THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, DULY REPRESENTED BY MAYOR RICARDO F. LIM, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE CARINO, VICTORIANO DACULLA, BEN GUMASING, LUCENA CRUZ, HILARIA YALON, …

The second paragraph of
Section 39, Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 provides that:

“No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal.  In lieu thereof, the entire original record
shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.”

Likewise, Sections 18 and
19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 provide that:

“Sec. 18.  The filing of a record on appeal shall be
dispensed with, except in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph (1) hereof.

“No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.”

xxx                                                                xxx                                                                   xxx

“Sec. 19(b).  In appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record
of appeal being required.”

Whether or not the above
provisions are applicable to the case at bar is the lone issue in this petition which assails the resolution of
the respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983.

The dispositive
part of the questioned resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, notwithstanding the foregoing, in the broader
interest of justice and considering that under the present Interim Rules a
record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal, the Court
resolved to order the recall of the records of this case from the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan Branch I, Puerto Princesa for further proceedings before this Court.” (Rollo, pp. 12-13)

Following are the pertinent
facts of the case as culled
from the records.

Sometime in 1976, an
action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 35.  The action sought authority
from the court to demolish the structures
built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the
petitioner’s wharf.  The complaint
alleged, among others:

“that the defendants’ houses were constructed
more than 3 years before the filing of instant action (par. 2, Complaint); that
on August 19, 1974 the herein defendants undertook to remove their structures
on the space where they were then at that time and are presently standing, when
it will be needed by the government (par. 3, Ibid); that the space or area is
needed by the plaintiff for the docking or berthing of pumpboats
(motorized bancas) and fishing boats and for the
loading and unloading of cargoes along the pier on both sides thereof (par. 4, Ibid); and also to ease the congested
traffic along it (par. 10, Ibid); that his Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos had directed the Mayor of plaintiff-municipality to demolish and remove
all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month notice
(par. 5, Ibid) and aside from this directive of the President, the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality is also authorized to remove the
defendants’ illegal constructions under LOI 19 (par. 7, Ibid); that despite
said mayor’s desire to comply immediately with the said presidential directive,
the defendants had already been given 3 extensions thereby delaying their ejectment therefrom (par. 6,
Ibid); that most of the defendants are affluent squatters (par. 9, Ibid); and
that for the indigent defendants, a surveyed area has already been made ready
for their relocation (par. 12, Ibid).” (Decision CFI, Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch IV, p. 2; Rollo, p. 15).

On the other hand, the
private respondents, in their answer,
counter-alleged, among others:

“that their structures when made were
covered by building permits with the approval of the Bureau of Public Highways
(par. 2, Answer); that the area
where their structures were located is a foreshore area (par. 4, Ibid); that a
meeting was convened and presided by Governor Socrates at Coron,
the same having been attended by the local representatives of the Philippine Constabulary, the
Philippine Coast Guard, the Department (now Ministry) of Social Services and
Development, the Sangguniang Bayan
and the defendants and it was agreed in this meeting that the demolition of the
defendants’ houses will be suspended pending action of the Office of the
President (pars. 15, 16 and 17, Ibid); and that the Chairman of
the National Housing Authority had sent a letter-advice to the mayor of the
plaintiff-municipality to suspend the demolition of the houses of the
defendants (par. 18, Ibid).” (Rollo, pp. 15-16)

After a series of
postponements, the trial court, on January 16, 1979, reset the hearing of the
case for the last time for three consecutive dates, March 20, 21,
and 22, 1979 with further warning to the private respondents that no more
postponements shall be allowed.

On March
20, 1979, despite
proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at
the scheduled hearing.  Consequently, the
petitioner
moved that private respondents’
non-appearance be considered as a waiver on their part of their right to
cross-examine the petitioner’s witnesses and their right to present
evidence.  The lower court issued an
order granting the petitioner’s motion and considered the case submitted for
decision.

In view of the above
order, the private respondents went to the appellate court on certiorari.  On June 9, 1979, the appellate court dismissed for lack of
merit CA G.R. SP-09389-R captioned “Jose Carino,
et al., petitioners v. Mayor Ricardo Lim and Hon. Benjamin Vega, Judge CFI, Palawan, Branch IV.”

On May 15,
1979, after the main
case had been submitted for decision as aforestated,
the private respondents filed a notice to take deposition which the lower court
disregarded for being “irrelevant and for other obvious
reasons.”

On October
10, 1980, the lower
court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff-municipality of Coron, Palawan
and against all the herein defendants as follows:

1.  Dismissing the
defendants’ counterclaim for lack of merit;

2.  Confirming the power of plaintiff-municipality and authority of its
incumbent mayor to demolish the defendants’ structures along the rock causeway
or pier of Caron; and

3.  Ordering the said defendants to remove their
structures in the area in
question within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this decision and for their failure to do so, authorizing the herein
plaintiff represented by its incumbent mayor to demolish the said structures at
the expense of the said defendants.

Costs against all the defendants.” (Rollo, pp. 28-29)

On appeal, the private
respondents on February 2, 1982 were required “to submit the forty (40)
printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of
fifteen (15) copies thereof upon the appellee”
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of the appellate court’s
Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal. 
(Rollo, p. 32)

Upon motion by the
private respondents, the appellate court granted an extension of sixty (60)
days from April 7, 1982 within which the required printed copies of
the record on appeal may be submitted. 
However, despite the extended period given, the private respondents were
not able to comply with the appellate court’s requirement.

In a resolution dated July 19,
1982, the appellate court required the private
respondents to show cause why their appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file the printed copies of their record on appeal.

On August 31, 1982,
the appellate court resolved to dismiss the private respondents’ appeal
docketed as CA G.R. No. 69052-R for failure to file the required record on
appeal.

On December 6, 1982,
the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court, in an Entry of Judgment,
certified that the above resolution dismissing the private respondents’ appeal
had become final and executory on September 27, 1982.

Accordingly, on February
1, 1983, a writ of execution was issued to enforce the October 10, 1980 decision of the
Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City,
Branch IV.

Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed with the execution of
the judgment, the private respondents, in a motion dated April 12, 1983 asked the appellate court that the
records of the case be recalled from the court of origin.  In their supplemental motion, the private
respondents argued that since under the present law, printed records on appeal are
no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal
must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities.

In its opposition to the private respondents’ motion, the
petitioner pointed out that although the newly promulgated procedural rules
invoked by the private respondents may be given retroactive effect, their
applicability only covers pending actions and does not extend to those which
had already become final and executory.

As a consequence of the private respondents’ motion to recall the
records of the case, a temporary restraining order dated April 29, 1983 was issued by the appellate court directing the Provincial Sheriff of Palawan to desist from executing the October
10, 1980 decision.

On July 29, 1983,
the appellate court issued the disputed resolution.  The subsequent denial of the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition.

The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court
promulgated on January 11, 1983 to implement the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply
to the case at bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed
cases which had been dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause a great injustice to those in whose
favor these cases had been decided.  It
is further contended that to allow its application would put no end to those
appealed cases which are otherwise considered as closed ones.

We find merit in the
petitioner’s contentions.

We have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive
application of section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court in Alday
v. Camilon (120 SCRA 521).  We reiterated the rule that:

“Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.  Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.” (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]) Underscoring supplied.”

The
appellate court should have followed this time honoured
rule instead of issuing its July 29, 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already
long final as evidenced by the entry of judgment made by its Acting Clerk of
Court on December 6, 1982.

The records of the instant case show that despite the 60-day
extension period given to the private respondents within which they could file
their printed record of appeal as then required, they
still failed to do so.  It was only after
a writ of execution had been issued on February
1, 1983 that the private respondents responded to the appellate
court’s resolution dated July 19, 1982
requiring them to show cause why their appeal should
not be dismissed for failure to file the printed record on appeal.  They claimed that the court’s resolution must
have been a result of oversight
because they actually filed a record on appeal.

As a general rule, our
policy towards an invocation of the right to appeal has been one of
liberality.  (Castro v.
Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 782 citing De Las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA
200).  This is so because an
appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities.  (See Siguenza
v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA
570).  However, it is an equally
established doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law.  (See United
CMC Textile Workers Union v. Clave, 137 SCRA 346).

For a proper exercise of their right to appeal, the private
respondents should have complied with Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by our resolution en banc dated September 17, 1974, which
partly provides that:

“Sec. 5.  Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. – It shall be the duty of the
appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in
the preceding section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal,
and within sixty (60) days from
such notice to submit to the
court twelve (12) printed copies of the record on appeal, or twelve (12)
typewritten or mimeographed (on
one side of good quality paper,
eleven inches in length by eight and a half inches in width – commonly known as
letter size – written double spaced) copies of said record on appeal, together
with proof of service of two (2) printed, typewritten or mimeographed copies
thereof upon the appellee.”

Thus,
upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule, the Court of Appeals may dismiss his appeal.  Said provision implicitly grants the Court of
Appeals the power to do so.  (See Pfleider
v. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491).  The private respondents in this case did not
submit printed copies of their record on appeal.  When the appellate court issued its July 19,
1982 resolution, it
was to afford the private respondents a chance to explain why they failed to
comply with the applicable rule.  After
having failed to submit the required printed copies of their record on appeal,
they cannot now rectify a clear
non-compliance with the law by
invoking the court’s liberality insofar as the application of remedial laws is
concerned.  The private respondents even
faulted the appellate court as having issued the July 19, 1982 resolution through oversight.  They alleged that they had filed the required
record on appeal when in fact what they referred to was the record on appeal
from the lower court to the appellate
court and not the printed record on appeal.

Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal, the lower
court’s judgment in favor of the petitioner became final and executory as an
eventual result of
the dismissal of the appeal.  Once a
judgment becomes final, the prevailing party, the petitioner in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right
to the execution of the judgment in his favor.  For the court, it
becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of said judgment.  (Santos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 56614, promulgated July 28, 1987 citing Agricultural and Industrial
Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 49; Balintawak Construction Supply Corporation v. Valenzuela, 124 SCRA 31; Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v.
Dayrit, 123 SCRA 203; Gonzales v. Sayo, 122 SCRA 607).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The resolution of respondent appellate court
dated July 29, 1983
is SET ASIDE.  Let the records of this
case be remanded to the court of origin for enforcement of the writ of
execution of the judgment.  This decision
is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., no part.