VICTOR QUE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of Our minute
resolution^[1]
dated September 22, 1986 denying the main Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the decision^[2] and resolution^[3] of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the judgment^[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City convicting herein petitioner of the crime of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 on two (2) counts.

In the main Petition filed on August 25, 1986, petitioner seeks a
review by certiorari of the appellate court’s decision dated January 14,
1986 and the resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
same, on the grounds that respondent appellate court not only decided a substantial question of jurisdiction not in
accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence but also sanctioned the
departure by the lower court from the accepted judicial procedures on the issue
of jurisdiction.

In his Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner raises the following grounds:

1.  That the denial of the
petition by way of a minute resolution is for no stated reason except for
“lack of merit.”

2.  That the
respondent-appellate court erred in not considering material facts as well as
the principal element of the crime charged showing that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to try the instant case.

3.  The respondent-appellate
court erred in failing to consider that one of the most important elements of
the offense charged under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which is the place of the issuance of the check is
clearly absent in the instant case.

Or simply stated, the issue is whether
the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the
Petition for Review are in accordance with law and evidence.

The motion is without merit.

There is no question that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over the case as provided for
in Secs. 10 and 15(a) Rule 110 of the New Rules of
Court.  The findings of fact of the trial
court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City as admitted by
petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his
civil liability.  Thus, the trial court
held:

“In his answer (Exhibit “H”) to
the civil complaint for collection of sum of money, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-32445 of the Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Quezon City (Exhibit
“G”), the accused inferentially admitted
that the purchases and issuance of the check in question were made at Francis
Hill Supply located at No. 194 Speaker Perez Street,
Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City.  (Exhibit “G-1” and Exhibit “H-1”).  (p. 4, Dec.) (p. 62,
Rollo)

It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the
complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City.  The determinative factor is the place of
issuance which is in Quezon City
and thus within the court’s jurisdiction.

The argument on petitioner’s second issue has likewise no leg to
stand on.  On this argument that he
issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases
by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager, We give our stamp of
approval on the findings of the appellate court, to wit:

“Neither may appellant’s claim in his second assignment of
error that the accused issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the
payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for
his act of issuing the checks in
question.

“It is now settled that Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in
the form of a deposit or a guarantee. 
The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether
the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee the said obligation. 
In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction,
inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such
distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application.  Furthermore, the history of the enactment of
subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition
all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor
of a guarantee.  This intent may be
gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9)
which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill
was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks
from becoming “useless scraps of paper” and to restore respectability
to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the
checks.  The legislative intent as above
said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original
text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding
from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final
version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of
Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned
qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of
the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular
Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).

“Consequently, what are important are the facts that the
accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and
that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not
the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.” (pp. 4-5, Dec. IAC)
(pp. 37-38, Rollo)

From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is
clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum
and thus punishable under such law.

Finally, We now come to the third
argument regarding the denial of the petition by a minute resolution.  Although, petitioner in his Reply, thru his
counsel, Atty. Joanes G. Caacbay
has never questioned the power of this Court to deny petition for review by the issuance of a mere minute resolution as
there is no violation whatsoever of the provisions of the Constitution and at
the same time, same counsel disowns having knowledge or a hand in the
preparation of the motion for reconsideration which was prepared by a certain
Atty. Victor T. Avena, We deemed it worthwhile to
mention here the case of In Re:  Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, 574 where We held that:

“Six years ago in Novino, et al vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May
31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice
Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter.  There,
the petitioner’s counsel urged that a
“lack of merit” resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the
Constitution.  Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

“In connection with identical short resolutions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these ‘resolutions’ are not
‘decisions’ within the above constitutional requirement.  They merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it.  It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s
denial.  For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.”

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for recon­sideration
of the denial of the instant petition for certiorari, is hereby DENIED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr.,
Padilla, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1] p. 46, Rollo,
Second Division

^[2] Penned by Justices Lorna Lombos-dela Fuente, concurred in
by Justices Emilio A. Gancayco & Jose A. Campos,
Jr., An­nex “B” to the Petition.

^[3] Resolution dated July 7, 1986 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration Annex “D”.

^[4] Penned by Judge Antonio P.
Solano.