G.R. No. L-39300. September 30, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERNIDO DETUYA, GREGORIO LOZANO, AND FELICIANO NAVALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 94,
promulgated on July 17, 1974, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused
BERNIDO DETUYA and FELICIANO NAVALES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with rape (there were eight rapes committed) penalized under the
provision of Article 294, paragraph 2.
WHEREFORE, appreciating the aggravating circumstances of band, dwelling, nighttime and ignominy, without
having been off-set by any mitigating
circumstance, the Court hereby
sentences both the accused BERNIDO DETUYA and FELICIANO NAVALES to
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, to be served as the National Penitentiary, Muntinglupa, Rizal with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, offended parties Indin Subana and Graciana Jumalon in the sum of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos for
each and Bernaldo Jumalon in the total sum of
Five Hundred Eighty-Four (P584.00) Pesos, representing the
total amount robbed; to acknowledge and support the off-spring of Graciana Jumalon should there be any, and to pay proportionate costs.
The accused, being detention prisoners, shall be credited with
four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive imprisonment already undergone by
them.[1]
xxx xxx xxx
In an
Information dated September 16, 1970, Bernido Detuya, Feliciano Navales,
Gregoria Lozano, Patricio Rafols, and
Rolando Rafols were charged as follows:
That on March 4, 1970 at about 2:00 o’clock dawn, in the barrio
of Ditulan,
Municipality of Dumingag, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused armed
with a revolver and hunting knifes, taking advantage
of the nighttime in order to facilitate the commission of the crime,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, by
force, did, then and there wilfully and
feloniously enter the house of one BERNARDO JUMALON,
once inside, with violence and intimidation, hogtied Bernardo and his children,
kick them, stab them, demanded for money, and with force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge with Indin Subana
a 14-year old wife of Bernardo and Graciana Jumalon a 17-year old daughter of Bernardo, taking turns one after the other against their will, then, take, steal and carry away cash money
in the amount of P500.00, 2 gold
rings worth P45.00, a lady’s wrist watch costing P30.00, 3 chickens
worth P7.50 all belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Bernardo Jumalon
without their consent and against their will to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the total amount of P583.50 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In
the court a quo, all of the five
accused pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged in the information. However, the accused Patricio Rafols and Rolando Rafols escaped
from detention while the trial was still underway, and are still at large. Of the three remaining accused, only Gregorio
Lozano was actually acquitted due to the failure
of the prosecution to prove his culpability beyond reasonable doubt.[3]
Subsequent to the
aforementioned judgment of conviction, Bernido Detuya and Feliciano Navales appealed to this court.
On February 7, 1984,
a Motion to Withdraw Appeal was filed by Feliciano Navales
thru his counsel de officio officially manifesting his voluntary decision to
withdraw his appeal in full
awareness of his legal rights and the import of such a withdrawal. We granted the motion in our resolution dated
February 29, 1984.[4]
Therefore, as to him, the judgment
has become final.
On the other hand, Bernido Detuya submitted his brief, as well as his reply brief, (both prepared by his
counsel de officio, Atty. Jejomar C. Binay), therein
reciting the errors allegedy committed by the lower court, to wit:
1. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE AND UNDESERVED CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES, PARTICULARLY BERNARDO JUMALON, ALEJANDRO LABANG AND
GRACIANA JUMALON, REGARDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNIDO
DETUYA AND THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, WHICH ARE REPLETE AND SHOT
THROUGH WITH GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, CONTRADICTIONS AND IMPROBABILITIES.
2. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNIDO DETUYA’S DEFENSE OF
DENIAL AND ALIBI IN THE FACE OF THE WEAK, UNRELIABLE, INCONCLUSIVE AND DOUBTFUL
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ON SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S IDENTIFICATION AND ON
THE COMMISSION OF THE RAPE.
3. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNIDO DETUYA OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
RAPE AND SENTENCING HIM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.[5]
After a careful
assessment of all the evidence on record, we are impelled to affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are
established by the evidence on hand:
At about 2 o’clock
in the morning of March 4, 1970
in Barrio Ditulan,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, Bernardo Jumalon was roused from his sleep by the barking of
dogs. He then lighted two lamps, one inside his room and another in the
living room, and proceeded to an
adjoining portion of his house to relieve himself. Upon reaching this extension of his house, Bernardo felt the presence of somebody in the kitchen which
made him nervous so that he returned
to his room, lighted a cigar, cleared
his throat, and made some
sounds. Feeling a bit braver, he went
back to urinate, but on the way he was met by five persons, the accused in
this case, four of whom were armed with
hunting knives and one with a revolver.
Bernardo immediately recognized two faces — those of Bernido Detuya and Feliciano
Navales. The
accused pointed their knives at Bernardo, at the same time demanding to know
where his money was hidden. Denying that
he had any money, Bernardo retreated towards his room but he was blocked by Bernido Detuya. He stumbled and fell on the floor. Thereupon he was made to lie flat on his
stomach; his two hands were tied at his back; and he was placed in a corner of the house.[6]
Thereafter, the accused went inside the room
where Bernardo Jumalon’s common-law wife, Indin Subana, and his four children were sleeping. After
blindfolding Indin, then only fourteen years young, appellant Bernick Detuya Feliciano Navales proceeded
to rape her. Graciana Jumalon, a daughter of Bernardo Jumalon, who at
that time was only 15 years of age,
was also raped by all five of
the accused.[7]
Subsequently, Graciana Jumalon was brought
downstairs where a companion of the accused also raped
her.[8]
Finally, the accused
ransacked the house, getting 500 from the trunk, a wristwatch worth P30.00,
two rings worth P45.00, and three hens
valued at P3.00 each.[9]
Before fleeing, they
warned Bernardo and his family not to
shout otherwise they will come back to kill all of them.[10]
After the accused had
gone, Bernardo wasted no time in reporting the incident to the barrio
captain, who promptly inspected the scene
of the crime.
Upon the latter’s advice,
Bernardo proceeded to the town proper and reported the incident to the police
authorities, who, after investigations, ordered the arrest of Bernido Detuya and Feliciano Navales who were both identified to the police authorities
by the victims.
On that same day, Graciana Jumalon and Indin Subana were
accompanied by Bernardo Jumalon and Police Lt. Felipe
Robles to the house of Dr. Tagaloguin where both women underwent physical
examination. The findings disclosed some
contusions in Graciana’s vaginal wall and bleeding lacerations in her hymen. Moreover, Dr. Tagaloguin
was able to gather a whitish substance from her vagina but
which he was not able to examine under the microscope.
Like in the case of Graciana Jumalon, Dr. Tagaloguin also
found some contusions and whitish substance in Indin’s
vaginal wall.[11]
Anent his first assignment of error, the appellant argues that
the testimonies of Bernardo Jumalon, Alejandro Labang, and Graciana Jumalon are replete and shot through with glaring
inconsistencies, contradictions, and exaggerations and because their
testimonies constitute the only proof linking him to the crime charged,
accordingly, he deserves to be acquitted.
We do not agree.
Contrary to the appellant’s claims, he was categorically and unequivocally identified
by the three principal witnesses for
the prosecution as being one of the five persons who robbed and raped the
victims.
The testimony of Graciana Jumalon reveals not only the fact of Bernido’s
presence at the scene of the crime on that fateful morning but, even more
importantly, the extent of his participation therein. She explained that it was the appellant, in
particular, who tied her and demanded for their
money; it was the appellant who removed her panty and sexually
abused her; and after all the other malefactors had finished raping
her, it was the appellant who brought
her downstairs where she was
again raped by another of
his companions; it was also the
appellant who brought her back upstairs and
who warned her not to shout, otherwise
she would be killed.[12]
Bernardo Jumalon’s testimony complements and confirms the declarations of his
daughter Graciana. His recognition of the appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime is positive and absolute. He testified that the appellant,
specifically, blocked his path while he was retreating towards his room, and minutes later raped his wife and
daughter.[13]
Confirming further the
statements of Graciana and Bernardo, Alejandro Labang, who was only eleven years old
when he witnessed the commission of the
dastardly crime, testified that he recognized the appellant as being one among
those who entered his uncle’s house in the early morning of March 4,
1970. According to him, the appellant and his companions
took turns in raping Graciana after which the appellant and Feliciano Navales raped Indin.[14]
All these principal witnesses
testified that after raping the women, the appellant and his cohorts robbed them of cash and other belongings. All of them likewise testified that even
prior to the incident in question the appellant and Feliciano Navales were
already quite known to them by face as well as by name.
As explicitly stated by
Alejandro Labang:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL FERNANDEZ: Since when
did you come to know Bernido Detuya and Fely Navales?
A I know two of them for
a long time already.
Q Why do you know them?
A They usually go to the mountain because
they have a farm there.[15]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant would want
to impress upon us that it was impossible for these prosecution witnesses to
make an accurate identification of him
because firstly, the place was not
illuminated, as shown by the absence of proof as to what kind of lamps were used and when the lights were put out, and secondly, the culprits admittedly blackened their
faces.
There is no basis
for these assertions. On the contrary, the testimony on cross-examination of Graciana Jumalon, which were corroborated
by that of Alejandro Labang during his own
cross-examination, dispels any doubt on this score. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAFOLS: Did you say that at the time you woke up and went out of your room
whether there was light in your room at that time?
GRACIANA: I can tell.
Q Please tell.
A Inside our house and
inside our room there were lights.
Q What was that light inside your room when you said
you woke up and stood up?
A It was a ‘lamparahan‘.
Q And will you describe
before this court what what do you mean by ‘lamparahan‘?
A I can.
Q Please tell the court.
A That
is made of tube with wick.
Q Will you tell this court
what was that tube made of?
A It is an empty can.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After the robbers left
and they were already away, what did you do?
A Just before they left
they put out the lights.[16]
xx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the culprits
blackened their faces but apparently this camouflage did not preclude the recognition of the appellant by his victims, who were already accustomed to his facial features and
mannerisms.
Beside, as aptly described Graciana Jumalon: “I was able to recognize
because their faces were not so painted with dirts.”[17]
Equally without merit is the appellant’s contention that the commission of rape was impossible under the facts narrated
by the prosecution witnesses so
that, in truth, it was not satisfactorily established.
Although the room where the rapes were committed is quite small, around five meters, it is, however, sufficient to accomodate
four or five people herded in one corner, plus two persons sprawled on the
floor, and five others
standing. As stated by Graciana Jumalon:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAFOLS: And that you would like to impress upon this court
that all these persons concentrated at you without going to other places of
your room, am I right?
A When they took turns, (in
raping me) I noticed that some of them
were also going around.[18]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant
would have us believe that with this number
of people inside the room it is impossible to have sex with anybody because one would naturally
feel too self-conscious to have any erection, much less libido. But
while that may be true to a normal person, one with a criminal mind is so bereft inhibitions
or of any sense of modesty or propriety
as to be able, even if he wanted
to, to depress a compelling sexual urge for then he turns into a craving animal. The
matter of decency would surely be the
least of the concerns of one who is capable of committing such
despicable crimes as robbery
with force upon persons and
multiple rape.
Neither is it so
inconceivable for five men to rape single woman in twenty-five minutes, as
argued by the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is quite possible for
a man in similar circumstances to consummate rape in one minute.
Additionally, the
appellant insists that rape could not
have been committed because the legs of Graciana
and Indin were tied as allegedly admitted by them. This
assertion is completely belied
by the responses of Graciana to the questions
propounded by the court a quo, one of which would suffice to illustrate:
COURT:
Q What do you mean, do you want to tell this court that at the time when Detuya had sexual intercourse with you, your eyes
were blindfolded and your legs were tied together?
A No.[19]
In the case of Indin, she explained how her legs were tied in a manner
that could not hinder, but could in fact facilitate, the commission of rape
against her:
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL CADELINIA: Were your
legs tied?
A They
held my legs apart.
Q By
the way, you feel it – how many persons held your legs apart?
A My legs were tied with piece of cloth like this. (The witness demonstrated by placing her legs apart whereas her feet are together.)
COURT:
Q What
part of your legs were tied?
A My legs were tied
to the bench.
Q Were
your legs tied together or only one to
the bench?
A Only one.[20]
xxx xxx xxx
As pointed
out by the appellant, there are, indeed, a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, these are not of a nature and magnitude that would impair
the credibility of the said witnesses.
The alleged inconsitencies refer to minor
details and ”do not, in actuality, touch upon the basic aspects of who, the
how and the when, of the crimes
committed.”[21] On the contrary, minor discrepancies in the testimonies of two or
more witnesses are but natural and would even enhance their credibility as witnesses,
because these indicate that the responses
given were honest and unrehearsed.[22]
Furthermore, it is hard
to believe that a woman would undergo the expense, trouble, and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention the scandal,
embarrassment, and humiliation it
inevitably entails, and allow an examination of her private parts, if
her motive was not to bring to
justice the person(s) who had abused
her.[23]
Besides, the contusions and lacerations found inside Graciana and Indin’s sexual organs confirm vividly their testimonies on their being raped.[24]
The other eyewitness,
fourteen-year old Alejandro Labang, (he was eleven
years of age when the crime was committed) had no reason to testify falsely
against the appellant, explicitly and implicitly accusing him of a capital offense. No ulterior
motive was imputed to him, and
thus, the presumption is that he was not actuated by improper motive and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[25]
Everything considered, there is no doubt in our mind of the truthfulness of the
testimonies of the three eyewitnesses. Equally, we are morally certain of the guilt of the appellant
from the evidence on record. Verily, the
quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — has been fully satisfied in this case.
The second assignment of error pertains to the supposed
error of the trial court in not giving credence to the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi in
the face of the weak,
unreliable, and inconclusive evidence of the prosecution. In the words of the trial court:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence for the accused Bernido Detuya shows that on March 4, 1970, the said accused was in
his house located at Mahayahay, Dumingag,
Zamboanga del Sur, with his
wife and other persons whom they invited to attend the house warming of their
house which was newly finished; that after the house warming, there was a dance
and merry making in the house; that among the guests present were Nap Nazareno, Gonzalo Gutano, Dalmacio Egot, Tunang Ebarle, Erenio Manada, Dodo Rosal, Mrs. Rosal, Gerning Maglasan, Santos Salcedo, Pastor Hinoguin, Berting Maglasan, Mrs. Maglasan, Jesus Baulos, Margarita
Detuya, Pedro Manada and
others; that they served food to their visitors at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening and they finished eating at
about 10:00 o’clock; that the party ended at about 12:00 o’clock at night and
thereafter the accused Bernido Detuya
who has drunk more than enough asked permission to go to bed and left his wife
to attend to his guests; the accused further maintained that his wife is a
school teacher and that he is a farmer and it is impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of May 4, 1970,
considering that he was in the
house at Mahayahay asleep, which house is approximately three
(3) kilometers Ditulan where the incident complained
of took place; that the reason
why he is charged as an accused in this case is because sometime about the end
of the year 1969, he was about to box Bernardo Jumalon
when Bernardo Jumalon and others were about to box
Feliciano Navales.[26]
Well-settled
is the rule that alibi as a defense is weak and that it
cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution’s witnesses
of the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime especially when there was no physical impossibility for the accused
to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[27]
It is not at all
improbable that after the appellant excused himself from the party, presuming arguendo that there really was one, he then proceeded with his companions to the house of Bernardo Jumalon
in Ditulan.
Even if they travelled by foot, it would not
have taken them an hour to reach Ditulan which is
only around three kilometers from Mahayahay.
Furthermore, the motive
that the appellant ascribes to Bernardo Jumalon —
which is revenge, because sometime in 1969 the appellant was about to punch Bernardo who, together with some others, were about to
hit Feliciano Navales – is too shallow to be acorded credence. In
the first place, the alleged “feud” was between Bernardo and
Feliciano, not the appellant — he merely intervened. In the second place, there were
no actual exchange of blows.
Since no harm came to Bernardo, there is no reason to expect any kind of
retaliation on his part, especially revenge by falsely accusing the appellant
of a very grave crime. The absurdity of
such a motive is only too apparent especially if we consider that by so falsely accusing the appellant of said
crimes Bernardo would be putting his own wife and daughter to great shame
and scandal before the public.
The two witnesses,
himself excluded, presented by the appellant contribute practically nothing to
strengthen his case. Rather, they
succeeded only in weakening his already weak alibi. The first witness is his wife; naturally,
human nature being what it is, she is expected to come to her husband’s aid; hence, her testimony, if at all,
carries very little weight. The
appellant’s second witness, Dalmacio Egot, similarly testified on the facts constituting his
alibi. However, in the course of Dalmacio’s cross-examination, the prosecution was able to establish the witness’ marked propensity
to testify in all kinds of cases where
he was not himself directly involved as a party or
as one who might suffer substantial
injury from the decision of the court.
For this reason, Dalmacio’s credibility
as a witness as well as the “believability”
of his testimony has been considerably impaired.
Further, “alibi is
at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication especially between parents and
children, relatives, and even
those not so
related.”[28]
At any rate, these witnesses’ testimonies alone cannot overcome
weight of the prosecution evidence clearly pointing to the appellant as one of the culprits.
The appellant’s third
assignment of error is a mere consequence of the first
and second.
From the facts
established, we find the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of robbery with rape penalized
under the provisions of Art. 294, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nighttime, and ignominy. Band
has been correctly appreciated by the
trial court only as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Nighttime is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in that
it facilitated the commission of the crime.[29]
As previously shown, the appellant and his companions blackened their faces so
that they could easily blend with the
darkness thereby making them even more indistinguishable.
Additionally, the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy is present in this case inasmuch as
firstly, Indin Subana
was raped in the presence of her husband, Bernardo Jumalon,
and secondly, Graciana Jumalon
was successively raped by five men — these circumstances made the effects of
the crime more humiliating.[30] Present, likewise, is the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, considering that the crimes were committed in the home of the victims who have not given
provocation to the appellant and his cohorts.
In view of the presence of four aggravating
circumstances without any mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed should
have bean death, which is the greater penalty.
However, in the light of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution[31] abolishing the death penalty, the imposable
penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity is increased to TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000) PESOS each to Indin
Subana and to Graciana Jumalon. With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and
Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Asaali S. Isnani,
Decision, 20-21; Rollo, 31-32.
[2]
Decision, 1-2; Rollo,
12-13.
[3]
Id., 16, Rollo,
27.
[4]
Rollo, 324.
[5]
Appellant’s Brief, 7; Rollo, 311.
[6]
T.s.n.,
session of January
29, 1973, 6-7, 9-10.
[7]
T.s.n., session of February 20, 1973, 8-9.
[8]
T.s.n., session of January 29, 1973, 101.
[9]
Id., 18.
[10]
Id., 103.
[11]
T.s.n.,
session of September
18, 1973, 166-168, 174.
[12]
T.s.n., sesion of January 29, 1973, 88-103.
[13]
Id., 7-20.
[14]
T.s.n.,
session of February
20, 1973, 5-11.
[15]
Id., 6.
[16]
Id., 19-20; T.s.n., session of January
29, 1973; 109-110, 103-104.
[17]
Id., 115.
[18]
Id., 137.
[19]
Id., 134-135.
[20]
T.s.n., session of October
11, 1973 265-266.
[21]
People vs. Cabeltes, Nos.
L-38145-48, June 29, 1979; 91 SCRA 208
(1979).
[22]
People vs. Agudo, No. L-43796, July 15,
1985; 137 SCRA 516 (1985).
[23]
People vs. Tuando, No. L-47720, May 20, 1987, citing: People vs. Macatangay, No. L-40726, June 29, 1982; 114 SCRA 743.
[24]
People vs.
Reyes, No. L-62387, June 19, 1985; 137 SCRA 99
(1985).
[25]
People vs. Canamo, No. L-62043, August 13, 1985, 138 SCRA 141 (1985), citing: People vs. Alcantara, No. L-49693-94, December 29, 1983; 126 SCRA 425.
[26]
Decision, 6-8; Rollo,
17-19.
[27]
People vs. Pecato, No.
L-41008, June 18, 1987, citing: People vs. Trawon,
No. L-51387, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA
170 (1981); People vs. Canamo, No. L-62043, August 13, 1985, 138 SCRA 141
(1985); People vs. Gani, Nos. L-54812-84, October 15, 1985, 139 SCRA 301
(1985).
[28]
People vs. Pecato, No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, citing: People vs. Cabanit,
Nos. L-62030-31, October 4,
1985, 139 SCRA 94 (1985).
[29]
People vs. Lorenzo, No. L-54414,
July 9, 1984; 130 SCRA 311 (1981).
[30]
U.S. vs. Iglesia,
et al., No. 6868, December 14, 1911, 21 Phil. 55 (1911); U.S. vs. Camiloy, No. 12693, August
11, 1917, 36 Phil. 757 (1917).
[31]
Article III, sec. 19(1).