CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE PLAZA CHUA AND MELCHOR AVILA CHUA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a special civil action for certiorari^[1]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the
decision^[2]
of respondent Court of Appeals acquitting private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua
and Melchor Avila Chua of the crime of estafa.

The antecedent  facts are as
follows:

On April 14, 1961, herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua
and Melchor Avila Chua, father and son, were elected
President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao
Development Bank, a private development bank, with a capital of P1 Million,
duly subscribed and paid-up.  Out of its
total capitalization, P500,000.00 was subscribed by the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) in accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 85 as
amended; the other P500,000.00 by private stockholders, as follows:

Felipe
Plaza Chua                                                    P200,000.00

Celerina Chua                                                             200,000.00

Lucia Limchiu                                                                60,000.00

Melchor Avila Chua                                                       20,000.00

Marinela G. Rama                                                         10,000.00

Eufemio Darunday                                                         5,000.00

Benjamin Lozada                                                           5,000.00

TOTAL                                                                      P500,000.00^[3]

vvvvvvvvvvvv

Pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors, composed of
the first five above- named stockholders and the directors- representatives of
DBP, Benigno Orig and Anatolio Viray, the capital of P1
Million was deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation in Manila and
private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua as President and Melchor
Avila Chua as Treasurer, were authorized to sign checks and withdrawal slips to
effect withdrawal from the depository bank.^[4]
The Surigao Development Bank formally started
operations on April 19, 1961.  On the same date, said respondents started
withdrawing from the deposit various amounts by means of checks drawn against
the Pacific Banking Corporation amounting to a total of P999,000.00, leaving a
balance of P1,000.00^[5]
as of June 1962.

On September 12, 1961,
an examination of the books of accounts as well as the operations of the Surigao Development Bank was conducted by the examiners of
the Central Bank of the Philippines.  The examination revealed a shortage of
P480,000.00 which increased to P555,000.00 as of December 31, 1961.^[6]

Based on their findings, Acting Superintendent of Banks Jose S.
Martinez wrote herein private respondents, asking them to authorize the Pacific
Banking Corporation to furnish the Central Bank with the records of deposits of
Surigao Development Bank together with photocopies of
the checks drawn against the latter, and further asking them for a conference
regarding the examination.  Due to the
refusal of private respondents to come to Manila
for the conference of the Acting superintendent of Banks referred the matter to
the Monitary Board.

On July 10, 1962, the Monetary Board passed a resolution
directing private respondents to refund and deposit with Pacific Banking
Corporation the shortage of P555,000.00; to require their permanent separation
as President and Treasurer, as the case may be; to disqualify then from being
directors thereof and/or holders of such other positions therein as will enable
them again to exercise influence over the management of the affairs and
operations of said bank; and to limit the bank’s activities to accepting loan
re-payments and servicing of its deposit liabilities.  On August
11, 1962, the private respondents wrote the Monetary Board denying
the shortage and asking for a reconsideration of its decision.

On October 30, 1962,
Resolution No. 1281 was passed by the Monetary Board denying the request.  On January
10, 1964, an application by the Central Bank, the Superintendent of
Banks was appointed receiver pendente lite of the Surigao
Development Bank by the Court of First Instance of Surigao
in Civil Case No. 1582.  In another order
dated July 30, 1964, the same Court directed the Pacific Banking Corporation to
produce the bank statements of deposits and withdrawals of the Surigao Development Bank, but the Central Bank could not
conduct the necessary examination due to on injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals on February 5, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 3315 which was lifted only on
September 7, 1964.

On July 2, 1968,
an information^[7]
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch V, charging herein private respondents Felipe  Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua with
the crime of estafa, as follows:

“That in or about and during the period comprised between
April 1961 to December 31, 1961, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank, located at Surigao,
Surigao del Norte, which is a private development
bank organized under the provisions of Republic Act 2081, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Central
Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines, banking
institutions duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, as follows, to wit:  The said Surigao
Development Bank, as such private development bank, began operations on April
19, 1961, in Surigao, Surigao
del Norte, with the said accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor
Avila Chua as its President and Treasurer, respectively, and by virtue of a
Certificate of Authority granted by the Monetary Board on March 29, 1961, 50%
of the preferred shares with voting rights is owned by the Development Bank of
the Philippines, while the remaining 50% also in the amount of P500,000.00, is
in common shares, which funds of the Surigao
Development Bank were deposited in trust with the depository bank, the Pacific
Banking Corporation, Manila, and the said accused, as such President and
Treasurer, respectively, of the said Surigao
Development Bank, being then the only persons duly authorized in the Surigao Development Bank to sign checks against, or
withdraw funds from the said Surigao Development
Bank’s deposit account with the Pacific Banking Corporation, withdrew and
received from the said Pacific Banking Corporation, Manila, during the
aforesaid period of time, the total sum of P555,000.00 for the purpose of
turning over the said amount so withdrawn by them to the Surigao
Development Bank in Surigao, Surigao
del Norte, and under the express obligation of accounting for the same to the
Central Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines from time to time, or
upon demand, but the said accused, once in possession of the aforesaid sum and
far from complying with their aforementioned obligation, wantonly failed and
refused to do so, despite repeated demands made upon them to that effect and
the length of time that has elapsed, and with intent to defraud,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Central Bank and
Development Bank of the Philippines, in the aforesaid amount of P555,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

“Contrary to law.”

Both accused-private respondents pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.  At the trial, the amount of
shortage proved was P499,000.00, which represented the total unrecorded withdrawals,
arrived at by comparing the ledger of the Surigao
Development Bank as against the Statement of Account issued by the Pacific
Banking Corporation.

On May 24, 1973,
the trial court rendered its decision^[8]
finding private respondents guilty of the crime charged.  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of swindling (estafa), as
defined in paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized in its 1st penalty paragraph, without the attendance of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance to modify their liability and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate term ranging
from twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the offended parties Surigao
Development Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines in the sum of
P499,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

Both private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.  On May
21, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, holding
that:

“The private stockholders having
received the refund of their investments in the total amount of P499,000.00 and
the DBP’s prepared shares of P500,000.00 being
fundable from the assets of P557,350.72, it is clear that there is no damage
caused to the Surigao Development Bank or to the
Development Bank of the Philippines.

“It is true that the accused-appellants disposed of the amount
of P499,000.00 without right or authority, but conversion, to constitute estafa, must result in damage or prejudice to another,
capable of pecuniary estimation.”^[9]

reversed the   decision of the trial court and acquitted private respondents.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari,
petitioners defining the issues^[10]
as follows:

1.     
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION ENTIRELY DISREGARDING
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE DULY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE CONSISTING MAINLY OF DOCUMENTS AND INSTEAD, ADOPT ITS OWN FINDINGS OF
FACT BASED (a) ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURES, (b) ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
AND (c) CONTRARY TO THE DOCUMENTS AND EXHIBITS OF THE CASE, THUS, LEADING IT TO
NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FORMULATE INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE
ABSURD AND POSITIVELY IMPOSSIBLE.

2.     
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON AN EXHIBIT
WHICH WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, MUCH LESS ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE DURING THE
TRIAL; and,

3.     
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON A DOCUMENT
AND GIVING THE SAME A MEANING COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO ITS CONTENTS – THUS
DISTORTING THE CORRECT CONTEXT OF THE SAME.

We rule in the affirmative.

Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of
the appellate court on appeals taken to it, thus:

Section 11.  Power of
Appellate Court on Appeal.- Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify
the judgment and increase or reduce the
penalty imposed by the trial, remand the
case to the Court of First lnstance for new trial or
retrial, or dismiss the case.  (Underscoring supplied).

The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case
opens its entire record for review in order to resolve not only questions of
law but also questions of facts. The Court of Appeals may thus re-examine and
re-weigh all the evidence on record and affirm, modify or reverse the findings
of facts and conclusions of the lower court.^[11]
That its findings of facts or conclusions are erroneous do not thereby deprive
it of its jurisdiction over the appealed criminal case as the mere fact that
the court decides the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to its
jurisdiction.^[12]
Neither do these erroneous findings and conclusions render the appellate court
vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari for where the court has
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, they would,
at most, constitute errors of law and not an abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.^[13]

In the case at bar, the appeal of private respondents having been
regularly taken to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court was clothed with
the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the
parties before it.  In so doing, it
re-examined and re-weighed the evidence on record and came to the conclusion
that private respondents were not guilty of the crime charged as the withdrawal
of the alleged shortage was done without intent to defraud nor was damage or
prejudice caused thereby to Surigao Development Bank
or the Development Bank of the Philippines.  Whether this conclusion was based merely on
speculations and conjecture, or on a misapprehension of facts and contrary to
the documents and exhibits of the case, is not for us to determine in a
petition for certiorari wherein only issues of jurisdiction may be
raised.  Neither can we determine whether
the constructions given by the appellate court to a document is right or wrong as
errors in the appreciation of evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari
because they do not involve any jurisdictional question.^[14]

The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.  It is available only for
these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judge’s findings or conclusions.^[15]
The mere fact that the court decides the question wrong is utterly immaterial
to the question of its jurisdiction.^[16]
Thus, assuming arguendo; that the court had
committed a mistake, the error does not vitiate the decision considering that
it had jurisdiction over the case.^[17]
The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.  The writ of certiorari
cannot be legally used for any other purpose.^[18]
If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, the
orders and rulings upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders and
rulings within its jurisdiction and cannot be corrected by certiorari.^[19]

Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely
appeal from the judgment on the merits. 
Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision
involved being one of acquittal.  An
appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to
the accused’s constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.

We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle
attempt to have us review the judgment of the appellate court on the
merits.  While the petition at bar is
denominated special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt with the
jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioners’ attack on the appellate
court’s jurisdiction is premised on the conclusions that (a) the findings of
facts of the appellate court were based on conjectures and speculations, or on
misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and exhibits; (b) the
exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been offered nor admitted in
evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court gave to a document a
meaning contrary to its contents.  But
how valid and tenable these premises are remains a question.  To determine their validity would entail a
review and re-evaluation of the evidence on record as well as the procedure
taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the
appellate court; in effect, a review of the judgment of acquittal, which we
cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without violating the private
respondents’ constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that
“the People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy.” The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because whatever error may
have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not
of jurisdiction.  It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision.  This
is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.^[20]
The rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not
reviewable by a higher court, for an Appeal by the
government from the judgment would put the accused in second jeopardy for the
same offense.^[21]

Moreover the case of People vs. Ang
Cho Kio ^[22]
tells us:

“No error, however flagrant, committed by the Court against
the State can he reserved by it for decision by the Supreme Court when the
defendant has once been in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge
was the result of the error committed.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.  NO pronouncement as to costs.  This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part, one of the counsel for the Government in this
case.

^[1] Rollo, p. 1

^[2] Rollo p. 61, promulgated on May 21, 1975 by the
First Division with Justice Luis B, Reyes, ponente,
and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. and Pacifico
P. de Castro, JJ., concurring

^[3] Rollo, p. 44

^[4] Rollo, pp. 44-45

^[5] Rollo, pp. 45, 79-80

^[6] Rollo, pp. 45-46

^[7] Rollo, pp. 49-50

^[8] Rollo, pp. 44-59, penned by then Judge, now
Ombudsman, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez

^[9] Rollo, pp. 77-78

^[10] Rollo, p. 5

^[11]
People v. Pajarillo, 94 SCRA 830 (1979)

^[12] Bustos vs. Moir, 35 Phil.
415; Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, No. L.-30570, July 29, 1969.

^[13] Casilan vs. Ibanez, G.R. No. 19968, October 31, 1962; Ramirez vs.
Jimenez, G.R. No. L-17062, October
31, 1962; Director of Forestry vs. Geronimo, L-29480, March 14, 1979.

^[14] Mujer v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 35 O.G.
1384; Abig v. Constantino,
No. L-12460, May 31, 1961

^[15] Regala v. CFI of Bataan,
77 Phil. 684; Ong Sit   v.
Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Ocucanim
v. Hernandez, 81 Phil. 161; Verhomal v.
Tan, 88 Phil. 389; Association of Beverages Employees v. Figueras, G.R. No. L-4813, May 28, 1952; Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340

^[16]
Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 891 (1969)

^[17]
People v. Francisco 128 SCRA 110 (1984)

^[18] Silverio v. C.A.,
141 SCRA 527 (1986)

^[19]
Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna, 148 SCRA 572 (1987)

^[20]
Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,
157 SCRA 522-523 (1988)

^[21]
People vs. Montemayor, 26 SCRA 687; U.S.
vs. Yam Tung Way,
21 Phil. 67; Kepner vs. U.S.,
195 U.S. 100.

^[22]
95 Phil. 475