VICTORIO SANTOS, REPRESENTED BY IGNACIA SANTOS, HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND YAN CHUAN, REPRESENTED BY ADELA YAN, HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
and set aside the decision^[1]
promulgated on December 29, 1981 of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied due course and
consequently dismissed, and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued
is hereby lifted, with costs against petitioners.”^[2]

It appears on record that sometime in May of 1973, private
respondent Yan Chuan, doing business under the name of Standard Food Products
and represented by Adela Yan, leased from petitioner Victorio Santos,
represented by his sister Ignacia Santos, a parcel of land with the
improvements thereon consisting of a house and two (2) warehouses located at
2350 Gamban Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila
for three (3) years. Thereafter or
sometime in April of 1976, the contract of lease was renewed for another three
(3) years.

On February 8, 1978, petitioner, through his representative and
without the knowledge of private respondent, sold the leased property to Victor
Reyes as shown by the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title.^[3]

Upon the expiration of the lease contract or sometime in March of
1979, private respondent maintained that he offered to buy from petitioner the
leased property and it was agreed between them that private respondent will pay
the rent on a monthly basis in the
amount of P1,200.00 until a final agreement on the selling price of the
leased property can be reached.

Private respondent paid the agreed rent covering the months of
April and May, 1979 which was duly accepted and receipted for by
petitioner. However, from June of 1979,
petitioner refused to accept private respondent’s rental payments compelling
private respondent to send the payments thru registered mail which was likewise
refused and/or returned to private respondent.

Thus, private respondent was compelled to file a Petition for
Consignation on October 26, 1979 against petitioner with the City Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 49598.

Petitioner filed an Answer with a Counterclaim for Ejectment
against private respondent, alleging that the lease agreement executed between
them had already expired; that private respondent had repeatedly requested for
an extension or renewal of the lease contract which he refused and thereafter
he gave private respondent sixty (60) days to remove his equipments on the leased
property. However, after the lapse of
said period, private respondent still refused to vacate the leased property and
insisted only on paying a monthly rent of P1,200.00 which petitioner
refused to accept.

Upon failure of private respondent to strike out petitioner’s
counterclaim for ejectment, he filed a petition for certiorari with the
then Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 132412 which petition,
however, was dismissed. Thereafter,
private respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-11806.

Meanwhile, the City Court of Manila, without waiting for the
final resolution of the aforesaid petition for certiorari, set the
hearing of petitioner’s ejectment counterclaim on June 10, 1980 and, upon
private respondent’s failure to appear, allowed petitioner to present evidence ex-parte.

Upon the continuation of the hearing of the ejectment case on
November 18, 1980, private respondent again did not appear and, instead, filed
an ex-parte manifestation
that he had appealed with the Court of Appeals its Order denying his motion to
strike out petitioner’s counterclaim for ejectment. On the same day, petitioner submitted the case for decision.

On December 10, 1980, the City Court of Manila rendered a
decision,^[4]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered:

“(1).   Ordering the plaintiff
Yan Chuan and any other person, or agent, claiming right under him to vacate
the lease premises at 2350 Gamban St., Balut, Tondo, Manila;

“(2).   Ordering the plaintiff
Yan Chuan to pay the defendant Victorio Santos the sum of P1,200.00 a month as
a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased premises
starting from June 1979 up to the time the premises is finally vacated and
surrendered to the defendant, minus whatever deposits may have been made by
plaintiff in court or subsequent payments made to defendants;

“(3).   Ordering the plaintiff
to pay defendant the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;

“(4).   The complaint for
consignation is hereby ordered dismissed.”^[5]

Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued upon the expiration of the reglementary period to
appeal, the implementation of which, however, was stopped on April 14, 1981 by
the Court of Appeals when it issued a restraining order in connection with the
appeal filed by private respondent in CA G.R. No. SP-11806.

On April 23, 1981, private respondent filed a Petition for Relief
with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX in Civil Case No.
139674 alleging that the decision of the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
49598 is null and void which petition was subsequently dismissed. Unfazed, on April 30, 1981, private
respondent filed a Second Petition denominated as an “Amendment To Amended
Petition For Relief.”^[6]

Meanwhile, private respondent’s appeal in CA G.R. No. SP-11806
was dismissed on May 14, 1981 and the restraining order lifted. Consequently, petitioner had the writ of
execution implemented.

On May 21, 1981, private respondent’s Second Petition for Relief
was given due course by the then Court of First Instance of Manila.

On June 1, 1981, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss private
respondent’s Second Petition for Relief which was denied by the aforementioned
court in an Order^[7]
issued on June 26, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

“The petitioner (herein private respondent) claims under oath
that he never received any notice sent to him by the respondent City Court
setting the hearing of the case for ejectment on November 18, 1980, after
dissolution of the restraining order issued by the Court of First Instance,
Branch XXV. That being the case, the
judgment rendered against him by the respondent City Court on December 10,
1980, was null and void. Such allegations
does not appear to have been successfully rebutted by the respondents. No affidavit or document has been appended
by the respondents (herein petitioner) to their pleadings to prove that notice
of hearing set for November 18, 1980 was received by the petitioner. Lack of notice of hearing to the petitioner
is in violation of due process. The
judgment thus rendered without notice is null and void. It may be attacked directly or
collaterally. The fact that the
petition for relief was filed beyond sixty days after the petitioner learned of
the judgment rendered is of no consequence. The petition filed in the instant case may be treated as a complaint for
annulment of judgment, a direct attack at one that is null and void.

“The respondents’ claim that the instant case has already become
moot and academic, the parties having allegedly entered into a settlement or
agreement, is not indubitable. The
better that resolution thereon is deferred until after the hearing on the
merits.^[8]

“WHEREFORE, upon the petitioners’ filing of a bond in the amount of
P1,000, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the judgment rendered by the respondent City Court,
until further orders from this Court.”^[9]

On July 2, 1981, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
order on the ground that the decision of the City Court of Manila is valid as
private respondent was duly notified of the hearing of November 18, 1980 as
evidenced by the certified copies of the notice of hearing received by private
respondent’s counsel on November 7, 1980.^[10]

While said motion is pending, private respondent filed on July
22, 1981 a Motion to admit his Third Petition for Relief, which was opposed by
petitioner.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower
court in an Order^[11]
dated September 4, 1981 while at the same time granting private respondent’s
motion to admit his Third Petition for Relief.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals which petition was dismissed on December 29, 1981 and
so with his motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent appellate court in holding that the then Court of First
Instance of Manila had jurisdiction when it admitted private respondent’s Third
Petition for Relief considering that the petition for relief was filed beyond
the reglementary period as provided under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 3, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification. – A petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after said judgment or order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case maybe.”

From the foregoing provision, the mandatory period for filing a
petition for relief from judgment should be within sixty (60) days from
knowledge of the judgment and not more than six (6) months after said judgment
is entered. In the instant case, there
is no question that private respondent’s Petition for Relief was filed beyond
the reglementary period since the record shows that private respondent received
the decision dated December 10, 1980 of the City Court of Manila on January 23,
1981 while the Petition for Relief was filed only on April 23, 1981 or more
than sixty (60) days as required under said Rule. The then Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, acted
without jurisdiction when it admitted private respondent’s Petition for Relief
and committed grave abuse of discretion when it treated private respondent’s
Petition for Relief as a complaint for annulment of judgment and thereafter declared null and void the decision of the
trial court for want of due process as private respondent allegedly did not
receive a copy of the notice of hearing set on November 18, 1980.

The records do not support the appellate court’s findings that
private respondent was denied due process. While it is true that petitioner failed to attach an affidavit or a
document in his pleading to prove that the notice of hearing set for November
18, 1980 was duly received by private respondent, it is equally true that under
the Revised Rules of Court it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that public officers have performed their duties in accordance with
the law.^[12]
Stated in another way, there is always a presumption that the court’s officers
had properly and regularly performed their official duties in sending the
notice of hearing to private respondent in the absence of convincing proof to
the contrary. Such being the case, the burden of proof is on the private respondent
to show that the notice of hearing was not sent to him. This burden, private respondent failed to
discharge. At any rate, the evidence on
record showed that private respondent was duly notified of the hearing for
November 18, 1980.^[13]

The fact that the trial court proceeded to hear petitioner’s
counterclaim for ejectment while private respondent’s certiorari case
was still pending with the appellate court does not, in any way, violate
private respondent’s right to due process as he was duly notified of the
proceedings in said case. Furthermore,
no restraining order was issued by the appellate court enjoining the trial
court from proceeding with the ejectment case.

It has been settled that a judgment can be annulled only on two
(2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.^[14]

In order for fraud to serve as a basis for the annulment of a
judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character otherwise there would
be no end to litigations. Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent.^[15]

In the case at bar, none of these grounds exists to warrant the
annulment of the decision in question. Private respondent was duly notified of the hearing but chose not to
appear and present his evidence. Furthermore, the fact of not informing private respondent that petitioner
had already sold the leased property to Victor Reyes on February 8, 1978 does
not constitute extrinsic fraud. That
fact could have been presented by private respondent during the hearings of the
ejectment case in the court below as he was not prevented by petitioner from
doing so.

At any rate, the alleged concealment of the sale is not relevant
or material in an ejectment case where the issue involved is merely physical
possession of the land and not ownership thereof.^[16]
Consequently, petitioner’s failure to disclose to private respondent that he
had already sold the leased property to Victor Reyes is of no moment. Hence, the respondent court has no valid
ground to annul the decision of the trial court since no extrinsic fraud was
found to have vitiated the proceedings in the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision dated December 10, 1980 of the City Court of Manila
is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., no part.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justice Mama D.
Busran and Justice Guillermo P. Villasor.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 73.

^[3]
Id., at pp. 102-104.

^[4]
Penned by Presiding Judge Jose B. Herrera.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 43.

^[6]
Id., at pp. 25-28.

^[7]
Penned by the Presiding Judge Pedro A. Ramirez.

^[8]
On May 27, 1981, petitioner, alleged that instead of implementing the writ of execution,
he entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent whereby the
former sold to the latter the leased property on installment which was later
repudiated by the private respondent. However, private respondent maintained that the signature of his wife in
the alleged compromise agreement was obtained through force and
intimidation. Rollo, at p. 142.

^[9]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

^[10]
Id., at p. 34.

^[11]
Id., at pp. 57-58.

^[12]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(m) and (n).

^[13]
Rollo, p. 34.

^[14]
Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 577 [1991].

^[15]
Gerardo vs. De la Peña, 192 SCRA 691 [1990].

^[16]
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 604 [1989].