ESTELITA, ROBERTO, LEONARD, REYNALDO, ELY, MYRNA, MICHAELANGELO, ROMEO AND LEONOR, ALL SURNAMED ROSALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH III,…

The basic issue in this case is whether or not the contract of
lease between the petitioners and the private respondent has already expired
according to their stipulations. 
However, that is not what we are called upon to decide at this
time.  What is raised in this petition is
a question of procedure, viz., which of two cases involving the same parties and the
same subject shall have precedence over the other.  That is what we shall determine now.

The antecedents are as follows: 
The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease over the former’s
property for the expressed period
of three years beginning March 1, 1977.^[1]
On January 12, 1980, the
petitioners advised the private
respondent that he would have to vacate the leased premises on March 1,
1980, not only
because of the lapse of the agreed term but also because he had subleased the
property in violation of their agreement.^[2] The private respondent objected, claiming
that his verbal agreement with them was for a period of ten years, which was
the reason he had introduced permanent and costly improvements in the building,
and moreover they had also consented to his sublease of the property.^[3] As no agreement between the parties appeared
in sight, the private respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to
speak, by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court of First Instance of Iligan City an action^[4] for the continued enforcement of the lease
contract and for damages.^[5] The said court on February
28, 1980, one day
before the expiration of the lease, issued a restraining order that maintained
the status quo between
the parties.^[6] Ten days later, the petitioners filed their
own complaint, this time for unlawful detainer,^[7] with the City Court of Iligan City.^[8] This was followed two days later with a
motion to dismiss the private respondents’ complaint before the Court of First
Instance on the ground inter alia
of the pendency of the ejectment
case, and for the lifting of the temporary restraining order.^[9]
For his part, the private respondent moved to dismiss the ejecment
suit also on the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had
filed earlier should be decided first before the petitioners’ complaint could
be entertained.^[10]

In the Court of First
Instance, the petitioners’ motion was in effect denied with its Order dated May 27,
1981, that the
“determination of the said motion is hereby deferred until the
trial.”^[11] The motion for reconsideration was denied in
an Order dated September 14, 1982.^[12] In the City Court, the petitioners fared no
better when the ejectment case was on April
24, 1980,
“ordered held in abeyance until the case in the Court of First Instance is
finally resolved.”^[13]
The motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 4, 1982.^[14]
Thus failing in both courts, the petitioners have come to this Court, praying
for a reversal of the said orders on the ground that they were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Specifically, the
petitioners ask us to enjoin the trial of the enforcement suit before the Court
of First Instance and to order the City Court to proceed with the ejectment case.

The facts of this case are practically the same as those of Pardo v. Encarnacion,^[15]
decided in 1968, which is itself a reaffirmation of several earlier
decisions.  The present case must be
examined in accordance with these precedents.

In Pardo, the lessor and the lessee had stipulated on an initial period
of twelve years for their lease, subject to extension by another eight years
upon subsequent agreement of the parties. 
Negotiations for this purpose having failed, the lessee filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite an action for the
renewal of the lease at a reduced rental. 
This the lessor sought to dismiss by
questioning the jurisdiction of the court and the venue of the case. 
One day after the expiration of the lease, the lessor
commenced an ejectment case in the City Court of Quezon City, and this time it was the lessee who moved to
dismiss, on the ground of the pendency of his own
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite.  The City Court ruled it had
jurisdiction.  However, in a petition for
certiorari and
prohibition, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City issued a temporary restraining order that maintained the status quo
between the parties pending action on
the petition on the merits.  Eventually,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, resolving the
challenge to its own jurisdiction, declared it was competent to proceed with
the specific performance case filed by the lessee.  The lessor then
came to us.

Speaking for a unanimous
Court, Justice Angeles declared:

“The lessor, Carmen Pardo de Tavera, has brought the
case directly to this Court on petition: 
(a) for certiorari, to annul the order of the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, declaring
itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. N-872, and to
likewise annul the orders of the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City in its Civil Case No. Q-10710
restraining the Quezon City Court from trying the ejectment case and denying the lessor’s
motion to dismiss; (b) for prohibition, to restrain the respondents judges of
said Courts of First Instance from further proceeding with the aforesaid cases
before them; and (c) for mandamus, to order the respondent judge of the Quezon City court to proceed with the hearing of the
unlawful detainer-ejectment case pending therein
until its final termination.

“We find the petition to be meritorious.

“The provision of the lease contract entered into between
petitioner and respondent is apparently clear that unless the lessor and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least
thirty days prior to the date of expiration, the lease shall not be
renewed.  The facts on record show that
despite the exchange of communication, proposals and counterproposals, between
the parties regarding a renewal of the lease, they were not able to arrive at
an agreement within said period, for while the lessor
wanted an increased rental, the lessee, on the other hand, proposed for a
reduction.  With this failure of an
agreement, it is to be presumed that the lessee was aware that an ejectment case against him was forthcoming.  Whether or not the case filed before the Cavite Court of First Instance, just one day before the
expiration of the lease contract, was an anticipation to block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to
take against the lessee, the fact, however, is that the lessee was not disposed
to leave the premises.  At any rate, while
the said case before the Court of First Instance
of Cavite appears to be one for specific
performance with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between the
parties is whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying
the land as lessee.

“The situation is not novel to Us.

“It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a
lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72)
of the Rules of Court.

“There is no merit to the contention that the lessee’s
supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the ejectment suit.  In
the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol,
supra, this Court held that “if the plaintiff has any right to the
extension of the lease at all, such
right is a proper and legitimate issue
that could be raised in the
unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a
defense to the action.” In other words, the matter raised in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out
in the ejectment suit, in consonance with the
principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. 
And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer-ejectment
case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the
application of the foregoing ruling:

‘It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for
dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action.  They provide that there is pending action,
not a pending prior action.  The fact
that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of
the present action‘ (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol,
supra.)”^[16]

Precedents are helpful in
deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially identical
with previous litigations.  Argumentum
a simili valet in lege.  Earlier
decisions are guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we
tread the highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and
justice.  These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the
past.  They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the
future.  Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent
viewpoint or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the
trodden path is best.

We have reviewed the ruling announced in the above-mentioned
cases and we see no reason to deviate from it. 
Its logic remains valid and no change in the law or in the condition of
the times calls for its revision or reversal. 
It is still sound doctrine and so we continue to apply it, remembering
that via trita est tutissima.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and judgment is hereby
rendered:  a) SETTING ASIDE the Orders of
the respondent Court of First Instance dated February 28, 1980, May 27, 1981,
and September 14, 1982, in Civil Case No. 1352-80 and of the respondent City
Court dated April 24, 1980 and October 4, 1982, in Civil Case No. 8174-AF; b)
DIRECTING the respondent Court of First Instance to dismiss Civil Case No.
1352-80; and c) ORDERING the respondent City Court to commence hearing Civil
Case No. 8174-AF without further delay. 
No costs.  It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
and Paras JJ.,
concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Annex “A”, petition.

^[2]
Annex “C”, petition; rollo, p. 53.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 39-40.

^[4]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 1352-80.

^[5]
Annex “E”, petition.

^[6]
Annex “F”, Ibid.

^[7]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 8174-AF.

^[8]
Annex “G”, petition.

^[9]
Annex “H”, Ibid.

^[10]
Annex “N”, Ibid.

^[11]
Annex “K”, Id.

^[12]
Annex “M”, Id.

^[13]
Annex “P”, Id.

^[14]
Annex “S”, Id.

^[15]  22
SCRA 632.

^[16]
See also Teodoro v. Mirasol, 99 Phil.
150; Pue v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81; and Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 856.