G.R. No. L-6705. December 23, 1954

Patrocinio Raymundo has brought up this case by direct appeal on
points of law against a decision of the Court or First Instance of
Manila (case No. 1169), denying her petition for a decree of divorce
under Act 2710.

The facts are clear and not disputed. Appellant Raymundo and
appellee Doroteo Peñas were validly married to each other in Manila on
March 29,1941. The spouses lived together until 1949, but had no
children, nor acquired conjugal property. Sometime in July 1949, the
husband Doroteo Peñas abandoned his wife appellant herein, and during
August and September, 1949, lived martially with another woman, Carmen
Paredes. At the instance of the deserted wife, an information for
concubinage was filed on October 3, 1949 (Criminal Case No. 11140). The
husband, Peñas, was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the
Court of First Instance of Manila on May 25, 1950. Pending his appeal,
on July 14, 1950, the wife instituted the present proceedings, praying
for a decree of absolute divorce. The conviction of Doroteo Peñas was
affirmed by the court of Appeals on October 31, 1951.

The Court below found that the acts of concubinage that gave rise to
the action, as well as the judgment of conviction rendered by the Court
of First Instance, took place before the repeal of Act 2710 by the new
Civil Code, (which became effective on August 30, 1950, as held by this
Court in Lara vs. Del Rosario, 50 Official Gazette, p. 1975)

Nevertheless, the Court a quo dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the appellant had acquired no right to a divorce that
the Court was bound to recognize after the effectivity of the new Civil
Code. The Court reasoned out as follows:

“Counsel’s argument in support of the alleged right
of the plaintiff would be indisputable if (it were) not for the
following provision of Article 2254 of the new Civil Code.

‘Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can rise from acts or omissions
which are against the law or1 which infringe upon the rights of others.’

The
above-quoted provisions is entirely new, not found in the old Civil
Code. Evidently it is designed to meet situations like the present.
Under its explicit and unequivocal I terms no acquired or vested right
can rise from offenses or acts which infringe upon the right of others.
It follows therefore that the acts of concubinage of the defendant,
which are not only against the law, but infringe upon the rights of his
wife, could not and did not give rise to a vested right in favor of the
plaintiff which would en- title her to secure a divorce from her
husband, the defendant herein. Under Article 97. of the new Civil Code
the most that the wife is now entitled to in case of concubinage on the
part of the husband is to secure a legal separation.” (Rec. 011 Appeal,
p. 14).

In our opinion, the judgment appealed from is incorrect. It should
be of Art. 2254 apparent, upon reflection, must be directed at the
offender, not the offended party who is in no way responsible for the
violation of legal duty. The interpretation adopted by the Court below
result of the very in depriving a victim of acts that injured him. The
protection of vested rights is but a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty against deprivation of property without due process, and a
violation of law by another can in no way constitute such due process

Our view of the true import of Art. 2254 is supported by the Report
of the Code Commission submitted to the Legislature in explanation of
the motives behind the innovations of the proposed Civil Code. Speaking
of Art 2254 of the draft (now Art. 2254 of the Code) the Report states.

“It is evident that no one can validly claim any
vested or acquired right if the same is founded upon his having
violated the law or invaded the rights of others.”

It follows that Article 2254 can not militate against the right of
appellant to secure an absolute divorce as a result of the concubinage
of her husband. Despite the change in legislation, plaintiff-appellant
is protected by art. 2253 of the Civil Code.

“Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other
previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from
acts done or events which took place under their regime, even though
this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize
them.”

** ** ** ** ** ** **

Conceding that there can not be a vested right in the continuing of a law recognizing absolute divorce (Grant vs.
Grant, 32 A. Rep. 506), still, the terms of Article 2253 are
sufficiently broad to protect the rights of the appellant to a remedy
against her husband’s infidelity in conformity with the terms of the
old legislation. True that the new Civil Code does not recognize
absolute divorce, but only legal separation (Arts. 97 to 108), thereby
impliedly repealing Act 2710; but other provisions of the Code clearly
safeguard rights and actions arising under the preceding law. Its Art.
4 expresses the well established principle that “laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided”; and Article 2258
plainly indicates that rights and actions already existing (and a fortiori, actions already initiated) should be governed by the prior legislation.

“ART. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being
but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall
remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their
exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated
by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or
the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date
this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that
established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose
which method or course to pursue.”

Further, Art. 2267 explicitly enumerates the articles that are to
apply to actions pending (like the present) when the new Civil Code
became effective, and articles 97 to 108 on legal separation are not
included therein.

“ART. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not
only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code
becomes effective:

(1) Article 29, relative to criminal
prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt;

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.”

The plain implication of these provisions is that the Code did not
intend its provisions on legal separation to apply retroactively; and
that the change from absolute divorce to legal separation was not
designed to affect cases of which the Courts had already taken
recognizance at the time the reform was introduced.

Thus the present case is readily distinguished from the case of
divorce proceedings instituted under Executive Order No. 141 of the
Japanese occupation Executive Commission, and which were pending at the
liberation of the Islands. We ruled in Peña de Luz vs. Court
of First Instance of Leyte, 43 Off. Gaz. p. 4102, that such pending
divorce proceedings must be dismissed because the occupation divorce
law ceased to be in force and effect upon liberation of the national
territory, and because the proclamation of General McArthur in Leyte on
October 23, 1944, had abrogated all occupation legislation absolutely
and without qualification. The repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil Code
is in a different position, since the transitional provisions of the
latter law expressly prescribed, as we have seen, the subsistence of
rights derived from acts that took place under the prior legislation.

It is of no moment that the conviction of the husband only became
final after the new Civil Code, denying absolute divorces, came into
effect, for this Court has already ruled in Chereau vs. Fuentebella (43 Phil. 220) that sec. 8 of Act 2710^[1]
is only evidentiary in character, since it merely “has reference, of
course, to the species of proof required to established the basal fact
on which the right to the divorce rests; and the circumstance that this
fact is not so proved in no wise impairs the jurisdiction of the court.”

The decision appealed from is reversed, and a new judgment shall be
entered granting a decree of absolute divorce as prayed for. Without
costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Bautista Angelo, concur.

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^[1] A divorce shall not be
granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final
sentence in a criminal action. Sec. 8, Act 2710.