G.R. No. 52007. September 24, 1987
JOVENCIO LAGUNZAD, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PROVINCE OF LEYTE, RESPONDENTS.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside
three orders of the respondent Court of Appeals[1] which,
in effect, bar the petitioner from pursuing his remedy of appeal.
The procedural facts as gathered from the pleadings submitted by
both petitioner and respondent follow.
An action for eminent domain was filed by the Province
of Leyte
against some 424 defendants, herein petitioner Lagunzad
among them, captioned Province of Leyte v. Teresita
Holanda, et al., and docketed as Civil Case No. 5199.
On March 11, 1977, the then Court of First Instance of Leyte[2] decided the case on the basis of
Presidential Decrees (P.D.) Nos. 76 and 464, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, final judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Confirming the order of
condemnation declaring that plaintiff Province of Leyte
has the lawful right to take the properties herein above described and sought
to be expropriated for the public use and purpose also herein described in the
Complaint;
2) Confirming the retention
of possession by the plaintiff Province of Leyte of those
properties already entered in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 42, and ordering the defendants to vacate those properties already
condemned but not yet entered by
plaintiff so that the latter can appropriate the same for public use/purpose
aforementioned;
3) Ordering the plaintiff
Province of Leyte to compensate those defendants who
have not yet received full payment hereof, the market value of their respective
properties in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 76 and Presidential Decree No. 464,
Section 92;
4) Ordering the clerk of
Court and the offices of the Provincial Administrator and Provincial Treasurer
to coordinate and proceed accordingly, by following the same procedure in the
payments already made herein;
5) Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Leyte, upon a receipt of a certified copy of
this decision with the descriptions of the properties herein involved and a
copy of the parcellary map (Exhibit “N”)
hereto attached, from him to vest title in the real estate so described, in the
plaintiff province of Leyte;
6) And finally, ordering the
plaintiff Province of Leyte to pay the cost of this
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Not satisfied with that portion of the
decision on just compensation, the petitioner interposed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals which ordered the filing of his printed record on appeal, then
an essential requisite for the perfection of an appeal. The awareness of his inability to comply
seasonably prompted his counsel to move for an extension of thirty days to submit his record on appeal. Meanwhile, Lagunzad
himself personally filed a motion requesting for sixty
days within which to file the same record on appeal. The Court of Appeals acted favorably on these
two motions and issued two orders. The
first, dated December 19, 1978, granted the petitioner thirty days from January
1, 1979, while the second, dated January 3, 1979, granted him sixty days from
the same date to submit the required record on appeal. On April 2, 1979, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal, saying:
xxx xxx xxx
Acting on the Docket Report that as of March 21, 1979
defendant-appellant Lagunzad has not filed his
printed Record on Appeal and considering that the last day to file Record on Appeal expired on December 3, 1978 the
Court RESOLVED to DISMISS this appeal.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
On this dismissal, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. By ill hap, however, it
was only on May 10, 1979, or seven days after the last day of the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, that the petitioner availed of the remedy. Hence, the respondent Court, in an Order
dated June 5, 1979, denied the motion, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for
defendant-appellant Jovencio Lagunzad
on May 10, 1979 by registered mail is denied, the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered having already become final and beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to alter. It appears, as per
admission of appellant Lagunzad himself in paragraph
1 of his subject motion, that on April 18, 1979, he received a copy of the
Resolution of this Court dated April 2, 1979, dismissing his appeal for failure
to file his appellant’s brief, and therefore, his last day to seek a
reconsideration thereof expired on May 3, 1979.[5]
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals in an order dated July 12, 1979, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The Second Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 28, 1979 (reg.
mail) by counsel for defendant-appellant Jovencio Lagunzad is denied.
The registry return card,
attached to the Rollo, clearly shows on both sides
thereof that the Resolution of April 2, 1979, dismissing the appeal of
appellant Lagunzad was received by his counsel on
April 17, 1979, and, therefore, his last day to move for a reconsideration
expired on May 2, 1979. Hence, his first
motion for reconsideration filed by registered mail on May 10, 1979, was filed
8 days after the Resolution of dismissal has become final.[6]
xxx xxx xxx
Be this as it may, we grant the petition.
As petitioner affirms, the two orders granting the two motions
for extension of time to file record on appeal could indeed cause
confusion. It is not unlikely that the
petitioner was truly misled into believing that he had a total of ninety days,
or up to April 30, 1979, within which to file his record on appeal. Thus, when he received on April 17, 1979 the order of
dismissal of his appeal dated April 2, 1979, the petitioner believed, and not
without good cause, that the dismissal was erroneous. And, this, as petitioner claims, was one of
the reasons why he failed to file his motion for reconsideration on time.
Even the respondent court, as shown by its two assailed orders
quoted above, was not entirely spared from confusion. In one order, respondent court declared that
the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration expired on May 2, while in
the succeeding order issued barely a month after, the court declared that the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration expired on May 3. Likewise the dates when the petitioner was
supposed to have received the order of denial were different, i.e., in the
first order it was April 18 while in the second order, it was April 17. If even the appellate court could not make up
its mind as to material dates, we must not expect more from petitioner.
Not only this, the onslaught of typhoon Bebeng which left
the Province of Leyte in disorder, likewise left the
counsel for petitioner’s office in the same sad state. His averment, which we believe, goes:
xxx xxx xxx
That after he had completed the typing and mimeographing of said
record on appeal and was ready for mailing on 16 April 1979 typhoon Bebeng struck the Province of Leyte
causing damage to the roofing of defendant-appellant and as a consequence
thereof the already mimeographed record on appeal got wet and some were blown
away and destroyed;
That appellant had to salvage whatever was left of the record on
appeal and had to start mimeographing again the same;[7]
xxx xxx xxx
We cannot just ignore petitioner’s plea for a review of his case
this instance. There is not the
slightest indication of malice
on his part or of a desire to delay the proceedings and to transgress the rules
on procedure. If at all, his was an
honest mistake or miscalculation worsened by
some fortuitous occurrence which we deem condonable under the circumstances.
For we have, in many cases, granted relief where a stringent application
of the requirement of timeliness of pleadings would have denied a litigant substantial justice and equity. Suffice it to note that the rules on
technicality were promulgated to secure not to override substantial justice.[8] As it should be in this case especially
because the petition appears also to be impressed with merit.
More importantly, however, under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as well as in section 18 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court, a record on appeal is no longer
necessary for perfecting an appeal. In
giving due course to the petition, we held in a recent case:[9]
xxx xxx xxx
Being procedural in nature, the provisions of (BP Blg. 129 and sec. 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines) may
be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners as appellants. ‘Statutes
regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. Procedural laws
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (People v. Sumilang,
77 Phil. 764 [1946].’
Having, therefore, disposed of the procedural issue, we shall now
consider the merits of the case. Instead
of remanding this case to the lower court for approval of the appeal, and
consigning in limbo the payment of the petitioner’s
just compensation for his land taken by the Province of Leyte,
we see the necessity of deciding this on the merits to avoid “undue burden
on the parties and needless
delays only to obtain the same judgment that could very well be laid down
through this petition.”[10] In Velasco v. Court of Appeals,[11] we broadened our inquiry into the case and
decided the same on the merits rather than merely resolving the procedural
question raised, to better serve the interests of justice.
We have sufficient basis to end the controversy between the
parties in the present case even if we have to dispense with some procedural
rules for the basic rights of the parties will, in no way, be impaired.
Moreover, the other defendants in this civil case who were
similarly situated were able to seek affirmative relief in their appeal with
the Court of Appeals. It would be the
height of injustice if we disallowed the petitioner herein to seek the same
relief as that accorded to his co-defendants if only for the flimsy reason of technicality.
Hence, there being no question as to the propriety of the taking
of the property(ies) for public use, we shall limit
ourselves to the issue of just compensation.
On this, the lower court ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, final judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) x x
x
(2) x x
x
(3) Order the plaintiff
Province of Leyte to compensate those defendants who
have not yet received full payment hereof, the market value of their respective properties in accordance with the
provisions of PD No. 76 and PD No. 464,
sec. 92.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.[12]
While we cannot fault the lower court for deciding the case on the
basis of P.D. Nos. 76 and 464, we must rule otherwise for we have declared
unconstitutional and void the presidential decrees on just compensation. In EPZA v. Dulay,[13]
we held:
xxx xxx xxx
It is violative of due process to deny to
the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to
basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated
only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented; and
after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination
have been judiciously evaluated.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The determination of “just compensation” in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Much
less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of
the decreed compensation.
xxx xxx xxx
In the same case, we, likewise, took note of the inequity that
could result in the application of the presidential decrees on just
compensation.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x To peg the
value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices
below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very
wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception
of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such
generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other
crops. Very often land described as
“cogonal” has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in
terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas
are more often inaccurate than correct.
Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to
question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local
assessors or municipal clerks for them.
They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs
until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency
authorized to do so.[14]
xxx xxx xxx
The case at bar is a truly glaring example of the harshness of
the abovementioned presidential decrees.
While the petitioner declared his 1.3090-hectare property planted with
coconut trees as having a market value of P10,260.00; the provincial assessor
assessed the property in the amount of P2,160.00 only.[15]
On the other hand, the commissioners
appointed by the trial court pursuant to sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, valued the property at even a much higher price than
the valuation given by the petitioner himself, i.e., P20,000.00 per hectare and
P25.00 per fruit bearing tree. This
valuation arrived at by the commissioners is what the petitioner prays this
Court to consider and not that fixed by the provincial assessor (the
lower price pursuant to the presidential decrees on just compensation) which,
obviously, is unjust, nay oppressive. Even
the commissioners themselves were well aware of the stringency of the said laws
necessitating them to state:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x it is the
considered view of the Commissioners that the “lower” market values reflected in the tax declarations will
not amount to “fair market value” for purposes of payment of just
compensation as mandated in the Constitution hence they have been constrained
to determine the fair market values of the affected properties, as they have
herein recommended, on the basis of their own ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented, and
facts and events which they have taken
judicial notice of, in the interest of justice and fairness and so as to enable
the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those acquired from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate
themselves as early as possible.[16]
xxx xxx xxx
The commissioners took into consideration
several points which became their bases for the determination of the fair
market values of the affected properties:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Many tax declarations do
not contain an owner’s market value because of his failure to file a Sworn
Statement in compliance with P/D 76;
(b) Actual kind and number
of improvements, as inspected and verified, are, in most instances, very much more than
those indicated in the tax declaration, but in some instances, however, the
kind and number of declared improvements are not existing;
(c) Many declared improvements,
given a market value by the owner, are not correspondingly valued by the
assessor, either because the improvements are not included in the assessor’s
schedule of market values or the land upon which they grow is not principally
planted to such growth, in which case no market value by the assessor appears on the tax declaration;
(d) Declared areas are, in
many instances, either much more or much lesser than the surveyed
areas, thereby affecting directly the owner’s as well as the assessor’s market
values which are reckoned on such declared areas;
(e) Many lots are not correctly classified and
valued, either because of a desire to minimize realty taxes, or, in a few instances, to arrive at exorbitant market values as in some interior
lands which are clearly agricultural but classified and valued as residential
land;[17]
xxx xxx xxx
We find nothing objectionable in the manner by which the
court-appointed commissioners arrived at their recommendations with regard to
the valuation of the affected properties.
Neither does petitioner. In fact,
it is precisely the commissioners’
report which the petitioner prays this Court to use as the basis for the
valuation of his expropriated property and not the lower court’s decision which
was based on the questioned presidential decrees already declared
unconstitutional and void and of no effect by us in EPZA v. Dulay[18] and other cases.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
respondent Court of Appeals and the decision of the trial court dated March 11,
1977, as well as the supplemental judgment dated May 30, 1977, are hereby SET
ASIDE and the respondent Province of Leyte ordered to
pay the petitioner the principal amount of TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY (P26,790.00) PESOS pursuant to the commissioners’ valuation plus legal interest to be computed from the date of taking. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.
[1] Sixth Division, Honorable Crisolito
Pascual, Chairman; Honorable Carlos L. Sundiam and Honorable Benjamin K. Gorospe,
Members.
[2] 13th Judicial District, Branch XI, Government Center, Palo, Leyte, Judge Godofredo Quimsing, Presiding Judge.
[3] Record on Appeal, 117-118.
[4] Rollo, 9.
[5] Id., 13.
[6] Id., 16.
[7] Id., 11.
[8] Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 120.
[9] Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-68043, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 168,
citing Alday v. Camilon,
No. L-60310, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 521.
[10] Siguenza v. C.A., No. L-44050, July 16, 1985,
137 SCRA 570.
[11] No. L-47544, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 616.
[12] Supra.
[13] G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, 13, 14.
[14] Id., 12-13.
[15] Record on Appeal, 131.
[16] Record on Appeal, 72.
[17] Id.
[18] Supra.