DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUIL…

All thirty-five (35)
petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the
auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie’s of New York of the Old
Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central
Bank.

The antecedents: On 9
August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President
Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed
Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and
Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie’s of New York, or
CHRISTIE’S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82)
Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.

On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off the
subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

On 15 August 1990, PCGG through Chairman Caparas, representing
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment
Agreement with Christie’s of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall
consign to CHRISTIE’S for sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old
Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as
the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be
identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE’S to be subject to the provisions
of the agreement.^[1]

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings
and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the
effect that: (a) the authority of
former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in
the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had
cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.^[2]

On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M.
Castro, wrote President Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting
the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo.^[3] On the same date, Director of National Museum
Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the
Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected
cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
cultural heritage.^[4]
Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January 1991 by Dean Jose Joya,
Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan, Irma
Potenciano, Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel, Ambassador E.
Aguilar Cruz, Florencio R. Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz,
Lucrecia R. Urtula, Susano Gonzales, Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler
Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag, Ligaya David Perez,
Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we
issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary
injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that
petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and
that proper parties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as
scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.^[5]

On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were
joined as additional petitioners: Charito
Planas, Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Calo
Medina, Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo
Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz Veto Planas.

On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as
former Executive Secretary, the incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman
Mateo A. T. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents.

Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to
file the instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique
silverware are embraced in the phrase “cultural treasure of the
nation” which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987
Constitution and/or “cultural properties” contemplated under R.A.
4846, otherwise known as “The Cultural Properties Preservation and
Protection Act;” (c) whether the paintings and silverware are properties
of public dominion which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of
the President and Congress; (d) whether respondent PCGG has the jurisdiction
and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christie’s of New York
for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether PCGG has complied with the due
process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of
the subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic,
and if so, whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court.

The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly
hereunder. However, before proceeding,
we wish to emphasize that we admire
and commend petitioners’ zealous concern to keep and preserve within the
country great works of art by well-known old masters. Indeed, the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a creative medium through
which man can express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at
the same time, reflecting his deep-seated ideals, art has become a true
expression of beauty, joy, and life itself. Such artistic creations give us insights into the artists’ cultural
heritage – the historic past of the nation and the era to which they belong –
in their triumphant, glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent years. It must be for this reason that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution mandated in Art. XIV, Sec. 14, that it is the solemn
duty of the state to “foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic
evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in
diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.” And,
in urging this Court to grant their petition, petitioners invoke this policy of
the state on the protection of the arts.

But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition
notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first be
resolved: whether the instant petition
complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review over this case.

The rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry namely: that the
question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.^[6] But the most important are the first two (2)
requisites.

On the first requisite,
we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.^[7] This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest
in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be
joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by
a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. “Legal standing”
means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The term
“interest” is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest.^[8] Moreover, the interest of the party
plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.^[9]

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed
exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus
to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution,^[10] and
when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.^[11]

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s
artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents
Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to
conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known
as “The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,” governing
the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural
properties. Petitioners also anchor
their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public
properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and
enjoy as great works of art. They
allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due
process of law in violation of the Constitution.^[12]

Petitioners’ arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock
corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation’s chairman was former First
Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members
thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and
appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding anniversary, an
occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled
by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the
ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on to the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process
and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties – the true owners thereof – whose authority
to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having
failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus
filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus
suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,^[13] this Court laid down the rule that a
writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case
at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required
of respondent officials under the 1987
Constitution. What they seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners’ claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer’s suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can
qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer’s suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.^[14]
Obviously, petitioners are not
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what
they allege to be public properties. It
is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners
argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the
rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and
silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure
trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the issues raised by the
petition deserve this Court’s attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this case
will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of
the nation’s priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the
public as a whole.^[15]

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be
an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-­legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice.^[16] A
case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,^[17]
such as the case before us. Since the
purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public
officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date –
11 January 1991 – which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest
is involved.^[18]
We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to
warrant the relaxation of the rule.

Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be
the policy of the state to preserve and protect the important cultural
properties and national cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their
intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic
and cultural properties are considered by the State as involving public
interest which should therefore be protected, the answer can be gleaned from a
reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846:

“WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under
existing laws and regulations, of preserving and protecting the cultural
properties of the nation;

“WHEREAS, innumerable sites all over the country have since
been excavated for cultural relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing priceless
cultural treasure that properly belongs to the Filipino people as their
heritage;

“WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the
Philippines, whether government or private
property, which has not been disturbed by commercially-minded diggers and
collectors, literally destroying part of our historic past;

“WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as
incapable of preserving and protecting her cultural legacies;

“WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact period, the Neolithic Age, and the Paleolithic Age,
has reached a point perilously placing beyond reach of savants the study and
reconstruction of Philippine prehistory; and

“WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on
movement and a limited form of registration of important cultural properties
and of designated national cultural treasures is necessary, and that regardless
of the item, any cultural property exported or sold locally must be registered
with the National Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our
national cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law”
(Emphasis ours).

Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be
under the protection of the state are classified as the “important
cultural properties” and the “national cultural treasures.”
“Important cultural properties” are cultural properties which have
been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional
historical and cultural significance to the Philippines but are not
sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of national cultural
treasures.^[19]
On the other hand, a “national cultural treasure” is a unique object
found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or
scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and
nation.^[20]
This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum
that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not
constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the
Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

We agree with the certification of the Director of the
Museum. Under the law, it is the
Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory,
registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts,
of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures.^[21]
Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing
authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of
specialization to which they are assigned.^[22]

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason
to grant the petition. Petitioners have
failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their
functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE,  for lack
of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 55-66.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 37-39.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 48-53.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 186.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., p. 235; Dumlao v. Commission on
Elections, G.R.No. 50245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392.

^[7]
Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. L-29341, 21 August 1989, 176 SCRA 579.

^[8]
House International Building Tenants
Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75287, 30
June 1987, 151 SCRA 703.

^[9]
Bernas, Joaquin B., The Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 279.

^[10]
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No.
63915, 24 April 1985, 136 SCRA 27; Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 72119, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 530.

^[11]
Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960).

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 156-157.

^[13]
G.R. No. 72119, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA
530.

^[14]
Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960).

^[15]
Rollo, pp. 174-175.

^[16]
See Note 6.

^[17]
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v Montano Jr.,
G.R. No. L-24465, 28 February 1977, 75 SCRA 264.

^[18]
Dumlao v. Comelec, G. R. No. 50245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392.

^[19]
Sec. 2, par. b, R.A. 4846, as amended.

^[20]
Sec. 3, par. c, R.A. 4846, as amended.

^[21]
Id., Secs. 5-7.

^[22]
Biak-na-Bato Mining Company v.
Tanco, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-34267-68, 25 January 1991, 193 SCRA 323.