ERNESTO MABAYLAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE BENJAMIN E. PELAEZ AND RHINE MARKETING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Ernesto
Mabaylan seeks the modification of the decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 19, 1985 and of Labor Arbiter Benjamin E.
Pelaez dated January 30, 1985.

Petitioner Mabaylan was employed as a driver of the branch
service vehicle of private respondent Rhine Marketing Corporation on September
11, 1975. At the time of his dismissal
in 1984, he was receiving a monthly
salary of P1,080.00 and an emergency cost of living allowance of P570.00 a
month.

From August 3 to 8, 1984, petitioner absented himself from work
allegedly due to the peace and order situation in his hometown, Barangay
Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City. For that
reason the area manager of respondent company, in a memorandum dated August 6, 1984, required petitioner to
explain his absences within twenty-four hours from notice. Upon receipt of that memo­randum on August
8, 1984, petitioner immediately went to the office of the branch manager,
arriving there at past five in the afternoon of the same day, to explain his
absences but the compa­ny official reportedly left without giving him a chance
to present his side.

On August 17, 1984, petitioner received a second memorandum from
respondent company dated August 14, 1984 officially informing him of his
termination effective August 3, 1984 for his failure to submit an explanation
of his unauthorized absences since August 3, 1984 and for abandonment of work.

Whereupon, on August 20, 1984, petitioner instituted a complaint
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay and service incentive
leave pay with the Regional Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, Cagayan de Oro City
(NLRC RABX Case No. 9-0588-84).

In his assailed
decision of January 30, 1985, the Labor Arbiter found that while petitioner was
not entirely faultless for incurring unauthorized absences, his dismissal was
illegal for failure of respondent company to observe due process in not giving
the employee sufficient time and opportunity to be heard before he was
discharged. Accordingly, the Labor
Arbiter ordered respondent company “to immediately reinstate complainant
Ernesto Mabaylan to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and without backwages, the period of
which he was deprived of work being more than reasonable penalty for his
infractions. Further, to pay the
complainant incentive leave pay equivalent to five days pay for every year of
service in the amount of P499.95.”^[1]

On appeal by both parties, the National Labor Relations Commission,
in its decision of December 19, 1985, modified the Labor Arbiter’s judgment and
merely ordered respondent company “to pay the complainant the sum of P499.95 as incentive leave pay.”^[2]

The NLRC found that the infractions committed by petitioner (e.g.
habitual absenteeism, tardiness and negligence in handling company equipment)
were proper grounds for separation and that there was no denial of due
process. On the question of due
process, respondent tribunal reasoned:

“The Labor Arbiter misappreciated the evidence on record in
holding that the complainant was not afforded due process and the respondent
refused to hear his explanation. The
memorandum dated 6 August 1984 requiring him to explain his absence was received
by complainant on 10 August 1984 as shown in
the return card. This vividly
indicates that he could not have reported to the office on 8 August 1984 to
submit his explanation as required in the same. Evidently, this is the reason why of all times, he chose 5:30
p.m. as the time he allegedly went to see the Branch Manager. He did not choose a regular working time as
there would be other employees that could attest that he never appeared on said
date. Ergo, if he was not afforded
opportuni­ty to explain his side for reason attributable to him, it was because
he never reported since 3 August 1984 thereby giving respondent no opportunity
to investigate him. Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondent violated B.P. 130.”^[3]

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Invoking the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code (P.D.
No. 442, as amended) and Rule XIV, Section 5 of the Rules Implementing BP Blg.
130, petitioner claims that his termination was illegal because respondent
company did not comply with the procedural requirements of due process. Consequently, an award to him of backwages,
on top of reinstatement, is in order.

Respondent NLRC counters that petitioner cannot invoke his right
to due process because it was precisely through his unex­plained non-appearance
that respondent company was unable to give him his day in court. Respondent tribunal further avers that
petitioner did not state the truth when he recounted in his affidavit of
October 17, 1984 that he went to the office of respondent company on August 8,
1984 to make the required expla­nation.

The ultimate issue to be resolved in the petition at bar is
whether or not petitioner Mabaylan was afforded due process before he was
dismissed from work.

Article 278 of the Labor Code, as amended, lays down the
procedure to be followed by an employer in terminating the serv­ices of an
employee, to wit:

“Miscellaneous provisions. – x x x (b) x x x However, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be termi­nated a written notice containing a statement
of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he
so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest
on the employer. x x x. ”

The above-cited provision has been reiterated in Sections
1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

In Century Textile Mills, Inc.
and Escano vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 77859, May 25, 1988, the Court explained:

“The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute
essential elements of due process in cases of employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employer’s intent to dismiss and the
reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the requirement of
hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer’s charges
against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is
effected. Neither of these two
requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process
requirement of the 1987 Constitution.”

While it is not disputed that petitioner Mabaylan was officially
notified of his impending dismissal and the reasons therefor, the Court is more
inclined to give credence to petitioner’s affidavit of October 17, 1984 which
narrated the circumstances leading to his separation from the service, and
which indubitably demonstrated that his employer failed to comply with the
requirements of administrative due process in not having given petitioner,
before his dismissal, the hearing required by law.

The only evidence adduced by respondent company to support its
assertion that it gave petitioner the chance to present his side was a
memorandum of its branch manager addressed to its president and general manager
which states: “On August 6, a memo
was sent to him by registered mail requiring him to report to the office and
explain within 24 hours why he was absent. Although Mabaylan received the memo on August 10, he did not bother to
report to the office and explain.”^[4]
Significantly, said memorandum was not under oath and no evidentiary weight was
attached to it by the Labor Arbiter. At
any rate, whatever doubt remains should ultimately be resolved in favor of the
worker.

Neither was there abandonment of work, as alleged by respondent
company. Records show that three (3)
days after receipt of notice of his termination effective August 3, 1984,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. It would be illogical for him to leave his job and later on file
said complaint.^[5]

Thus, standing alone, the failure of respondent company to
provide petitioner with the proper forum to ventilate his side is an
infringement of his constitutional right to due process. As stressed in the case of Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC and Mallare, G.R.
No. 80587, February 8, 1989, “(t)he standards of due process in
judicial as well as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law
simply means giving notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.”

Considering the circumstances of this case, we hold that petitioner is not entitled
to reinstatement with backwages as it was clearly established that he committed
various infractions detrimental to the business of the company.* However, respondent company should be made to account
for its omission to observe due process by paying the discharged petitioner indemnity in the amount of
P3,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated December 19, 1985 is AFFIRMED with the modification that private respondent Rhine
Marketing Corporation is ordered to indemnify petitioner Ernesto Mabaylan in
the amount of P3,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 15

^[2]
Rollo, p. 12

^[3]
Rollo, p. 12

^[4]
Rollo, p. 46

^[5]
See Asphalt and Cement Pavers, Inc. vs. Leogardo, Jr., et. al., G.R. No.
74563, June 20, 1988.

* In his Memorandum dated
September 8, 1987, petitioner has deviated from his original demand that he be
re-employed and has indicated his preference for separation pay instead
“due to already strained relationship” between him and respondent
company (Rollo, p. 82).