SOLANO LAGANAPAN, PETITIONER, VS. MAYOR ELPIDIO ASEDILLO MUNICIPALITY OF KALAYAAN, LAGUNA, AND EPIFANIO RAGOTERO, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal from the judgment*, dated 16 October 1967, of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case no. SC-719, which ordered the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his former position of chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries from
his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.

The facts are not disputed. 
The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed
chief of police of the municipality
of Kalayaan,
Laguna on 4 January 1960,
with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo.  On 1 July 1960, his salary was increased
to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an appointment which was approved as
provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act no. 2260 by the Commissioner of
Civil Service^[1].

On 1 April 1962,
the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding
appointment was made which the Commissioner of Civil Service “approved
under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act no. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days
from receipt of certification of eligibles by the
Provincial Treasurer of Laguna”^[2].

Then, on 1 July 1963,
1 July 1964, and 1 July 1965, he was again given salary
increases, and new appointments were extended to him, which appointments were
also approved under Section 24(c) of Republic Act no. 2260 by the Commissioner
of Civil Service^[3].

However, on 16 February
1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by
respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo,
on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility.  The petitioner was told to surrender his
firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna^[4] who was also informed of petitioner’s
dismissal on the same day^[5].  Respondent Epifanio
Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner^[6].

Subsequently, or on 21
February 1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan,
Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna^[7].  In view thereof, the petitioner complained to
the Police Commission which advised him to file an injunction suit against
Mayor Asedillo^[8].

Hence, on 16 March 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus,
quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo,
the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, docketed therein as Civil Case no.
SC-719, seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages^[9].

In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner,
being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service
eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the
pleasure of the appointing power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies^[10].

The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that the
petitioner has no cause of action against it; and that, if the acts of the
respondent mayor are patently irregular, the said mayor should be held solely
liable therefor^[11].

After due hearing,
judgment was rendered, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment –

(a)  Declaring the summary
dismissal of the petitioner on February
16, 1967 illegal;

(b)  Ordering the respondent
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo to
forthwith recall his designation of respondent Epifanio
Ragotero as Acting Chief of Police of Kalayaan;

(c)  Ordering the respondent
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and
the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan to forthwith
reinstate the petitioner to his former position of Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, restore the appropriation for his salary
and pay him his back salaries from February 16, 1967, until reinstated; and

(d)  Ordering the respondent
Mayor and respondent Municipality to give the petitioner a period of not less
than thirty days from the date this decision becomes final within which to file
his application for Civil Service eligibility under Sec. 9 of Republic Act. No.
4864.

Without pronouncement as to costs”^[12].

From this judgment, the
respondents appealed directly to this Court, claiming that the lower court
erred:  (1) in holding that petitioner
need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action for quo warranto and mandamus in court, as the action
prescribes in one year and an administrative appeal does not interrupt the
running of the period; (2) in holding that the summary dismissal of the
petitioner-appellee was illegal; (3) in ordering the
respondents-appellants Mayor and Municipality to give the petitioner a period of not less than thirty (30) days from the date the decision
becomes final within which to file his application for civil service
eligibility under Sec. 9 of Republic Act no. 4864; and (4) in not fixing and
ordering the petitioner to pay the respondents reasonable expenses incurred by
them by reason of the false allegations in the verified petition for mandamus
and quo warranto.

The appellant Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna additionally claims that the lower court erred in not holding respondent–appellant
Mayor Elpidio
Asedillo personally liable for his illegal act.

We have carefully examined
the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court, which are supported by the evidence and law.  Thus, the appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted all administrative
remedies before he resorted to the courts. 
They suggested that the appellee should have
appealed the order of dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service in view of
the provisions of Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16(j) of
Republic Act no. 2260 which grant the Commissioner of Civil Service the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all
permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service; and
to hear and determine appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved by an action or determination of any appointing authority
contrary to the provisions of  the Civil
Service Law and rules.

While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can
bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all the remedies
in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of exhaustion or
administrative remedies is not a
hard and fast rule.  It has been
repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one; where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter
ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due
process^[13].  The rule does not also apply where insistence
on its observance would result in nullification
of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy^[14].

In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the
services of the appellee, the appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily
without any semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply with the
elementary rules of due process.  No
charges were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite the
provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act no. 4864, otherwise known as the Police
Act of 1966, which took effect on 8 September 1966, that “Members of the
local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint
filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct
or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious
irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law”.  Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies
before appellee could come to court for the
protection of his rights.

Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and
the appellee was immediately removed from office and
replaced by the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the appellee,
was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Furthermore, appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not a
pre-requisite to, nor a bar to the institution of quo warranto
proceedings^[15],
so that, as pointed out by the trial court, to require the appellee
to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this action, could easily
result in a grave injustice of barring him forever from bringing the matter to
the courts of justice for judicial determination.

We also find no merit in the appellants’ contention that, since
the appointments extended to the appellee as chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna were all provisional in
nature, and not permanent, his services could be terminated with or without
cause, at the pleasure of the appointing officer.  While it may be true that the appellee was holding a provisional appointment at the time
of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be dismissed at any
time.  His provisional appointment could
only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of
a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission^[16].  Here, no such certification was received by
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo
thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of the appellee.

The appellants have also assailed the trial court for ordering
them to give the appellee a period of not less than
thirty (30) days within which to file an application for civil service
eligibility under Sec. 9 of Republic Act no. 4864, claiming that the appellee had not asked for such relief in his petition.

Whether or not such relief was asked for in the petition or
included in the petitioner’s
general prayer “for such relief and remedies that may be just and
equitable in the premises”, as the appellee
claims, is now of little importance, in view of our finding that the appellee’s provisional appointment could only be terminated
thirty (30) days after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service Commission.  With such a posture, the appellee
had ample time to ask the Civil Service Commission for a certification of civil
service eligibility under the law.

We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of the respondent
Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone
should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner, because the
records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo,
not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan,
Laguna, and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity.

Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of
the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967, the Municipal
Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least
protesting the petitioner’s summary dismissal from his position, even abolished
the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan,
Laguna.  We consider this act of the
Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent
Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality
equally liable, as held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner
and for the payment of his back salaries.

A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was
held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees,
to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. 
In Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals^[17],
for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the
Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary
but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
reinstate.

In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano^[18], the municipal mayor was held
personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service
eligibility, the
dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative
investigation.

In Rama vs. Court of Appeals^[19],
the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor,
provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and
severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200
employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from
their positions because of their party affiliations.

The trial court, therefore, did not commit error in finding
that the summary dismissal of
the petitioner was illegal and in ordering the respondent Mayor and respondent
Municipality to reinstate him with back salaries from the time of his
dismissal.

The appealed judgment, however, needs some modification in the
light of supervening events.  It would
appear that the reinstatement of the petitioner-appellee
to his former position of chief of police of Kalayaan,
Laguna, as ordered in the appealed judgment, is no longer feasible and hence,
it cannot be enforced, in view of the appointment of a permanent chief of
police (now called Station Commander) in accordance with PD 482, issued on 13
June 1974, which provides for the integration of police and fire departments
and jails in certain provinces, including the province of Laguna.

In the Court’s Resolution, dated 18 May 1987, the parties were
required “to MOVE in the premises within ten (10) days from notice,
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that
has transpired since the promulgation of the Freedom Constitution by virtue of
Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986 as well as the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and pursuant to the provision of Section 18 of Rule 3, insofar as
the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor official to
state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his
predecessor in office)”^[20].  Pursuant thereto, respondents-appellants filed
a Motion to Dismiss^[21]
which states, among others, that –

“3.  Upon the organization of Integrated
National Police, respondent Epifanio Ragotero, who was designated Acting Chief of Police of Kalayaan, was replaced by a permanent Station Commander,
Antonio de la Paz, who holds said position until now;

“4.  That respondent
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo has
long been dead since April 26, 1978, but even before he died he had been
succeeded as Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, by Mayor
Norma Macaraeg, then after his death by Mayor Gerardo
Kabamalan, who was elected in 1980, and finally by
OIC Turiano Montes, Jr., who was appointed on April
3, 1986 after the EDSA revolution;

“5.  That petitioner-appellee Solano Laganapan himself
was appointed as Municipal
Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Kalayaan, Laguna on April 7, 1986 after the EDSA revolution but his services
were terminated on April 7, 1987,
as he is not a civil service eligible^[22]“.

Such
being the case, the petitioner-appellee is entitled
only to back salaries which however, should be limited to a period of five (5)
years^[23].

In addition, respondent
Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official capacity
as municipal mayor, having passed away, the liability to pay petitioner his
back salaries must now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the petitioner-appellee is entitled only to the payment of five (5) years back
salaries to be paid by respondent municipality, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed.  Without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

* Rendered by Judge Arsenio Nanawa

^[1]
Original Records, p. 46

^[2]
Id., p. 48

^[3]
Id., pp. 49, 50, 51

^[4]
Id., p. 53

^[5]
Id., p. 54

^[6]
Id., p. 59

^[7]
Id., p. 57

^[8]
Id., p. 56

^[9]
Id., p. 1

^[10]
Id., p. 16

^[11]
Id., p. 35

^[12]
Id., p. 105

^[13]
Mitra vs. Subido,
L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967, 21
SCRA 127 and other cases cited therein.

^[14]
Cuevas vs. Pineda, L-47617, Aug.
29, 1986, and other cases cited therein.

^[15]
Galano vs. Roxas,
L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67
SCRA 8

^[16]
Ramos vs. Subido, L-26090, Sept. 6, 1967, 21
SCRA 44; Del Rosario vs. Subido, L-23934, July
25, 1968, 24 SCRA 117; Aguilar vs. Valencia, L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 210; Lamata vs. Cusi,
L-32619, Oct. 31, 1972, 47 SCRA 385; Sarmiento vs.
Nolasco, L-38565, Sept. 16, 1974, 59 SCRA 173

^[17]
G.R. No. L-40846, Jan. 31, 1978,
81 SCRA 408

^[18]
G.R. No. L-20977, Sept. 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 1)

^[19]
G.R. No. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16, 1987

^[20]
Rollo, p. 47

^[21]
Rollo, pp. 48-49

^[22]
Id., p. 48

^[23]
Samson vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 654 limited back
salaries for an illegally terminated civil service employee to three (3) years
only but the cases of Balquidra vs. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, G.R. No. L-40490, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 123; Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40846, January 31, 1978; 81 SCRA 408; and Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41717-33,
April 12, 1982, 113 SCRA
477 granted back salaries of five (5) years for illegally terminated civil
service employees.