily’s and
Graciano’s clothes.[24]
Yet, he cannot offer any credible explanation as to how it came about that the
jewelries of the victims found their way under his bed.[25]
We are then of the
opinion that the evidence for the
prosecution in this case has established beyond all reasonable doubt that appellant
committed the crimes of rape and, with his co-accused, the crime of robbery.
In rape cases, the
following guidelines and principles are well-entrenched:
1. An accusation for rape can be made with
facility: it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it;
2. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution;
3. The evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[26]
We believe that the lower court judiciously applied these
guidelines in holding appellant liable for the rape. To begin with, both complainants were able to
positively identify the accused as one of the two (2) malefactors. More particularly, since Emily was the victim
of the assault herself, she naturally came face to face with the accused. We have held that it is the natural reaction
of every victim of criminal violence to strive to know the identify of the
assailant.[27]
And, when a woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that
is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and that if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof.[28]
The lower court also concluded that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution were “positive, categorical, and unequivocal” and given
in a direct, coherent, and forthright manner.[29]
We are bound by such a finding.[30]
Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court considering that it is in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless the court has
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case.
Further confirmation of Emily’s account came from Dr. Willie Calimbas, the examining physician who, after examining her
physically barely twelve (12) hours after the incident, found the presence of
fresh injuries on her body which were explained to have been caused by the
force applied on the victim resulting in trauma and hyperemia (blood
congestion) due to the forceful penetration of a hard object, like a penis,
into the vaginal wall.[31]
Finally, the records disclose that appellant’s mother and wife
offered, on several occasions, to settle the matter amicably. The following testimony of Emily:
“FISCAL
VIANZON:
Q Where did the mother and the wife of Bayani de los Reyes approached
(sic) you in connection with the case?
A They visited me in my home, sir.
Q Where?
A At San Isidro,
sir.
Q Do
you remember when?
A I cannot remember cause it took long
before he was jailed and after his incarceration it was then that the mother
and wife approached me, sir.
COURT:
Q What
was the purpose of mother and the wife of Bayani in
visiting you in your house, if you know?
A They were asking for settlement, sir.
FISCAL
VIANZON:
Q
Was that the only occasion when the
mother and wife of Bayani de los
Reyes went to you for the settlement of the case?
A Several times, sir.
Q How
many times?
A I can no longer tell you how many times
because they visited me several times, they even went to the factory where I
work, sir.
Q What happened when they went to the
factory?
A They told me that they would even double
my P500.00 and return to me P1,000.00 and
they even offering (sic) me watch as a gift but I decline (sic) to accept the
same because I told them it was not my birthday.” [32]
was not rebutted by appellant.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the offer of compromise
by appellant’s mother and wife betrays the guilty conscience of appellant,
which can be taken as an implied admission of guilt.[33]
As likewise established by the evidence, rape was committed on
the occasion of the robbery. From the
testimony of Graciano Hernandez, it is conclusive
that the two accused divested him of his wallet before physically abusing
Emily. Thus:
“FISCAL VIANZON:
Q And what was the answer of the accused?
A He told us why we were there while it was prohibited and we did not ask
their permission to be there, sir.
Q
And so, what did they do?
A The two of them talked and left for a while
for about ten (10) meters away and then return (sic), sir.
Q And upon the return, what happened else, if
any?
A When they returned Bayani
de los Reyes got my wallet, sir.
Q
And how much was contained in your
wallet?
A My wallet contained P30.00, sir.
Q And after getting your wallet, what
happened else, if any?
A He returned it to me, sir.”[34]
We disagree, however, with the trial court’s appreciation against
appellant of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. This circumstance should not be taken into
account unless there is proof that an accused had purposely sought the cover of
darkness in committing the crime, or that it facilitated its commission[35]
or that he took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity.[36]
Nighttime is aggravating if the offender sought for it in order to realize the
crime with more ease[37]
or when the accused waited for the night before committing the crime.[38]
Nighttime is not especially sought for when the notion to commit the offense
was conceived only shortly before its commission.[39]
It is not aggravating if it does not concur with the intent or desire of the
offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of the night.[40]
In the instant case, there was only a chance or accidental
encounter at nighttime between the victims and the malefactors. It was not proved that the latter had prior
knowledge that the former would be at the scene of the incident at any time in
the evening of 15 October 1986
or that the appellant or his co-accused were there, or used to be there at
nighttime, to commit robbery, rape or any crime upon any person. Nocturnity would
not be an aggravating circumstance if it was not purposely sought for and a
crime was committed at night upon mere casual encounter.[41]
The penalty for the crime of robbery with rape under the second
paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. It
consists of three (3) periods, namely:
(a) the minimum period, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period; (b) the
medium period, which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period; and (c) the maximum period,
which is reclusion perpetua. Since
the crime was committed without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period,[42]
i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[43]
Accordingly, he can be sentenced to a penalty whose minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code as indicated above, and whose maximum shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
Accordingly, We hereby modify the sentence imposed by the trial
court by imposing upon the appellant the penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor as MINIMUM, to Eighteen (18)
years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, in all
respects, the decision appealed from except as to the penalty which is hereby
modified as above indicated. As modified, appellant BAYANI DE LOS REYES y
PUSTIGO is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor as
MINIMUM, to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal
as MAXIMUM. He shall be fully credited
with the period of his preventive imprisonment, if any.
Costs against appellant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Original records, 16.
[2]
Original records, 1-2; Rollo, 6-7.
[3]
Per Judge Pedro Villafuerte, Jr.
[4]
Op. cit., 382-395; op.
cit., 29-42.
[5]
Original records, 396.
[6]
Paragraph 2 (d), Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution, and Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
[7]
Rollo, 43.
[8]
Brief for Appellee, 3-9; Rollo,
97, et seq.
[9]
Exh. “H”; Original records, 236.
[10]
Rollo, 67-68.
[11]
Rollo, 34-39.
[12]
Id., 61-76.
[13]
TSN, hearing of 10 September 1987,
8.
[14]
TSN, hearing of 10 September 1987,
16.
[15]
People vs. Viray, 164 SCRA 135, citing People vs.
Opena, 102 SCRA 755; People vs. Aragona, 138 SCRA 569; People vs. Lopez, 141 SCRA
385.
[16]
Medios vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 838;
People vs. Barros, 122 SCRA 34; People vs.
Delavin, 148 SCRA 257.
[17]
People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329; People vs.
Cantuba, 183 SCRA 289; People vs. Palino, 183 SCRA
680; People vs. Flores 185 SCRA 366.
[18]
People vs. Del Socorro, 182 SCRA 359.
[19]
TSN, hearing of 11 November 1987,
22-23.
[20]
TSN, hearing of 1 October 1987,
8.
[21]
People vs. Budol, 143 SCRA 241 citing People vs.
Jose, 37 SCRA 450 and People vs. Carandang, 52
SCRA 259; People vs. Ocampo, 143 SCRA 428;
People vs. Eclarinal, 182 SCRA 106; People vs.
Tabago, 167 SCRA 65; People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530; People vs. De Guia, 185 SCRA 336.
[22]
TSN, hearing of 11 November 1987,
16.
[23]
TSN, hearing of 11 November 1987,
23-24.
[24]
TSN – Hipolito, 17 February 1988, 6-7.
[25]
Id., 8.
[26]
People vs. Quintal, 125 SCRA 734; People vs. Aldana,
175 SCRA 635; People vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA
313; People vs. Alburo, 184 SCRA 655; People vs.
De Guia, supra.; People vs. Leoparte, 187 SCRA 190; People vs. Giron, 192 SCRA 141.
[27]
People vs. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109; People vs.
Catipon, 139 SCRA 192.
[28]
People vs. Avero, 165 SCRA 130; People vs.
Cariño, Jr., 167 SCRA 285; People vs. Poculan, 167 SCRA 176; People vs. Abonada, supra., People vs. Rosell, 181 SCRA 679; People vs. Barcelona, 191 SCRA
100.
[29]
Decision, 7; Rollo, 35.
[30]
People vs. Cruz, Sr., 151 SCRA 609; People vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60; People vs. Patog,
144 SCRA 429; People vs. Adones, 144 SCRA 364.
[31]
Op. cit., 8; op. cit.,
36.
[32]
TSN, hearing of 6 August 1987,
23-26.
[33]
Section 27, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court. See also People vs. Magdaraog, 160 SCRA 153.
[34]
TSN, hearing of 1 October 1987, 6.
[35]
People vs. Palino, supra.; People vs.
Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71, citing People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568; People vs. Cabale,
185 SCRA 140.
[36]
U.S. vs.
Billedo, 32 Phil. 574; People vs. Matbagon,
60 Phil. 887.
[37]
People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 615.
[38]
People vs. Barredo, 87 Phil. 800.
[39]
People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 578-579.
[40]
People vs. Boyles, 11 SCRA 89, cited in People vs. Gatcho, 103 SCRA 207.
[41]
AQUINO, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, vol. I, 1987
ed., 333.
[42]
Paragraph 1, Article 64, Revised Penal Code.
[43]
AQUINO, R.C., op. cit., 724-725.