G.R. No. L-7481. December 23, 1954

On September 4, 1953, the University of the East,
petitioner-appelle, filed with the City Engineer of Manila an
application for a permit to construct a four-story high school building
on its lot on Gastambide Street, Sampaloc, Manila, submitting the plans
and specifications prepared by its architect, in conformity with the
provisions of Zonification Ordinance No. 2830, as amended by Ordinance
No. 2906 of the City of Manila, but not in conformity with the
requirements of the Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated by the
National Planning Commission on March 18, 1953. Section 43, paragraph (c)
of said Zoning Regulations provides that there shall be a minimum depth
of six meters for the front yard, five meters wide for side yards, and
a minimum depth of six meters for the rear yard. The City Engineer
notified the petitioner-appellee to prepare plans and specifications in
conformity with the Zoning Regulations. As the petitioner-appellee
failed to amend its plans and specification as required, the City
Engineer refused to issue the permit. The petitioner-appellee brought
an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
compel him to do so. Honorable Judge Rafael Amparo of said court
rendered a decision declaring the Zonification Regulations of the
National Planning Board null and void, and ordered the City Engineer to
issue the permit.

The City of Manila and the City Engineer appealed from this decision to this Court. In their brief they make the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

“I. The lower court erred in declaring that the
Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated by the National Planning
Commission on March 18, 1953, are null and void; and

“II. The
lower court erred in ordering the respondent-appellants to issue the
corresponding permit for the construction of a high school building on
Gastambide Street in accordance with the plans and specifications
submitted by the petitioner-appellee which are not in conformity with
the said Zoning Regulations.”

The theory of the respondent-appellants is set forth in their brief, as follows:

“According to the lower court, ‘there can be no
question that Executive Order No. 98, series of 1946, was promulgated
in accordance with the emergency powers of the President.’ We subscribe
to this. As a matter of fact, it is our own contention, for said
Executive Order No. 98 was promulgated by the President on March 11,
1946, that is more than two months before the Congress convened in
regular session for the first time after the last war. We also
subscribe to the opinion of the lower court to the effect that ‘when
the President, acting under Republic Act No. 422, merged into one
single body the National Urban Planning Commission, the Capital City
Planning Commission, and the Real Property Board, the power and
authority of the President were limited to consolidating the powers,
duties and functions of said bodies for purposes of economy.’ * * *.”

The respondents-appellants further explain that when then President
Quirino issued Order No. 367, he acted under the authority of Republic
Act No. 422 and in consolidating the National Urban Planning Commission
and the National Planning Commission he thereby transferred the powers
conferred on the former Commission by Executive Order No. 98 to the
latter.

But section 7 of Executive Order No. 98 provides as follows:

“Legal Status of Zoning Regulations.—(a)
Any resolution of the Commission adopting zoning regulations for any
urban area or any part thereof, or amending or repealing any zoning
regulation, shall be filed with the President of the legislative body
having jurisdiction over the area affected by said resolution. Unless
said legislative body shall disapprove such resolution by a
three-fourths vote within thirty (30) days from the date of filing it
shall thereupon take effect and shall supersede any similar regulations
of said urban area or any part thereof effective at the date such
regulation takes effect. Disapproval of any such resolution shall not
be effective unless it is filed with the Chairman of the Commission
together with a statement in writing giving the reasons for such
disapproval.”

And Section 4, Executive Order No. 367 reads as follows:

“Building Code.—The National Planning
Commission shall draft uniform regulations for the construction, repair
and alteration of buildings, which shall be known and cited as the
Building Code. Such regulations shall set the minimum performance
standards for building materials and methods of construction for the
purpose of preventing building collapse and accidents, minimizing fire
hazards, insuring sanitary and healthful living conditions, and, in
general, promoting public safety and welfare. The Building Code, or any
proposed amendment thereof, shall be submitted to the local legislative
bodies concerned for adoption in the form of ordinances, and shall take
effect in the same manner as zoning or subdivision regulations. The
Building Code shall be administered and enforced by the local officials
concerned.”

The Municipal Board of Manila is the local legislative body of said City.

It is a fact, however, as alleged in Paragraph VIII of the petition
presented by the petitioner-appellee to the lower court and not denied
by the respondents-appellants:

“That not only have said ‘Zoning Regulations for the
City of Manila’ (Annex ‘C’ hereof) not been adopted as a city ordinance
by the Municipal Board in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 409, supra, but said Municipal Board of the City of
Manila even protested against said zoning regulations, as promulgated
by the National Planning Commission, and recommended that, considering
the far-reaching effects of said regulations on property owners and
other persons engaged in construction, public hearing should first be
conducted whereat the public and persons interested might express their
views on the matter, before final action thereon would be taken by said
Municipal Board;”.

Consequently, the above-mentioned zoning regulations having been
rejected by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila are of no force
and effect, as one of the essential requisites prescribed by Executive
Orders Nos. 98 and 367 has not been complied with.

Moreover, the issuance of such zoning regulations which affect very
important and valuable property rights throughout the whole country,
cannot be delegated to an administrative commission without specific
standards and limitations to guide the commission in the exercise of
the wide discretion granted to it. In the case of people versus Vera (65 Phil., 56, 116), this Court said:

“* * *. The rules governing delegation of
legislative power to administrative and executive officers are
applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here
adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show the ratio decidendi is at
variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves
around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action—or the
sufficiency thereof—in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising
the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is
sufficient; in others that it is insufficient; and in still others that
it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. * *
*.”

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur