THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG, BRANCH XXIII, RESPO…

This is an appeal
by certiorari of a decision of the respondent Judge in Land Registration
Case No. N-10317, LRC Record No. N-54803 entitled “In Re:  Application for Registration of Title, Manila
Electric Company, applicant,” dated May 29, 1981.

The facts are not
disputed.   Manila Electric Company filed amended
application for registration of a parcel of land located in Taguig,
Metro Manila on December 4, 1979.  On August 17, 1976, applicant acquired
the land applied for registration
by purchase from Ricardo Natividad (Exhibit E) who in
turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad
as evidenced by a Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970 (Exhibit E).  Applicant’s predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the property under the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.  The property was declared for
taxation purposes under the name of the applicant (Exhibit I) and the taxes due thereon have been paid (Exhibits J and J-1).

On May 29, 1981
respondent Judge rendered a decision
ordering the registration of the property in the name of the private
respondent.  The Director of Lands
interposed this petition raising the issue of whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land.  After comments
were filed by the respondents, the Court gave the petition due course.  The legal issue raised by the petitioner
Director of Lands has been squarely dealt with
in two recent cases [The Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., etc., No. L-73002
(December 29, 1986), 146 SCRA 509; The Director
of Lands v. Hon. Bengzon and Dynamarine Corporation, etc., No. 54045
(July 28, 1987)], and resolved in
the affirmative.  There can be no different answer in the case at bar.

In the Acme decision, this Court upheld the doctrine that
“open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure
and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property.”

As the Court said in that case:

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) “x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title x x x.” No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited
to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. 
The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected (sic) from the moment the required period of possession became complete.

Coming to the case at bar, if the land was already private
at the time Meralco
bought it from Natividad, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporation holding
alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease (1973 Const., Art. XIV, Sec. 11) does not apply.

Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among
those that may apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the Public Land Act.

As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation
proceedings were instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental
circumstance, “productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to
be confirmed in said proceedings.” Considering that it is not disputed
that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the
law would deny private respondent the right to register its property which was
validly acquired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The questioned decision of the respondent
Judge is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., see dissent.