DR. PEDRO A. DANAO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS MARTIN DANAO, MINDA DANAO AND CO-PETITIONER CONCEPCION S. DANAO) AND CONCEPCION S. DANAO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BA…

These are two petitions
for review on certiorari of the decision^[1] of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
59865-R, promulgated on April 14, 1978 (Rollo, p.
22), affirming the decision^[2] of the Court of First Instance of Manila
with modifications.  The dispositive portion of the appellate judgment reads:

“WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the actual and compensatory
damages are eliminated, the moral damages are reduced to P30,000.00,
and the attorney’s fees are likewise reduced to P5,000.00, the decision
appealed from is affirmed.

The facts of the cases involved are quoted from the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as follows:

“On February 27, 1963,
spouses Pedro Danao and Concepcion
S. Danao applied for a commercial credit line of P20,000.00 with the People’s Bank and Trust Company.  The application having been granted, the
parties on March 14, 1963,
executed a Commercial Credit Agreement and Mortgage in which, among others,
they stipulated:

‘WHEREFORE, the said mortgagor(s) have offered and agreed to secure
the repayment of the said credits and advances with interest due or accruing
thereon as well as any other liability or liabilities of the said mortgagors to
the said mortgagee, now existing, due or to become due, or hereafter incurred
by means of a good and valid mortgage as hereinafter stated, and the mortgagee
has consented to grant the line of credit applied for a good and sufficient
security;

‘NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual
covenants herein set forth the parties do have agreed and do hereby agree, as
follows:

‘The said mortgagor(s) shall be and are hereby granted a line of
credit not to exceed at any one time the sum total of TWENTY THOUSAND AND
00/000 (P20,000.00) at NINE (9%) per cent per annum,
which credit shall be available to said Mortgagor(s) or EITHER OF THEM in the
form of advances from time to time to be evidenced by promissory note or
notes.  x x x’

and
on the mortgage that –

‘This mortgage shall continue as security for the payment of the
indebtedness herein contracted by said Mortgagor(s) as aforesaid, and of all money
expanded or liabilities incurred by virtue hereof, with interest thereon, as
well as security for the repayment of any other sums now or hereafter owing to
the said Mortgagee in addition to or aside from the credit facilities herein
granted by the Mortgagee to the Mortgagor(s).

‘F. – In the event that the Mortgagor(s) should fail to pay the
sums of money secured by the mortgage, or any part thereof, in accordance with
the terms and conditions herein set forth, x x x, the Mortgagee shall
have the right, at its election, to foreclose this mortgage extrajudicially.  x x
x.

‘The proceeds of such sale of the mortgaged properties shall be
applied as follows:  x x x.  3) To the satisfaction of the principal
amount of obligation herein secured; and 4) To the
satisfaction of all further obligations owing by the Mortgagor(s) to the
Mortgagee.’

“Given as a security for the credit line of P20,000.00 was a parcel of land in the City of Baguio, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-233, together with the buildings
and improvements thereon.

“The spouses availed of the credit facility granted them by
the People’s Bank and Trust Company not only during the original term of one
year, but also during the renewals or extensions thereof.  The last promissory note signed by Pedro Danao during
the extensions was fully paid on July 5, 1968.

“It appears that October
28, 1963, Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao
signed a promissory note for P10,000.00.  The two agreed to pay the note,
jointly and severally, within 179 days after date.  The check for the proceeds of the note was
issued in the name of Antonio Co Kit alone. 
The note was renewed by Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao
for the amount of P8,650.00 on April 27, 1964, payable within 91 days.  They promised to pay the amount, jointly and
severally.

“On September 30, 1968, counsel for the People’s Bank and
Trust Company wrote a demand letter to Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao for the payment of the balance of the promissory note
in the amount of P5,870.09.

“On July 14, 1969,
the manager of the People’s Bank and Trust Company wrote another demand letter,
this time to Pedro Danao, for the payment of the
balance of P4,225.15, excluding interest.

“On September 19, 1969, the People’s Bank and Trust Company
filed a complaint in the City Court of Baguio City
against Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao, praying that
judgment be rendered, ordering
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay it (plaintiff) the sum of P4,225.15,
plus interest thereon at the rate of 13.5% per annum from July 8, 1969 until
full payment, attorney’s fees in the sum equal to 10% of the total amount due,
and the costs of suit.

“On January 5, 1971,
the City Court issued an order, dismissing the complaint ‘for lack of interest
on the part of the plaintiff.’

“On March 1, 1971,
the branch manager of the People’s Bank and Trust Company, Baguio
Branch, wrote a letter to Pedro Danao, informing the
latter that they had filed a petition
for foreclosure to the City Sheriff of Baguio City,
attaching therewith a copy of the petition. 
Stated therein is that the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2033 will be sold at public auction.  According to the petition, the land is
security for the payment of any other sums owing to the Bank ‘in addition to or
aside from x x x credit
facility.’ The indebtedness to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale is P3,024.03, exclusive of interest.

“On March 4, 1971,
notice of public auction sale was published in the Baguio
Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and edited in the City of Baguio and which is of wide
circulation in the City, province of Benguet and in the Philippines,
for three consecutive weeks, once a week. 
Copies of the notice were also posted in three public and conspicuous
places in Baguio
for the information of the public.  In
the published notice of public auction sale, it is stated that in the petition
for foreclosure it is alleged that Mortgagors’ spouses PEDRO DANAO and
CONCEPTION DANAO, x x x, x x
x failed to pay the x x x loan when it fell due thereby violating the terms and
conditions of the real estate mortgage above mentioned.

“On March 10, 1971,
counsel for the People’s Bank and Trust Company, Baguio
Branch, wrote a letter, informing the Bank of the full payment of the
obligations of Antonio Co Kit and Pedro Danao.

“On March 16, 1971, the branch manager of the People’s Bank
and Trust Company executed a cancellation of the real estate mortgage, stating
therein that the mortgagors had fully paid the obligation or indebtedness
secured by the mortgage.

“On June 16, 1972,
Pedro Danao and Concepcion
S. Danao filed a complaint for damages against the
Bank of Philippine Islands, as successor to the People’s Bank and Trust
Company, in the Court of Instance of Manila, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
8781.

“The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that both the petition for foreclosure and the notice of public auction sale
published in the ‘Baguio Midland Courier’ have
neither legal nor factual bases, because (1) while the credit line was availed
of from time to time in different amounts by promissory notes, the credits and
loans obtained were dully paid in 1968 and since then no further loans were
availed of under the credit line secured by mortgage of the plaintiffs’ properties;
(2) the plaintiffs’ alleged indebtedness mentioned in the defendant’s petition
for foreclosure and in the consequent notice of public auction sale was the
balance due on a ‘clean loan’ granted by the defendant to Antonio Co Kit,
although admittedly the promissory note was cosigned by plaintiff Pedro Danao, and the same
was a distinct and separate transaction from the plaintiffs’ credit line, and
was not covered nor secured by the plaintiffs’ properties mortgaged to the
defendant.  The complaint further alleged that the publication of the notice of
public auction sale in the ‘Baguio Midland Courier’
was malicious and/or with deliberate intent, or was due to gross negligence,
causing the plaintiffs, who are respected members of the community of Baguio City, untold mental and moral anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation and social humiliation; that as a result of his
social humiliation, anxiety, mental and moral anguish, plaintiff Pedro Danao suffered serious heart attack and was hospitalized
and confined in bed for a period of one year, causing him to incur hospitalization
and medical expenses, and resulting in the loss of his income from his medical
practice.  The plaintiffs ask for actual
or compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

“In its answer with conterclaim, the
People’s Bank and Trust Company contended that in filing the petition for
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage with the consequent publication of
notice of public auction sale, it merely exercised its legal right as
creditor-mortgagee after plaintiff Pedro Danao had
defaulted, despite repeated demands, in the payment of the indebtedness or
obligation contracted by him jointly
and severally with Antonio Co Kit; that
in exercising such right, it
acted lawfully, in good faith and with full justification to protect
its interest; and, as affirmative
defense, alleged that, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, the
Commercial Credit Agreement and Mortgagee provides that the mortgage shall
continue as security for the payment of the indebtedness therein contracted by
the mortgagors, ‘as well as security for the repayment of any other sums x x x (then or thereafter) owing to
the said mortgagee in addition to or aside from the credit facilities (therein)
granted by the Mortgagee to the Mortgagors; and that plaintiff Pedro Danao’s solidary obligation upon
the promissory note signed by him as co-maker jointly and severally with
Antonio Co Kit constitutes a further obligation secured by the aforementioned
mortgage, in addition to the indebtedness arising from the commercial credit
line, which additional obligation was subsisting at the time the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding was commenced.

“After the issues had been joined upon the filing of the
answer to the counterclaim and reply to answer, the case was set for pre-trial.

“After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered a decision the dispositive part of
which read as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P14,290.00
as actual and compensatory damages, P100,000.00, as moral damages, and
P10,000.00, as exemplary damages, in addition to P20,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees, as well as the costs of suit. 
The counterclaim is dismissed.

“SO ORDERED.”

From this decision only
the Bank of the Philippine Islands as successor of Peoples Bank and Trust Company
appealed.  Respondent Court affirmed the
trial court’s decision with some modifications as earlier quoted.  Both parties moved for reconsideration.  The motion for reconsi­deration filed by
Pedro and Concepcion Danao,
as plaintiff-appellees (Rollo,
p. 39) was denied in respondent Court’s resolution dated May 9, 1978 (Rollo, p. 48), while the motion for reconsideration filed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
defendant-appellant (Rollo, p. 41), was also denied
in the resolution of the same Appellate Court dated September 6, 1978 (Rollo, p. 53).

Hence, these petitions
filed by both parties.

The
petition in G.R. No.
L-48276 was filed with the Court by the spouses Dr. Pedro A. Danao and Concepcion S. Danao on June 7, 1978 (Rollo, p. 5);
while the petition in G.R. No. L-48980 was filed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands on October 7, 1978 (Rollo, p. 7).

In G.R.
No. L-48276 respondent
bank filed its comment on the petition for review on certiorari (Rollo, L-48276, p. 114) in compliance with the resolution
of the First Division of this Court dated June 27, 1978 (ibid, p. 107) on August 8, 1978 while the petitioners filed their reply on
September 14, 1978 (ibid, p. 265) in compliance with the resolution of
August 21, 1978 (ibid, p. 261). 
The Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution dated October
4, 1978 (ibid, p. 274).  The brief for the
petitioners was filed on December 5, 1978 (ibid,
p. 277); while the brief for the
respondent, was filed on February 3, 1979 (ibid,
p. 301).  Petitioner having failed to file the required
reply brief within the period granted by the Court which
expired on March 1, 1979, the Court resolved on April
16, 1979 (ibid, p. 305) to declare the case submitted for decision.

In G.R.
No. L-48980, respondents
filed their comment on the petition for review on certiorari on November
15, 1978 (Rollo, L-48980, p. 62) in compliance with
the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated October 18,
1978 (ibid, p. 61) while petitioner filed its Reply on January 18, 1979 (ibid,
p. 76) in compliance with the resolution of December 4, 1978 (Rollo, p. 73).  The
Court resolved to give due course to the petition in the resolution of March 21, 1979 (ibid, p.
83).  The brief for petitioner was filed
on June 23, 1979 (ibid,
p. 98); while the brief for respondent was filed on July 8, 1979 (ibid, p. 101).  On September 14, 1979 the Court resolved to
consider the case submitted for decision (ibid, p. 105), petitioner
having failed to file its reply brief within the period granted by the Court which expired on August 7,
1979.

On April 29, 1980,
the spouses Pedro and Concepcion Danao,
petitioners in L-48276 and private respondents in L-48980 moved for the
consolidation of the two cases (Rollo, L-48276, p.
308) which was granted by the First Division
of the Court in its resolution dated May
7, 1980 (ibid, p. 311). 
On July 2, 1980 the
Second Division of the Court also ordered the consolidation of L-48980 with
L-48276 and the transfer of the case to the First Division of the Court (Rollo, L-48980, p. 110).

On August 16, 1985,
counsel for the spouses Pedro and Concepcion Danao manifested to the Court the death of his client Pedro
Danao and moved for the substitution of the heirs
Martin Danao and Minda Danao as co-petitioners and co-respondents of Concepcion Danao in the instant
cases (Rollo, L-48276, p. 327).  On September
4, 1985 the heirs submitted to the Court a copy of the death
certificate of Pedro A. Danao (ibid, p. 341),
hence the effecting of the substitution.

In L-48276, petitioners
raised the following assignment of errors:

FIRST – THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGED UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CREDIT AGREEMENT & MORTGAGE BY AND
BETWEEN THE PARTIES ALSO SECURED THE CLEAN LOAN EXTENDED TO MR. ANTONIO CO KIT,
THE PROMISSORY NOTE FOR WHICH WAS CO-SIGNED BY PETITIONER DR. PEDRO A. DANAO.

SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE ILLNESS AND HEART ATTACKS SUFFERED BY PETITIONER DR. PEDRO A. DANAO
HAD NO CASUAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE AND PUBLICATION OF
THE NOTICE OF AUCTION SALE.

THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REDUCING
THE MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

In L-48980, petitioner
bank raised the following assignment of errors:

I.  The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that petitioner’s predecessor Peoples Bank and Trust Company,
by filing a civil complaint against Antonio Co Kit and Pedro A. Danao in the Baguio City Court
for the collection of the unpaid balance of the latter’s promissory note
“had waived” the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage,
and “such complaint barred the subsequent petition for foreclosure of
mortgage.”

II.  The
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage ultimately resorted to as a last recourse to en­force payment of the
outstanding balance long past due on Co Kit and Danao’s
promissory note “was unwarranted”, and in not holding that said bank
as creditor-mortgagee acted lawfully and was fully justified in exercising such
remedy.

III.  The
Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs-appellees, private
respondents herein.

IV.  The
Court of Appeals erred in not awarding at least temperate damages and
reasonable attorney’s fees upon defendant-appellant bank’s counterclaim against
the plaintiffs-appellees, private respondents herein.

Plaintiffs’ (Petitioners in L-48276 and respondents in L-48980)
claim for damages is predicated on the theory that the real estate mortgage
executed by them on March 14, 1963 in favor of defendant did not secure the solidary obligation of Dr. Danao
upon the promissory note signed by him jointly and severally with Antonio C.
Kit on October 28, 1963 and therefore, defendant’s act in foreclosing said
mortgagee extrajudicially was unwarranted.  (Respondent’s brief in
L-48276, Rollo, p. 301).

Placed in proper perspective, the deed of mortgage otherwise called
“Commercial Credit Agreement and Mortgage” is under scrutiny not for
the purposes of the loan itself because the same has been fully paid but for
the determination of the legality or illegality of the foreclosure proceedings instituted by the bank, which is now
the subject of the action for damages.

The creditor bank insists that the promissory note co-signed by
Dr. Danao with Antonio C. Kit as accommodation party
for the latter, is secured by the deed of mortgage in favor of the bank so that
in the foreclosure proceedings so instituted, it was merely exercising its
rights as stipulated in the contract and was acting with justification.  (L-48980, Petition, Rollo, p. 19).

Be that as it may, such distinction is in fact immaterial for
even assuming that the promissory
note of Antonio C. Kit was indeed
included among the obligations secured by the deed of mortgage of Dr. Danao, still the creditor bank in opting to file a civil
action (Civil Case No. 4281) in the Baguio City Court for the collection of the unpaid balance
of P4,225.15 plus interest has abandoned its mortgage
lien on the property in question.

Thus the Court has
invariably held that:

“x
x x The rule is now
settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring,
instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to
execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor, including the
subject matter of the mortgage x x x, subject to the
qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived.” (Manila Trading and
Supply Co. vs. Co Kim, et al. 71
Phil. 448 [1941]; Movido v. RFC, et al. 105 Phil. 886
[1959]).

Anent real properties in particular, the Court has
laid down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage.  In other words, he may pursue
either of the two remedies, but not both. 
As explained by the Court, the rule is as follows:

“For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor
has a single cause of action against the debtor.  This single cause of action consists in the
recovery of the credit with execution of the security.  In other words, the creditor in his action
may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of the
mortgage.  But both demands arise from
the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action. 
Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter
is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.  Consequently there exists only once cause of
action for a single breach of that obligation. 
Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated cannot split up his
single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage.  If he does
so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint.  By allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him
plural redress for a single breach of contract at much cost to the courts and
with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

“x x
x a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to
bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively
another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in
multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano
v. Enriquez, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San
Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of
being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place
where the property lies.” (Bachrach Motor Co.
Inc. v. Esteban Icarangal, et al., 38 Off. Gaz. 389
[1939]).

Evidently, the prior recourse of the creditor bank in filing a
civil action against the Danao spouses and
subsequently resorting to the complaint of foreclosure proceedings, are not
only a demonstration of the prohibited splitting up of a cause of action but
also of the resulting vexation and oppression to the debtor.

Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals found that the
People’s Bank and Trust Co. (succeeded by the Bank of the Philippine Islands)
acted unlawfully and without justification in extra-judicially foreclosing the
disputed mortgage and hence the Danao spouses are
entitled to damages.

As basis for
actual damages, the lower court relied on the testimonies of Mrs. Danao and Dr. Rodolfo Perez
and the medical certificates of the various doctors and came out with
the award of actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of P14,290.00
in favor of the same spouses, computed as follows:  (1) P1,290.00
representing medical and hospitalization expenses of Pedro Danao while confined at the Manila Medical Center from
October 1 to October 12, 1972; (2) P7,000.00 as costs for various examinations;
and (3) P6,000.00 supposed to be the amount of income lost by Pedro Danao from his medical practice because of this incident.

But the evidence as correctly appreciated by the Court of Appeals
shows that the first mild heart attack suffered by Pedro Danao
occurred in October 1977 or more than seven months after the initial
publication of the notice of foreclosure sale and the second heart attack occured in October 1978 or more than 19 months after said
publication.  No less important is the
fact that Dr. Rodolfo Perez, the regular attending physician of Pedro Danao and the latter’s own witness, testified to the
effect, that aforesaid heart attacks were the natural result or outgrowth of a
chronic rheumatic heart disease of long standing which developed over a period
of years, possibly even before 1966.  (Decision D.A. G.R. No. 59865-R; Rollo,
pp. 36-37).

The second item was found to be unsupported by evidence while as
to the third item, Pedro Danao did not testify to
prove the alleged lost income.  (Ibid, p. 37). 
In the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals (131
SCRA 127 [1984]) the Court ruled that an alleged loss of income is not recoverable
for being speculative if no receipt or any kind of evidence on the matter is
presented to prove it.

The Court has ruled that actual or compensatory damages are
“those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation and the
same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no
damages will be given.“ (Perfecto v. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 640 [1984]).

More specifically in
point to the case at bar, the Court has said:

“x x x Well settled is
the rule that even if the complaint filed by one against the other is clearly
unfounded this does not necessarily mean, in the absence of specific facts
proving damages, that said defendant really suffered actual damages over and
above attorney’s fees and costs.  The
Court cannot rely on its speculations as to the fact and amount of
damages.  It must depend on actual proof
of the damages alleged to have been suffered.” (Ibid, p. 640).

On the other hand, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.  The assessment of such damages, except liquidated
ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
the case.  (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 63 [1984]).

As a general rule, the filing alone of the foreclosure
application should not be a ground for an award of moral damages.

In the case at bar, however, the main bone of contention is not
only the filing of the petition for foreclosure proceedings but the manner in
which the same was carried out, such as the publication of the notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale at public auction in a Sunday edition of the
Baguio Midland Courier in the society page, instead
of in the “legal notices” or “classified ads” sections as
usual in these types of notices, in extraordinarily large and boxed advertisements, which allegedly bespoke the bank’s
malicious intent to embarrass and harass the Danao
spouses which actuations are contrary to the canons of conduct provided for in
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. 
(Comment, Rollo, p. 67)

Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals took cognizance of
the spouses’ mental anguish, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation
traceable to the unfortunate publication (Record on Appeal, p. 79; Rollo,
p. 38).

For moral damages, the lower court awarded P100,00.00 but the Court of Appeals reduced said
amount to P30,000.00 and attorney’s fees from P20,000.00 to P5,000.00.

We have laid down the rule that the fairness of the award of
damages by the trial court also calls for appellate determination (Luzon
Concrete Products Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 456 [1985]), such that
where the award of moral damages is far too excessive compared to the actual
losses sustained by the claimants, the former may be reduced.  (Siguenza v. Court
of Appeals, 137 SCRA 577-579).  In fact, We have held that reduction of moral damages is justified where the negligence of
petitioner bank and its employees is not wanton and reckless.  (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,
117 SCRA 628).

After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason can be
found to justify the reversal of the findings of the Court of Appeals, however
in view of the embarrassing circumstances attendant to the foreclosure notice,
as already explained hereinabove, We hereby MODIFY the judgment of the
respondent Court of Appeals by increasing the award of moral damages to P60,000.00 and
the attorney’s fees to P10,00.00, and by imposing exemplary damages the amount
of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
and Cruz, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Luis B. Reyes with the concurrence of
Justices Mama D. Busran and Nestor D. Alampay.

^[2]
Penned by Judge Guillermo P. Villasor.