RODOLFO B. INALDO & MANUEL B. INALDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CECILIO F. BALAGOT & JUSTINO R. VIGILIA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order (pp.
48-56, Rollo) dated February 9, 1981 of then
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
stationed in Bayombong which held that the principal
amount representing the legal services of
Atty. Justino R. Vigilia
had already been paid but that the interest thereon in the amount of P5,488.21
computed from June 1, 1959 had not been paid yet and the Resolution (pp 55-57, Rollo) of the same court dated May 15, 1981 denying
the motion for reconsideration.

The claim for attorney’s
fees was filed by private
respondent Atty. Justino R. Vigilia
in Special Proceedings No. 54 entitled, “Re:  Intestate Estate of the spouses Pedro Inaldo and
Consuelo Bariuan.” Atty. Vigilia
acted as counsel of all the heirs of the deceased spouses, including the
administrators, Rodolfo Inaldo and Manuel Inaldo.  The claim alleged that his legal fees had not been settled for the last fifteen
(15) years since January 8, 1955 (p. 22,
Rollo) by the heirs-administrators, Rodolfo
and Manuel Inaldo and the estate.

On May 28, 1974, the court, then presided by Judge Jesus Arlegui, issued an Order fixing Atty. Vigilia’s
fees, the pertinent portion of which states:

 “The movant counsel’s fees, however, is from 1955 to 1963, inclusive (pp. 111-116, and 413-414, Record); when at
the latter year he ceased to render services, as appears on the record, or 8 years of valuable and important legal
works and services.  In working for
correction of accounting of the income and expenses of the administration of the estate, movant
counsel obtained a court order for balances to the guardianship of P411.67 and
to the estate in the sum of P31,532.67 for the period from March 1, 1948 to December
31, 1954 alone (pp. 230-231, Record).

“The delay in the payment of movant
counsel’s legal service fees is manifestly unwarranted and unreasonable,
hence, interest of 6% is meted to
the heirs administrators from the judicial demand on May 30, 1959 (Art. 2209, New
Civil Code).  What is more, the
purchasing power of the peso
from 1959 has gone to a very low level, which is of judicial knowledge (Re Pantoja, 25 SCRA 460).

“WHEREFORE, the legal service fees of Mr. Justino
R. Vigilia, whose legal fees remain unpaid, is hereby
fixed in the sum of P6,358.00 from 1955 to 1963, inclusive, with legal
interest thereon at 6% from date of judicial
demand on May 30, 1959 (p. 259, Record), to this date, and until each and all
are paid for, which are
all hereby ordered to be paid as expenses of the administration.”

“IT IS SO ORDERED.” (p. 25, Rollo).

On June 17, 1974, the heirs-administrators filed a motion to
vacate the order of May 28, 1974; to re-open the claim of Atty. Vigilia and to admit evidence to resist said claim for
attorney’s fees on the following grounds: 
1) that neither the heirs-administrators nor their counsel received a
copy of the motion of Atty. Vigilia; 2) that Atty. Vigilia’s claim had already been paid; and 3) that granting
that the said claim had not been paid yet, the same had already prescribed (pp.
26-28, Rollo).

On July 31, 1974,
Atty. Vigilia filed an urgent motion for inscription
of attorney’s lien in the titles of some properties of the estate on the ground
that the heirs had depleted the immovable properties of the estate and that
said heirs had not paid the attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court on May 28, 1974 (pp. 30-31, Rollo).

On July 29, 1974, the trial
court denied the motion (pp. 36-37, Rollo) of the heirs-administrators to vacate the May 28, 1974 order and to re-open the claim for
attorney’s fees filed by Atty. Vigilia for lack of
merit and for failure of the movants to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the motion.  The
heirs-administrators filed an appeal from the denial of their motion.

Subsequently, on June 4,
1975, the heirs-administrators and Atty. Vigilia
entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter’s claim for attorney’s
fees.  The parties agreed that the award
granted in the trial court’s order of May 28, 1974 be reduced by two-thirds
(2/3), to be payable in two equal
installments (pp. 38-39, Rollo).
For their part, the heirs-administrators’ would withdraw their appeal. The
corresponding order of the trial court, through another judge, Gabriel Dunuan, approving the
compromise agreement was issued by
the court on June 19, 1975, the
pertinent portion of which is quoted hereunder:

“The records of this case
shows (sic) that on May 28, 1974, this Court issued an order fixing the legal fees of Atty. Vigilia in the
sum of P6,358.00 from 1955 to 1963, inclusive with legal interest
thereon at 6% per annum from May 30, 1959 until fully paid. In the Compromise Agreement now under consideration, the parties agreed that only (2/3) of said amount will be
paid by the administrator in two equal
installments, the first installment to
be delivered on the date of the
signing of the said document and the
second to be delivered within three months
thereafter; and that the Heirs administrators
withdraw (sic) their appeal.

“WHEREFORE.,
the order of this Court dated May 28, 1974 is hereby amended and the Administrator is ordered to pay two thirds (2/3) of the amount stated in said order in two equal installments as stipulated by the parties in their Compromise Agreement. The appeal made by the Heir–Administrator is hereby withdrawn.” (p. 40, Ro11o)

On June 6, 1975,
Rodolfo B. Inaldo paid the first installment in the sum of P2,119.33.
The second installment, in the
same amount, was paid on September 8, 1975  (p. 18, Rollo).

About a year after the order
approving the compromise agreement was issued by the trial court, or on May 10, 1976, Atty. Vigilia -filed with the same trial
court an urgent motion for payment of
counsel’s fees (pp. 41-43, Rollo). The motion alleged that so far, the heirs-administrators had paid only  P4,236.66 which
under the law should be applied first to the interest starting from May 30, 1959 (date of judicial
demand) up to May 1976.  The motion also
alleged that the total interest amounted to P4,321.40.  The motion further claimed that payment of
the principal amount of two-thirds (2/3) of P6,358.00
had not been made yet.

On June 4, 1976,
the heirs-administrators filed an opposition to the motion.  They alleged that Atty. Vigilia’s
claim was duly settled when they paid in two installments the total amount of
P4,238.66, the only amount granted him in the
compromise agreement (pp. 44-47, Rollo).

The motion of Atty. Vigilia was
resolved five (5) years after it was filed. 
On February 9, 1981, the trial court, through another judge, Cecilio F. Balagot, issued an
order (pp. 48-51, Rollo) granting Atty. Vigilia’s
motion and holding that the principal of
the legal services of Atty. Vigilia had
already been paid but the interest thereon remain unsettled.  The dispositive
portion of the order read:

“WHEREFORE, this Court hold(s) that the principal or the legal
services of Atty. Justino R. Vigilia
have (sic) already been paid but has (sic) not been paid the interest of P5,488.21 computed from June
1, 1959 to December 30,
1980 or 259 months at P21.19 per month.” (p. 51. Rollo)

The motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs-administrators
was denied by the trial court in its resolution dated May 15, 1981.

Aggrieved, the heirs-administrators filed this petition before Us.

The petition alleged that the order approving the compromise
agreement and the compromise agreement itself never
made mention of any interest charges owing to private respondent Atty. Vigilia.  It alleged
further that since the said order had already become final, the trial court
acted without jurisdiction when it altered or amended the order by granting the
interests payments claimed by private respondent.

There is merit in this petition.

In the May 28, 1974
order of the trial court, Atty. Vigilia was adjudged
entitled to legal fees amounting to “P6,358.00
from 1955 to 1963 inclusive, with legal interest thereon at 6% from the date of judicial demand on May 30, 1959.” This order of the court however, was superseded by the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties.  The said compromise agreement provided that:

“x x x”

“1.  It is hereby agreed that only two-thirds of the
sums as stated in the order of May 28, 1974 which is deemed incorporated as
part hereof will be paid by Mr. Rodolfo B. Inaldo in
his behalf as administrator and of his co-administrators and in behalf of the
said intestate estate, which shall be considered as full and complete payment without any deductions whatsoever of
the same as computed therein;”

“2.  That
the payment of the above mentioned sums shall be paid in two equal monthly
installments, the first installment to be delivered on the date of signing of
this compromise agreement and the second to be delivered within three (3)
months from this date;”

“x x x”
(p. 38, Rollo)

A compromise agreement is final and executory.  Such a final and executory
judgment cannot be modified or amended. 
If an amendment is to be made, it may consist only of supplying an omission, or striking out a
superfluity or interpreting an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body
of the decision which gives it life [Republic v. CA, 41 SCRA 422 (1971);
Central Bank v. CA, 61 SCRA 348
(1974), cited in Commercial Credit Corporation of Cagayan
de Oro v. CA, G.R. No. 78315, January 2, 1989, 169 SCRA 1].

The compromise agreement dated June 4, 1975 and the trial court’s
order approving the agreement contained no specific provision regarding the
award of interests in addition to the award of 2/3 of the principal amount
granted by the court in its order
of May 28, 1974.

The trial court, in resolving the motion for reconsideration of
its February 9, 1981 order held that:

“x x x“

“As correctly pointed out by the claimant in this case, the order of May 28, 1974 is still the controlling
order.  The only amendment made in the
order of June 19, 1975 is as regards the principal amount.  This Court, however, maintains that the same order
of May 28, 1974, ordering the payment of legal interest from the date of
judicial demand has not been done away with
or amended by the order of June 19, 1975, because the said order of June
19, 1975 specifically states that ‘the order this Court dated May 28, 1974 is
hereby amended and the Administrator is ordered to pay two thirds (2/3) of the
amount stated in said order xx xx).  Inasmuch as the
order of May 28, 1974 mentions about interest, the order of June 19, 1975,
therefore, necessarily means that the interest is included in the 2/3 of the
amount to be given to the claimant in this case, Atty. Justino R. Vigilia
(pp. 56-57, Rollo).

However, the acts of the parties subsequent to the execution of
the compromise agreement show that they intended to forego with the interest claims awarded in the May 28, 1974
Order of the trial court.

Thus, pursuant to the agreement, Rodolfo Inaldo
complied with his part of the deal by delivering to the private respondent the
amount of P2,119.33 on June 6, 1975, representing one-half of P4,238.67 the
reduced amount of that originally granted to private respondent in the May 28,
1974 Order of the trial court.  An equal
amount was delivered to the private respondent three (3) months after on
September 8, 1975, again pursuant to the compromise agreement.

Considering the amount of two-thirds of P6,358.00
plus interest at 6% to be
computed from the date of the judicial demand (May 30, 1959), private respondent expected a total payment
of P8,053.43, computed as follows:

2/3 x P6,358.00           =          P4,238.67

Add: Interest

(P4,238.67
x.06

x
15 (years)     =            3,814.80

Total                            P8,053.80

If it were true, as claimed by him, that interests on the
principal amount was not excluded in the agreement, he should have objected to
the payment of the first installment of only P2,119.33
which was not half of the amount he expected to receive.  It should be noted that the compromise
agreement provided that petitioners’ liabilities would be payable in two
equal installments only. 
Since the first installment delivered to him was short of what was
allegedly agreed upon by them, private respondent should have brought the
matter to the attention of the petitioners. 
But, he did not.  Neither did he
interpose any objection when the second installment in the same amount was paid
to him.

The agreement itself equipped the private respondent with a
remedy in case of default or non-­compliance with any of its terms.  Paragraph 5 thereof provides:

“5.  The effectivity of
this compromise agreement upon its signing shall be retroactive to this date
and writ of execution shall
issue upon default of any of its terms or
of the order herein incorporated as integral portion hereof (p. 39, Rollo).

Instead of availing of this remedy, the private respondent waited
for eight (8) months after the petitioners complied with their part of the
agreement before bringing an action.  His
silence for an unreasonable length of time after the payment to him of the last
installment payment revealed that as far as he was concerned, there was already
a full satisfaction of his claims.

Thus, while the May 28, 1974 order mentions about interests, the
failure of the compromise agreement to categorically provide therefor meant that it had been excluded.  The reference in the compromise agreement to
the amount stated in the May 28, 1974
order of the court pertains to the amount specifically stated therein which was only the principal.

In addition, the failure of private respondent to object or
protest to the amount of the installment payments delivered to him, revealed
that the parties actually agreed that only the reduced amount of the principal
stated in the May 28, 1974 order of the trial court would be paid to him.  Private respondent is estopped
from claiming otherwise.

The respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion and
acted without jurisdiction when it granted the motion of private respondent for payment of his legal fees when there
had already been a complete and full satisfaction of the claim eight months
back.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.  The Order of the trial court dated February
9, 1981 is SET ASIDE and the motion of the private respondent dated May 10,
1976 praying for payment of his legal fees is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano,
and Grino-Aquino,
JJ., concur.