BENJAMIN C. UY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RENATO S. MERCADO, RESPONDENT.

Municipal Trial Court Judge Renato S.
Mercado of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
later Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Aglipay-Sagaday,
Quirino Province,
is administratively charged with abuse of judicial power and discretion and
gross ignorance of the law.

The records show that, on 3 May 1985, former Mambabatas
Pambansa (MP) Orlando C. Dulay
of Quirino Province filed a complaint for libel with
the Municipal Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, presided over by respondent judge,
against herein complainant Benjamin C. Uy, Apolonio Batalla and Ulpiano Quizon, based on a
publication in the Tempo newspaper, dated 28 April 1985,
implicating said former MP Orlando C. Dulay, along
with several others, who were charged before the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite with the crime of robbery in band.

The records further show that respondent judge conducted the
preliminary investigation on former MP Orlando C. Dulay,
as complainant,
on 3 May 1985,
and issued the warrant for the arrest of the accused in the libel case on the
same day, without any evidence or proof that there was immediate necessity of
placing the accused under custody of the court and without proof or evidence to
warrant a conclusion that the accused may frustrate the ends of justice by
their non-appearance in the trial, as mandated by Rule 112, Section 6(b) of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.  As a
result, complainant Benjamin C. Uy, on 14 May 1985, while in the vicinity of
the City Hall in Quezon City,
was arrested and ordered detained in Cabarroguis, Quirino
Province.  The issuance of said warrant of arrest caused
incalculable damage and suffering to complainant and his family, particularly
because of the unusual arrest effected by the military elements under the
control and supervision of then MP Orlando C. Dulay.

Complainant alleges that respondent judge gave due course to the
complaint of libel despite the fact that, under Rep. Act No. 1289, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 4363, the proper jurisdiction and venue of the case is Quezon City, where former MP Orlando C. Dulay
held office or in Manila where the allegedly libelous article was printed and
first published.

Respondent judge, in his Comment, admits having conducted the
preliminary investigation in the libel case. 
He claims, however, that from the preliminary examination made, along
with what he gleaned from the news item, there was reason to believe that there
was probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest and the court, over
which he presided, was of the belief that the three accused were probably
guilty of said libel.  Citing the cases of
US vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, and Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, respondent judge
claims that the judicial determination of probable cause is final and
conclusive and that whether probable cause exists or not is discretionary for
the court.  He asks for the dismissal of
the administrative complaint.

Under Sec. 37 of Batas Pambansa No.
129, judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital
Region, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions and cognizable by
the Regional Trial Courts.  And, Art. 360
of the Revised Penal Code on libel, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1289 and further
amended by Rep. Act No. 4363, provides that, where one of the offended parties
is a public officer, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where he holds office at the
time of the commission of the offense or of the province or city where the
libelous article was printed and first published.  It is also provided that preliminary
investigation of criminal actions for written defamations shall be conducted by
the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal
court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the above article.  The limitation of choice of venue is clearly
intended to minimize or limit the filing of out-of town libel suits to protect
the alleged offender from hardship, inconvenience, and harassment and to
protect the interest of the public service where one of the offended parties is
a public officer^[1].  Hence, the proper court to hear the libel
case, in this instance, was either the court in Quezon City where former MP
Orlando C. Dulay held office, or the court in Manila
where the allegedly libelous matter was printed and first published, but not
the court in Quirino
Province.

When respondent judge, in the libel case filed by MP Dulay, conducted the preliminary investigation on Dulay, he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused
on the same day.  While it is mandated by
law that preliminary investigations should be simple, speedy and should not
drag on for weeks and months, to protect the substantial rights of the accused,
and that the investigating judge acts only upon probable cause and reasonable
belief in issuing a warrant of arrest, it is equally mandated that preliminary
investigations should secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution to protect him from public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of public trial and to protect the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions^[2].

Considering that libel suits are often intended to harass an
alleged offender, respondent judge should have satisfied himself not only that
probable cause exists, but likewise made certain that venue is properly laid
and jurisdiction legally acquired before taking cognizance of the case and
issuing the warrant of arrest.  This, he
did not do.  Reference may be made, at
this point, to cases where despite the existence of probable cause, the
investigating judge does not issue a warrant of arrest when there appears to be
no necessity therefor.^[3]

It should be noted that the accused in the libel case filed a
motion to dismiss, raising the issue of venue and jurisdiction, thus affording
respondent Judge an opportunity to rectify his previous stand, but respondent
failed and refused to dismiss the libel suit^[4],
even as it was clear that the court, over which he presided, really had no
jurisdiction over the case.  With this
unjustified action, respondent judge placed his integrity under a heavy cloud,
leading the Court to believe that he went “out of his way” to accommodate
and favor the then influential and powerful former Governor and later Mambabatas Pambansa of Quirino Province, Orlando C. Dulay.  As held by this Court in Montemayor
vs. Judge Collado.^[5]

x x x The
conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
disposition of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge to the
lowest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.  His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized with propriety and above all must be above suspicion.  Although every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.  x x x“

It appearing that the records of the case sufficiently provide a
clear basis for the determination of respondent judge’s administrative liability,
there is no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges^[6].  The unjustified and irregular acts of
respondent judge in the premises constitute serious misconduct or, at least,
gross ignorance of the law.  Ordinarily,
the misconduct of the respondent would have warranted his dismissal from the
service in view of its gravity.  However,
this penalty may no longer be imposed because of his automatic separation from
the service upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy for the position of
Congressman for the province of Quirino in the elections of 11 May 1987.  But, his actions cannot be allowed to go
unpunished.

WHEREFORE, the Court orders the forfeiture of respondent’s
accrued retirement benefits as well as leave and other privileges, if any, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. 
Respondent is further required to show cause, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be disbarred for the misconduct referred to
in this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmeinto,
and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]  Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303

^[2]
Hashim vs. Boncan,
71 Phil. 216

^[3]
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Jose Y. Feria,
Philip­pine Legal Studies, Series No. 2, p. 16

^[4]
Rollo, p. 32

^[5]
107 SCRA 258

^[6]
Flores vs. Tatad, 96 SCRA 676