KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, QUEZON CITY, AZUCENA A…

This is one of the many cases that have unnecessarily clogged the
dockets of this Court because they should not have been brought to us in the
first place.

The issues are mainly factual. 
They have been resolved by the trial court, which has been affirmed by
the respondent court, except as to the award of damages, which has been
reduced.  We see no reason why the
decision had to be elevated to us.

Time and again we have stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts.^[1]
We leave these matters to the lower courts, which have more opportunity and
facilities to examine these matters.  We
have no jurisdiction as a rule to reverse their findings.^[2]
The exception invoked is that there is
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion on their part, but we do not see
it here.

We are satisfied from the findings of the respondent court (and
of the trial court) that the private respondent was, in the language of the
airline industry, “bumped off.” She had a confirmed ticket.  She arrived at the airport on time.  However, she was not allowed to board because
her seat had already been given to another passenger.  As a result, she suffered damages for which the
petitioner should be held liable.

Specifically, petitioner Korean Airlines (hereinafter called KAL)
issued to Azucena Tomas a plane ticket to Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.,
on Flight No. KE 612 departing from the Manila
International Airport
on July 29, 1977, at 2:20 p.m. 
She paid the fare of P2,587.88.^[3]
She and her husband arrived at the KAL check-in counter at 1:50 p.m. of that date^[4]
and presented her ticket to Augusto Torres, Jr., who
was in charge.  Torres refused to check
her in, saying that the Immigration Office was already closed.^[5] Januario Tomas, her husband, rushed to the said office,
which was still open, and was told by the immigration officer on duty that his
wife could still be cleared for departure. 
Januario rushed back to Torres to convey this
information and asked that his wife be checked in.  Torres said this was no
longer possible because her seat had already been given to another
passenger.  His reason was that Azucena had arrived late and had not checked in within forty minutes before
departure time.^[6]

There no evidence in the record of any rule requiring passengers
to check in at least forty minutes before departure time, as invoked by
Torres.  KAL admits that it has not been
able to cite any statutory or administrative requirement to this effect.^[7]
In fact, the alleged rule is not even a condition of the plane ticket purchased
by Azucena.

At the same time, KAL invokes the memorandum-circular of February 24, 1975, issued by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation which says that “all passengers
authorized to leave for abroad shall be required to check in with the
Immigration Departure Control Officer at least thirty minutes before the
scheduled departure.” The record shows that Azucena
was ready to comply.

If, as Torres said, he gave Azucena’s
seat to a chance passenger thirty-eight minutes before departure time^[8]
instead of waiting for Azucena, then he was intentionally
violating the said circular. 
Significantly, it was proved he was not telling the truth when he said
the Immigration Office was already closed although it was in fact still open at
the time the private respondents arrived. 
Moreover, the immigration officer on duty expressed his willingness to
clear Azucena Tomas for departure, thus indicating
that she was well within the provisions of the memorandum-circular.  Torres’ refusal to check her in was clearly unjustified.

As it appeared later, the real reason why she could not be
checked in was not her supposed tardiness but the circumstance that Torres had
prematurely given her seat to a chance passenger.  That person certainly had less right to prior
accommodation than the private respondent herself.

The claim that the real party in interest is the Gold N. Apparel
Manufacturing Corporation and not the private respondent^[9]
is also untenable.  Counsel for Azucena Tomas declared at the trial that she was suing in her personal capacity.^[10] In testifying about her participation in the
said corporation, she was only stressing her status as a respected and
well-connected businesswoman to show the extent of the prejudice caused to her
interests by the unjustified acts of the petitioner.

It is clear that the petitioner acted in bad faith in violating
the private respondent’s rights under their contract of carriage and is
therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.  We agree with the Court of Appeals, however,
that the award should be reduced to P50,000.00 for
actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 for moral damages, and P20,000.00
for attorney’s fees, the exemplary damages to be eliminated altogether.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the respondent court
is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
and Paras, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1] Chemplex, Inc. v. Pamatian, 57 SCRA 409; Ereñeta v.
Bezore; 54 SCRA 13; Miguel v. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234.

^[2] Olango v. Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338; Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 99.

^[3] Rollo, p. 19.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id.,
pp. 19-20.

^[7] KAL’s Brief in the C.A., p. 34.

^[8] Rollo, pp. 27-28.

^[9] Id.,
pp. 72-76.

^[10] Id.,
pp. 28-29.