SANTIAGO NICOLAS, ANTONIO MATAWARAN, ALBINO CARREON, VENANCIO MATAWARAN, LUZ FRANCO AND AMPARO DIONISIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO G. VALENTIN, JUSTIC…

This is a petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals* dated June 15, 1973 in C.A. G.R. No. 36283-R
entitled “Santiago Nicolas, Antonio Matawaran,
et al. vs. Anastacio Madlangsakay,
Hon. Lorenzo G. Valentin, etc., et al.” which
affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
in Civil Case No. 2355 involving the quieting of title over a residential land.

Briefly, the facts are as
follows:

In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay [a.k.a. Anastacio M. Sakay], rice dealer,
married to Lourdes Manuel, bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land with
a combined area of 8,955 square meters situated in Barrio Matungao,
Bulacan, Bulacan and known
as Lot Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Plan PSU 28714. 
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8012 was
issued on October 19, 1951 in the name of Anastacio
M. Sakay.^[1] At the time of the purchase, petitioners
were occupying Lot No. 8 [with an area of 6,886 square meters] as tenants.

Negotiations begun for
the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner-tenants and in an affidavit dated August
26, 1958, Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at
P0.70 per square meter.^[2] Nothing came out of the negotiations.

Soon thereafter, the
relationship between the new owner and the occupants soured and quickly
deteriorated into a series of legal squabbles which culminated in the present
controversy.

On April
26, 1961,
petitioners filed an amended complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan against respondent Madlangsakay
to quiet title over Lot No. 8 [Civil Case No. 2355].  They alleged that in an affidavit dated
August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay agreed to sell the
property to them at P0.70 per square meter;^[3] that pursuant to that affidavit, Madlangsakay executed several deeds of sale transferring
different but uniform portions of the land in favor of Venancio
Matawaran, Albino Carreon,
Antonio Matawaran, Santiago Nicolas and Amparo Dionisio;^[4] that on November 21, 1960, Madlangsakay executed another affidavit to facilitate the
registration of the deeds of sale, which in due time were accomplished under
Act 3344, thus making petitioners owners in fee simple;^[5] that in 1961, in the exercise of their
rights as owners, they cut and cleared the bamboo groves near their houses,
prompting Madlangsakay to file five criminal cases
for robbery against them which they, in turn, countered with separate criminal
complaints for perjury against Madlangsakay;^[6] that
despite the sale, Madlangsakay persisted in
encroaching on their rights by gathering the fruits on the subject land and
selling them; and that the pending criminal actions between them before Judge
Lorenzo Valentin, Bulacan
Justice of the Peace, would remain unresolved until the real ownership of the
property was determined, hence the action to quiet title.

In his amended answer, Madlangsakay
averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavit of November 21, 1960 which he purportedly executed
were all forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property,
registered under the Torrens system and mortgaged with
the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife’s
consent.

The trial court upheld Madlangsakay.  It dismissed the complaint, nullified the
deeds of sale and the affidavit of November
21, 1960^[7] for being spurious and ordered the
cancellation of their registration in the Registry of Deeds.  It further awarded Madlangsakay
actual and moral damages in the amounts of P1,000.00 and P5,000.00 respectively, attorney’s
fees of P3,000.00 and litigation costs.^[8]

On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in the main but fixed the moral
damages at P3,000.00, the handwriting expert’s fees at
P1,000.00 and attorney’s fees at P1,000.00.^[9]

Hence,
the present recourse.

As earlier mentioned, petitioners’ asserted interest over the
disputed property is based on the alleged absolute sale of the same to them by
respondent Madlangsakay.

An examination of the
instruments evidencing the sale discloses the following:  The deeds in favor of Santiago Nicolas and Amparo Dionisio were dated August
12, 1960 and notarized by Atty. Genaro Arribe in Manila on the same date,^[10] while those in favor of Albino Carreon, Antonio Matawaran and Venancio Matawaran were dated
October 27, 1960 and notarized by Atty. Saligumba on
even date and also in Manila.^[11] All five documents were identically worded
and included the notation that “[h]is property is not registered under Act
496 or the Spanish Mortgage Law and the parties herein agree to register this
instrument under Act 3344 as amended.” Madlangsakay,
as the vendor, uniformly conveyed to each petitioner-vendee an area of 1,571
square meters of “canaveral” land in
consideration of P1,099.70.  Not a single document, however, bore the
conformity of Madlangsakay’s wife.

On petitioners’ claim
arising from the sale, the trial court, guided by the testimony of handwriting
expert Jose del Rosario, witness for respondent,
declared:

“Looking at the documents themselves, the questioned as well
as the genuine signatures appear to be the same in general appearance.  However, the enlarged photographs of the same
signatures presented in Exhibits 6 and 7 of the defendants and Exhibit XX-1 of
the plaintiffs reveal marked differences between the two sets of signatures.^[12]
It has been said that when an enlarged photograph of a forgery is compared with
a similarly enlarged photograph of a genuine signature, differences between the
two signatures become patent in spite of the general similarity in their
appearance, for it is only when they are magnified several times that the
details of the construction of any signature can be appreciated by the naked
eye; that however much a genuine signature is enlarged, the curves which constitute
the greater part of the handwriting lose none of their grace because, as they
have been formed as the result of a smooth regular movement, their curvature
will appear smooth and even throughout; that on the other hand, with the
enlarged photograph of a forgery, once the eye is able to study each stroke and
curve as an individual element of a signature, the ragged and hesitant curves
and patchwork appearance of the signature as a whole can be fully appreciated;
and that most people who view an enlarged photograph of a forgery are surprised
that it was ever accepted as genuine. 
This observation is never more true than in the
present case.

“As seen in the enlarged photographs, the first difference
between the two sets of signatures is the discernible tremor in the initial
stroke of the capital letter ‘A’ in the questioned signatures.  There are no such tremors in the genuine
signatures, which show fluidity of movement. 
In the questioned signatures, the cross of the letter
‘t’ is heavy at the end of the line; in the genuine signatures, this
cross tapers towards the end.  In the
genuine signatures the ‘s’ in the Anastacio
although often only vestigial is always discernible; in most of the questioned
signatures the ‘s’ is entirely omitted. 
The middle initial ‘M’ in the questioned signatures has a tendency to be
written with a loop at the bottom of the first staff; this does not occur in
the genuine signatures.  Furthermore, the
‘M’ in the genuine signatures is written gracefully while in the questioned signatures
it is very ungainly.  The last difference
is in the writing of the tail of the letter ‘y’ in Sakay.  In the questioned
signatures the tail is written in a straight abrupt line and is heavy at the
end; in the genuine signatures it is often written with a curve in the stem and
is always tapering at the end.

“It is plain, furthermore, that the signature ‘Anastacio M. Sakay‘ in the
questioned documents were written by only one person, as the characteristics
pointed to above appear in all of them. 
These signatures were written by an expert forger.  Without the aid of enlarged photographs they
can easily pass for real signatures of Anastacio Madlangsakay.’^[13]

The Court of Appeals,
agreeing with the conclusion of the lower court as to the fabricated signatures
of Madlangsakay in the assailed documents, went
further and held:

“In this particular case, however, we agree with the
conclusion of the lower court as to the falsity of the questioned documents,
but for the reasons other than those advanced by the court a quo, which are:

“x x x
There are only four exemplars or standard signatures ‘relied upon by the lower
court as basis of comparison with the questioned signatures appearing on the
deeds of sale, marked as Exhs. A, B, C, D and E’,
thus limiting the scope of analysis between the two sets of signatures.

“From the various documentary evidence
before us, however, we picked 14 documents bearing admittedly genuine
signatures of appellee Madlangsakay,
to wit:

“Exhs. F, M, N, O, P, S, T and U, and Exhs.
CC, 7-a, 7-b, 7-d, 9 and 10,^[14]
and comparing these with the questioned signatures,
we find various significant differences between them.  For instance, in all of the
first group of signatures, Madlangsakay invariably
signed his name, if not exactly on top, a little bit after his typewritten
name.  In the questioned documents,
however, his name was written on top, but about an inch, or at most, like in Exh. A, about half an inch, before his
typewritten name.

“Exhs. CC,
7-a, 7-b, 7-c [four copies], 7-d, 9 and 10, like the questioned documents, were
signed with a fountain pen in fluid ink, but while the letters of the
signatures in the former are thin and characterized with fluidity in the
movement of the writing, all the letters in the latter are thick and evincing signs
of hesitancy on the part of the writer. 
Generally, because a fountain pen is sharp pointed, slow movement of the
writer will cause the pen to emit more ink on the paper; whereas when the
writer’s movement is swift, the letters
impressed are thin.  The thick
script on the questioned documents would therefore tend to indicate that they
were written in a very slow movement; which in turn would give rise to the
supposition that whoever wrote Madlangsakay’s name was not Madlangsakay
himself.

“Again, in all the
questioned documents, the capital letter ‘A’ in the word ‘Anastacio‘
is not aligned with the rest of the characters of the signature.  In all the documents admittedly bearing Madlangsakay’s genuine signatures the said capital letter ‘A’ is aligned with the rest of the
signature.”^[15]

As we see it, the only
plausible legal question in the present appeal is whether respondent court
erred in concluding that the deeds of sale on which petitioners have anchored
their claim are spurious and therefore non-existent in contemplation of law.

This Court finds that there is substantial and convincing
evidence that the deeds of sale, Exhs. A, B, C, D and E and the affidavit, Exh.
G, were in fact falsified as to warrant full affirmance
of the decision under appeal.  Strongly
indicative of their fake character is not only the physical manifestation of
imitation, but also the questionable circumstances under which the documents
were prepared and executed.  Consider the
following:

Of the two notaries public, Atty. Genaro
Arribe and Francisco Saligumba,
before whom the aforementioned documents were acknowledged, only Atty. Saligumba took the stand. 
But Saligumba admitted not
knowing the parties personally nor the instrumental witnesses who
appeared before him.  They, according to Saligumba, just walked into his office in Manila
and requested him to notarize the deeds of transfer.  Nor did he know Madlangsakay.  He just relied on the word of petitioners
that the person who introduced himself as Madlangsakay
was truly Madlangsakay.  When asked during the trial to identify the
vendor, he merely answered that he could not recall respondent Madlangsakay’s appearance.^[16]

Secondly, the parcel of land in question was registered under Act
496 in the name of Madlangsakay under TCT No.
8012.  The entry in the certificate of
title reads:  “is registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of Anastacio M. Sakay, x x x, married to Lourdes
Manuel.”^[17]
The questioned instruments, however, invariably recited that “the property
is not registered under Act 496 or the Spanish Mortgage law x x x.” What reason could have
impelled Madlangsakay to state such a blatant flasehood about his title when he did not stand to profit thereby.  In fact, by
so declaring, he risked criminal prosecution for perjury.

Thirdly, it was most
unlikely that Madlangsakay would have sold the land
in 1960 to petitioners, or to anybody else for that matter, because it was not
his alone to dispose of.  The land is a
conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated without the
conformity of his wife.  Moreover, it was
heavily mortgaged with the PNB, Malolos branch, and
could not be transferred without the bank’s consent.  As a matter of fact, the transfer certificate
of title was then in the possession of said bank.^[18]

Finally, it is titled
property and any conveyance affecting said property must be registered under
Act 496 and not under Act 3344 as was done by petitioners in the case at bar.

A careful reading of the
decision of the Bulacan trial court as well as the
decision of the Appellate Court reveals that all pertinent evidence available
were assiduously considered.  It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again.  Our jurisdiction is limitted
to reviewing errors of law which might have been committed by the lower court.^[19] In this regard we are not inclined towards a
different conclusion in the face of strong and convincing indicia that Exhs. A, B, C, D, E and G are fraudulent instruments.  But even without going into the due execution
of the aforesaid documents, it is clear that there can be no legal transfer of
ownership in favor of petitioners.  One point alone – the very conspicuous absence of the wife’s conforme to such disposition of the ganancial
property, there being no showing that Lourdes
Manuel, whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927,
is legally incapacitated – renders the alleged sale void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the
mandatory requirement in Article 166 of the Civil Code.^[20] This doctrine is too well-settled in our
jurisprudence to require further elucidation.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed.  In view of the length of time
that the case at bar has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Justice Lourdes P. San
Diego and concurred in by
Justices Ruperto G. Martin and Emilio A. Gancayco.

^[1]
Exh.
11, p. 89 of Original Exhibits

^[2]
Exh.
F, p. 11 of Original Exhibits

^[3]
Exh.
F

^[4]
Exhs.
A, B, C, D and E

^[5]
Exh.
G

^[6]
Exhs.
M, P, S, T, U, V, X, Y and Z

^[7]
Exh.
G

^[8]
Original Record on Appeal, pp. 112-113

^[9]
Rollo, p. 83

^[10]
Exhs.
A and E

^[11]
Exhs.
B, C and D

^[12]
Exhs.
6 and 7 are photostats of questioned signatures and
sample signatures of respondent Madlangsakay, respectively.  Exh. XX-1 is pictorial evidence.  See pp. 71 and 120 of Original Exhibits.

^[13]
Original Record on Appeal, pp. 107-109

^[14]
These are various affidavits, court pleadings, real estate mortgage and
promissory note in favor of the PNB and other business-related documents.

^[15]
Rollo, pp. 6-8

^[16]
TSN, November 23, 1961, pp.
4 and 7

^[17]
Exh.
11

^[18]
TSN, February 18, 1963, pp.
5-7

^[19]
Collector of Customs vs. IAC, G.R. No. 65418, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 3

^[20]
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
L-49644-45, July 16, 1984,
130m SCRA 433, 535, citing other cases and Article 5 of the Civil Code