PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LOPE VIENTE Y MAPILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In an information filed on 4 April 1989 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, accused Lope Viente y Mapili was charged with the
violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act,
in that:

“x
x x on or about the 29th day of January, 1989, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with two others
whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at the nape
of one Narciso Cabatas y Limora, driver of an Isuzu passenger jitney with Plate
No. DVB-424, with Motor Number 386028 and Chassis Number SPMM-10408-86-C, valued
at P150,000.00, owned by Lucila Crespino y Manzalan, grabbing the wheels
(sic) of the said vehicle and pushing the said driver off the same, take, steal
and carry away the said passenger jitney, against the will of said Narciso
Cabatas y Limora, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid sum of P150,000.00, Philippine Currency.”^[1]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-72203 and was
assigned to Branch 28 (Pilot Court) of the said court.

Trial on the merits ensued after the accused had entered a plea
of not guilty at his arraignment on 6 June 1989.^[2]

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Narciso Cabatas,
Lucila Crispino and Sgt. Wilfredo Bautista for its evidence in chief. The witnesses for the defense were Jaime
Nuay, Jesus Benitua, Romeo Rosales, Nona Nuay, Atty. Elpidio Unto (defense
counsel) and the accused. The
prosecution recalled Mrs. Crispino and Sgt. Bautista as rebuttal witnesses
while the defense presented the accused and his brother, Vaselides Viente, as surrebuttal
witnesses.

A demurrer to evidence filed by the defense after the prosecution
had rested its case was denied by the court.^[3]

On 17 October 1991, the trial court, per Judge Rosalio G. De la
Rosa, promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping or violation of Republic Act 6539 and is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years and to indemnify the
offended party the sum of P150,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.”^[4]

The accused (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) seasonably
filed a notice of appeal which the trial court approved. This Court accepted the appeal in the
Resolution of 19 February 1992.

On 7 May 1992, the appellant wrote this Court a letter^[5]
wherein he stated that his counsel,
Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, had failed to file a formal offer of evidence in the
court below and had later abandoned him. He asks that a counsel de oficio be assigned to him.

On 10 June 1992, this Court relieved Atty. Unto as counsel for
the appellant and subsequently appointed Atty. Abel C. Coloma of Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco as counsel de oficio.^[6]

The appellant and the appellee filed their main briefs on 25
September 1992 and 9 March 1993, respectively. The former filed a Reply Brief on 20 April 1993.

The facts of this case, as culled from the records and the
pleadings, are as follows:

Narciso Cabatas is the driver of an Isuzu passenger jeepney owned
by Lucila Crispino which plies the Baclaran-Cubao route. At
about 4:00 a.m. of 29 January 1989, Cabatas left Libertad, Pasay on board the jeepney in order to ply
his router.^[7] At the corner of Gil Puyat and Taft Avenues,
three men boarded the passenger jeepney and sat at the back. One of the men sat directly
behind Cabatas on the left side of the jeepney while the other two sat at the
right side opposite the first one. Upon
reaching the corner of Taft Avenue and Malvar Street near the Philippine
Women’s University at about 4:15 to 4:30 a.m., one of the three men signaled
Cabatas to stop. When Cabatas stopped
the jeepney in front of the Philippine Women’s University, one of the two men
seated at the right side poked a gun at Cabatas’ nape and ordered the other
passengers to alight from the jeepney. The other passengers got down from the jeepney; thereafter, one of the
men pulled Cabatas to the right front seat while the man seated directly behind
Cabatas transferred to the driver’s seat. It was at this point that Cabatas saw the face of the one who had taken
hold of the steering wheel. Cabatas was
then shoved out of the jeepney by one of the men at the back. While on the pavement, Cabatas heard one of
the men utter: “Pareng
Lope, patakbuhin mo na ang jeep!” The three men then drove off.^[8]

Cabatas immediately reported the incident to the Western Police
District (WPD) Anti-Carnapping Section at the WPD Headquarters in U.N. Avenue,
Manila.^[9]
He was advised to return at 8:00 a.m. of the following day with the
registration papers of the vehicle. He
went to Lucila Crispino, told her of what transpired and mentioned to her the
statement uttered by one of the carnappers.^[10]

The next day, Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino went to the WPD. He was assured by the officers of the WPD
Anti-Carnapping Section that they would immediately send out an “Alarm Report”
of the incident.^[11]

Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino also reported the incident to the
PC/INP Anti-Carnapping Section at Camp Crame, Quezon City as well as to the PC
CAPCOM at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Tagig on 15 April 1989.^[12]
Cabatas told the CAPCOM officers that he had twice seen the suspect riding in
passenger jeepneys plying the Baclaran-Divisoria route.^[13]
Thereupon, Lt. Alfredo Orbeta, Sgt. Wilfredo Bautista and Sgt. Eduardo Bautista
asked him to accompany them in a surveillance operation along Taft Avenue. The first day of surveillance proved
unfruitful. On the second day of
surveillance or on 31 March 1989, Cabatas and the CAPCOM officers posted
themselves at the corner of Taft Avenue and Pedro Gil Street. Cabatas then spotted the suspect aboard a
north?bound
passenger jeepney and pointed him out to the CAPCOM officers. The
CAPCOM officers told Cabatas to go home and, afterwards, to proceed to the
CAPCOM headquarters the next day. The CAPCOM
officers then followed the suspect and apprehended him along Taft Avenue in
front of the Jai Alai Building. The
person arrested was identified as Lope Viente, the herein appellant. The following day at the CAPCOM
headquarters, Cabatas positively identified the appellant from a five-man
line-up as the one who had grabbed the steering wheel of the jeepney.^[14]

It appears that the day before the appellant’s arrest, Atty.
Elpidio Unto had visited Lucila Crispino in her residence, accompanied by a man
and a woman, both of whom he did not introduce to Mrs. Crispino. Atty. Unto pleaded to Mrs. Crispino not to
suspect his nephews who he said were good people.^[15]
Lucila was cordial enough, but told Atty. Unto she would file a case against
whoever stole her jeepney. The man who
had accompanied Atty. Unto was later identified as the appellant.^[16]

While in the custody of the CAPCOM, the appellant executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” (Exhibit
“L”) dated 31 March 1989. He
was also brought to the Department of Justice (DOJ) where he executed a
handwritten statement (Exhibit “N”). The handwritten statement contains the certification of State Prosecutor
Hernani T. Barrios that he had personally examined the appellant and that he is
satisfied that the appellant voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit. Both statements were given
without the assistance of counsel.

The appellant relies on the defense of alibi which his witnesses
tried to weave. Jaime Nuay testified
that he is a driver-jeepney
operator and that he has known the appellant since childhood. The appellant was his alternate driver, a
conductor of one of his jeepneys and a pig butcher. During the incident in question, the appellant was at his
(Nuay’s) residence at 2230 Muñoz Street, Malate, Manila butchering hogs from
2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. and then slicing and cooking the meat from 5:00 a.m.
until 10:00 a.m.^[17]

Jesus Benitua, who is a resident of 2240 Muñoz Street, Malate,
Manila, knows the appellant to be a driver and conductor. Benitua testified that the latter stays at
the residence of Jaime Nuay, his (Benitua’s) next-door neighbor. On 29 January 1989 at 2:00 a.m., he saw the
accused butchering pigs at the house of Jaime Nuay.^[18]

Romeo Rosales, a former driver of Mrs. Crispino, testified that
at about 7:00 or 8:00 o’clock in the morning of 29 January 1989, he was with
the appellant eating and drinking at the latter’s place. The appellant is his “barkada” and
the brother of
his “compadre,” Vaselides
Viente.^[19]

Nona Nuay, the wife of Jaime Nuay, corroborated the testimony of
the other witnesses that the appellant was at their residence butchering and
cooking pigs. The appellant is a third cousin of her husband,
Jaime Nuay.^[20]

Atty. Elpidio Unto, then counsel for the defense, testified for
the appellant,^[21]
acting as both the examining lawyer and the defense witness. He declared that he, together with the appellant
and the sister of Derio Punto, went to the residence of Mrs. Crispino and
pleaded to the latter not to suspect his relatives as they are good people.^[22] He did
not bother to introduce the appellant to Mrs. Crispino.^[23] The
appellant was his former bodyguard who is probably capable of killing somebody
but not of stealing.^[24] He
averred that he had filed administrative and court cases against the CAPCOM
officers and that he would submit a formal offer of documents anent these
matters. The record shows, however,
that he failed to do so.^[25]

The appellant testified that he worked as an alternate driver and
conductor from Monday to Saturday each week, and as a pig butcher on
Sundays. He is known to the Crispino
spouses and Narciso Cabatas. He was
arrested on 31 March 1989 and brought to the CAPCOM where he was tortured and
forced to execute a statement (Exhibit “L”). He was then brought to the DOJ where he
executed another statement (Exhibit “N”) under threat of death from
the accompanying CAPCOM officers.^[26]

In his main brief, the appellant makes the following assignment
of errors:

“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSES OF
DENIAL AND ALIBI GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE AND
CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED’S WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSES OF
DENIAL AND ALIBI

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539.”^[27]

In support of the first assigned error, the appellant insists
that Narciso Cabatas is not a credible witness because he readily admitted that
the owners of the stolen jeepney are his relatives and employers; hence, he is
“specifically inclined to color his statements, to suppress the truth, or
to state what is false.” Furthermore, he points out the inconsistency
between Cabatas’ court testimony that he was shoved out of the jeepney and his
statement entered in the Alarm Report (Exhibit “A”) that he decided
to jump off for fear of his life. He
also questions the failure of Cabatas to immediately inform the police or
Lucila Crispino concerning the statement one of the carnappers uttered.

We are not persuaded.

The relationship of Cabatas with the owners of the stolen jeepney
neither disqualifies him from testifying nor renders his testimony unworthy of
belief considering the lack of showing of any improper motive compelling him to
testify falsely against the appellant. The latter’s suggestion that “Cabatas was pressured to point to
anyone as the probable carnapper since it was he who lost the vehicle subject
of this case” is nothing but a self-serving conclusion which finds no
support whatsoever. We have held that a
witness’ relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased,
would even render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who
is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real
culprit.^[28]
Nor is the testimony of a witness discredited by the mere fact that he is an
employee of the complainant.^[29]

The claimed inconsistency is more apparent than real. We adopt what the appellee said in
refutation thereof:

“The sworn statement imputed to Cabatas is not what appellant
claims it to be. Exhibit “A”
is merely an Alarm Report prepared by the Anti-Carnapping Section of the
Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila, which very briefly summarizes the
events reported by Cabatas. Worse, it is not under oath. It seems that said report was prepared solely by the
investigating officers after hearing Cabatas’ narration. Moreover, Exhibit “A” is in
English, a language alien to Cabatas x x x. On cross examination, Cabatas testified that his highest educational
attainment was merely Grade 6. He cannot speak
or write English (tsn. Oct. 4, 1989, p. 59). Whatever inaccuracies and omissions in the translation of Cabatas‘ story,
therefore, can not be taken against him or be regarded as in any way detracting
from his credibility as a witness.

x x x

Appellant conveniently fails to mention, however, that Cabatas’
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 30, 1989, given before the Office of the
Regional Investigation Unit, Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, corroborates
practically all material points of his testimony at the trial. x x x In Exhibit “B,” Cabatas
categorically stated that he was pushed/shoved out of the jeepney and that he
later heard one of appellant’s companions utter the alleged statement. Exhibit “B” is a real affidavit, subscribed and
sworn to by Cabatas, unlike Exhibit “A,” which is merely an Alarm
Report. If consistency between extrajudicial
statement/affidavit and testimony in open court is appellant’s yardstick of a
witness‘ credibility, surely, Cabatas more than adequately measures up
to this standard.”^[30]

The allegation that Cabatas failed to forthwith inform Lucilla
Crispino about the statement he heard from one of the carnappers, viz., “Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na ang Jeep!” is traversed by the testimonies of Narciso Cabatas and
Mrs. Crispino that
the former had informed the latter of the said utterance on the day of the
incident.^[31]

The reticence of Cabatas to immediately reveal the said statement
to the police officers was satisfactorily explained: he was then afraid.^[32] The
natural reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information to the police
authorities in criminal cases is a matter of judicial notice.^[33]
He might have deemed it the better part of valor not to give the name of the
accused who was still at large and who probably recognized him. Such reluctance should not affect his
testimony. The decisive factor is that
he in fact identified the accused.^[34]

Finally, the appellant argues that it is highly improbable for
him to forcibly take a jeepney from someone who could easily identify him. He states that he is known to both Narciso
Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino, which, however, the two deny. Defense witness Romeo Rosales declared that
Cabatas and the appellant know each other because “this is the Visayan
custom, that when we met we became (sic) close to each other.” Yet, in the
same breath he stated that he knew Cabatas only by face,^[35]
although both he and Cabatas are Visayans. Jaime Nuay, who used to drive for Mrs. Crispino, also testified that he
did not know the name of one of the drivers.^[36]
Considering the fact that there were more than thirty drivers employed by Mrs.
Crispino^[37] and that
Romeo Rosales took the appellant as his conductor without the permission and
knowledge of Mrs. Crispino, and even paid the appellant out of his own pocket,^[38] it is not
improbable that the appellant was not known to Cabatas and Mrs. Crispino.

The appellant’s attempts to discredit Narciso Cabatas not having met
with success, the issue then boils down to whether his defense of alibi should
be favorably considered.

Axiomatic is the
rule that the said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of
an accused.^[39]
In the instant case, there is no doubt in our minds that the appellant was
positively identified by Cabatas. The
efforts of the defense counsel during cross-examination to cast doubt thereon
only succeeded in strengthening Cabatas’ testimony. Thus:

“ATTY. UNTO:

Q Mr. Witness, you said during the last session that you looked at the
person who took the wheel of the jeepney from you and you saw his
face, is that right?

WITNESS:

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    And
how long and how many seconds or minutes were you able to see his face?

A     It
was like this, sir. That man who took
the wheel from me came from the backseat of the jeepney. So that when he transferred to the driver’s
seat I looked at him and then he shoved me and then this man pushed me towards
the right portion of the front seat.

ATTY. UNTO:

Q    And
in fact, at that time you did not know his name yet, is that right?

A     Yes,
sir. I did not know his name yet as of
that date.

Q    And
did you ever come to know his name?

A     Yes,
sir. I came to know his name later.

Q    How?

A Well, I heard his companion called him by his name. I heard his companion said: ‘Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na ang jeep.’
‘Pareng Lope, you may now drive the jeep.’

COURT:

Q    How
many were his companions?

A He has two companions and his companions told him: ‘Pareng Lope, patakbuhin mo na.’

ATTY. UNTO:

Q    And
please tell us, before his companions uttered those words you never recognized
his face and you never knew his name is ‘Lope’?

A     I
was able to recognize the face of the accused.

Q
   How did you recognize his face
or what is your basis on how you were able to recognize his face?

A     Because
the place was already well lighted.

COURT:

Q    Was
the interior of your passenger jeepney with lights on?

WITNESS:

A     Yes,
Your Honor. As a matter of fact the
lights in the interior part of the jeepney were on.”^[40]

Besides, we agree with the observation of the appellee that the
appellant’s testimony “does not contain any information as to his
activities on the date and time of the carnapping incident.” In short, he
was completely silent regarding vital facts in support of the defense of
alibi. His tongue stubbornly refused to
express it. Only his witnesses
testified on what he did and where he was at the time the carnapping took
place. Thus, we have here a situation where,
as aptly put by the appellee, “appellant’s alibi is not really his,”
or the witnesses concocted the alibi for the appellant which the latter did not
even bother to corroborate. All told,
the alibi in question cannot convince any rational mind and miserably fails to
cast any dubiety on the positive identification of the appellant.

That three witnesses^[41]
testified in support of the appellant’s defense of alibi will not suffice to
exonerate the latter. In determining
the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of witnesses but
the credibility, nature and quality of the testimony.^[42]
Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may
suffice for conviction if otherwise trustworthy and reliable.^[43]
The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best
performed by a trial judge who is in a far advantageous position than us to
distinguish more competently the prevaricators among the witnesses from those
who testified the truth.^[44]

In passing, it may be noted that although the appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit “L”) and
handwritten statement (Exhibit “N”) were obtained from him without
the assistance of counsel, their inadmissibility under paragraphs (1) and (3),
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution has not been squarely raised
before us. In any event, we find it
unnecessary to dwell on their inadmissibility since the evidence on record is
more than adequate to warrant the appellant’s conviction. Where there is independent evidence, apart
from the appellant’s uncounselled confession that he is truly guilty, he
accordingly faces a conviction.^[45]

We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in
imposing upon the appellant a straight penalty of imprisonment for thirty years. The carnapping in this case was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons. The penalty prescribed therefor under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539
is “imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years.” Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,^[46]
if an offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by the said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same. The proper penalty to be imposed should not, therefore, be thirty years,
but an indeterminate penalty which is hereby
set at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum.

WHEREFORE, except as to the modification regarding the
penalty, the appealed judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. As modified, appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as
minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Original Records (OR), 1; Rollo, 1.

^[2]
OR, 26.

^[3]
Id., 96.

^[4]
Id., 179-180; Rollo, 40-41.

^[5]
Rollo, 48.

^[6]
Id., 53-54.

^[7]
TSN, 31 August 1989, 9.

^[8]
TSN, 31 August 1989, 8, 11-17.

^[9]
Id., 18.

^[10]
TSN, 5 October 1989, 14, 30; TSN, 12 October 1989, 77.

^[11]
TSN, 31 August 1989, 17-22.

^[12]
TSN, 4 October 1989, 52-53.

^[13]
TSN, 5 October 1989, 10.

^[14]
TSN, 31 August 1989, 27, 31-32; TSN, 6
October 1989, 10-11.

^[15]
TSN, 16 July 1990, 3-6.

^[16]
TSN, 12 October 1989, 94, 98-99.

^[17]
TSN, 8 March 1990, 3-21.

^[18]
TSN, 16 May 1990, 3-12.

^[19]
TSN, 17 May 1990, 13-14, 43.

^[20]
TSN, 11 July 1990, 4-7.

^[21]
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that, except in the cases therein stated, a lawyer shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client.

^[22]
TSN, 16 July 1990, 4-6.

^[23]
TSN, 12 October 1989, 105.

^[24]
TSN, 16 July 1990, 12.

^[25]
OR, 177.

^[26]
TSN, 18 July 1990, 3-47.

^[27]
Rollo, 65.

^[28]
People vs. Almario, 171 SCRA 291
[1989].

^[29]
Santos vs. Concepcion, 103 Phil.
596 [1958].

^[30]
Appellee’s Brief, 10-12.

^[31]
TSN, 12 October 1989, 77; TSN, 5
October 1990, 14, 30.

^[32]
TSN, 29 September 1989, 19.

^[33]
People vs. Caringal, 176 SCRA 404 [1989].

^[34]
People vs. Untalasco, 125 SCRA 159 [1983].

^[35]
TSN, 17 May 1990, 20.

^[36]
TSN, 9 March 1990, 26.

^[37]
TSN, 17 May 1990, 50.

^[38]
Id., 32-33.

^[39]
People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992].

^[40]
TSN, 29 September 1989, 14-17.

^[41]
A fourth witness, Romeo Rosales, testified that he only saw the appellant
between 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. of 29 January 1989, long after the carnapping
had occurred.

^[42]
People vs. Maloloy-on, 189 SCRA 250 [1990].

^[43]
People vs. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471 [1987].

^[44]
People vs. Kamlon Hadji, 9 SCRA 252 [1963].

^[45]
People vs. Como, 202 SCRA 200 [1991].

^[46]
Act No. 4103, as amended.