ELIGIO LEYVA, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

These consolidated cases are petitions for review on certiorari
of the decision**
dated October 17, 1984 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in A.C.-G.R. CV
No. 61875 affirming with modification the decision of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I in an action for eminent domain.  The dispositive
portion of the decision under review reads:

“WHEREFORE, with the modification
that the just compensation for Lots  Nos.
A-1 and C-1 is P20.00 per square meter and for Lot No. B-1, P30.00 per square meter, which plaintiff should pay to
defendant, the decision appealed from, is AFFIRMED in all other aspects without pronouncement as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.”^[1]

Petitioner in G.R. No. 70959 Eligio Leyva is the owner of three [3] contiguous parcels of land
situated in Nakar,
General Santos City, known as Lot A with
an area of 32,639 square meters, Lot B comprising 11,710 square meters and Lot
C consisting of 10,200 square meters.

On June 29, 1970,
Proclamation No. 714 ordaining the development and improvement of the Makar Wharf
in General Santos
City was issued.  Pursuant thereto, the Republic of the
Philippines [Ministry of Public Highways] offered to buy from petitioner Leyva portions of his land as follows:  from Lot A, 10,178 square meters to be
separated and segregated as Lot A-1; from Lot B, 1,860 square meters to be known as Lot B-1; and from Lot
C, 621 square meters to be called Lot C-1.

When the parties failed to agree on the price, a complaint for eminent domain was instituted on August 12, 1975 by the Republic of the Philippines
against petitioner Leyva before the CFI of South
Cotabato.

On September 30, 1975, Leyva filed his
objections and defenses to the
complaint, alleging inter alia
that Presidential Decree Nos. 42 and 76 “or any other decree, general
order or directive, of similar or identical import” are unconstitutional
for “they arbitrarily and without due process of law fix the compensation to which owners of the property affected
are entitled, and that the power to determine just compensation is essentially
judicial, rather than executive or legislative x x x“.^[2]
With leave of court, Leyva, later amended his objections
and defenses to include the allegation that a newly-constructed four-door
apartment costing P30,000.00 per door stood in the area sought to be
expropriated.

On March 5, 1976,
after the amount of P56,189.93 provisionally
fixed by the trial court had been deposited with the Philippine National Bank by the Republic, a writ of
possession was issued in favor of the latter.

On April 20, 1976,
the lower court issued an order for the appointment of commissioners to
determine the just compensation for the property.  The Republic moved for a reconsideration on
the grounds that [1] the Presidential Decrees had fixed the basis of the
payment of just compensation at the market value per sworn statement made by
the owner or the assessment made by the Assessor, whichever is lower; and that
[2] the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding the appointment of
commissioners are deemed repealed or modified by said presidential decrees.

On February 2, 1977,
the trial court rendered a decision condemning the properties sought to be expropriated in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.  To arrive at the just compensation to be paid
by the government, the lower court applied Sec. 1, par. 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 76,^[3]
Sec. 92 of P.D. No. 464^[4]
and Sec. 92^[5]
of P.D. No. 794.  These provisions read:

Sec. 1, par. 3 of P.D. No. 76:

“For purposes of just compensation in cases of private
property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the
current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such
market value was determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.”

Sec. 92 of Presidential Decree No. 464:

“Sec. 92.  Basis for
payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.- In determining just
compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public
use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator
or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.”

Sec. 92 of Presidential Decree No. 794:

“Sec. 92.  Basis for payment
of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.- In determining such
compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public
use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower.”

The lower court then
considered the sworn statements made by the daughter of Leyva
and by Leyva himself as well as the assessments made
by the City Assessor and the
Assistant City Assessor, as follows:

A.  Sworn statement No. 775
dated June 8, 1973 by Chit Leyva Cornelio for and in
behalf of her father, Eligio Leyva,
stated the current and fair market value of the properties in question, to
read:

Lot A – P1,958,340.00 or P60.00 per
square meter

Lot B – P 702,600.00 or P60.00 per
square meter

Lot C – P612,540.00 or P60.00 per square
meter.^[6]

B.  Sworn statement No. 4738
dated September 29, 1973 by
Eligio Leyva declaring the
current and fair market value of said parcels of land to be:

Lot A – P1,180.00 or P0.036 per square meter

Lot C – P 380.00 or P0.037 per square meter.^[7]

C.  Assessment made by the
City Assessor in Tax Declaration No. 3436 wherein Lot A was assessed as an
industrial land with a market value of P652,780.00 or P20.00 per square meter and in Tax Declaration No. 3460 wherein
Lot B was assessed as a commercial lot with a market value of P361,200.00 or P30.00 per square meter.  As per assessment made by the Assistant City
Assessor in Tax Declaration No. 3461, Lot C was assessed as an industrial land
with a market value of P204,180.00 or P20.00 per square meter.^[8]

Using the sworn statement of
Eligio Leyva which
had the lowest current and fair market
value as compared with those stated in the sworn statement submitted by his daughter and those contained in the assessments made by
the City Assessor and Assistant
City Assessor, the lower court fixed
the just compensation for the properties in the following manner:

“Lot A-1 containing an area of 10,178 square meters at P0.036 per square
meter; Lot B-1 containing an
area of 1,860 square meters at P30.00 per square meter and Lot C-1 containing an area of 621 square
meters at P0.037 per square meter. 
Furthermore, the Republic of the Philippines was ordered to pay Eligio
T. Leyva the sum of P96,000.00 as just compensation for the apartment built on Lots C
and C-1.”^[9]

The lower court further ruled that the
provisions for appointment of commissioners in the Rules of Court which are
inconsistent with the Presidential Decrees had been repealed.

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision with the modification
that the just compensation for Lot A-1 be increased from P0.036 to P20.00 per
square meter; Lot C-1 from P0.037 to P20.00 per square meter and for Lot B-1 maintained at P30.00 per square meter.  The respondent court reasoned that the price
of P0.036 per square meter is shocking to the conscience and is certainly not
the price at which a willing seller
would sell without being unduly
pressured.

Both Eligio Leyva
and the Republic of the Philippines
filed their petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.  These
two (2) cases were considered consolidated as per resolution dated October 28, 1985.

Leyva’s petition is based on the following grounds:  [1] P.D. 76,464 and 794 as construed by respondent
court would become unconstitutional and void for the determination of just
compensation which is a judicial function has become an executive function; [2]
P.D. 76 and 794 did not repeal the Rules of Court as to the appointment of
commissioners since “whichever is lower” only provides the
“basic” for ascertaining, through the commissioners, the true current
and fair market value; and [3] P.D. 794 which states that the payment of just
compensation “shall not exceed” the market value declared by the
owner and such market value was determined by the assessor, whichever is lower,
should not be given a retroactive
effect.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that [1] P.D. 76
and P.D. 464 fixed the just compensation and did not merely establish a starting minimum for determining just
compensation; and that [2] P.D. 76 and P.D. 464 repealed Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court relative
to the appointment of commissioners.

With the promulgation on April
29, 1987 of the
decision in Export Processing
Zone Authority vs. Hon. Ceferino
C. Dulay, etc. et al., G.R. No. 59603, this Court has laid
to rest the very same issues presented in the instant petitions.

In said case, We declared as unconstitutional and void the
provisions of the Decrees on just compensation,
i.e., Sec. 1, par. 3, P.D. 76; Sec. 92 of P.D. No. 464; Sec. 92 of P.D. 794 and
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1533.  We stated that the manner of
determining just compensation under these decrees constituted
“impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.”

Moreover, the Court likewise ruled that Presidential Decree No.
1533^[10] is unconstitutional for it
“eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.” With this
declaration, there is no repeal of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court to speak of.  The
determination of just compensation is still vested in the judiciary.

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petitions are hereby GRANTED.  Let
the records be remanded to the trial court of origin for determination of just compensation in accordance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Bidin*,
J., no part.

**
Concurred by Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Porfirio V. Sison and Marcelino R. Veloso, with Justice
Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, dissenting

^[1] p.
42, Rollo

^[2] p. 23, Rollo

^[3] Requiring all Persons, Natural or Juridical,
Owning or Administering Real
Property, Including the Improvements Thereon, to File Sworn Statement of
the True Value of Such Property.  [December 6, 1972]

^[4] Enacting a Real Property Tax Code, (May 20,1974)

^[5] Amending Presidential Decree No. 464
Regarding the Basis for Payment
of Just Compensation in Expropriation Proceedings (September 4, 1975)

^[6] p. 33, Rollo

^[7] p. 34, Rollo

^[8] The assessment made by the City Assessor on Lot A was appealed by Eligio
Leyva on July 21, 1974 to the Board of Tax Assessment Appeal
stating that the “valuation made by the City Assessor in our honest and
considered opinion is highly excessive, humanly oppressive and obviously
unjust.” This appeal was dismissed. 
[pp. 34-35, Rollo]

^[9] p. 95, Rollo

^[10]
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1533 reads:

“Section 1. In determining just compensation for
private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation
to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real
Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendation
or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property.”

*
Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin penned the decision in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 61875